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Abstract 
This thesis places the Wisdom of Solomon and Paul’s letter to the Romans in conversation. While 
the lexical and thematic parallels between Wisdom 13-15 and Romans 1.18-2.5, and to a lesser 
extent Wisdom 10-12 (or 10-19) and Romans 9-11, have often been noted, comparisons between 
these two texts have typically identified points of continuity and discontinuity without 
enquiring into the hermeneutical rationale and theological basis for the observed similarity-
in-contrast. This thesis attempts to deepen the dialogue between Wisdom and Romans, not 
primarily by an examination of Paul’s use of or dependence upon Wisdom but by attempting to 
consider and compare the essential theological grammar of both texts. 
 Part one offers a reading of Wisdom without reference to Romans. In this way, this 
thesis both fills a scholarly gap – as no large scale comparison of Wisdom and Romans provides 
a complete reading of the former text – and allows the terms of Wisdom’s theological 
description to be configured on the basis of its own basic theological structures. It will be 
argued that Wisdom’s absolute distinction between the righteous (Israel) and the ungodly (non-
Israel), its emphatic articulation of divine grace and its rereading of Israel’s scripture are 
consistent with and comprehended within a fundamental theological conviction: the God of 
illimitable love is immutably just. 
 Part two considers pivotal sections of Romans in dialogue with Wisdom. Taking Wisdom’s 
central concerns and motifs as topics of conversation, chapters six, seven and eight compare 
and consider the relationship and respective soteriological status of Jew and Gentile (chapter 
six), the meaning and relationship of divine righteousness and grace (chapter seven), and the 
hermeneutical logic that shapes the respective rereadings of Israel’s scripture (chapter eight). 
These multiple points of comparison reflect a common conversational pattern: while Wisdom 
and Romans share much in terms of theme, vocabulary and theological mode, the theologies 
they articulate are ultimately incommensurable. The central thesis of part two is that the 
anthropological, semantic and hermeneutical differences between Wisdom and Romans point 
to and are generated by a material contrast at the level of the texts’ essential theological logic: 
Wisdom’s theology is governed by and reflective of the nuclear significance of the protological 
order σοφία fashioned, sustains and reveals; the theology of Romans is determined by and 
radiates from the generative and centrifugal significance of the divine act that is the event, 
impact and proclamation of Jesus Christ.   
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Chapter 1 
A Contextual Conversation 
Il faut en tout dialogue et discours qu’on puisse dire à ceux qui s’en offensent: ‘De 
quoi vous plaignez­vous?’ – Blaise Pascal1 
 
 
Scandalous and foolish. This, according to Paul, was how Jews and Greeks classified the 
proclamation of Christ crucified (1 Cor 1.23). But how would a Diaspora Jew, one soaked in 
Israel’s scriptures and schooled in Hellenistic philosophy, react to the Pauline gospel? This 
thesis is an attempt to ask and answer this question by reading sections of Paul’s letter to the 
Romans in conversation with the Wisdom of Solomon (hereafter, Wisdom).2 Would the author of 
Wisdom, as the extensive thematic and stylistic similarities between Romans and Wisdom have 
suggested to generations of scholars, see Paul as a kinsman, ‘not only in ethnic origin but also 
in theological focus and method’?3 Or, as 1 Corinthians 1.23 indicates, would he encounter the 
‘word of the cross’ as doubly offensive: a scandal to his Jewish theology and folly to his 
philosophical conceptualities?  
 
Contextualising the Conversation  
Locating the present comparison of Romans and Wisdom within the history of research 
requires, first, situating the particular question about Romans’ relationship to Wisdom within 
the larger question about Paul’s relationship to Judaism and, second, a review of previous 
comparisons of Paul and Wisdom. The first section, while emphasising the significant change of 
                                                        
1 Blaise Pascal, Pensées (Brunschvicg edition, 1897), III.188.  
2 The once popular thesis that Paul’s polemical statements about Judaism and the law targeted Hellenistic 
Judaism rather than Palestinian Judaism (e.g. C.G. Montefiore, Judaism and St. Paul: Two Essays [London, 1914], 87-
112, 126-129; H.-J. Schoeps, Paulus: Die Theologie des Apostels im Lichte der jüdischen Religionsgeschichte [Tübingen: 
J.C.B. Mohr, 1959], 224-30) has been fatally problematised by the relativising of the distinction between 
‘Hellenistic’ and ‘Palestinian’ in M. Hengel, Judentum und Hellenismus: Studien zu ihrer Begegnung unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung Palästinas bis zur Mitte des 2. Jahrhunderts vor Christus (WUNT 10; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1969); cf. 
the collection of essays in Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide (ed. T. Engberg-Pedersen; Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox, 2001); G. Boccaccini, ‘Myth or Reality’, in Jewish Literatures and Cultures: Contexts and 
Intertexts (ed. Y.Z. Eliav and A. Norich; Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 2008), 55-76. The question being asked 
here is not how a Diaspora Jew rather than a Palestinian Jew would have reacted to Paul; the question is 
specifically how the Diaspora Jew who wrote Wisdom would have reacted to Paul.     
3 The citation is from J.M.G. Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace: Approaching Romans 9-11 from The Wisdom of 
Solomon’, in Between Gospel and Election (WUNT 257; ed. F. Wilk and J.R. Wagner; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010): 
91-110 (92), though as will become apparent below, he detects both broad continuity and an essential 
discontinuity between Romans and Wisdom.  
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perspective brought about by E.P. Sanders’ Paul and Palestinian Judaism,4 will question whether 
that shift in perspective amounts to a ‘paradigm shift’ and ask if the interpretative and 
evaluative frame within which Paul and Judaism are usually compared tunes into or mutes the 
proposed conversation between Romans and Wisdom. The second section, while appreciatively 
surveying the many and varied comparisons of Paul and Wisdom, will note the lack of a full-
scale theological comparison of Romans and Wisdom, and suggest that most comparative 
projects have been content to specify points of continuity and discontinuity without enquiring 
into the hermeneutical rationale and theological basis of the stated similarity-in-contrast.  
 
Paul and Judaism: The Pre- and Post-Sanders Paradigm 
 Situating the theological relationship of Paul and Wisdom within the larger question 
about the relationship between Paul and Judaism requires a clear sense of what the present 
project is not and what it is. The dialogical analysis undertaken here is not a comparison of 
Paul and some meta-phenomenon called Judaism; it is a specific, focused conversation between 
Paul and the Diaspora Jew who wrote Wisdom. This particular comparison, moreover, is not a 
tacit suggestion that the theology of Wisdom is representative of the variegated matrix of 
thought and praxis that compromises Second Temple Judaism, nor does it imply that the form 
of Judaism articulated in Wisdom is the ‘real’ target of Paul’s polemics. Rather, the contextual 
conversation between Romans and Wisdom offered here functions as a case-study – that is, this 
thesis is an attempt to compare the essential theological structures of Wisdom and Romans and 
ask whether the interpretative and evaluative frame within which the comparison of Paul and 
Judaism is usually conducted clarifies or obfuscates the deep logic of Wisdom’s theology and 
thus sharpens or silences the proposed dialogue between Romans and Wisdom. While Wisdom’s 
theology cannot be said to be representative of Second Temple Judaism, it is a thought-pattern 
available to Second Temple Jews and if, to borrow a few conceptualities from Thomas Kuhn, it 
relates to the received ‘paradigm’ as an ‘anomaly’, then the present comparison of Romans and 
Wisdom will contribute to establishing the preconditions for a scholarly ‘crisis’.5 In other words, 
                                                        
4 E.P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1977).   
5 The terms ‘paradigm’, ‘anomaly’ and ‘crisis’ are from T.S. Kuhn, The Structures of Scientific Revolutions (3rd 
ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). In Kuhn’s accounting of scientific progress, ‘crisis’ is a technical 
term that refers to the questioning of a paradigm due to the accumulation of ‘anomalies’ and thus specifies the 
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if the standard catalogue of comparative tropes and the presuppositions of the interpretative 
paradigm repress rather than reveal the essential theological structures of Wisdom and thus 
fail to facilitate the fine parsing necessary to conduct a conversation between Romans and 
Wisdom, then the precision and functionality of the paradigm itself will need to be rethought.     
While E.P. Sanders acknowledges the scholarly antecedents to his argument for the 
reevaluation of Palestinian Jewish soteriology,6 it is generally recognised that it was Paul and 
Palestinian Judaism that finally shifted the tectonic plates that supported the antithetical 
relation of Judaism and (Pauline) Christianity established and exemplified in the work of 
Ferdinand Weber, Wilhelm Bousset and Paul Billerbeck.7 Among Sanders’ ‘chief aims’ was ‘to 
destroy the view of Rabbinic Judaism’ associated with Billerbeck’s description of Judaism as 
‘eine Religion völligster Selbsterlösung’8 and ‘to establish a different view of Rabbinic’ and 
Palestinian Judaism.9 As is well known, Sanders’ strategy was to consider the ‘pattern of 
religion’ reflected in the ‘Palestinian material dating from the period 200 b.c.e. to 200 c.e.’, and 
he argued that, with the exception of 4 Ezra, ‘the type of religion best called “covenantal 
nomism” is common to Judaism as it appears in the literature’.10 The welcome and lasting 
contribution of Sanders’ study is the success of his stated aims: he ‘destroyed’ the view of early 
Judaism that prejudiced the literature by ‘the retrojection of the Protestant-Catholic debate 
into ancient history’, and he argued for and to a large extent established ‘a different view’ in 
which the Palestinian Jewish pattern of religion emphasised and prioritized the grace and 
mercy of God.11 This, to be sure, represents a seismic shift in perspective. But is this, as is so 
often claimed, a ‘paradigm shift in the Kuhnian sense’?12    
                                                                                                                                                                                   
condition for the practice of ‘revolutionary science’ – that is, the search for alternative explanations to received 
assumptions and ultimately a new paradigm. T.S. Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, 52-91.   
6 See especially G.F. Moore, ‘Christian Writers on Judaism’, HTR 14 (1921): 197-254; W.D. Davies, Paul and 
Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology (London: SPCK, 1948). Cf. S. Schechter, Aspects of Rabbinic 
Theology (New York: Schocken, 1961 [1909]); Montefiore, Judaism and St. Paul; Schoeps, Paulus: Die Theologie des 
Apostels im Lichte der jüdischen Religionsgeschichte. For a review of Sanders’ scholarly precedents, see Laato, Paul and 
Judaism, 13-20.    
7 Weber’s 1880 work was edited by F. Delitzsch and G. Schnedermann and published as Jüdische Theologie 
auf Grund des Talmud und verwandter Schriften (Leipzig: Dörffling & Franke, 1897); W. Bousset, Die Religion des 
Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter (Berlin: Ruether & Reichard, 1903); H. Strack and P. Billerbeck, Kommentar 
zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch (4 vols.; München: C.H. Beck, 1922-28).   
8 Billerbeck, Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch, 4.3-13.   
9 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, xii.  
10 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 16-18, 422.  
11 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 57.  
12 The citation is from D. Boyarin, A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1994), 47. Others who use Kuhn’s concept to describe Sanders’ achievement include R. Jewett, 
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 For Thomas Kuhn, a ‘paradigm’ is ‘the entire constellation of beliefs, values [and] 
techniques…shared by members of a given community’ – it names the presuppositions about 
the objects of enquiry, the method of investigation and the principles of evaluation.13 As 
Donaldson notes, Kuhn uses this concept ‘to refer…to the set of basic assumptions and 
convictions’ that tacitly regulate the process and results of scholarly research.14 A brief 
analysis of Sanders’ notions of ‘pattern of religion’ and ‘covenantal nomism’ will demonstrate 
that while Paul and Palestinian Judaism swung the perspectival pendulum from viewing Judaism 
as ‘eine Religion völliger Selbsterlösung’ to seeing it as ‘a religion of grace’, his project 
operated with the same ‘constellations of beliefs, values and techniques’ utilized by Weber, 
Bousset and Billerbeck, with the result that his proposal reinforced rather than replaced the 
inherited interpretative and evaluative paradigm. 
 Following his own methodological advice to ‘compare an entire religion…with an entire 
religion’, Sanders proposed ‘the concept of a “pattern of religion”’ as the point comparison.15 
‘A pattern of religion’, as Sanders defines it, is a description of how a religion is perceived by its 
adherents to function’ – that is, ‘how getting in and staying in are understood’.16 In other 
words, Sanders is concerned to identify and compare a kind of ordo salutis; he wants to trace 
the movement or ‘sequence of steps from the logical starting-point to the logical conclusion of 
the religion’ because ‘the relationship of the sequential steps to each other is crucial’ in 
determining ‘whether election was perceived to precede the requirement of obedience’.17     
By emphasising the foundational function of election, Sanders was able to insist that, in 
contrast to Billberbeck’s classification of Jewish soteriology as ‘Selbsterlösung’, in Palestinian 
Judaism ‘salvation…is always by the grace of God’ and therefore ‘the intention and effort to be 
obedient constitute the condition for remaining in the covenant, but they do not earn it’.18 My 
purpose here is neither to endorse nor to question Sanders’ results; my purpose is to question 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
‘The Law and the Coexistence of Jews and Gentiles in Romans’, Int 39 (1985): 341-56 (341); J.G. Gager, The Origins of 
Anti-Semitism (Oxford: OUP, 1983), 198-99. The concept is also used by T.L. Donaldson, Paul and the Gentiles: 
Remapping the Apostle’s Convictional World (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997), though Donaldson shows a much 
greater awareness of Kuhn’s definition of the term and employs it to describe the transformation of Paul’s 
thought (43-47).  
13 Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, 175.   
14 Donaldson, Paul and the Gentiles, 44.  
15 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 16.  
16 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 17.  
17 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 548.  
18 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 297, 180.  
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his basic question: when studying early Jewish literature ‘on its own terms’ and when 
comparing it with Paul, does Sanders’ index of questions about the causal or conditional 
function of law-observance and the soteriological sequence offer the right interpretative 
frame? A consideration of ‘covenantal nomism’ will show that Sanders’ driving question about 
the priority of election and divine mercy, rather than being a neutral heuristic, is a reflex of 
the inherited (and ultimately ideological) ‘mental furniture’ embedded in the interpretative 
and evaluative paradigm.  
 Sanders identifies the ‘pattern of religion’ evidenced in the Palestinian literature 
between 200 BCE and 200 CE as ‘covenantal nomism’: 
(1) God has chosen Israel and (2) given the law. The law implies both (3) God’s promise 
to maintain election and (4) the requirement to obey. (5) God rewards obedience and 
punishes transgression. (6) The law provides means of atonement, and atonement 
results in (7) maintenance or re-establishment of the covenantal relationship. (8) All 
those who are maintained in the covenant by obedience, atonement and God’s mercy 
belong to the group which will be saved.19 
Following this extended description Sanders offers an interpretative comment: ‘An important 
interpretation of the first and last points is that election and ultimately salvation are 
considered to be by God’s mercy rather than human achievement’.20 Here, ‘covenant’ and 
‘nomism’ are distinguished and ordered. Law-observance is a consistent feature of this pattern 
of religion, but it occurs subsequent to and within the humanly uncaused and thus 
gratuitously established covenant. In Sanders’ words, ‘obedience…is the condition of 
salvation…but not its cause’.21 The cause of salvation is always ‘the grace of God, embodied in 
the covenant’.22 It is hard not to hear a Pauline antithesis in Sanders’ absolute distinction 
between ‘human achievement’ and ‘the grace of God’, and indeed, as Sanders famously 
concludes, ‘on the point at which many have found the decisive contrast between Paul and 
Judaism – grace and works – Paul is in agreement with Palestinian Judaism’.23 This conclusion 
is suggestive, and implies that Sanders’ principal difference with Weber, Bousset and 
Billerbeck concerns whether the Jewish ordering of grace and works is antithetical to or 
harmonious with the Pauline pattern. Whereas Weber refers to obedience as the ‘means of 
                                                        
19 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 422.  
20 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 422.  
21 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 371.  
22 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 297.  
23 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 543.  
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salvation’ that earns the mercy and satisfaction of God,24 Sanders insists that Palestinian 
Judaism ‘kept grace and works in the right perspective’ and that ‘the gift and demand of God 
were kept in a healthy relationship’.25 But on what basis is such a perspective and relationship 
judged to be ‘right’ and ‘healthy’? The evaluative language here points to the shared values 
and assumptions that Kuhn suggests constitute a paradigm, and ultimately imposes an 
ideology on Second Temple Judaism. Like Weber, Bousset and Billerbeck before him, Sanders 
assumes that grace, by definition, is ‘groundless’, ‘free’, ‘not earned’ and ‘unmerited’; his 
distinction is that he finds this grace in Palestinian Judaism.26 The question, however, is 
whether this is an assumption reflected in the extant early Jewish literature; or more to the 
point: is this an assumption shared by the author of Wisdom? An answer to this question will 
have to await the conclusion, but at this stage it is necessarily to note that while Sanders’ 
alternative to the antithetical relating of (Pauline) Christianity and Judaism represents a 
significant change of perspective, it is not a ‘paradigm shift’ because it operates with the same 
presuppositions about the proper (or right or healthy) ordering of God’s grace and human 
works.27  
In the end, Sanders does not ask, presumably because the tacit entrenchment of the 
interpretative paradigm prevents him from imagining, whether an early Jewish text might 
emphasise and order God’s righteousness and grace in a way that is equally emphatic yet 
finally different from Paul (and, it should be noted, different from the negative foil associated 
with Weber-Bousset-Billerbeck). A similar tendency can be observed in those who have 
worked in his wake. Sanders’ study initiated a renaissance of sorts, with scholars both 
sympathetic and dubious crying ad fontes as they reconsidered the early Jewish literature and 
reconstructed Paul’s relationship to early Judaism. But here, too, it must be asked whether the 
extensions, challenges and alternatives to Sanders’ thesis ever broke out of the inherited 
                                                        
24 Weber, Jüdische Theologie auf Grund des Talmud und verwandter Schriften, 259-62; quoted in Laato, Paul and 
Judaism, 6.   
25 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 427.  
26 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 394-96.  
27 Cf. the early reaction to Sanders’ book by Jacob Neusner, ‘The Use of Later Rabbinic Evidence for the 
Study of Paul’, in Approaches to Ancient Judaism II (6 vols.; ed. W.S. Green; Chicago: Scholars Press, 1980), 2.50-51: 
Sanders’ brought to the Jewish sources ‘questions of Pauline-Lutheran theology, important to Sanders and New 
Testament scholarship’, thereby imposing ‘the pattern of one religious experience, Paul’s, upon the description of 
another’.   
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paradigm.28 There is, on the one hand, an interpretative trend that regards Sanders’ challenge 
to the prejudicial construal of Judaism ‘as more or less established’ and has therefore sought to 
locate Paul’s ‘problem’ with Judaism somewhere other than the traditional sola gratia versus 
synergism antithesis.29 On the other hand, there is a more mixed reaction to Sanders’ thesis, 
one which grants the necessary recalibration of Jewish soteriology performed by Sanders but 
also insists that his proposed reconstruction is in danger of being as ‘misleadingly one-sided’ 
as the position he set out to destroy.30 Both of these responses to Sanders need to be 
considered briefly. 
Representative of the former trend is James D.G. Dunn’s statement that after Sanders 
Judaism ‘can now be seen to preach good Protestant doctrine: that grace is always prior; that 
human effort is ever the response to divine initiative; that good works are the fruit and not the 
root of salvation’.31 This reorientation, according to Dunn, requires a new target for Paul’s 
polemics. In what is now a well-known and widely influential alternative to the so-called 
‘Lutheran’ reading of Paul, Dunn, along with N.T. Wright and others, argued that, to borrow a 
phrase from Sanders, ‘what Paul finds wrong with Judaism’ is not works righteousness, but 
‘national righteousness’;32 or in Dunn’s description, ‘the xenophobic strand of Judaism’.33 In 
Don Garlington’s precise summary of the thesis that defines and unifies the otherwise diverse 
and complex phenomenon known as ‘the new perspective’, ‘Paul’s dispute with Israel…had not 
                                                        
28 My purpose here is not recount the history of scholarly reactions to Sanders, but rather to trace the 
presuppositional status and tacit influence of the interpretative and evaluative paradigm in post-Sanders’ 
research. For a detailed review of the various responses to Sanders through 2004, see S. Westerholm, ‘The “New 
Perspective” at Twenty-Five’, in Justification and Variegated Nomism: Volume 1, The Paradoxes of Paul (ed. Carson et al.; 
Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), 1-38.   
29 The citation is from N.T. Wright, ‘New Perspectives on Paul’, in Justification in Perspective: Historical 
Developments and Contemporary Challenges (ed. B.L. McCormack; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2006), 243-64 (247).  
30 This classification is from S.J. Gathercole, Where is Boasting: Early Jewish Soteriology and Paul’s Response in 
Romans 1-5 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 182.   
31 J.D.G. Dunn, ‘The Justice of God: A Renewed Perspective on Justification By Faith’, in The New Perspective 
on Paul (revised edition; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 193-211 (199). We leave to one side the question of 
whether and to what degree ‘covenantal nomism’ as described by Sanders and endorsed by Dunn is actually 
consistent with the Protestant or Reformational ‘pattern of religion’. For an early observation of the similarities 
between ‘covenantal nomism’ and the soteriology of late medieval nominalism, see K.T. Cooper, ‘Paul and 
Rabbinic Soteriology’, WJT 44 (1982): 123-24, quoted in T. George, ‘Modernizing Luther, Domesticating Paul: 
Another Perspective’, in Justification and Variegated Nomism: Volume 2, The Paradoxes of Paul (ed. Carson et al.; Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), 437-63 (448 n.30); cf. M.A. Seifrid, ‘Blind Alleys in the Controversy Over the Paul of 
History’, TynBul 45 (1994): 73-95 (74); P.F.M. Zahl, ‘Mistakes of the New Perspective on Paul’, Them 27.1 (2001): 5-11.  
32 N.T. Wright, ‘The Paul of History and the Apostle of Faith’, TynBul 29 (1978): 61-88 (65).  
33 J.D.G. Dunn, ‘Paul: Apostate or Apostle of Israel?’ ZNW 89 (1998): 256-71 (261). Similarly, B.W.  
Longenecker, Eschatology and the Covenant: A Comparison of 4 Ezra and Romans 1-11 (JSNTS 57; Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1991), 228 describes the target of Paul’s polemics as ‘ethnocentrism’. Cf. Boyarin, A Radical Jew, 52.  
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to do with “grace” as opposed to “legalism”…but with a more ethnically inclusive vision of God 
and his law as over against one which was more nationally restrictive’.34 The purchase of this 
proposal on the relevant Pauline texts continues to be debated, but what needs to be 
emphasised here is, first, that it was Sanders’ rereading of Palestinian Jewish soteriology 
within a particular interpretative and evaluative paradigm that precipitated this rereading of 
Paul and, secondly, it is, for our purposes, an open and essential question whether a firm 
distinction between national and works/worth righteousness is applicable to Wisdom. The 
presuppositional status of the paradigm is exemplified in Wright’s insistence that the 
polemical target of ‘justification by faith…is not the usual Lutheran one of “nomism” or 
“Menschenwerke”’, while his counter-proposal that the polemical target is ‘the Pauline one of 
Jewish national pride’ crystallizes the distinction between ‘ethnocentrism’ and ‘legalism’ that 
unifies the new perspective.35 As we will see, however, though Wisdom draws its 
anthropological dividing-line between Jews and non-Jews, it does so on the basis of moral and 
rational criteria and in accordance with the symmetrical structuring of the cosmos.36 In other 
words, for Wisdom, the question of works/worth and the question of Israel’s election are 
integral rather than alternative aspects of Jewish identity. This, again, raises questions about 
the adequacy and assumptions of the standard interpretative paradigm for a dialogical analysis 
of Wisdom and Romans and forces us to ask whether the identification of Paul’s ‘problem’ with 
Judaism as national rather than nomistic righteousness points to or away from Paul’s ‘problem’ 
with the Diaspora Jew who wrote Wisdom.37         
                                                        
34 D.B. Garlington, ‘The Obedience of Faith’: A Pauline Phrase in Historical Context (WUNT II.38; Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1991), 265.  
35 Wright, ‘The Paul and History’, 71.  
36 For this, see especially chapters four and six.  
37 It should be noted that there is an increasingly vocal scholarly opinion that it is misleading to talk 
about Paul’s ‘problem’ with Judaism when in fact Paul’s polemical target is Christian Judiazers rather than non-
Christian Jews and when Paul’s pattern of religion is describable as ‘Paul’s Judaism’. For variations of this thesis, 
see e.g. L. Gaston, Paul and the Torah (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1987); N. Elliott, The Rhetoric of 
Romans: Argumentative Constraint and Strategy and Paul’s Dialogue with Judaism (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1990); S. Stowers, A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, and Gentiles (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); M. 
Nanos, ‘Paul and Judaism: Why Not Paul’s Judaism?’, in Paul Unbound: Other Perspectives on the Apostle (ed. M. Given; 
Peabody: Hendrickson, 2010), 117-60. While this is a significant alternative to the standard comparative 
conclusions, the deep discontinuity that will emerge between Wisdom and Romans in the course of this thesis 
suggests that, at least in terms of his theological relation to this Diaspora Jew, the possibility of theological 
incommensurability needs to be left open. That being said, as will become clear, the common inheritance, 
especially the common scriptural inheritance, that is signified by the identity-descriptor ‘Jew’ is an essential 
element in accounting for the broad continuity between Paul and the author of Wisdom. As Watson writes, Pauline 
and early Jewish theology occur ‘within a single interpretative field’ and therefore the hermeneutical significance 
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If Wright regards Sanders’ thesis about Palestinian Jewish soteriology as ‘more or less 
established’ and if Lloyd Gaston assumes both that Sanders’ reconstruction is right and ‘that 
Paul knew at least as much about “covenantal nomism” and Jewish “soteriology” as E.P. 
Sanders’,38 there is another interpretative trend that judges Sanders’ work to be a necessary 
though overstated correction. Again, my purpose here is not to offer a thorough review of 
post-Sanders scholarship, but rather to consider a few representative responses in order to 
demonstrate the continued influence of the common interpretative and evaluative paradigm. 
As Kent Yinger notes, much of the scholarly debate since Sanders has focused on what he calls 
‘the grace-works axis’ – that is, whether divine grace or human achievement is the cause of 
salvation and whether an instrumental and conditional role for law-observance renders a 
soteriological scheme synergistic.39 This index of questions exposes the presuppositional status 
of a paradigm that appears to (tacitly) assume the normativity of Pauline antitheses and 
ensures that the various scholarly answers will be plottable within the inherited interpretive 
frame. Thus, for example, Laato’s important anthropological comparison of Paul’s post-
lapsarian pessimism and Judaism’s more optimistic embrace of free will assumes a 
soteriological correlate: Pauline soteriology is monergistic; Jewish soteriology is synergistic.40 
Similarly, noting the coordination of grace and human works/worth in Philo, Chris 
VanLandingham questions the graciousness of what some Jews labeled χάρις. Commenting 
specifically on Philo’s insistence on the correspondence between God’s grace and Abraham’s 
worth, VanLandingham asserts, ‘Considering what “grace” means, Philo’s portrayal of 
Abraham’s election cannot be characterized as such’.41 That an interpretative and evaluative 
paradigm is in play here is evident in the fact that VanLandingham’s exegetical incredulity is 
based on a presupposed definition of grace that prevents the possibility of imagining that 
Philo’s use of χάρις and his regular coordination of it with the adjective ἄξιος is a real and 
emphatic articulation of divine benefaction. As we will see, Wisdom too links divine grace and 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
of Paul’s Jewishness is not predicated on the fact that ‘many other Jews were saying the same thing (they were 
not), but because Paul [is engaged in] intra-Jewish issues of scriptural interpretation and hermeneutics’ (F. 
Watson, Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith [London: T&T Clark, 2004], 5, 27).    
38 Gaston, Paul and the Torah, 65.  
39 K.L. Yinger, Paul, Judaism, and Judgment According to Deeds (SNTS 105; Cambridge: CUP, 1999),4.  
40 T. Laato, Paul and Judaism: An Anthropological Approach (trans. T. McElwain; Atlanta: University of South 
Florida, 1995), 213; cf. T. Eskola, Theodicy and Predestination in Pauline Soteriology (WUNT II.100; Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1998), 296.  
41 C. VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification in Early Judaism and the Apostle Paul (Peabody: Hendrickson, 
2006), 27.  
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human worth, and it is therefore vital for the purposes of this comparison to insist that, in the 
first instance, theologies of grace should not be compared based on degree – what text 
emphasises grace more – but must ask after definition – what grace means in Wisdom and 
Romans. 
The complementary corrections to Sanders by Simon Gathercole and Friedrich 
Avemarie also demonstrate the tacit influence of the same interpretative and evaluative 
paradigm. Focusing on ‘the basis of the boast of Israel’, Gathercole concludes that Sanders’ 
preoccupation with ‘getting in’ and ‘staying in’ misleadingly relativizes the soteriological 
question about the grounds of eschatological salvation, what Gathercole calls ‘getting in to the 
life in the future age’ or ‘getting there’.42 This necessary nuancing of Sanders’ thesis leads to 
the helpful observation that ‘the basis of the boast of Israel was not just election but also 
obedience’.43 In this soteriological scheme, as Gathercole notes, ‘there is a considerable 
emphasis on gracious election’ and ‘obedience [is]…a basis for vindication at the eschaton’.44 
The doubleness of this conclusion creates the condition to rethink the assumed univocity of 
grace and thus to imagine the possibility of a new interpretative frame; and in fact, Gathercole 
observes that the co-existence of divine grace and human obedience is ‘by no means 
incompatible’. But then he adds, parenthetically, ‘at least in the texts’.45 This qualification is 
grounded in the presuppositions of the interpretative paradigm: grace and works appear 
commensurate in the Jewish literature, but how can that be? That an unspoken question of 
this kind is implied by Gathercole’s parenthesis is confirmed by the parallel he draws between 
his study of Jewish ‘literature written before the destruction of Jerusalem’ and Avemarie’s 
consideration of ‘the rabbinic literature from (approximately) 200-500 C.E.’46 The significance 
of Avemarie’s study is that it identifies and acknowledges the co-existence of ‘recompense’ 
(Vergeltung) and ‘election’ (Erwählung) as soteriological principles in rabbinic literature without 
                                                        
42 Gathercole, Where is Boasting, 24. Cf. P. Stuhlmacher, Revisiting Paul’s Doctrine of Justification: A Challenge to 
the New Perspective (trans. D.P. Bailey; Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2001), 42. See also Hans-Martin Rieger’s 
comment with reference to Sifre Deut. 306: ‘als conditio des „Darinverbleibens“ könnte der Sachverhalt von SifDev 
§ 306 schliesslich „soteriologisch“ bedeutsamer werden als das „Hineingelangen“’ (‘Eine Religion der Gnade Zur 
‘Bundesnomismus’ – Theorie von E.P. Sanders’, in Bund und Tora: Zur theologischen Begriffsgeschichte in 
alttestamentlicher, frühjüdischer und urchristlicher Tradition (WUNT 92; ed. F. Avermarie and H. Lichtenberger; 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996), 129-61 (151).    
43 Gathercole, Where is Boasting, 263.  
44 Gathercole, Where is Boasting, 263-64. 
45 Gathercole, Where is Boasting, 263.  
46 Gathercole, Where is Boasting, 264. Cf. F. Avemarie, Tora und Leben: Untersuchungen zur Heilsbedeutung der 
Tora in der frühen rabbinischen Literatur (TSAJ 55; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996).  
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attempting to subordinate election to recompense (Billerbeck) or recompense to election 
(Sanders).47 Avemarie’s own solution to this ‘problem’ of co-existence, as endorsed and 
summarised by Gathercole, ‘is to recognize the diversity of rabbinic views…. The better model 
is…one of tension’.48 This conclusion, like Gathercole’s, recognises the apparent 
commensurability of gracious election and human obedience in the rabbinic sources, but the 
insistence that the harmonious co-existence of grace and reward language is actually, despite 
appearances, a theological ‘tension’ exposes a presupposition.49 The assumption that divine 
grace and human work/worth are, by definition, in tension is indicative of the tacit influence 
and presuppositional status of an interpretative and evaluation frame – that is, it assumes 
rather than asks about the meaning and coordination of grace and work/worth.  
This is, for our purposes, an essential observation because it foregrounds the need to 
penetrate the logic of Wisdom’s theology before offering evaluated conclusions about whether 
it ‘keeps grace and works in the right perspective’, whether ‘the gift and demand of God are 
kept in a healthy relationship’ or whether the concurrence of gift and reward language reflects 
a theological tension.50 In this sense, this thesis, at least by implication, is an attempt to test 
the interpretative and evaluative paradigm and consider the possibility that the essential 
theological structures of Wisdom, and thus the proposed dialogue between Wisdom and Romans, 
are silenced rather than allowed to surface by the usual catalogue of questions about the 
priority of grace, the causal or conditional function of obedience, the relative pessimism or 
optimism of an author’s anthropology and the presupposed tension between divine giving and 
human deserving. Is it possible, in other words, that Wisdom, like Paul, is preoccupied with the 
relation between Jew and non-Jew, theologises with and from Israel’s scripture and is emphatic 
about divine grace and divine righteousness and yet that the meaning, location and relation of 
this shared conceptual constellation operates in a theological frame that is finally 
incommensurable with Paul? This question forces us to move beyond the identification of 
                                                        
47 This way of framing the contrast between Avemarie’s work and the respective theses of Billerbeck and 
Sanders is drawn from F. Avemarie, ‘Erwählung und Vergeltung: Zur optionalen Struktur rabbinischer 
Soteriologie’, NTS 45 (1999): 108-26 (113).  
48 Gathercole, Where is Boasting’, 155.  
49 A similar tendency is evident in Westerholm’s critique of Sanders’ ‘Lutheran’ reading of the rabbinic 
literature, but his claim that the rabbinic explanations for election ground election in something other than the 
‘utter gratuity of God’ does not consider the possibility of a soteriological logic in which grace was precisely grace 
in its explainable operations vis-à-vis the worth of its human beneficiaries (Perspectives Old and New, 341-46).  
50 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 427.  
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structural continuity and discontinuity and to enquire after the deep logic of Wisdom and 
Romans in an effort to determine why two texts that share so much can also configure the 
theological world so differently. As will be noted below with reference to the history of 
comparing Romans and Wisdom, it is this hermeneutical question that is regularly left unasked 
and, as this section has demonstrated, the presuppositional status of the interpretative 
paradigm in pre- and post-Sanders scholarship tends to (tactically) restrict comparisons of 
Paul and Judaism to their soteriological structures, thereby submerging the ‘why’ questions: 
Why do some Jewish texts coordinate grace and human worth when Paul sets them in 
antithesis? Why do election and recompense co-exist in texts without any indication of 
incompatibility when Paul emphasises the unconditioned operations of God’s electing word? 
Why do some Jewish texts explain the Pentateuch’s occasional failure to specify the human 
quality that makes divine blessing sensible and just, when Paul’s exegesis often exploits that 
same silence? Why, in basic terms, are Paul and various Jewish texts different? For the 
purposes of the present comparison of Romans and Wisdom, then, the basic heuristic question 
is hermeneutical: Romans and Wisdom are, as we will see, both deeply Jewish and deeply 
different texts – but why? What hermeneutical rationale, common inheritance and theological 
basis accounts for what they share and where and why they configure the world differently? 
By asking this specific question – by remaining true to the scope of this study – it is hoped that 
this particular comparison of Romans and Wisdom can make an implicit and indirect, though 
not therefore unimportant, contribution to the larger question about Paul’s theological 
relationship to early Judaism.  
 
Chronicling the Conversation: Comparing Paul and Wisdom in the History of Research 
 The conclusion of Moyna McGlynn’s 2001 study of Wisdom of Solomon provides an apt 
introduction to the present project:  
The coincidences of topics between Paul’s epistle to the Romans and Wisdom: the 
corruption of idolatry, the judgment of God, the problem of sin and Adam’s fall, the 
glory inherent in creation and the long struggle with the place of Israel, have never 
been adequately studied and compared.51 
                                                        
51 M. McGlynn, Divine Judgment and Divine Benevolence in the Book of Wisdom (WUNT II, 139; Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2001), 222.  
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The ‘coincidences’ to which McGlynn refers are of course well known; her observation is 
simply that the numerous and striking parallels between Wisdom and Romans, while regularly 
noticed, are yet to be adequately probed and parsed.52 Eduard Grafe’s influential attempt to 
determine the probability and extent of Paul’s engagement with Wisdom traces a history of 
recognising the overlap between portions of Wisdom and various parts of the Pauline corpus 
beginning with B. Kuinoel in 1794.53 According to Grafe, the most conspicuous points of contact 
between Wisdom and Romans are the polemics against false worship in Wisdom 13.1-9 and 
Romans 1.18-32 and the pattern of predestination in Wisdom 12-15 and Romans 9.19-23.54 In his 
opinion, these parallels, together with several other notable correspondences, force the 
conclusion that it is ‘mindestens höchst wahrscheinlich’ that Paul knew and used Wisdom.55 A 
few years later, in acknowledged agreement with Grafe, Sanday and Headlam considered the 
‘resemblances’ between Romans 1.18-32 and Wisdom 13, as well as the topical overlap and 
similar ‘drift of the argument’ in Romans 9-11 and Wisdom 10-19, and argued that ‘while there 
can be no question of direct quotation’, it appears that ‘St. Paul must have bestowed upon the 
Book of Wisdom a considerable amount of study’ and that between Romans and Wisdom there 
is ‘some definite literary obligation’.56 For Sanday and Headlam, however, ‘the contrast’ 
between the texts was ‘equally instructive’: ‘If St. Paul learnt from the Book of Wisdom 
expressions illustrating the Divine power, and a general aspect of the question: he obtained 
nothing further’.57 For some, this theological discontinuity between Wisdom and Romans argues 
against a direct literary relationship, but even here the lexical and topical parallels are not 
denied; they are attributed to a shared tradition.58 At this stage in the history of research, then, 
the tendency was essentially to locate correspondences between the two texts in an effort to 
                                                        
52 For a detailed review of the scholarly comparison of Romans and Wisdom through 2004, see J.R. Dodson, 
The ‘Powers’ of Personification: Rhetorical Purpose in the Book of Wisdom and the Letter to the Romans (BZNW 161; Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 5-13. Among the most thorough tabulations of the parallels between Romans 1.18-2.5 
and Wisdom 11-15 is a book that Dodson does not include in his survey: Laato, Paul and Judaism, 94-95.   
53 E. Grafe, ‘Das Verhältniss der paulinischen Schriften zur Sapientia Salmonis’ in Theologische 
Abhandlungen: Carl von Weizsäcker zu seinem siebzigsten Geburtstage 11. December 1892 gewidmet (Freiburg: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1892), 251-86 (257).  
54 Grafe, ‘Verhältniss’, 274-76. 
55 Grafe, ‘Verhältniss’, 285. This conclusion has been defended in recent years by, among others, U. 
Wilckens, Der Brief an die Römer (3 vols; EKKNT; Neukirchen: Benziger, 1978-82), 1.96-97; C.M. Pate, The Reverse of the 
Curse (WUNT II.114; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 139-45, 233-36; Watson, Hermeneutics, 405.  
56 W. Sanday and A.C. Headlam, The Epistle to the Romans (ICC; New York: Scribner’s, 1896), 51-52, 267-69.   
57 Sanday and Headlam, Romans, 268-69. 
58 See e.g. F. Focke, Die Entstehung der Weisheit Salomos (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1913), 113-26; 
O. Michel, Der Brief an die Römer (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978), 16-18   
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identify the likelihood and scope of Paul’s ‘dependence’ on Wisdom. This all changed in 1947 
with the publication of Anders Nygren’s Romans commentary. 
 Like his scholarly predecessors, Nygren notes the points of contact between Romans 
1.18-32 and Wisdom 13-14, but unlike Grafe and Sanday and Headlam, he is unwilling ‘to assert, 
on the basis of these facts alone, that Paul makes direct reference to…the Book of Wisdom’.59 
For Nygren, however, Paul’s ‘very special relation’ to Wisdom becomes apparent and ‘decisive’ 
when the comparison is extended into Romans 2.60 According to this reading, the text of 
Romans is not just formally linked to Wisdom by a catalogue of shared lexemes or a similar 
theological style or a parallel argumentative pattern; Romans 2 actively addresses the 
theological content of Wisdom 11-15, argues against it, and accuses ‘the Jew’ who is described 
by it. Citing Wisdom 11.9f, 12.22, and 15.2f, Nygren suggests that Wisdom restricts divine wrath 
to Gentiles because, unlike Israel who knows and worships God, they are idolatrous and 
immoral. In Romans 2, according to Nygren, Paul attacks precisely this presumption and as he 
does so ‘it is not against an imaginary opponent that Paul contends…. When he says, “O man, 
you who judge,” he addresses himself to the Jew’s manner of life, as we see it in the Book of 
Wisdom’.61 This interpretation has proven programmatic, dominating the modern 
commentaries together with the added insistence that the reactivation of Wisdom’s polemic 
against Gentile idolatry in Romans 1.18-32 functions as ‘a rhetorical sting operation’,62 eliciting 
the sympathy of Paul’s interlocutor before ‘Paul turns to him and denounces him’.63 This 
diatribal reading moves the comparison of Romans and Wisdom beyond the identification of 
parallels by demonstrating the argumentative function of Paul’s engagement with Wisdom. But 
even here, where the points of textual connection and theological disconnection are identified 
and exploited, there is essentially no consideration of the theological grounds for the deep 
anthropological incommensurability between the two texts that this reading exposes: why is 
Paul’s perspective on the hamartiological status of Jew and Gentile so different from Wisdom’s? 
                                                        
59 A. Nygren, Commentary on Romans (trans. C.C. Rasmussen; London: SCM Press, 1952), 112, 114. The 
original German appeared in 1947.  
60 Nygren, Romans, 114.  
61 Nygren, Romans, 115-16.  
62 R.B. Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1996), 389.  
63 Watson, Hermeneutics, 410; cf. E. Käsemann, An die Römer (HNT 8a; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1973), 49; 
J.D.G. Dunn, Romans 1-8 (WBC 38a; Waco: Word, 1988), 82-83; J.A. Fitzmyer, Romans (AB 33; London: Geoffrey 
Chapman, 1992), 298; D.J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 133; E. Lohse, Der 
Brief an die Römer (KEK 4; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003), 86, 99. This interpretative trend will be 
discussed and evaluated more fully in chapter six.      
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The failure to ask this type of question legitimates McGlynn’s complaint that Romans and 
Wisdom ‘have never been adequately studied and compared’.64 
 There are, however, four comparisons of Romans and Wisdom that partially mitigate 
this conclusion, three of which appeared after McGlynn’s comment.65 The first, which bears 
the closest resemblance to the present work, is an unpublished doctoral dissertation by Paul-
Gerhard Keyser.66 For Keyser, the rationale for comparing Romans and Wisdom is not lost if a 
direct literary relationship is denied: both texts reflect on the mercy and righteousness of God 
in relation to the anthropological distinction between the ungodly and the righteous/elect, 
and both make sustained and repeated recourse to Israel’s scripture in the process.67 These 
similarities in terms of focus and method, however, regularly give way to theological 
disagreement: whereas Wisdom exonerates Israel from idolatry and thereby excludes Israel 
from judgment, Paul detects divine wrath in Israel’s history and includes Israel among the 
objects of eschatological judgment; whereas Wisdom defines mercy as the temporary 
postponement of divine justice, Paul locates the paradigmatic exemplification of mercy in the 
Christ-event.68 This is a valuable contribution and many of the points made by Keyser will be 
argued in the course of this thesis. There are, however two serious weaknesses to this work. 
The first problem, admittedly pragmatic, is inaccessibility and, as a result, anonymity. 
Comparisons of Paul and Wisdom, especially in English-speaking scholarship, are usually 
carried out without reference to Keyser’s significant (unpublished) dissertation for the simple 
                                                        
64 The one exception to this criticism is D.A. Campbell, The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of 
Justification in Paul (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 2009), 360-62, 542-47. In Campbell’s reconstruction,  the reason 
Romans 1.18-32 parallels Wisdom 12-15 is that Paul, in Romans 1.18-32, summarises the exordium of his opponent – 
‘the Teacher’ – whose theology is indebted to Wisdom. This explains the points of contact. Campbell’s explanation 
for the theological difference is that the Teacher’s ‘vision of the future wrath of God – of God as retributively just’ 
is not, for Paul, ‘the essential nature of the God of Jesus Christ’ (543). Campbell’s proposal will be considered in 
chapter six.  
65 A few other works have undertaken topical comparisons of Paul and Wisdom and will be referenced 
when appropriate. See e.g., B.R. Gaventa, ‘The Rhetoric of Death in the Wisdom of Solomon and the Letters of 
Paul’, in The Listening Heart (ed. K.G. Hoglund; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1987), 127-45; J. Barr, Biblical 
Faith and Natural Theology (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 66-78; Rodrigo J. Morales, ‘The Spirit, the Righteous Sufferer, 
and the Mysteries of God: Echoes of Wisdom in 1 Corinthians?’ BZ 54 (2010): 54-72.     
66 Paul-Gerhard Keyser, ‘Sapientia Salomonis und Paulus: Eine Analyse der Sapientia Salomonis und ein 
Vergleich ihrer theologischen und anthropologischen Probleme mit denen des Paulus im Römerbrief’ (Dr. theol. 
diss., Martin-Luther-Universität, 1971), 2 vols. I am grateful to Joseph Dodson for alerting me to this work.    
67 Keyser, ‘Sapientia Salomonis und Paulus’, 225-26. For a similar insistence that there is value in 
comparing Romans and Wisdom irrespective of the question of literary dependence, see N. Walter, ‘Sapientia 
Salomonis und Paulus’, in Die Weisheit Salomos im Horizont biblischer Theologie (ed. H. Hübner; Neukirchen-Vluyn: 
Neukirchener, 1993), 86; cf. Watson, Hermeneutics, 405.  
68 Keyser, ‘Sapientia Salomonis und Paulus’, see 141-42, 195, 215-225.  
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reason that it is unavailable and unknown. The second, and for our purposes more urgent, 
weakness of Keyser’s work is the limited attention it gives to the central section of Wisdom – 
chapters 6-10. While Keyser’s concern to relate God’s righteousness and mercy to the 
anthropological contrast between the ungodly and the righteous explains his preoccupation 
with Wisdom 1-5 and 11-19, the logic of Wisdom remains obscure without a full consideration of 
the identity, character and function of σοφία in chapters 6-11. Consequently, while Keyser 
deepens the comparison by focusing on points of theological continuity and discontinuity, the 
conversation he facilitates between Romans and Wisdom is unable to penetrate the essential 
logic of either text because it ignores the centrifugal and organizing significance of σοφία. The 
result is an important study that nevertheless fails to ask the basic question: what is the 
hermeneutical rationale and theological basis for the theological similarities and 
dissimilarities Keyser identifies?   
 The three other works are by Francis Watson, Joseph R. Dodson and John M.G. Barclay. 
Watson’s Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith places Paul in conversation with a range of Second 
Temple Jewish authors as one who ‘read the same texts, yet read them differently’.69 The 
comparison with Wisdom is thus a comparison of their respective exegetical activity, in 
particular their respective readings of select narratives from Numbers which Watson identifies 
primarily in Wisdom 16-19 and Romans 7.7-11 and 1 Corinthians 10.5-10. After a detailed 
demonstration of Wisdom’s editorial technique of ‘displacement’ – that is, transplanting an 
event or actor from one narrative location to another – Watson concludes that Paul and the 
author of Wisdom agree canonically, but disagree exegetically: ‘Paul and the author of Wisdom 
are agreed that the scriptural narrative of Exodus and Numbers bears paradigmatic witness to 
the nature of divine saving action’ (canonical agreement); but ‘Wisdom strives to suppress’ 
Israel’s complicity ‘in the idolatry and ungodliness it prefers to ascribe to the Gentiles’ whereas 
‘Paul chooses not to conceal the fact that the gift bestowed at Sinai led immediately to 
catastrophe’ (exegetical disagreement).70 The exegetical contrast is stark: Wisdom reads 
Numbers as a narration ‘of the saving benefits bestowed on the holy nation’; Paul reads 
Numbers as ‘the justification of the ungodly’.71 This is a remarkably subtle study and the 
comparative conclusion is able to offer a formal explanation for the points of continuity and 
                                                        
69 Watson, Hermeneutics, ix.  
70 Watson, Hermeneutics, 411.  
71 Watson, Hermeneutics, 411.  
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discontinuity: Paul and the author of Wisdom read the same texts (continuity) yet read them 
differently (discontinuity). But again, Watson’s conclusion raises a crucial question that he 
never fully answers: why are the readings of Numbers in Paul and Wisdom so different? Watson 
does note that this is partially explicable in terms of ‘a difference in homiletical strategy’ – 
Wisdom wanting to encourage; Paul wanting to warn72 – and he mentions in one place that the 
exegetical activity of Paul and Wisdom are enmeshed in a hermeneutically transformative 
event – the illumination of σοφία and God’s act in Christ respectively.73 But these homiletical 
and hermeneutical answers are never developed.74 
 A similar complaint can be raised against the otherwise incisive and illuminating 
studies of Dodson and Barclay. Dodson’s book, The ‘Powers’ of Personification, does not purport to 
be a full comparison of the theology of Romans and Wisdom; it is a focused comparison of their 
respective employment of personification. While Dodson concludes on a strong note of 
continuity – Paul and Wisdom use personification ‘to exonerate God’ from evil and ‘to explain 
the history of Israel’75 –, he recognises a range of differences related to salvation from 
personified Sin and Death to immortality (through ‘intimacy with personified Wisdom’ in 
Wisdom) or everlasting life (through ‘participation with personified Grace and Righteousness 
and the person of Christ’ in Romans). This, again, is a subtle and sophisticated identification of 
real difference and commonality, and Dodson does offer the beginnings of an explanation for 
his findings: ‘The difference here reflect the authors’ respective beliefs concerning the epoch 
of God in history’ and is reflective of Wisdom’s protological emphasis on ‘God’s work…through 
Sophia at Creation…. before death intruded the world’ and Paul’s eschatological orientation to 
‘the second Adam’ who ‘came into the world after Sin and Death had already entered it’.76 
Dodson’s concern, however, is to compare the use and function of personification in Romans 
and Wisdom, and so the scope of his study prevents him from pursuing this promising line of 
thought. Dodson’s book is by far the most thorough comparison of Romans and Wisdom in 
English-speaking scholarship, but like Watson’s work, Dodson’s observation that ‘each author 
                                                        
72 Watson, Hermeneutics, 383.  
73 Watson, Hermeneutics, 529-30.  
74 Cf. Richard Hays’ contribution to the book symposium on Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith: R.B. Hays, 
‘Paul’s Hermeneutics and the Question of Truth’, Pro Ecclesia 16.2 (2007): 126-33.  
75 Dodson, The ‘Powers’ of Personification, 222.  
76 Dodson, The ‘Powers’ of Personification, 221.  
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shares ideas’ and that they have ‘vastly different ideas’ forces the hermeneutical question: 
what is the theological basis and rationale for this broad continuity and deep discontinuity?  
 Barclay’s recent study, ‘Unnerving Grace: Approaching Romans 9-11 from The Wisdom of 
Solomon’, is the only work to date that explicitly addresses this question. After a brief yet full 
reading of Wisdom, Barclay considers Romans 9.6-18 in conversation with Wisdom’s vision of 
‘cosmic order, symmetry and equilibrium’ – a vision that is exemplified in an emphatic stress 
on divine grace that is comprehended with the operations of divine justice: there is a 
correspondence between God’s benefaction and the ‘worth’ of his human beneficiaries.77 
Noting Paul’s repeated refusal to relate the operations of divine grace to ‘any comprehensible 
moral, rational, or natural order in the cosmos’, Barclay concludes that ‘in contrast to Wisdom, 
with which he shares so much, Paul propounds a quite bizarre notion of Israel’s story’.78 This 
comparative conclusion, that ‘Paul’s voice in this dialogue in thoroughly Jewish, but also 
bizarre, theologically dangerous and extremely unnerving’,79 raises the hermeneutical 
question to its highest pitch: what accounts for Paul’s ‘disregard of cosmic order’?80 It is a 
virtue of Barclay’s work that he provides an answer: ‘What has twisted Paul’s theology into this 
strange shape is his understanding of a “gift” [i.e. the Christ-event] that has redefined the 
meanings of χάρις and ἔλεος and defies explanation or rationale’. The restrictions of scope and 
space, however, mean that this thesis is asserted rather than argued, and the limited focus on 
Romans 9.6-18 invites a fuller comparison. In a certain sense, the present study is an attempt 
to test Barclay’s hypothesis by offering a more comprehensive reading of Wisdom and by 
extending the dialogue to a significantly larger selection of passages from Romans.    
 It seems, then, that McGlynn’s observation remains valid. The long and significant 
history of comparing Romans and Wisdom indicates that readers of both texts have regularly 
agreed with Gaventa’s judgment ‘that they might profitably be read together’.81 And yet, 
because no such comparative project has offered a thorough reading of Wisdom, and because 
the identification of continuity and discontinuity has never been sufficiently followed by an 
exploration of its hermeneutical rationale and theological basis, it remains the case that ‘the 
                                                        
77 J.M.G. Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace: Approaching Romans 9-11 from The Wisdom of Solomon’, in Between 
Gospel and Election (WUNT 257; ed. F. Wilk and J.R. Wagner; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010): 91-110.   
78 Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 110.  
79 Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 92.  
80 Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 110.  
81 Gaventa, ‘The Rhetoric of Death’, 127.  
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coincidences of topics between Paul’s epistle to the Romans and Wisdom…have never been 
adequately studied and compared’.  
 
A Contextual Conversation: Outline and Approach       
 The basic methodological orientation of this study is captured by Mikhail Bahktin: ‘The 
text lives only by coming into contact with another text…. Only at the point of this contact 
between texts does a light flash, illuminating both the posterior and anterior, joining a given 
text to a dialogue’.82 Texts look different when they are allowed to talk, and it is the hope of 
this dialogical analysis of Wisdom and Romans that both texts will look different in the light of 
the other, that familiar passages will lose some of their familiarity and come alive ‘by coming 
into contact with another text’.83 Expressed another way, the basic methodological benefit of 
comparative projects is that, to the degree the textual dialogue can expose the presuppositions 
of the reader and thereby amplify the voice of the texts, the exegesis itself becomes an act of 
listening – that is, an endeavor not so much to solve a set of scholarly debates as an attempt to 
let the respective authors ask each other the exegetical questions.84 This thesis is thus an 
exercise in exegetical eavesdropping; it hopes to facilitate and listen to a contextual 
conversation between the author of Wisdom and Paul.  
 Comparisons, however, come with their own set of problems. As Sanders noted in the 
introduction to his large scale comparison of Paul and Palestinian Judaism, ‘the two principal 
difficulties’ of placing texts in conversation can be ‘summarized by the words imbalance and 
imposition’.85 The first difficulty, ‘imbalance’, refers to the problem of comparing a single author 
with a large body of literature. The tendency here is to reduce the collection of texts to some 
comparatively useful common denominator that may conceal rather than capture the logic of 
the texts in question. The decision to restrict our comparison to two texts is an attempt to 
circumvent this issue by providing the space to engage Wisdom and Romans in sufficient depth 
                                                        
82 M. Bakhtin, ‘Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences’, in Speech Genres and Other Late Essays (eds. 
C. Emerson and M. Holquist; trans. V.W. McGee; Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 159-72, (162). 
83 For the reciprocal benefit of comparative projects, see Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 19; cf. 
Dodson, The ‘Powers’ of Personification, 2-3.  
84 This way of framing the comparison is both an indication about the suggested ‘freshness’ of my 
approach and a disclaimer of sorts: the various and important debates that surround the texts of Paul and Wisdom, 
while regularly engaged throughout the thesis, are, for our comparative purposes, subordinate to the 
conversation between Wisdom and Romans. 
85 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 19. 
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to allow their own logic to emerge. The second difficulty, however – what Sanders calls 
‘imposition’ – is less easily avoided. Sanders’ strategy to navigate this exegetical error is ‘to 
compare an entire religion…with an entire religion’ by comparing ‘Paul on his own terms with 
Judaism on its own terms’.86 But it must be asked whether the imbalance of Sanders’ 
comparison and the resulting reduction of Jewish soteriology to covenantal nomism, together 
with the presuppositional status of the interpretative paradigm that shaped its articulation, 
forced the imposition of a Pauline pattern onto the Jewish literature.87 This tendency to 
assume and impose the normative status of Paul in comparative projects is also evident in 
dialogical analyses of Romans and Wisdom. As Gaventa observes, ‘For Christian scholars, Paul 
was the standard against which Wisdom was measured’.88 My attempt to combat this 
temptation is essentially structural, and it is therefore necessary to offer a brief outline of the 
present project. 
 First, in an attempt to take seriously Sanders’ invitation to consider Jewish texts on 
their own terms and thus avoid the error of imposition, part one of this thesis will offer a 
reading of Wisdom without reference to Romans. In this way, I hope both to fill a scholarly 
lacuna by comparing Romans with a full reading of Wisdom and to allow the terms of Wisdom’s 
theological description to be configured based on its own essential theological structures and 
concerns. Part two will then consider pivotal passages of Romans in conversation with Wisdom. 
Here, however, the topics under consideration – e.g. the relation of Jews and non-Jews, the 
meaning and theological ordering of God’s justice and grace, the hermeneutical logic that 
shapes the rereading of Israel’s scripture – arise, in the first instance, not because they are 
important to Paul (though they are), but because they are central to Wisdom. Chapter six will 
consider the issue of the relation and relative soteriological status of Jews and non-Jews. At 
this juncture, the often asked question about the literary and theological relationship between 
Wisdom 13-15 and Romans 1.18-2.5 will be reconsidered with reference to the function of that 
anthropological distinction within the rhetorical argumentation and broader theological 
structures of Romans and Wisdom. Chapter seven will then moderate a dialogue about the 
definition and relationship of divine righteousness and grace. Following Sanders’ insistence 
                                                        
86 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 18, 12.  
87 Cf. the criticism of Sanders by Neusner noted above (n.27); see also Westerholm, Perspectives Old and 
New, 341: in Sanders’ reconstruction, ‘Jews are said, in effect, to have been good Protestants all along’.   
88 Gaventa, ‘The Rhetoric of Death’, 138.  
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that comparisons need to ‘go behind the terminology’, this chapter will ultimately move 
beyond Sanders’ by suggesting that it is necessary to go through the terminology – δικαιοσύνη 
and χάρις – to get to the deep logic of Romans and Wisdom. This chapter will therefore question 
the assumed univocity of theological vocabulary and ask whether Romans and Wisdom offer 
equally emphatic though finally incommensurable expressions of the justice and grace of God. 
Lastly, chapter eight will compare the rereadings of Israel’s scripture in Wisdom 10-19 and 
Romans 9-11. However, whereas some recent comparative work has been content to observe 
that Paul and the author of Wisdom ‘read the same texts, yet read them differently’,89 this 
chapter will both identify these points of canonical connection and exegetical difference and 
enquire after the hermeneutical rationale behind the authors’ respective rereadings.   
 Thus, by allowing Wisdom to set the dialogical agenda, the conversation between 
Romans and Wisdom will engage the ‘common places’ of comparisons between Paul and 
Judaism –  anthropology (Laato), soteriology (Sanders, Gathercole), hermeneutics (Watson) –  
and engage us in a range of issues in Pauline theology: the soteriological (in)significance of the 
Jew/Gentile distinction, the origin and meaning of Paul’s soteriological semantics – e.g. 
δικαιοσύνη θεοῡ, piίστις χριστοῡ,  χάρις – and the content and hermeneutical contours of Paul’s 
engagement with Israel’s scripture. ‘The intention then’, to adapt Sanders’ statement of 
purpose, is to make a contribution both to Pauline theology and to the understanding of 
Wisdom, ‘as well as to clarify how they stand vis-à-vis each other’.90  
  
                                                        
89 The citation is from Watson, Hermeneutics, ix, though this restriction does not adequately characterise 
his study.  
90 See Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 19.  
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Part I 
Wisdom of Solomon 
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Chapter 2 
Reading the World Rationally from End to Beginning: Wisdom 1-6 
 
‘The human mind has at no period accepted a moral chaos’ – George Eliot, Middlemarch 
 
Reading a Reader, Between the Lines 
The theological horizon of ‘sapiential theology is’, as Giuseppe Bellia and Angelo 
Passaro gracefully conclude, ‘to discover the thread of the discreet lordship exercised by God 
in history, even within the shadowy and opaque twists and turns of daily life’.1 The author of 
Wisdom of Solomon (hereafter, Wisdom) takes his place within this theological trajectory as a 
reader, both of texts and of the world. As John Barclay summarises, ‘Wisdom struggles to make 
sense of a world that does not follow an anticipated script’ and, in its effort to ‘understand the 
workings of God on an individual, a communal and a cosmic scale’, Wisdom ‘activates scriptural 
resources which it reshapes in order to make sense of the present’.2 This is both a description 
of the theological content and contours of Wisdom and a methodological invitation. Readings 
are the result of the dynamic exchange between text and interpreter.3 Both text and reader – 
in this case the author of Wisdom – play a constitutive role in the creation of the interpretative 
product. This means that when and where a reading departs from its text it provides a clue 
about the hermeneutical and theological substructure of the interpreter. The text, of course, is 
often straightforwardly complicit in the reading it generates,4 but when a reading breaks with 
                                                        
1 G. Bellia and A. Passaro, ‘Infinite Passion for Justice’, in The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research: Studies on 
Tradition, Redaction, and Theology (DCLY 2005; ed. A. Passaro and G. Bellia; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005), 307-28 (307).    
2 J.M.G. Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace: Approaching Romans 9-11 from The Wisdom of Solomon’, in Between 
Gospel and Election (WUNT 257; ed. F. Wilk and J.R. Wagner; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010): 91-110 (91-92). 
3 For differing views concerning whether the mutually affective and relational interplay between text 
and reader is properly described as ‘dialogical’, see Paul Ricoeur, From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics (trans. 
K. Blamey and J.B. Thompson; Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1991) and Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
Wahrheit und Methode: Grundüzge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik, Gesammelte Werke 1 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul 
Siebeck], 1990). While both reference Plato’s preference for dialogue in the Phaedrus, Gadamer insists that a text is 
‘ein echter Kommunikationspartner’ (Wahrheit und Methode, 364) and therefore speaks ‘vom einem 
hermeneutischen Gespräch’ (Wahrheit und Methode, 391). Ricoeur, by contrast, argues that ‘The writing-reading 
relation is…not an instance of dialogue….The reader is absent from the act of writing; the writer is absent from 
the act of reading. The text thus produces a double eclipse of the reader and the writer’ (From Text to Action, 107). 
4 Cf. Watson, Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 4: ‘It is wrong to imagine that 
the text itself is no more than a blank screen onto which readers project their various concerns: normally it is 
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the script (again this could be the manipulation of the history or ideas in a document or 
assertions that run counter to the empirical realities of the observed world) these ‘breaks’ are 
the hermeneutical effect of some prior theological cause. These ‘effects’, then, are hints, 
invitations to those who read readers to reverse the aetiological process and attempt to detect 
the substance of the theological causes that give rise to the interpretative effects.  
An attentive tracing of the contours and idiosyncrasies of Wisdom’s reading of the 
workings and temporal completion of the world (Wis. 1-6) and of the classic history contained 
within Israel’s sacred texts (Wis. 10-19) will create the methodological space within which it 
will be possible to work backwards from the ‘effects’ (counter-empirical and manipulated 
readings of world and text) to the ‘cause’ (a web of theological convictions which shape and 
are shaped by the interpretation of text and world). The principle of ‘scripture normativity’, 
which states that ‘text and world must somehow be made to fit one another’,5 certainly exerts 
a constraining function on Wisdom’s theologising. The ‘vagueness of this “somehow”’,6 
however, provokes a power struggle between text and interpreter. In the case of Wisdom, this 
politicking for interpretative power is resolved by a hermeneutical reactivation of the text 
which, while legitimately called a ‘realization of semantic potential’,7 is nevertheless reflective 
of ‘the press of an interpretative paradigm onto somewhat recalcitrant material’.8 Within this 
creative act of appropriation the hermeneutical balance appears to be tipped in favour of 
making text conform to conviction. This, then, is the juncture at which to investigate the 
theological and hermeneutical patterns which inform Wisdom’s reading of sacred history and 
eschatological destinies. The basic thesis of this section is that Wisdom’s reading of text and 
world operates within the theological boundaries marked off by a vision of cosmic order that 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
possible to show that the text itself is implicated in the reading it occasions. To interpret is always to interact 
with a text, and it is also to be constrained by the text’ (italics original). 
5 Watson, Hermeneutics, 1. 
6 Watson, Hermeneutics, 1. 
7 Watson, Hermeneutics, 4. 
8 Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 92. This notion of ‘power struggle’, however, need not imply violence. As 
Ricoeur argues, ‘Appropriation [i.e. the constructive process of moving beyond intended meaning to potential 
meaning] loses its arbitrariness insofar as it is the recovery of that which is at work, in labour, within the text. 
What the interpreter says is a resaying that reactivates what is said by the text’ (From Text to Action, 124).  Thus, 
for Ricoeur, this act of appropriation is neither (necessarily) violent nor arbitrary. In fact, it is in the ‘concert act’ 
of reading, an act which includes appropriation ‘at the extremity of…the hermeneutical arc’, that ‘the destiny of 
the text is fulfilled’ (italics removed).  
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σοφία fashioned, manages and reveals and in which the operations of divine justice ensure the 
stable and rational distribution of fitting salvation and judgment.9  
Nothing, however – configurations of the cosmos included –, comes from nothing. The 
symmetry and soteriological logic of this cosmological construal is shaped by a paradigmatic 
reading of the Exodus-pattern of salvation for the righteous and condemnation for the 
ungodly (Wis. 10.15-21; 19.1-9) and, more subtly, the eschatological projection of the 
deuteronomic formula of blessings and curses.10 This rationality, however ‘canonical’, is not 
obvious; it is the effect of the illumination of divine Wisdom that enables the right evaluation 
of history, reality and eschatology. Wisdom acknowledges that temporal history appears to be 
an arena in which its perception of moral and cosmic order is disqualified, where the ungodly 
prosper and the righteous suffer. The gift of divine Wisdom, however, enables a right 
reasoning which sees past the empirical to the ineluctable forces of divine justice and 
creational order which will, however surprisingly, ensure the eschatological dispensing of 
fitting destinies (Wis. 1-6). Similarly, the apparent ambiguity of Israelite and Egyptian morality 
and the unpredictability of the divine disposition in the pentateuchal narrative give way, again 
under the illumination of Wisdom, to a reading in which moral symmetry is maintained by the 
exoneration of Israel and the consistent exercise of divine favour and judgment (Wis. 10-19).11 
It is Wisdom that both enables this proper reading of world and text and ensures that this 
stable and rational order persists despite all appearance, whether historical or empirical, to 
the contrary (Wis. 6-10). Wisdom, then, or at least the vision of cosmic order which she 
generates, is the hermeneutic that shapes Wisdom’s comprehensive reading of history and 
                                                        
9Cf. Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 92: ‘For Wisdom, the goodness and mercy of God are comprehended 
within a sacred order – natural, rational and moral – in accordance with which the cosmos makes stable sense; 
scriptural types and narratives are manipulated to demonstrate the equitable workings of this moral universe, 
and to eliminate any possibility of arbitrariness or injustice’. For three recent treatments of Wisdom which 
recognize the thematic centrality of justice, see M.F. Kolarcik, ‘Universalism and Justice in the Wisdom of 
Solomon’, 289-301 and F. Raurell, ‘From ∆ΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗ to ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΑ (Wisd 1,1.15)’, 331-56, both in Treasures of 
Wisdom: Studies in Ben Sira and the Book of Wisdom (BETL CXLIII; ed. N. Calduch-Benages and J. Vermeylen; Leuven: 
Leuven University Press, 1999); Bellia and Passaro, ‘Infinite Passion for Justice’, 307-28. A thorough analysis of 
δικαιοσύνη in Wisdom is provided by H. Engel, Das Buch der Weisheit (Stuttgart: Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk, 
1998), 58-60.     
10 The probability of this latter hypothesis is strengthened by Wisdom’s conceptual dependence on the 
Epistle of Enoch, which, as will be discussed below, theologises in explicitly deuteronomic categories.      
11 Watson, Hermeneutics, 385: ‘For the author of Wisdom, the narrative sequence from Genesis to Numbers 
consists in a homogeneous series of anticipations and repetitions of the exodus paradigm of salvation for the 
righteous and judgment for the unrighteous’.  
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reality from eschatology (Wis. 1-6) to Israel’s origins (Wis. 10-19); a rational reading of the 
world from end to beginning.  
 This theological consideration of Wisdom will unfold in three stages. After a brief 
structural and socio-historical introduction, this study will, in turn, explore Wisdom’s 
eschatology (this chapter), celebration of σοφία (chapter three) and Exodus-shaped 
hermeneutic (chapter four). In the end, it will be argued that despite obvious thematic and 
stylistic diversity, Wisdom, even where prima facie tensions exist (e.g. is justice historically [Wis. 
10-19] or eschatologically [Wis. 1-6] realised?) argues from and for a consistent theological 
vision shaped by the rational exercise of divine justice and the predictable patterns of moral 
order, both of which find paradigmatic, canonical expression in the Exodus event.         
 
Setting and Structure 
 It is difficult to fix the date, provenance and setting of Wisdom. The consensus, which is 
probable though not definitive, places Wisdom in Alexandria somewhere between 220 BCE and 
50 CE.12  While it seems correct to note that portions of Wisdom, especially 19.13-15, ‘reflect 
social tensions in Egypt (Alexandria)’,13 attempts to affix the occasion of Wisdom to a particular 
socio-historical event, the hostilities towards Jews under the reign of Caligula in 38 CE for 
example,14 appear to stretch the evidence.15 What can be said with some certainty, however, is 
                                                        
12 C. Larcher, Le Livre de la Sagesse, ou La Sagesse de Salomon (Paris : Gabalda, 1983) 1.141-61; D. Winston, The 
Wisdom of Solomon (AB, 43; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1979), 20-25; H. Hübner, Die Weisheit Salomons (ATD 
Apokryphen 4; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1999), 15-19; J.J. Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age 
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1997), 178.  See, however, R. Zimmermann, ‘The Book of Wisdom: Its Language and 
Character’, JQR 57 (1996): 1-27, 101-35 and D. Georgi, ‘Weisheit Salomos’, JSHRZ III.4 (Gütersloh: Gütersloher 
Verlagshaus, 1980): 391-478 who both argue for a Syrian provenance. The Alexandrian (or at least Egyptian) 
setting seems to be confirmed by the expansion of the Egyptian plague cycle and the relative disinterest in the 
Canaanites, the similarities to Philo of Alexandria and the adaptation of (what appears to be) Middle Platonism 
(McGlynn, Divine Judgment and Divine Benevolence in the Book of Wisdom [WUNT II, 139; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2001], 9-10). While 220 BCE and 50 CE serve as terminus a quo and terminus ad quem, a date in the early Roman 
period, perhaps three or four decades after Actium, appears to better satisfy lexical questions and possible 
allusions to Roman occupation (McGlynn, Divine Judgment, 13). This narrower dating has been recently 
supplemented by fresh evidence from Egyptian cultic practice (M.F. Baslez, ‘The Author of Wisdom and the 
Cultured Environment of Alexandria’, in The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research: Studies on Tradition, Redaction, and 
Theology [DCLY 2005; ed. A. Passaro and G. Bellia; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005], 33-54).   
13 Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 91 n.1. 
14 Winston, Wisdom, 23-24; S. Cheon, The Exodus Story in the Wisdom of Solomon: A Study in Biblical 
Interpretation (JSPSS 23; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 151 
15 J.M.G. Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora from Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE – 117 CE) (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1996), 181-82. See also B.J. Lietaert Peerbolte, ‘The Hermeneutics of Exodus in the 
Book of Wisdom’, in The Interpretation of Exodus: Studies in Honor of Cornelis Houtman (BET 44; Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 
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that whatever social conflict necessitated the writing of Wisdom, the event(s) was serious 
enough to generate a series of questions about the stability of the cosmos, the patterns of 
history and the past, present and future justice of God. 
 The diversity of content and style which characterises Wisdom’s three major sections 
has occasioned a litany of source-critical hypotheses.16 As Winston remarks, ‘its abrupt shifts in 
style, meter, and subject long resisted all efforts to see it as a unified and fully coherent 
whole’.17 Such long standing resistance, it seems, has finally been overcome. While the 
composite history of this text should not be ruled out, current scholarly opinion favours 
reading Wisdom as a unified work.18 Whether or not this trend is correct, it reflects the skill 
with which the author or final redactor transitions from one section to the next. There is 
almost unanimous agreement that Wisdom should be divided into three general units, but it is 
difficult to deciding exactly where to place the breaks. Chapters 6 and 10/11 appear to serve 
something of a Janus function, rounding off one section as they introduce the next. As Maurice 
Gilbert remarks, ‘in the Book of Wisdom every conclusion says more than its introduction, and 
does so with new nuances, and in doing so, moves progressively ahead’.19 Recognising this 
structural ambiguity, Gilbert calls for ‘an account which is fluid and flowing’, an invitation the 
following outline attempts to accept.20 
I. Two Ways of Reasoning: Justice and the Problem of Death (1.1-6.11) 
II. Wisdom, a Saving and Fitting Gift (6.1-10.21) 
III. History and the Divine Economy (10.15-19.22)   
   
A Rational Paradox: Divine Justice and the Problem of Death (1.1-6.11) 
 Rationality and paradox are matters of perspective. At the close of Wisdom’s imaginary 
drama, the ungodly murderers of the righteous are confronted with ‘the paradox of salvation’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
97-116 who suggests a polemical reaction to Egyptian idolatry and polytheism as the socio-rhetorical occasion of 
Wisdom.  
16 For a review of the source-critical proposals see Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 182. 
17 D. Winston, ‘A Century of Research on the Book of Wisdom’, in The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research: 
Studies on Tradition, Redaction, and Theology (DCLY 2005; ed. A. Passaro and G. Bellia; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005), 1-18 
(1).    
18 J.M. Reese, Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and its Consequences (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 
1970) 145; Larcher, Le Livre de la Sagesse, 1.100-103; L.L. Grabbe, Wisdom of Solomon: Guides to Apocrypha and 
Pseudepigrapha (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 25. 
19 M. Gilbert, ‘The Literary Structure of the Book of Wisdom: A Study of Various Views’, in The Book of 
Wisdom in Modern Research: Studies on Tradition, Redaction, and Theology (DCLY 2005; ed. A. Passaro and G. Bellia; 
Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005), 19-32 (31).   
20 Gilbert, ‘The Literary Structure of the Book of Wisdom’, 31.  
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(τῷ piαραδόξῳ τῆς σωτηρίας, 5.2). Their unsound reasoning (λογισάμενοι οὐκ ὀρθῶς, 2.1) 
blinded them to the ‘mysteries of God’ (2.22), leading to the cynical conclusions that death is 
final (2.1-5), pleasure is proper (2.6-9) and might is right (2.11). Within this logical sphere the 
eschatological vindication of the murdered righteous is impossible, irrational and paradoxical. 
Wisdom, however, reasons within an alternative sphere of logic. The salvation of the righteous 
may be ‘counter-intuitive’,21 or at least counter-empirical; but as Wisdom reads the world, the 
symmetrical and fitting destinies of the righteous and the ungodly are both inevitable and 
supremely rational. 
 Twin addresses to the ‘rulers of the earth’ (1.1-11; 6.1-11) form an inclusio around the 
opening section of Wisdom, thus indicating the universality of the subject matter.22 The topic 
under discussion is announced in the opening exhortation: ‘Love justice’ (δικαιοσύνη, 1.1). On 
the surface, however, Wisdom’s world is not a straightforwardly just and equitable place. 
Therefore, the task of divine Wisdom, while characteristically a φιλάνθρωpiον piνεῦμα (1.6), is 
to expose the irrational superficiality of the ‘perverse’ (σκολιός, 1.3) and ‘foolish’ (ἀσύνετος, 
1.5) thoughts which characterise the ungodly (ἀσεβής, 1.16). This introduces the negative side 
of an irreducible distinction between the righteous and the wicked that runs throughout 
Wisdom. Whereas Wisdom regularly passes into holy souls (ψυχὰς ὁσίας, 7.27), she will not 
enter into one that is characterised by evil practices (κακότεχνον ψυχήν, 1.4). The twisted 
logic (σκολιοὶ λογισμοί, 1.3) of the impious cannot reason beyond the penultimacy of death 
and therefore overlooks the inevitability of judgment. Blasphemous and unrighteous words, 
along with those who utter them, will not go unpunished (1.3, 8-10). Thus, what the ungodly 
fail to recognise is that hidden beneath the ubiquity and obvious injustice of death is a 
primordial rationality, a divinely instituted order that is life-creating (1.13-14a) and, at an 
elemental level, salvific (σωτήριοι αἱ γενέσεις τοῦ κόσμου, 1.14b). This counter-empirical moral 
order is maintained by the power of God which exposes foolishness (1.3), and the activity of 
Wisdom who, in the role of personified justice, ensures that a record of the words of those who 
utter unrighteous things will be brought before the Lord (1.6, 8-9).23 As Joseph Dodson 
                                                        
21 Watson, Hermeneutics, 384. 
22 J.M. Reese, ‘Plan and Structure in the Book of Wisdom’, CBQ 27(1965): 391-399; A.G. Wright, ‘The 
Structure of the Book of Wisdom’, Biblica 48 (1967): 165-184; Winston, Wisdom, 9-10 
23 McGlynn, Divine Judgment, 55. The activity of Wisdom here, especially as listener, reporter and avenger 
(1.8), parallels the roles of personified ∆ίκη in classical Greek literature. See, for example, Plato  Laws 715E, 872E; 
Aeschylus Agamemnon; and Sophocles Electra 475, 528 (Winston, Wisdom, 105; McGlynn, Divine Judgment, 90).   
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indicates, the joint effect of the summons to love righteousness and the threatening 
personifications is a two-ways exhortation which has justice as its goal and judgment as its 
warning.24     
 The empirical, however, cannot be ignored. If there is a rationality deeper than the 
reality and apparent finality of death it must be able to account for and pass through this most 
basic of theistic enigmas. The obvious tension between Wisdom’s assertion that God created 
humanity for incorruption (ἀφθαρσία, 2.23) and the presence of death invites an account of 
death’s cosmogony. The words and works of the ungodly summon death as a friend for whose 
company they are well suited (ἄξιος, 1.12, 16; cf. 2.24). Additionally, death’s entrance onto the 
stage of God’s life-creating world is ascribed to ‘the devil’s envy’ (2.24).25 Both explanations, 
which together frame the first speech of the wicked (2.1-20), contain an unmistakable trace of 
theodicy: ‘God did not make death’ (ὁ θεὸς θάνατον οὐκ ἐpiοίησεν, 1.13); ‘God created 
humankind for incorruption’ (ὁ θεὸς ἔκτισεν τὸν ἄνθρωpiον ἐpi᾽ ἀφθαρσίᾳ, 2.23).26 Death, 
however, makes his way into God’s originally deathless world by acting antithetically to 
Wisdom. Whereas Wisdom avoids the unrighteous (1.4-5), death draws near to those who 
summon and pine after (τήκω) him.27 As Larcher describes this illicit love affair, the impious 
‘flirt avec la Mort’, and in response death offers himself, thereby ensuring that neither his 
desire (i.e. the destruction of his partners) nor that of his ungodly lovers goes unrequited. 
Death’s deal with the devil (2.24) stands behind this romantic pact, establishing a causal chain 
that moves from death’s entrance via the devil’s envy to the experience of death by those who 
                                                        
24 J.R. Dodson, The ‘Powers’ of Personification: Rhetorical Purpose in the Book of Wisdom and the Letter to the 
Romans (BZNW 161; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 103: ‘The chief purposes of these personifications [Dodson 
cites Dynamis, Sophia, Spirit and Dike]…are to motivate the audience to love righteousness and to seek the Lord. If 
they refuse to pursue righteousness, these personifications…ensure judgment, a life without Wisdom and a future 
examination without mercy’.  
25 Although the devil’s activity is noted, the aetiological weight seems to be on the side of the self-
destructive patterns of the ungodly (cf. 1.16; 13.1-14.31). Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 93 n.4 sees in this imbalance 
an emphasis on human responsibility in determining soteriological status. Simon Gathercole (Where is Boasting? 
Early Jewish Soteriology and Paul’s Response in Romans 1-5 [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002], 68) detects in Wisdom a 
‘three-part historical scheme’ that moves from intended immortality, through the interruption of death, back to 
immortality by way of a Torah-defined holiness. 
26 Dodson, The ‘Powers’ of Personification, 62: ‘As in 1.13-16, Wisdom sets two statements about the original 
intentions of God vis-à-vis His creation (2.23) in contrast to two statements about the current reality of creation’.  
27 In the context of Alexandrian poetry, τήκω language was often employed as a metaphorical expression 
of sexual desire (Larcher, Le Livre de la Sagesse, 207)    
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belong to his company (μερίς) because their wickedness (ἡ κακία αὐτῶν) makes then worthy 
(ἄξιος) of such a lot.28 
More important than how death invaded God’s ordered cosmos, however, is the 
troubling reality that death’s chaotic regime is a challenge to the purported immutability of 
the operations of divine justice. Death stands in explicit antithesis to the divine creative 
intention and, by extension, the very image of God in accordance with which humankind was 
fashioned (2.23). This creational contradiction must be addressed. Before proceeding to 
subvert the disorderly polity of death, however, death himself, or at least death’s friends 
(φίλοι, 1.16), are permitted to provide an (ir)rational apologia for his anarchic rationality (2.1-
20). The naturalistic logic of the ungodly moves from the randomness of life and the finality of 
death (2.1b-5) to a corresponding (οὖν, 2.6) ethic of temporal pleasure (2.6-9), and ends in an 
assertion of authority established by power (2.10-11).29 The evidence for the correctness of this 
chaotic perspective is death itself: ‘Our name will be forgotten in time and no one will 
remember our works…. For our time is the passing of a shadow, and there is no return from 
our death’ (2.4-5). Within this line reasoning, the fate of the righteous (δίκαιος, 2.12) functions 
as an experiment to test the theological perspectives of the righteous and the ungodly (2.12-
20).30 If the righteous person, who claims divine sonship (2.13, 16) and adheres to a codified 
                                                        
28 The reference to the ‘devil’s envy’ – a probable allusion to the tradition found in Life of Adam and Eve 
12.1 – together with the phrase ‘image of God’ and a reflection on the original creation suggest a reworking of the 
Genesis 1-3 narrative. 
29 While the Epicurean feel of this line of reasoning has led some commentators to posit an Epicurean 
identity for the ‘ungodly’ (e.g. A. Dupont-Sommer, ‘Les Impies du Livre de la Sagesse sont-ils des Épicuriens’? RHR 
111 [1935]: 90-109), Winston is correct to argue that ‘only a grossly distorted understanding of Epicureanism could 
conceivably reconcile that philosophy with the…crude and unprincipled brand of hedonism’ placed on the lips of 
the ungodly (Winston, Wisdom, 115). The Epicurean hypothesis is further problematised by Wisdom’s apparent 
dependence on the imputed speech of the sinners in 1 Enoch 102.6-11. In parallel to Wisdom 2.1-20, 1 Enoch 102.6-11 
has the wicked reasoning from the brevity of life and finality of death (102.6-8; cf. Wis. 2.1-5) to the conclusion 
that life should be enjoyed (102.9; cf. Wis. 2.6-9) and the righteous who question this rationality, helpless as they 
are (102.10-11; cf. Wis. 2.18-20), should be exploited and persecuted (102.9; cf. Wis. 2.10-16).       
30 For the death of the righteous as a test of justice see Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age, 195; 
McGlynn, Divine Judgment, 69. See also S. Manfredi, ‘The Trial of the Righteous in Wis 5.1-14 (1-7)’, in The Book of 
Wisdom in Modern Research: Studies on Tradition, Redaction, and Theology (DCLY 2005; ed. A. Passaro and G. Bellia; 
Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005), 159-78 (161): ‘The persecution of the just…puts God himself, his existence and the 
truthfulness of his particular revelation in that law by which the just man lives, to the test’. Early Christian 
interpreters, hearing the allusion to Isaiah 3.10 (LXX) in Wisdom 2.12 and noting the familiar pattern of the 
Servant Songs of Isaiah 52-53 within the drama at large, read the persecution of the suffering righteous as a 
straightforward reference to Jesus’ passion (e.g. Barn. 6.7, Justin Martyr Dial. 17, Augustine Civ. Dei 17.20.1; see 
Winston, Wisdom, 119 for further references).  
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morality (2.16), dies at the hands of those whom he reproaches and calls sinners (2.12), then 
the ungodly are justified in their reasoning.31 
 Within Wisdom’s moral schema, however, the ungodly can never be justified, especially 
not in their reasoning. Their logical fallacies (λογισάμενοι οὐκ ὀρθῶς, 2.1) are a product of the 
noetic effects of their wickedness (κακία, 2.21) which prevent them from knowing, and 
therefore reasoning from, the ‘mysteries of God’ (μυστήρια θεοῦ, 2.22). Being ‘fit’ (ἄξιος, 1.16) 
for death, the irrationality of the ungodly will meet its appropriate retribution (3.10). The 
righteous, by contrast, read the world sub specie aeternitatis. In accordance with the ‘mysteries 
of God’ (2.22), they are able to peer beyond the roodscreen of death and perceive a hidden, 
though still operative, cosmology governed by divine justice. The tyranny of death’s de-
creative injustice will give way to the intended incorruption (2.23) as the righteous receive the 
‘reward of holiness’ (μισθὸν ὁσιότητος 2.22; cf. 5.15) and the ‘prize for blameless souls’ (γέρας 
ψυχῶν ἀμώμων, 2.22). Only the foolish think that the righteous have met death (3.2) and 
punishment (3.4),32 while those reasoning rightly know that ‘their hope is full of immortality’ 
(ἀθανασία, 3.4) and their suffering was not punishment but discipline (ὀλίγα piαιδευθέντες 
μεγάλα εὐεργετηθήσονται, 3.4-5), the paternal process through which God determined them to 
be ‘worthy of himself’ (εὗρεν αὐτοὺς ἀξίους ἑαυτοῦ, 3.5).  
 
The Empirical and the Eschaton 
This equitable cosmic administration is illustrated by contrasting the uselessness of the 
illegitimate progeny of the ungodly (4.3-6; cf. 3.16-19) with the counter-empirical favour 
bestowed on the undefiled barren woman (3.13), the law-observant and faithful eunuch 
                                                        
31 The oppressors here are accused by the righteous of ‘sinning against our training’ and ‘against the law’ 
(2.12). This has compelled commentators to identify the author’s rhetorical target as fellow, though probably 
apostate, Jews (e.g. E. Clarke, The Wisdom of Solomon [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973], 25). While this 
is possible, the ungodly’s characterisation of the customs of the righteous as odd (ἀνόμοιος, 2.15), coupled with 
the ethnically-other polemical orientation of Wisdom as a whole (especially Wis. 11-19), suggests that the contrast 
between the ‘righteous’ and the ‘ungodly’ in Wisdom 1-6 is probably reflective of socio-religious tensions between 
Jews and non-Jews (see Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 186; N.T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God 
[Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003], 166).       
32 For the confusion surrounding the definition of death in Wisdom see M. Kolarcik, The Ambiguity of Death 
in Wisdom Chapters 1-6: A Case Study of Literary Structure and Interpretation (Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1991), 
passim; J.P Weisengoff, ‘Death and Immortality in The Book of Wisdom’ (CBQ 3, 1941): 104-133. The precise nature 
of immortality is similarly difficult to determine (see, for instance, M.-J. Lagrange, ‘Le Livre de Sagesse, sa doctrine 
des fins dernières’, RevB 4 [1907]: 85-104; N.T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2003], 162-175). 
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(3.14),33 and the righteous whose God-pleasing lives ended prematurely (4.7-8, 16; cf. 4.9-15).34 
In each case, an empirical curse is reinterpreted as a blessing.35 According to canonical 
tradition, the eunuch was debarred from the assembly (Deut 23.1), but Wisdom promises him ‘a 
place of great delight in the temple of the Lord’ (3.14). Similarly, Wisdom’s redefinition of 
longevity (4.8-9) clearly clashes with Moses’ exhortation to ‘choose life, that you and your 
children may live’ (Deut 30.19). Whereas Moses promises life (ζήσεται, future tense) to those 
who keep the law (Lev 18.5b), Wisdom defines long life as moral spotlessness (ἡλικία γήρως βίος 
ἀκηλίδωτος, 4.9). The most dramatic instance of this rethinking of tradition, however, is 
Wisdom’s assignment of blessing to the barren. In contrast to the causal connection between 
favour and fertility (Deut 28.4, 11) and infertility and transgression (Deut. 28.18; 1 En. 98.5), 
Wisdom links the childless with virtue (ἀρετή, 4.1), thereby implying, in Larcher’s words, that 
‘la vertu confère une valeur positive à l’ ateknia’.36 Dodson is correct to detect here a ‘redefining 
of reality’.37 The contrast is between the empirical and the ontological/eschatological – that is 
between the way things appear and the way things actually are and will be.         
This depiction of blessing and curse, while empirically upside-down, is neither 
arbitrary (cf. 2.2) nor irrational. In fact, it appears to be a patterned projection of the 
conditions and symmetry of the deuteronomic formula onto an eschatological stage: the 
righteous will be blessed and the wicked will be cursed.38 This hunch moves closer to certainty 
                                                        
33 For piίστις as faithfulness here, see Hübner, Weisheit Salomons, 57.  
34 Barclay is correct to emphasise the note of compensation that shapes the respective blessings of the 
empirically cursed (Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 185 n. 7): barrenness is overturned with fruit (3.13), 
faithfulness is met with special favour (3.14), and brevity of life is countered with a redefinition of longevity in 
terms of understanding rather than age (4.8).  
35 The canonical motivation for rethinking the deuteronomic tradition of blessing and curses is provided 
by Third Isaiah (cf. Isa 56.3-5) and, as will be argued below, the theological pattern, if not the details, of 
Deuteronomy. 
36 Larcher, Le Livre de la Sagesse, 2.315.  
37 Dodson, The ‘Powers’ of Personification, 104-105. Dodson notes the contrast between the soon-forgotten 
children of adultery with the enduring memory of virtue, suggesting that, in concert with the various victories 
and prizes she confers (4.1-2), ‘Lady Virtue….provides true fulfillment for life, promising women a fertility greater 
than that of carnal fecundity’.  
38 That our author can critique the details of Deuteronomy (e.g. the status of the barren and the eunuch, 
Deut 23.1; 28.18) on the basis of the text’s basic theological shape demonstrates a characteristic willingness to re-
evaluate canonical data in light of paradigmatic readings of what, to Wisdom, are central canonical themes. This 
pre-critical brand of canonical criticism – perhaps Sachkritik is a more accurate label – will occupy us below in 
relation to Wisdom’s Exodus-inspired re-narration of pentateuchal history in 10.15-19.21 (chapter four). G.W.E 
Nickelsburg (Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism and Early Christianity [Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2006], 162) probably overstates the matter when he refers to ‘Wisdom…opposing 
the deuteronomic theology’. As will presently be argued in the case of the Epistle of Enoch, the deuteronomic 
pattern is rescued from its temporal contradiction by relocating its actualisation in the eschaton.  
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when considered in relation to the Epistle of Enoch (hereafter, the Epistle).39 As noted above, the 
similarities between Wisdom (especially chapter 2-4) and the Epistle (especially chapter 102-104) 
are striking. In addition to parallel speeches of the sinners (Wis. 2.1-20; 1 En. 102.6-11), both 
texts refute the logic of the wicked (Wis. 2.21-3.9; 1 En. 103.1-4) by appealing to a divinely 
revealed mystery (Wis. 2.21-24; 1 En. 103.1-2) which relates to the eschatological preservation of 
the souls/spirits of the righteous dead (Wis. 3.1; 1 En. 103.4-5).40 These connections (and a few 
others)41 have compelled some commentators to argue for literary dependence.42 While such a 
conclusion is certainly possible, it is enough for our purposes to note the indisputable presence 
of conceptual dependence. In an effort to clarify the theological shape of Wisdom’s theodicy, it 
will be useful to explore briefly one of its (major) theological resources.  
For the Epistle, the problem of the present is the perceived inversion of deuteronomic 
theology: the wicked prosper at the expense of the righteous whose lived experience is 
characterised by the deuteronomic curses. The explicitly deuteronomic shape of this injustice 
is evident in 103.9-15 which describes the conditions of the righteous in terms of the covenant 
curses of Deuteronomy 28-30.43 ‘Having hoped to be the head’ (γενέσθαι κεφαλή), the righteous 
‘have become the tail’ (ἐγενήθημεν κέρκος; 103.11a; cf. Deut 28.13, 44). The question is whether 
this upside-down existence reflects reality or simply reality’s empirical, temporary aberration. 
The Epistle’s opinion is clear: at the judgment the righteous ‘will not be found to be as sinners’ 
(οὐ μὴ εὑρεθῆτε ὡς οἱ ἁμαρτωλοί; 104.5).44 Actuality, it seems, cannot be separated from 
eschatology. More colloquially, looks can be deceiving. The apparent righteousness of the rich 
                                                        
39 The Epistle (1 En. 92.1-5; 93.11-105.2) represents a relatively late moment in the Enochic literary history. 
The composition of both the frame and body of the Epistle probably date from the period immediately before the 
Maccabean Revolt (L.T. Stuckenbruck, 1 Enoch 91-108 [CEJL; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2007], 211-15; Nickelsburg, 1 Enoch 1: 
A Commentary on the Book of 1 Enoch, Chapters 1-36; 81-108 [Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001], 427-28).   
40 Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality and Eternal Life, 161.   
41 For Georgi, the presence of the resurrection of the soul in both Wisdom and 1 Enoch 96-97 is an 
indication that Wisdom should be dated earlier and its provenance moved closer to Palestine than the general 
scholarly consensus (Weisheit Salomos, 395-97).   
42 P. Grelot, ‘L’Eschatologie de la Sagesse et les Apocalypses Juives’ in Bibliothèque de la Faculté 
Catholique de Théologie de Lyon, ed., La Reconcontre de Dieu : Festschrift für A. Gelin (Le Puy: Xavier Mappus, 1996), 
169, quoted in Gathercole, Where is Boasting, 68 n.138.  
43 Stuckenbruck, 1 Enoch, 548: ‘The language in the text...consists in large part of words, expressions and 
whole phrases drawn from the reservoir of curses for breaking the covenant in Deuteronomy 28….The righteous 
are made to utter a deep disappointment, if not disillusionment, that they themselves are suffering the 
consequences promised in the covenant to the disobedient (cf. e.g. Lam. 5.1-22; Deut. 31.17b)’. See also A. 
Dillmann, Das Buch Henoch (Leipzig: Fr. Chr. Wilh. Vogel, 1853), 322.  
44 Note also the prohibition that introduces the speech of 103.9-15 (μὴ γὰρ εἴpiητε, 103.9) and the oath-
formula that opens 104.1-6. These prefaces serve to commend the content of the latter passage while discouraging 
the attitude expressed in the former.   
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(cf. 96.4) and the assumed disobedience of the downcast (103.9-15) will both be exposed in an 
eschatological reversal of fortunes (104.5-6).45 By way of this ontological sleight-of-hand – that 
is, the eschatological is more real than the empirical – the symmetrical justice of deuteronomic 
theology is preserved by being postponed.  
For this theodicy to work, however, the aetiological lines that connect, on the one 
hand, covenant obedience and blessings and, on the other hand, disobedience and the 
covenant curses need to be redrawn. Put another way, the problem of the present is the 
empirically asymmetrical relationship between Deuteronomy’s anthropological and 
soteriological dualisms. The anthropological poles of righteousness and impiety are supposed 
to correspond to the twin soteriological destinies of, respectively, blessing and curse or, if 
interpreted eschatologically, life and death. Restated in these terms, the Epistle’s problem is the 
disjunction between the crisscross soteriology of the present and the linearity of 
Deuteronomy. Quite naturally, then, the solution is articulated in terms of the eschatological 
reestablishment of the soteriological correspondence between the righteous and blessing/life 
and, conversely, the wicked and curse/death. As Nickelsburg distills the Epistle’s central 
message, the final judgment is the time when ‘God will recompense the righteous and the 
wicked according to their deeds’.46 Within the narrative world of the Epistle, then, the good 
news is not that sinners will enjoy soteriological blessings – that is precisely the problem – but 
rather that divine saving action will correspond to human moral action.47 
Not surprisingly, therefore, and in harmony with the Epistle’s deuteronomic 
eschatology and theodicy, there is in Wisdom a correspondence between human ‘worth’ (ἄξιος, 
3.5) and the divine exercise of judgment and ‘grace and mercy’ (χάρις καὶ ἔλεος, 4.15). The 
children of an ‘unlawful union’ (piαρανόμου κοίτης, 3.16), even if they appear to experience the 
covenantal blessing of long life, will find themselves hopeless and inconsolable on the ‘day of 
                                                        
45 G.W.E. Nickelsburg, ‘Riches, the Rich, and God’s Judgment in 1 Enoch 92-105 and the Gospel According 
to Luke’, NTS 25 (1978-1979): 324-44.  
46 Nickelsburg, 1 Enoch 1, 420. It is important to note that for the Epistle the main question is not whether 
the righteous and wicked deserve their respective fates, although that is, to a degree, assumed in the reward 
soteriology of 99.10; 103.3-4; 1-4.13-105.1 and the two-ways theology of 94.1-5. The question is whether or not the 
right people are going to receive the right retribution. In other words, the basic question is one of theodicy, not 
soteriology. 
47 The grounds for this soteriological fittingness are implicit in the sobriquets that stereotype the 
competing groups: sinners and righteous. That these are essentially moral categories is evident, on the one hand, 
in the correlation between the repeatedly described sins of the wicked and their eschatological destruction and, 
on the other hand, the assumption that the righteous have chosen the path of righteousness and will be rewarded 
accordingly. These respective points are particularly clear in the woe-oracles and exhortations.  
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judgment’ (ἡμέρα διαγνώσεως, 3.18). By contrast it is the empirically cursed undefiled barren 
woman who is actually blessed (μακαρία, 3.13) and the paradoxically righteous objects of the 
covenant punishment of an early death who will find eschatological rest (ἐν ἀναpiαύσει ἔσται, 
4.7). This latter example is canonically confirmed by an appeal to the figure of Enoch, whose 
premature departure from earthly existence is interpreted as a protective and loving 
expression of the grace and mercy of God towards one who pleased him (4.10-15). Similarly, 
the covenantally cursed and ostracised eunuch will be, because of (γάρ, 3.14) his faithfulness 
(piίστις, 3.14) given χάρις ἐκλεκτή (3.14; cf. 3.9; 4.15).  Election, therefore, is not a process of 
random selection, but operates within the boundaries of the justly constituted moral order. In 
accordance with the soteriological pattern implicit in 2.22 (i.e. ‘wages of holiness’), the χάρις 
καὶ ἔλεος of election (ἐκλεκτός, 3.9; 4.15) is reserved for the ‘holy ones’ (οἱ ὅσιοι, 4.15).48 
Similarly, as Barclay observes, ‘Wisdom refers to the “lot” (κλῆρος) of the righteous (3.14; 5.5) 
as the product not of chance but of justice, the “fruit” of good labours (3.13, 15)’.49 Not 
surprisingly, therefore, immortality, precisely as a divine gift (χάρις, cf. 3.5-9; 4.10-15), is 
nevertheless spoken of in terms of reward (μισθός, 5.15; cf. 2.22; 3.13-15).50 There is a suitably 
rational correspondence between gift and beneficiary, for after all, it is precisely 
‘righteousness that is immortal’ (δικαιοσύνη ἀθάνατός ἐστιν, 1.15).51 As Gathercole reads 
Wisdom, ‘Reward is considered to be something gracious and granted by God’s free choice’;52 or 
again, in Lagrange’s pithy definition of Wisdom’s notion of χάρις, the gift of immortality is a 
                                                        
48The process by which people become οἱ ὅσιοι is, with some redundancy, spelled out in 6.10: οἱ γὰρ 
φυλάξαντες ὁσίως τὰ ὅσια ὁσιωθήσονται. That election was ‘utterly gratuitous’ has become something of a 
rallying cry in the post-Sanders era. While this refrain is true as it stands, it tends to (ironically) import the 
peculiarly Pauline notion of the un-preconditioned gift into its description of early Jewish theology. Election as a 
divine χάρις is coordinated with notions of human suitability such that the gift (election) corresponds to the 
social, intellectual and/or moral worth of its recipient (for Abraham’s election see e.g. Jub. 11.14-12.24; L.A.B. 6.1-
18; Ant. 1.154-185; Apoc. Ab. 1-9; for the election of Abraham’s immediate descendents see e.g. Jub. 19.13-20; CD 3.1-
4; L.A.B. 32.5; for the election of national Israel see e.g. 2 Bar. 48.20; 1QM 10.9-11). For a fuller discussion of 
‘grace/gift’ in Wisdom in relation to its ancient context (both social and theological) see the section on Wisdom as 
a ‘saving and fitting gift’ (chapters three, five and seven).  
49 Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 94 n.5. 
50 Larcher, Le Livre de la Sagesse, 1.265; H. Bückers, Die Unsterblichkeitslehre der Weisheitsbuch: ihr Ursprung 
und ihre Bedeutung (Münster: Aschendorff, 1938), cited in Reese, Hellenistic Influence, 64 n. 149. For more on Wisdom’s 
conception of χάρις and the mechanics of gift-giving see the discussion of 6.12-10.21 (chapter three). 
51 Hübner interprets the connection between righteousness and immorality as implying a 
correspondence between the human performance of righteousness and immorality: ‘Wer die unsterbliche 
Gerechtigkeit übt’ (Weisheit Salomons, 36).  
52 Gathercole, Where is Boasting, 71. For the use of μισθός in gift-discourse, see chapter seven.  
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‘récompense gracieuse’.53 ‘The outcome of life, then’, as Barclay remarks, ‘is not the product of 
chance (2.2) or ultimately unfair: in accordance with what is morally, socially or rationally 
fitting, the ungodly will meet their end in death (1.16) and the godly will live with God (3.5)’.54   
The principles, then, are in place. The injustice of death’s anarchic reign is a temporary 
aberration from the ultimately unassailable orderliness of the divine intention. Death’s 
destabilising rationality has been boldly countered with an empirically nonsensical vision of 
moral symmetry and cosmic equitability. To counter the empirical, however, is necessarily to 
point to the eschatological. In other words, to say that injustice, chaos and death will give way 
to justice, order and immortality is to invite an explanation of how and when this equitable 
administration will come into being.  
For Wisdom the arena in which the irrationality of death will be exposed and defeated is 
an eschatological judgment scene (4.16-5.23).55 Clothed for battle (5.17-20), the Lord will don 
the ‘helmet of impartial justice’ (κόρυθα κρίσιν ἀνυpiόκριτον, 5.18) to ensure that the righteous 
and the ungodly meet their ‘fitting’ fates. Demolished by the justice and power of God (4.18-
20), terrified and condemned by their sin (4.20) and unable to account for the paradoxical 
vindication of the righteous (piαραδόξῳ τῆς σωτηρίας, 5.2) the ungodly will acknowledge that 
their perception of reality was far ‘from the way of truth’ (ἀpiὸ ὁδοῦ ἀληθείας, 5.6). The 
righteous, by contrast, will receive their reward (μισθός, 5.15): exalted life in the presence and 
protection of God (5.15-16). This eschatological reversal extends to the empirical sphere as 
Wisdom’s natural theology (Wis. 13.1-5) is transposed into a creational soteriology in which the 
elements join in the divine battle against the ungodly (5.17-23; cf. 19.18-20), thus 
demonstrating the cosmic scale on which the principles of divine justice and moral order 
operate (cf. 1.14b). 
                                                        
53 Lagrange, ‘Le Livre de Sagesse’, 95. Gathercole (Where is Boasting, 71 n. 157) notes D.A. Carson’s 
argument for the redefinition of ‘grace’ in some early Jewish literature as a kind response to merit rather than 
favour in defiance of demerit (Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: Biblical Perspectives in Tension [London: 
Marshall Pickering, 1991], 69). This observation appears to move beyond univocal assumptions about 
soteriological terms, but Carson’s comment about ‘the diluted value of “grace”’ in early Judaism indicates that he 
presupposes a normative definition  of grace that assumes a fitting gift is an inferior gift (Divine Sovereignty and 
Human Responsibility, 69). Also, the reference to merit implies that moral worth (i.e. merit) is the sole pre-
condition for divine favour, when a range of Jewish literature, not least Wisdom (cf. Wis. 10.1-2), indicate that 
fittingness can be based on rational, ethnic and social status as well as ethical conformity.  
54 Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 94. 
55 Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life, 67. 
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Glancing backwards from the end of chapter 5 provides a view from which we can 
detect a suggestive connection between 1.13-2.24 and 4.16-5.23.56 If 1.13-2.24 expresses the 
empirically accurate though theologically ignorant worldview of the ungodly from the 
perspective of the present, then 4.16-5.23 provides an eschatological re-presentation of this 
drama that turns the empirical inside-out and thereby turns the theological right-side-up. In 
both instances, the ungodly are given a voice (2.1-10; 5.3-13), but the content and tone of the 
speeches are antithetical. Eschatology is an event of exposure. What once appeared to the 
wicked as the totality of existence (i.e. earthly life, 2.1b-5) is now, in view of the salvation of 
the righteous (5.4-6), seen to be ontologically empty (ἡμεῖς γεννηθέντες ἐξελίpiομεν, 5.13). A 
similar reverse is evident as the counter-empirical affirmations of the soteriological nature of 
the cosmos (1.13-14; 2.23) find eschatological confirmation: God arms creation to repel his 
enemies and fight with him against his deranged (piαράφρων) enemies (5.17, 20). According to 
Manfredi, this complete postponement of deuteronomic justice moves beyond both the 
prophetic and even Enochic traditions from which it draws: ‘the revelation of that which gives 
sense to the life and suffering of the just, the perfect divine recompense is life after death, in 
the presence of God , in peace and in love’.57 This eschatological extremity, however, only 
highlights the categorical distinction between the ungodly and the righteous, between life and 
death, between the way things appear and the way things actually are. The present is a 
perversion. The covenantal lines of blessing and curse are unjustly and inversely linked to the 
wrong people – the ungodly prosper and the righteous suffer. The first speech of the wicked 
takes this aberration to be actuality; their second speech acknowledges their overly empirical 
irrationality in the face of the eschatological reestablishment of the straight lines of justice: 
the ungodly are consumed (καταδαpiανάω, 5.13) and the righteous are numbered among the 
children of God (5.5).    
            
 
                                                        
56 Manfredi, ‘The Trial of the Righteous’, 161-62.  
57 Manfredi, ‘The Trial of the Righteous’, 176. Manfredi argues that the Confessions of Jeremiah (11.18-
12.6; 15.10-21; 17.14-18; 18.18-23; 20.7-18) and the Third Servant Song of Isaiah (50.4-9, 10-11) provide Wisdom’s 
main canonical resources in the Trial of the righteous (Wis. 5.1-14). Nickelsburg prefers to see the story of the 
persecuted and exalted righteous person as ‘an interpretation or expansion or elaboration of Isaiah 52-53 with 
certain motifs and elements added from Isaiah 13 and 14…. using the latter to describe the judgment/punishment 
of the persecutors’ (Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life, 101, 107).  
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Concluding a Court Drama 
In Wisdom the eschatological actualisation of the promise of immortality is the answer 
to the theodicy question that has shaped the debate between the righteous and the ungodly.58 
Offering the finality of death as their seemingly incontrovertible closing statement, the 
ungodly rested confidently in the perceived unassailability of their evidence.59 Such logical 
confidence, however, failed to account for God’s universal providence (piρονοεῖ piερὶ piάντων, 
6.7) which scrutinizes everything (6.3) and relentlessly judges (κρίσις ἀpiότομος, 6.5) all, 
especially the powerful (δυνατοί, 6.6), who οὐκ ἐκρίνατε ὀρθῶς οὐδὲ ἐφυλάξατε νόμον οὐδὲ 
κατὰ τὴν βουλὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐpiορεύθητε (6.4). The righteous, by contrast, reasoning within the 
rational sphere constituted by the μυστήρια θεοῦ (2.22), know that even an early, childless and 
violent death cannot separate them from their fitting destiny: ‘the souls of the righteous are in 
the hands of God’ (3.1). Immortality, then, is the counter-evidence to death, an eschatological 
ace-in-the-hole which trumps death’s dual pretensions: finality and anarchy. These competing 
teleological perspectives generate ‘alternative readings of the world’,60 one characterised by 
moral chaos, judicial mayhem and cosmic instability, the other corresponding to a primordial 
order which is predictably and unalterably rational, symmetrical and equitable. The most basic 
manifestation of this symmetrical justice is the fitting destinies of the righteous and the 
ungodly. As Nickelsburg suggests, ‘The thesis of the Wisdom of Solomon 1-6 is that 
unrighteousness leads to death and destruction (1.12; 5.9-14), while righteousness leads to life 
and immortality (1.15; 5.15)’.61 This counter-empirical thesis cannot be read off the surface of 
temporal existence; it is the product of an interpretative exercise shaped by the hermeneutical 
constraints of a pre-existing cosmological and theological vision of divine justice and moral 
order.  
                                                        
58 A.A. Di Lella (‘Conservative and Progressive Theology: Sirach and Wisdom of Solomon’, CBQ 28 [1966]: 
139-54) argues that Wisdom’s theological innovation is most clearly detectable in the author’s emphasis on 
eschatological retribution and the afterlife. Cf. D.J. Harrington, Invitation to the Apocrypha (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1999), 75: ‘The emphasis on immortality is the writer’s most original and influential contribution to 
biblical theology’.  
59 For death and immortality as the respective pieces of evidence marshaled by the ungodly and the 
righteous see Kolarcik, ‘Universalism and Justice in the Wisdom of Solomon’, 300. 
60 Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 94. 
61 Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life, 67; see also Kolarcik, ‘Universalism and Justice in 
the Wisdom of Solomon’, 300; D.E. Gowan, ‘Wisdom’, in Justification and Variegated Nomism: Volume 1, The 
Complexities of Second Temple Judaism (ed. D.A. Carson, Peter T. O’Brien and Mark A. Seifrid; Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2001), 215-239; Watson, Hermeneutics, 384; S.J. Gathercole, Where is Boasting, 67-72.  
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Cosmology and theology, however, are noetically unavailable to the natural 
epistemological project. Within Wisdom’s theological grammar, it is the educational activity of 
the divine σοφία that reveals the true structures of the ordered cosmos which she fashioned 
and sustains. Thus, following Wisdom, it is to Wisdom that we now turn. 
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Chapter 3 
Wisdom’s Place in Wisdom’s Theology: 6.1-10.211 
 
Soteriologically interested interpretations of Wisdom tend to hurry from the so-called ‘Book of 
Eschatology’ (Wis. 1-5/6) to the ‘Book of History’ (Wis. 10/11-19), making only passing 
comments about the central section (the ‘Book of Wisdom’, Wis. 6-9/10) as they catch glimpses 
of the strange conceptual topography from the window of their exegetical train. In contrast to 
the ‘cross-cultural’ semantics of σοφία, the δίκαιο- language which dominates the first and last 
section of Wisdom provides, especially for the Pauline tourist, familiarity, a lexical home away 
from home.2 This trend, while understandable, is problematic. Although the distribution of 
vocabulary is indicative of the central thematics of Wisdom’s three major units, it is not quite 
right to suggest that σοφία is absent from the books of eschatology and history. The prologue 
is peppered with the poetics of Wisdom (1.4-9), and she pops up again in 3.11 and 6.9.3 
Furthermore, while it is almost true that Wisdom ‘only occurs twice in an incidental way in 
chs. 11-19 (14.2, 5)’,4 σοφία (10.21) is the unambiguous subject of εὐόδωσεν in 11.1. The result is 
a gong-like effect in which 11.1 sounds the loud note of Wisdom’s initiating and directing role 
in the Exodus events (10.15-11.1) and sends her agency, however hidden and unspoken, 
reverberating through the re-narration of the wilderness adventures (chapters 11-19).5 These 
exegetical observations reflect the centrality of σοφία at the sub-structural level of Wisdom’s 
theology. However, because Wisdom is often read as a conversation partner for Paul, Pauline 
patterns of discourse are permitted to dictate what is deemed interesting and relevant – even 
theologically important – for Wisdom’s soteriological schema. The problem is that Wisdom is a 
central and constituent feature of Wisdom’s theological architecture and the architect of 
                                                        
1 For a similarly entitled and conceptually related discussion see D. Winston, ‘Wisdom in the Wisdom of 
Solomon’, in In Search of Wisdom: Essays in Memory of John G. Gammie (ed. Leo G. Perdue; Louisville: John Knox Pres, 
1993), 149.  
2 D.E. Gowan, ‘Wisdom’, in Justification and Variegated Nomism: Volume 1, The Complexities of Second Temple 
Judaism (ed. D.A. Carson, Peter T. O’Brien and Mark A. Seifrid; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 215-239.   
3 J.R. Dodson also detects the agency of ‘Lady Wisdom’ in the activity of her synonymous personification 
(i.e. Lady Virtue) in Wisdom 4.1-2 (The ‘Powers’ of Personification: Rhetorical Purpose in the Book of Wisdom and the Letter 
to the Romans [BZNW 161; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008], 103-105).  
4 Gowan, ‘Wisdom’, 225.  
5 Pace H. Hübner, Die Weisheit Salomons (ATD Apokryphen 4: Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1999), 
393 who argues that σοφία is absent from Wisdom 11-19 in order to indicate that ‘die das Heil wirkende Weisheit 
wirkt kein anderes Wirken als das Wirken Gottes’.    
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Wisdom’s theological universe. As will be argued below, Wisdom is both the creative instrument 
through whom the natural, rational and moral order coheres and the educational agent by 
whom a proper perception of reality is engendered. Moreover, the soteriological significance 
of σοφία is evident in her action as a salvific agent, an agency which is particularly notable as 
Wisdom is portrayed as the divine gift (χάρις, 8.21) and as she is retrojected into the Genesis 
narratives (10.1-14). 
 
Speaking as Solomon – Singing of Σοφία 
 The historical implausibility of Solomonic authorship should not distract us from the 
hermeneutical perspective implicit in the rhetorical association of the ‘Book of Wisdom’ with 
the voice of Solomon.6 Two points need to be emphasised. First, Solomon speaks as a king (9.7) 
to fellow kings (6.1, 9, 21). This rhetorical address is regularly described as a (mere) adoption 
of, as Reese puts it, ‘a hellenistic literary convention’,7 but the preponderance of ‘ruling’ 
language8 and the explicit connection between Wisdom and kingship9 suggests material as well 
as formal significance.10 The abrupt transition from judgment against the inappropriate 
exercise of power (οὐκ ἐκρίνατε ὀρθῶς, 6.4) to Wisdom’s instructive generation of lasting (εἰς 
τὸν αἰῶνα, 6.21) and sensible (φρόνιμος, 6.24) kingdoms reflects the ancient, near-eastern 
tradition of locating the instantiation of divine principles in the person and activity of the 
monarch.11 Within this kingship model, the βασιλεύς is both the focal point of moral 
                                                        
6 The references to the speaker’s kingship and charge to build the temple (9.7-8) make the allusion to 
Solomon unmistakable.  
7 J.M. Reese, Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and its Consequences (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 
1970), 110-11; E. Clarke, The Wisdom of Solomon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 14.  
8 For example: κρίνω (1.1, 3.8, 6.4), βασιλεύς (6.1, 24; 7.5; 9.7; 10.16; 11.10; 12.14; 14.17; 18.11), δικαστής 
(6.1), κράτησις (6.3), δυναστεία (6.3), κρατέω (3.8, 6.2), βασιλεία (6.4, 20; 10.10, 14), τύραννος (6.9, 21; 8.15; 12.14; 
14.17).    
9 M. McGlynn, Divine Judgment and Divine Benevolence in the Book of Wisdom (WUNT II, 139; Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck), 105-08.  
10 This is further indicated by the clarifying repetition of the objects of address in 6.9, 21 in which it is 
explicitly the ‘rulers’ (note the οὖν in 6.9) and not the people (λαός, 6.21) whom they govern who are summoned 
to learn (μανθάνω, 6.9) about Wisdom from their fellow king. A notable exception to this general interpretive 
indifference is Roberto Vignolo, ‘Wisdom, Prayer and Kingly Pattern: Theology, Anthropology, Spirituality of Wis 
9’, in The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research: Studies on Tradition, Redaction, and Theology (DCLY 2005; ed. A. Passaro 
and G. Bellia; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005), 255-282. Setting the model of kingship expressed in Wisdom 9 alongside the 
‘Qoheletian model’, Vignolo argues that in contrast to Qoheleth’s claim that ‘regality is…an unfitting…symbol of 
the anthropologic condition’, Wisdom thinks ‘regality is man’s true vocation’ (279).   
11 S.N. Morschauser, ‘The Ideological Basis for Social Justice/Responsibility in Ancient Egypt’, in Social 
Justice in the Ancient World (ed. K.D. Irani and Morris Silver; Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995), 101-11. 
Morschauser argues that this was particularly true in pre-Ptolemaic Egypt where Pharaoh was regarded as the 
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discourse12 and the guarantor of justice – the one through whom the orderly structures of the 
cosmos take earthly shape in political, social and judicial praxis.13 Wisdom appears to operate 
within this basic framework, depicting kings in general (6.9-25) and Solomon in particular (7.1-
9.18) as the instruments through whom Wisdom effects the proper ordering of the created 
sphere: ‘[a king’s] desire for Wisdom leads to a kingdom’ (6.20) However, the apparently 
generous invitation to learn Wisdom (μάθητε σοφίαν, 6.9) subtly subverts this monarchial 
model by divesting rulers of their a priori association with divine virtue and locates the 
potentiality of equitable societies not in the king per se but in the king as a recipient and pupil 
of the educational agency of σοφία. That Solomon was this kind of king bring us to our second 
point.  
The reading of reality and primeval history offered in these chapters comes from an 
interpreter whose hermeneutical vision has been transformed by the illuminating gift of 
divine Wisdom. Solomon, aware of the common origin and mortality of humankind (7.1-6), 
prayed for understanding (φρόνησις, 7.7a) and received in response the hermeneutically 
generative piνεῦμα σοφίας (7.7b).14  It is the educational agency of Wisdom (7.22), an agency 
guided (ὁδηγός, 7.15) by God, which produces an ‘unerring knowledge of what exists’ (τῶν 
ὄντων γνῶσιν ἀψευδῆ, 7.17) that extends from the ‘composition of the cosmos’ and ‘activity of 
the elements’ (7.17) to the ‘nature of animals’ and the ‘variety of plants’ (7.20). It is from the 
hermeneutical vantage point of this ‘perfection of understanding’ (φρονήσεως τελειότης, 6.15) 
that the poems in praise of Wisdom (6.12-9.18)15 and the Exodus-shaped recasting of the 
Genesis narratives (10.1-14) are placed on the lips of Wisdom’s archetypal beneficiary. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
embodiment of justice (balance) because he was the possessor and distributor of maʽat (‘Social 
Justice/Responsibility in Ancient Egypt’, 101, 103).   
12 Discussing kingship tracts Reese notes that ‘productions of this genre became the ordinary vehicle for 
tracing the moral ideal of Hellenism in the form of a mirror for the wise and benevolent king…. hellensitic 
thinkers resorted to essays on kingship to explain the idea of human perfection’ (Hellenistic Influence, 72-73).  
13  Morschauser, ‘Social Justice/Responsibility in Ancient Egypt’, 103; McGlynn, Divine Judgment, 105-08. 
See also A. Mancini (Maat Revealed: Philosophy of Justice in Ancient Egypt [United States: Buenos Books America, 
2004], 3) who argues that in Egyptian society ‘there is no difference between divine and human justice’, the latter 
being modeled after and, if maʽat flows unhindered (Maat Revealed, 82), reflective of the former.  
14 Watson speaks of ‘Sophia’s transforming illumination’ which ‘comes onto the scene “vertically, from 
above”’ (Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith [London: T & T Clark, 2004], 529-30).  
15 McGlynn, Divine Judgment, 102: ‘The author of Wisdom has adapted the form of the praise-poem/hymn 
to suit his own theological convictions of unequivocal monotheism where God’s active attributes are presided 
over by wisdom’.  
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The rational relationship between Solomon and σοφία is the antithesis to the foolish 
friendship the ungodly imagine they have with death (1.16).16 Whereas the wicked indulge 
their unwise infatuation with death (1.16-2.1), Solomon, loving her whom God loves (8.3) and 
enchanted by her beauty, pursues Wisdom as a bride (8.2). In contrast to the illicit pact 
(συνθήκη, 1.16), which has death as both its co-signer and telos, marriage to Wisdom brings all 
the sexual joys of matrimony (8.16)17 and has immortality as its soteriological end: ἀθανασία 
ἐστὶν ἐν συγγενείᾳ σοφίας (8.17). The antithesis is stark. The ungodly long for and therefore 
find death in all its absurd meaninglessness. The righteous seek Wisdom and through her 
educational and salvific beneficence attain immortality. Those worthy of death die; those 
worthy of Wisdom live forever. As one who was worthy of Wisdom, as one who loved her and 
knew her both intimately and intelligently, Solomon is qualified to sing praises about her in 
the presence of kings so that they might learn Wisdom (μάθητε σοφίαν, 6.9).18    
Solomon’s song is wide ranging. The language of Middle-Platonism is commandeered to 
describe the indescribable, she who is a breath of divine power and whose beauty eclipses the 
sun and stars (7.29). It takes the sage a list of twenty-one words just to establish a rough sketch 
which he then colours in with the conceptualities of emanation, beauty, power, image and 
reflection (7.22-30).19 Σοφία proceeds from God and reflects his eternal light, she is the image 
of his goodness and, though she is one, she is omnipotent, passing into holy souls (ψυχαὶ ὅσιαι) 
                                                        
16 Dodson explores this contrast in terms of Wisdom’s personification of ‘Death’ and ‘Sophia’, suggesting 
that the author employs this rhetorical device to establish a two-ways soteriology. ‘Through this juxtaposition, 
the sage presents two paths of life. Either one will pine for Death or long for Wisdom. His audience can either 
make Death their king or take Sophia as their bride’ (The ‘Powers’ of Personification, 106-14, 16). Burton Mack, Logos 
und Sophia (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1973), 106 also notes the contrast, though he frames it in 
relation to spheres of existence: ‘Diese Sphäre der Existenz Israels, die als Sphäre des Lichtes, der Sohnschaft 
Gottes und der Weltherrschaft vorgestellt wird, ist aber nicht konsequent ins Überkomische verlegt als eine 
transzendente Erscheinung, sondern erscheint als Existenzbereich innerhalb des Kosmos, der für die Gottlosen 
die Sphäre der Strafe, der Finsternis und des Todes darstellt’.    
17 Wisdom 1.16 speaks of the gladness and joy derived from lying beside (piροσαναpiαύω), having 
intercourse with (ἡ συναναστροφή) and cohabitating with Wisdom. This may serve as a counter-claim to the 
sexual imagery that characterised the relationship between death and the ungodly in 1.16. For the erotic 
personality of Wisdom, see J.M. Reese, The Book of Wisdom, Song of Songs (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1983), 97; 
L.L. Grabbe, Wisdom of Solomon (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 68; A.M. Sinnott, The Personification of 
Wisdom (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 198.  
18 Solomon’s instruction extends to at least 10.14. This is indicated by the parenetic function of Adam and 
Joseph as exemplary monarchs who, respectively, had ‘strength to rule all things’ (10.2) and received ‘the sceptre 
of the kingdom’ (10.14). The end of this unit is difficult to fix, but the rhetorical transition from addressing kings 
to addressing God (10.20) probably functions as both a conclusion and an introduction (as does 10.15-21 as a 
whole).   
19 Winston, Wisdom, 178-80 notes the significance of the number twenty-one.  
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to make them friends of God.20 As the song expands Wisdom is depicted as quintessentially a 
creator, instructor and saviour. She was present when God created the cosmos (9.9) and is 
herself credited with ‘fashioning what exists’ (τῶν ὄντων τεχνῖτις, 8.6). Cognizant of the 
operations and structures of that which she fashioned (7.17-21; 8.6), Wisdom is able to 
disseminate the secrets of history, the beginning and end and middle of times (ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος 
καὶ μεσότητα χρόνων, 7.18; cf. 8.8). This educational activity, moreover, has a soteriological 
intention. Those who, by Wisdom, are taught what pleases God (τὰ ἀρεστά σου ἐδιδάχθησαν, 
9.18) are saved by Wisdom (τῇ σοφίᾳ ἐσώθησαν, 9.18).21 Furthermore, Wisdom’s instruction 
(piαιδεία, 6.17) produces a love for her that takes the form of obedience to her laws (τήρησις 
νόμων αὐτῆς, 6.18),22 which in turn ensures the actualisation of God’s soteriological purpose: 
immortality (6.18).23 The aetiology here is carefully structured and, on the surface, 
straightforward. Desiring instruction generates a love of Wisdom that produces obedience to 
her. This obedience in turn has its soteriological end in immortality whose own telos is 
nearness to God (6.17-19).  
Behind – ‘within’ is perhaps more precise – this seemingly simple cause and effect 
soteriology is the salvific activity of Wisdom. Divine and human agency coexist within the 
same causal chain. Wisdom’s ἀρχή is located in a human desire for her, but it is precisely these 
persons whom Wisdom is already seeking (1.12-16). The love which presupposes and produces 
obedience to her laws is also the precondition of her self-disclosure (1.12). Human worth 
(ἄξιος, 1.16) is a necessary prerequisite for those who would be the objects of Wisdom’s acts of 
revelation and salvation; and yet even to the worthy she comes only as a divine gift (χάρις, 
8.21).  Set against this complex aetiological pattern, Wisdom’s soteriological role is again seen 
                                                        
20 The use of φίλους θεοῦ in 7.27 is reminiscent of Jubilees 30.21 where, in the context of a discussion of 
the heavenly tablets (3.17-23), Israel is exhorted to do the commandments and so ‘be written down as friends of 
God’ (adscribentur amici dei).  
21 While it is clear that it is Wisdom who saves, it is difficult to determine whether she saves by teaching 
or simply saves those whom she has taught, the latter assuming no causal link between knowledge and salvation. 
Either way, the crucial point is that the objects of Wisdom’s saving action are those who know what pleases God. 
In other words, in both readings, it is those who have been taught who are the objects of saving action. This 
proper ‘fit’ between Wisdom’s soteriological activity and the beneficiaries of that activity will occupy us below.   
22 Gathercole assumes that the commandments of Wisdom are functionally equivalent to Torah (Where is 
Boasting? Early Jewish Soteriology and Paul’s Response in Romans 1-5 [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002], 68). If this is 
correct, then immortality, the soteriological telos of Wisdom, is the gift/reward awaiting Torah-observant Israel 
(see also Lagrange, ‘Le Livre de Sagesse, sa doctrine des fins dernières’, RevB 4 [1907]: 85-104). This conclusion, 
while possible, should not be pressed too far as the paucity of evidence makes a firm conclusion impossible.  
23 It is perhaps more accurate to say that immortality is the instrumental precondition for God’s 
soteriological purpose which is nearness to and life with him (5.15; 6.19). 
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to include her educational activity. Wisdom saves those whom she instructs (9.18), but she 
only instructs those who desire instruction (6.17). This does not necessarily imply a 
cooperative soteriology – it is unambiguously Wisdom who saves (τῇ σοφίᾳ ἐσώθησαν, 9.18) – 
but it does indicate that the objects of salvation correspond to a preconditional standard of 
worth. This is not salvation by human worth; this is salvation for those who are worthy.24  
 This connection between salvation and education, moreover, cannot be disconnected 
from Wisdom’s cosmological role as co-creator. Because Wisdom fashioned the cosmos (7.22), 
she can reveals its secrets (7.17-21). Consequently, because the content of Wisdom’s 
instruction is, at least in part, cosmological (cf. 7.18), Wisdom’s creative, educative and salvific 
functions mingle together in a web of interdependence: Wisdom saves by teaching about 
creation.25 Wisdom, therefore, in her cosmological, epistemological and soteriological 
operations, manages all things (διοικεῖ τὰ piάντα, 8.1). This is not quite the same as saying that 
‘wisdom is the sacred order according to which the universe is governed, and in which the 
natural, social and moral orders coheres’,26 but it is at least true that it is the beneficent and 
humane (εὐεργετικόν, φιλάνθρωpiον, 7.23; cf. 1.6) activity of Wisdom that guarantees the 
stability of this order, reveals its operations to suitable beneficiaries and acts with salvific 
efficacy within the rational and moral parameters of the cosmic structures she fashioned.27  
 
Pre-Conditional Χάρις: Σοφία, God’s Saving and Fitting Gift    
   The intersection between the agency of Wisdom and human existence is the divine 
granting of Wisdom as ἡ χάρις (8.21). For Wisdom, however, even, or perhaps especially, the 
economy of divine beneficence functions within the rational confines of moral order and 
divine justice. Correspondingly, the gifting of Wisdom cannot be a whimsical exercise of 
                                                        
24 The various ways in which Wisdom conceives of human worth will be addressed below. What is 
important here is that Wisdom’s interest is not so much in how humans contribute to their salvation (i.e. causality), 
but rather whom Wisdom saves (i.e. the worthy).  
25 This interconnectedness makes me hesitate to adopt the otherwise helpful structure proposed by 
Dodson, The ‘Powers’ of Personification, 106: ‘The three dimensions of Sophia unfold in Wisdom 6-10. In Wisdom 6, she 
is the way to eternal life; in Wisdom 7, the emanation of God and co-creator of his universe. She is the bringer of all 
good gifts in Wisdom 8, the key to understanding in Wisdom 9, and the deliverer from suffering in Wisdom 10’.  
26 Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 93 (italics original).  
27 The significant lexical and thematic parallels between Wisdom’s mediation on σοφία and the popular 
Isis aretalogies are regularly noted (e.g. Reese, Hellenistic Influence, 45-50). Although it is probable that Isis-
vocabulary informed Wisdom’s reflection, divine Wisdom is, unlike Isis, not an autonomous deity, but rather ‘a 
pure emanation of the glory of the Almighty’ (ἀpiόρροια τῆς τοῦ piαντοκράτορος δόξης εἰλικρινής, 7.25). 
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random favour, but rather must be seen to cohere with the principles of cosmic equity that 
have shaped Wisdom’s theological project. Therefore, even though Wisdom is easily discerned 
(εὐχερῶς θεωρεῖται, 6.12) and proactively self-disclosing (φθάνει piρογνωσθῆναι, 6.13),28 
neither of these traits are without qualification. Wisdom is found by those who love (ἀγαpiάω) 
and seek (ζητέω, 6.12) her and reveals herself to those who eagerly desire (ἐpiιθυμέω, 6.13) her. 
There is, then, both reciprocity of agency and a correlation of gift and recipient. While it is 
difficult to determine a chronology of agency – although priority is typically ascribed to 
human request (7.7; 8.21) – it is clear that both Wisdom and her beneficiaries actively 
contribute to the distribution of the divine χάρις. Within Wisdom’s ‘gift-theory’, however, 
aetiology is a subsidiary concern to the ‘fittingness of the gift’. In Barclay’s words, ‘Wisdom’s 
concern here is less causality (regarding “prior” cause, God or humanity) than affinity’.29 
Wisdom’s qualified proactivity seeks those who are ‘worthy of her’ (ἀξίους αὐτῆς, 6.16). This 
condition of suitability can be variously met by requesting (7.7; 8.21; 9.1-18), loving (6.12, 17; 
8.2), honouring (6.21), serving (10.9), desiring (6.13, 17, 20; 8.2) and seeking (6.12; 8.2, 18) 
Wisdom. The diversity of criteria, however, in no way delimits the fundamental criterion of 
‘fittingness’. Thus, in the particular case of Solomon who, by virtue of his lot, received a good 
soul (ἀγαθὴ ψυχή, 8.19), and in the general case of holy souls (ψυχαὶ ὅσιαι, 7.27), Wisdom only 
enters, illumines and ultimately saves those whom she determines to be ἄξιος.  
But again, as emphasised above, while it is the worthy who are saved, it is Wisdom who 
saves (9.18). Wisdom’s repeated insistence on the suitability of the human recipient of divine 
grace is not indicative of notions of human earning. On the contrary, though Solomon was 
good (ἀγαθὸς ὤν, 8.20), his obtainment of the χάρις of Wisdom required an act of genuine 
giving (δίδωμι). His goodness made him a ‘fitting’ recipient of the divine gift, but the gift 
remains a gift – a rational bestowal of divine Wisdom to one who corresponds to an 
appropriate standard of pre-conditional worth. In this theological context, an act of grace or a 
divine gift is an unearned – non-contractual, voluntary – though explainable – fitting, congruous 
– benefaction.       
                                                        
28 The syntax of this verse is thorny, but following Winston (The Wisdom of Solomon (AB, 43; Garden City, 
NY: Doubleday, 1979), 153) it seems best, both grammatically and contextually, to take the infinitive 
(piρογνωσθῆναι) with φθάνω.  
29 Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 95 (italics original).  
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According to Barclay, this emphasis on the affinity between gift and recipient situates 
Wisdom squarely within the normative antique practices of gift exchange. 
Like any good giver in the ancient world, God gives gifts to those able and willing to 
receive them, and this proper ‘fit’ between gift and recipient does not make the gift any 
less a gift (it is entirely that), but ensures that it is a good gift, not wasted, ineffective or 
inappropriate.30     
 While anything like a competent survey of ancient gift-theory is beyond the scope of this 
project, it is worth noting that Seneca’s De Beneficiis, the most elaborate and influential ancient 
discourse on benefaction and gratitude,31 offers an exhaustive – and somewhat exhausting – 
argument for the moral, logical and social necessity of ensuring that acts of benefaction are 
directed toward suitable beneficiaries.32 Seneca’s basic complaint is that people ‘do not know 
how either to give or to receive benefits’ (De Beneficiis I.1.1). This ignorance is principally 
evident in irrational gifting and a correspondingly irrational expectation of reward: ‘For it 
follows that, if they [gifts] are ill placed, they are ill acknowledged, and when we complain of 
their not being returned, it is too late; for they were lost at the time they were given’ (De 
Beneficiis I.1.1; cf. VII.30.1). The primary cause of this frustrated economy of benefaction is that 
people fail to ‘pick out those who are worthy (dignus) of receiving our gifts’ (De Beneficiis I.1.2).33 
This gives way, after some qualification and digression, to a maxim of sorts: ‘we ought to be 
careful to confer benefits by preference upon those who will be likely to respond with favour’ 
(De Beneficiis I.10.4).  
It is crucially important, however, both for a proper understanding of Seneca and for a 
fair reading of Wisdom, to note that this discerning benefaction in no way disqualifies the 
                                                        
30 Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 96 (italics original).  
31 J.W. Basore, introduction to Seneca III: Moral Essays, by Seneca (trans. J.W. Basore; LCL 310; Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1935), vii-viii. It is important to remember that Seneca’s discourse represents a 
philosophical reflection on the ideals of gift exchange rather than a description of popular practice. Nevertheless, 
even when Seneca is complaining about the improper praxis of the populace, he argues from a shared ideology of 
social exception, thereby reflecting the substructural dynamics that shape his mediations as well as the habits of 
the masses.  
32 Suitability here is defined both in terms of worth in some social, moral or practical sense (De Beneficiis 
I.1.2; I.10.4) and in relation to a perceived need or desire (De Beneficiis I.12.3; II.1.3)  
33 This logical and pre-conditioned gifting appears to be qualified later as Seneca exhorts his reader to 
continue, like the gods who show lavish and unceasing kindness to those who are sacrilegious and indifferent to 
them’ (De Beneficiis I.1.9), in generosity even in the face of ingratitude; thus making their ‘benefits not 
investments, but gifts’ (De Beneficii I.1. 9). But even the apparent irrationality of this seemingly reason-less giving 
is misconstrued if the benefits involved are regarded as wasted; for even this act of benefaction will realise its 
reciprocal intentions as it ‘draws forth gratitude even from a heart that is hard and unmindful’ (De Beneficiis I.3.1). 
Furthermore, at the conclusion of his discourse, Seneca relocates the benefit of giving in the act of beneficence 
itself, rather than in the reciprocity of returned honour, such that to give is to receive (De Beneficiis VII.32.1).     
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graciousness – the ‘giftness’ – of the gift. On the contrary, a gift is defined as such precisely as 
it is rationally extended to a fitting recipient. Indeed, even ‘the gift of a huge sum of money, if 
neither reason nor rightness of choice has prompted it, is no more a benefit than it is a 
treasure-trove’ (De Beneficiis I.15.6). Thus, drawing together the various discursive threads from 
Book I, Seneca concludes: ‘The benefit that is a delight to have received…is one that reason 
delivers to those who are worthy (dignus), not the one that chance and irrational impulse carry 
no matter where’ (De Beneficiis I.15.3).  
This contextual definition of gift resolves what to many readers of Wisdom appears as 
an irreconcilable tension. The coordination of human worth and divine grace smells like 
synergism to those whose senses have been trained in a post-Pauline world. This, however, is 
to read aetiology where Wisdom is arguing for affinity: human worth is a soteriological 
condition but not a soteriological cause. Synergism implies a cooperation of agencies, which, 
while perhaps present between the lines in 6.17-20 and 3.14, is never the material interest of 
Wisdom’s mediation. To say that God’s gifts are reserved for the worthy – or to use Seneca’s 
language, the dignus – is not in itself an expression of cooperative soteriology; it is rather an 
instance of contextual common sense. In Wisdom, it is only and always God who saves. The 
question is whom does he save? Answer: the worthy, because God is just and good. Divine 
benefaction does not disrupt the elemental structures of the cosmos; God’s giving exemplifies 
the theological and cosmological reality that he ‘arranged all things by measure and number 
and weight’ (11.20).        
It appears, then, that Barclay’s location of Wisdom’s ‘gift-theory’ within the norms of 
ancient practices of benefaction is, at least in relation to Seneca’s influential treatise, 
confirmed. The assumption of affinity between benefit and beneficiary does not reflect an 
early Jewish deterioration of the concept of χάρις,34 but rather, as Barclay remarks, ‘expresses 
the absolutely basic and universal theistic presumption that the universe is fitly and morally 
ordered’.35 For Wisdom, God’s goodness is evident in his giving precisely because his acts of 
                                                        
34 This is the impression given by D.A Carson’s study Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility (p. 69). As 
we shall argue later, however, though it is incorrect to detect a deterioration of the concept of χάρις – for this is 
to access the early Jewish literature retrospectively from the novelty and peculiarity of a Pauline framework – it is 
both accurate and crucially important to note that the semantic domain and corresponding theological meaning 
of χάρις in Paul and his ideological context (both Jewish and Greco-Roman) are in fact quite different.    
35 Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 104. The implication, of course, is that χάρις operates within the 
boundaries of this rationally defined order. Whether or not the same can be said of the Pauline notion of grace is 
precisely the question that this project is attempting to answer.  
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benefaction instantiate the protological pattern fashioned and managed by σοφία and because 
divine grace is therefore an expression of rather than an exception to the immutable 
operations of justice.   
 
              
Excursus: Philo on Radical though Rational Χάρις 
 The contextual normativity of Wisdom’s description of divine benefaction is confirmed 
by a comparison with another Alexandrian: Philo. The Philonic corpus has the capacity to 
impress post-Pauline interpreters with its insistence on the creational and causative priority of 
divine grace. This admiring sense of ‘appropriateness’, however, often gives way to 
befuddlement as Philo ‘confusingly’ coordinates divine χάρις and human ἀξία.36 This 
interpretative incredulity, not unlike what we saw in relation to Wisdom and Seneca, is a 
product of thinking Paul while reading Philo.37 For his part, Philo is quite capable of insisting 
that the necessary correspondence between anthropological suitability and divine grace does 
not disqualify the graciousness of the gift. On the contrary, though the recipients – in this case 
the five daughters of Zelophehad (Num 27.1-11) – are ‘considered worthy’ (ἀξιόω), the χάρις 
which they receive is emphatically not a payment (οὐδ’ ἀpiοδώσεις), but ‘a gift’ (δόμα).38  
Several modern readers of Philo have balked at this linking of ‘worth’ and ‘gift’, 
supposing that such an affinity reflects an idiosyncratic or depreciated notion of χάρις.39 Philo, 
                                                        
36 For χάρις in conjunction with the ἄξιο- word group see, e.g., De Cherubim 84; De Somniis 2.177; Quod Deus 
immutabilis sit 104-10; Legum Allegoriae 3.14, 27, 164; De Mutatione Nominum 52, 58, 268; De Specialibus Legibus 1.43; 
2.219; De Vita Mosis 2.242.  
37 Again, if, as this study intends to demonstrate, Paul’s usage of χάρις represents a conceptual 
redefinition, then the meaning he assigns to this common term should not be used to evaluate the theological 
content and cogency of other ancient authors.  
38 De Vita Mosis 2.242. Philo is able to refer to divine χάρις as a reward (γεραίροντος) for the pious (e.g. De 
Praemiis et Poenis 126), but this does not signal a transition to a pay-economy; it indicates the congruence between 
gift and recipient (see chapter seven). 
39 H.A. Wolfson labels some of Philo’s χάρις language ‘merited grace’ (Philo: Foundations of Religious 
Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam [Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1947], I.1457-58). Similarly, J. Harrison, who 
otherwise correctly locates Philo’s grace discourse within the ancient conventions of gift exchange (Paul’s 
Language of Grace in its Graeco-Roman Context [WUNT II.172; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003], 114-33), suggests that 
‘the ἄξιοι somehow attracted God’s grace’ (125). Similar protests against the graciousness of Philo’s 
understanding of grace can be found in W. Völker, Fortschritt und Vollendung bei Philo von Alexandrien, Leipzig: J.C. 
Hinrichs, 1938, quoted in J.M.G. Barclay, ‘Grace Within and Beyond Reason: Philo and Paul in Dialogue’, in Paul, 
Grace and Freedom: Essays in Honour of John K. Riches (ed. Paul Middleton et al.; London: T&T Clark), 2009, 9-21; D.A. 
Carson, ‘Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility in Philo’, NovT 23 (1981): 148-64; VanLandingham, Judgment 
and Justification, 27.   
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however, would be the first to criticise those who reason from (ὥστε) their virtues to some 
presumption of worthiness in relation to divine favour (Sacr. 54), citing Deuteronomy 9.5 as a 
reminder that it is impious and philosophically dubious to consider oneself worthy (ἀξιόω) of 
the good (Sacr. 57). According to an allegorical exegesis of Leviticus 7.34 (LXX), even human 
effort towards virtue has its causative power (δύναμις) in God, who energises the quest for the 
good (τὸ καλόν) by gifting a love for it (ὁ τὸν ἔρωτα χαρισάμενος, Leg. 3.136). In fact, as Barclay 
observes, at his most extreme Philo ‘can emphasize the nothingness of humanity and press for 
a polar opposition between God, whose nature it is to act (piοιεῖν) and humanity, whose nature 
it is to be acted upon (piάσχειν, Cher. 77; Leg. 1.49)’.40 The connection between divine χάρις and 
human ἀξία, therefore, cannot properly be conceived in terms of anthropological merit or 
even a cooperation of agencies. The soteriological equation is not reducible to a symmetrical 
quid pro quo. On the contrary, rather than implying that the ‘worthy’ earn God’s grace, the 
ἄξιος-χάρις link ensures that the ‘fit’41 between gift and recipient exhibits the rational fairness 
which, by definition, must characterise the Existent One.42  
It is this theological necessity that motivates Philo’s exegetical search for an unstated 
αἰτία in Legum Allegoriae 3.77-103.43 In a manner reminiscent of Romans 9.6ff and, as we shall 
see below, Wisdom 10.1-14, Philo compiles a list of seven canonical figures – Noah, Melchizedek, 
Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Ephraim and Bezalel – who received some form of divine favour without 
any apparent cause or reason (αἰτία).44 The initial impression, at least in these admittedly 
peculiar instances, is that the exercise of divine benefaction appears whimsical, irrational and 
potentially unjust. For Philo, however, this initial impression is (necessarily) a misreading, 
                                                        
40 J.M.G. Barclay, ‘By the Grace of God I Am What I Am’: Grace and Agency in Philo and Paul’, in Divine and 
Human Agency in Paul and His Cultural Environment (ed. J.M.G. Barclay and Simon J. Gathercole; London: T&T Clark, 
2006), 140-57 (144). Barclay finds similar evidence that Philo ultimately conceived of human virtue as a product of 
divine action in the fragment of the lost Legum Allegoriae Book 4 (145-46).   
41 Semantically, ἄξιος typically indicates a relational correspondence between two comparable, though 
not necessarily identical or equal, things. Thus, as Barclay suggests, ‘fit’ is often a better translation than ‘worthy’, 
as it avoids the possibly misleading ethical connotations associated with the latter, more common gloss (‘Grace 
Within and Beyond Reason’, 12). Philo seems to conceive of this ‘fit’ primarily in terms of capacity to receive (e.g. 
Spec. 1.43; Post. 139); but his interest in the absence of works in Legum Allegoriae 3.77-103 (see below) implies that 
moral worth was within his purview, as was social status (e.g. Leg. 3.192; Opif. 45).  
42 That this conceptuality finds its ideological location in the patterns of ancient benefaction is rightly 
perceived by D. Zeller, Charis bei Philon und Paulus (Stuttgarter Bibelstudien 142; Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 
1990), 68; Harrison, Grace, 114-33; Barclay, ‘Grace Within and Beyond Reason’, 12.  
43 For a penetrating analysis of this passage see Barclay, ‘Grace Within and Beyond Reason’, 10-12.  
44 The missing αἰτία appears to be conceived primarily in terms of a lack of preexisting works or 
accomplishment (ἔργον, Leg. 3.77, 79, 83, 95).    
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failing as it does to notice the subtle clues in the text that point to the required, though 
unnamed αἰτία behind the divine blessings. The goal of Philo’s exegesis, as John Riches 
summarises, ‘is to discern the hidden rationale of God’s gift-giving, that which renders the 
recipient worthy of such a gift and the gift appropriate to the receiver’.45 In this case, the 
various names of the objects of grace represent and in some sense anticipate the quality that 
establishes the individual as a suitable recipient of blessing (e.g. Noah = rest/righteous; Isaac = 
joy).46 Thus, while the divine verdict may be temporally prior to the exercise of virtue that 
expresses human ἀξία – indeed, in two instances (Isaac and Jacob) it even precedes birth – it is 
still necessarily tied to the potential and inevitable worth or fit indicated by the various 
names. This fit, however, is neither aetiologically symmetrical nor soteriologically synergistic; 
for even the intrinsically (ἐξ ἑαυτῆς) worthy natures (φύσις) which God considers appropriate 
objects of divine benefit are themselves moulded (piλάττω) and crafted (τορεύω) by God (ὑpiὸ 
θεοῦ, Leg. 3.104). Thus, any apparent notion of divine response to human worth is, for Philo, 
more essentially a divine reaction to previous divine action. God’s suitable gift locates as its 
proper object those who, in an antecedent act of creational grace, are constituted as ἄξιοι. As 
such, human worth is a necessary condition though not itself the final αἰτία; for God himself, 
precisely as the giver, is forever the first cause. This, then, is a notion of divine χάρις that is as 
radical as it is rational. At stake for Philo in the affinity between gift and recipient is not 
humans receiving the good they earned or caused (the thought itself is impious), but rather 
God acting in accordance with the moral, natural and rational justice that defines his character 
and the cosmos he created. Divine χάρις is reserved for the ἄξιοι, not because such worth earns 
grace, but simply because God is φιλόδωρος (e.g. Conf. 182; Leg. 3.166), and as such his 
beneficence is necessarily appropriate, rational and fair.               
              
 
 
                                                        
45 J.K. Riches, ‘Paul, Grace and Freedom: A Response’, in Paul, Grace and Freedom: Essays in Honour of John K. 
Riches (ed. Paul Middleton et al.; London: T&T Clark), 2009, 193-203 (195).  
46 The choice of Jacob over Esau is explained in terms of the divine foreknowledge (Leg. 3.88-89), which, as 
Barclay evocatively translates Legum Allegoriae 3.89, responds to even ‘the “slightest whiff of virtue” or vice’ 
(‘Grace Within and Beyond Reason’, 11). That Philo is compelled to marshal a different form of argumentation for 
the reasonableness of God’s electing activity when the logic from symbolic names lacks relevance demonstrates 
that pre-conditional gifting, rather than being an historically unfortunate qualification of divine benefaction, is, 
at least for Philo, a philosophical, and indeed theological necessity.  
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Wisdom 10: The Operations of Grace in Primeval History 
The correspondence between the gift of Wisdom and her soteriological beneficiaries 
shapes Wisdom’s re-narration of primeval history in chapter 10.47 In order to demonstrate the 
historical stability of the moral order and divine activity, Wisdom provides a reading from 
Adam to the Exodus which is infused with the retrojected agency of Wisdom and patterned 
after the soteriological logic of the Exodus event.48 Wisdom’s salvific personality is announced 
as something of a leitmotif in 10.9: ‘Wisdom rescues from trouble those who serve her’.49 Even 
here, however, Wisdom’s soteriological activity is qualitatively conditioned – it is for those 
who care for her (τοὺς θεραpiεύοντας αὐτήν). Unsurprisingly, then, all the objects of Wisdom’s 
saving benefaction in chapter 10 are credited with a suitable degree of status (whether social 
or moral). This salvation for the fitting, however, is only one side of a bipartite divine action. 
The rescue of the righteous always has as its negative foil the condemnation of the 
unrighteous. As such, the affinity between the benefit of Wisdom and her recipients is Exodus-
shaped, a two-sided correspondence expressed in the simultaneous exercise of divine mercy 
and judgment.50 In order to demonstrate this thesis it is useful to begin where chapter 10 ends 
– with the Exodus – and then return to the recast Genesis narratives to assess both the logic of 
Wisdom’s soteriological activity and the paradigmatic function of the Exodus pattern of 
salvation for the righteous and judgment for the ungodly. 
Wisdom’s deliverance of Israel, a holy people and blameless race (λαὸν ὅσιον καὶ 
σpiέρμα ἄμεμpiτον, 10.15), is portrayed as a fitting reward (μισθός, 10.17) for their labours.51 It 
                                                        
47 Chapter 10, while connected to the poetics of chapters 6-9, has a certain independence which is evident 
in the transition from the first person narrative to the repetition of the third person αὕτη (McGlynn, Divine 
Judgment, 123). This independence, however, is not a definite indication of a composite literary history (pace A.G. 
Wright, ‘Numerical Patterns in the Book of Wisdom’, CBQ 29 (1967): 218-232). Larcher, Le Livre de la Sagesse, ou La 
Sagesse de Salomon (Paris: Gabalda, 1983), 607 is probably correct to see in chapters 6-9 an anticipation of Wisdom’s 
soteriological activity in Israel’s history. For McGlynn, ‘the primary link [between Wis. 6.12-9.18 and 10.1-21] is 
related to wisdom’s purpose as the one who brings about creation with the purpose of saving those who are 
“righteous”’ (Divine Judgment, 124).      
48 Cf. Watson, Hermeneutics, 386.  
49 Burton Mack, Logos und Sophia (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1973), 80 similarly describes 
10.9 as ‘ein Leitmotiv des Buches’. For the thematic and structural centrality of this verse see U. Schwenk-
Bressler, Sapientia Salomonis als ein Beispiel frühjüdischer Textauslegung (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1993), 58, 77-
78.   
50 Watson, Hermeneutics, 389: ‘For the author [of Wisdom] as for the biblical narrator, the exodus is 
simultaneously an event of salvation and judgment’.  
51 These labours, presumably, are those associated with the hard and unpaid work of slavery rather than 
the moral effort of law-observance. At work here is a notion of compensation, not soteriological desserts. The use 
of μισθός to describe an act of saving grace will be discussed in chapters five and seven.    
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was Wisdom who empowered Moses, guided Israel in the form of a pillar of cloud and fire, 
carried the people over (διαβιβάζω) the Red Sea and opened mouths in praise of God (10.16-
21). There are, however, two actors – or rather two objects of Wisdom’s action – in the Exodus 
tale. Casting Israel as the righteous (δίκαιοι, 10.20), the Egyptians, Israel’s oppressors and 
enemies, assume the role of the ungodly (ἀσεβεῖς, 10.20). At the Red Sea, a scene painted as a 
singular event, the righteous and the ungodly are acted upon by Wisdom with diametrical 
symmetry: ‘She brought Israel over the Red Sea and led them through deep waters; but she 
drowned their enemies, and cast them up from the depths of the sea’ (10.18-19).52 The Exodus, 
at least for Wisdom, is the instantiation of the coterminous exercise of divine judgment and 
mercy (see chapter four).  
But this pattern, however paradigmatic, is not without precedent. As Wisdom reads 
Genesis the activity of σοφία from Adam to Joseph parallels, though does not quite mirror, the 
soteriological symmetry of the Exodus event.53 As Watson remarks: 
The author ensures the coherence of Genesis-Exodus…by projecting the exodus 
paradigm of salvation and judgment back into Genesis. If the Israelites and the 
Egyptians represent the primary objects of salvation and judgment respectively, the 
same pattern may be seen in Genesis in the pairing of Adam and Cain (10.1-4), Abraham 
and the builders of the tower of Babel (10.5), and Lot and the inhabitants of the Five 
Cities (10.6-8)…. The Genesis events of judgment and deliverance are types looking 
ahead to the supreme event narrated in Exodus. The exodus is the definitive fulfillment 
of the pattern established in Genesis.54 
This construal implies that the objects of Wisdom’s benevolence in the selected episodes from 
Genesis correspond to the ‘righteous’ in Exodus’s dualistic anthropology. Wisdom carefully 
alludes to some qualitative indicator in each of the objects of Wisdom’s salvific benefaction, 
thereby emphasising the appropriateness of the divine exercise of mercy and the diametrical 
deployment of wrath, both of which operate within the boundaries of divine justice. This 
                                                        
52 Wisdom is the unambiguous subject of all four aorist active verbs in 10.18-19: διεβίβασεν, διήγαγεν, 
κατέκλυσεν, ἀνέβρασεν. Thus, it is a divine activity that both rescues the righteous and destroys the ungodly. 
Watson, however, is right to note that the introduction of Wisdom into the scriptural narratives provides a 
‘secondary level of divine agency’ (Hermeneutics, 388), which, in addition to implying a cooperation between 
divine and human agents in the righteous actions of Wisdom’s beneficiaries (Hermeneutics, 388), may indicate a 
theological desire to place an extra step in the aetiological chain between God and the destructive exercise of his 
justice (cf. Dodson, The ‘Powers’ of Personification, 111). 
53 Establishing a theological principle by appealing to a series of canonical heroes was common practice 
in early Judaism (e.g. Sir 44-50; 1 Macc 2.49-60; 4 Macc 16.20-21; Leg. 3.77-103; Rom 9.6-13; Heb 11). Dodson, 
however, correctly notes that Wisdom is unique in its presentation of antithetical examples (though cf. Rom 9.10-
13). Dodson also suggests The Apocalypse of Sedrach as the nearest parallel to Wisdom 10 due to its singular focus (on 
divine love) and anonymous presentation (The ‘Powers’ of Personification’ 110 n.55).    
54 Watson, Hermeneutics, 389-91.   
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pattern is evident in Wisdom’s depiction of all seven recipients of Wisdom’s saving 
beneficence.55 Adam’s potential moral worth, while not explicitly stated, is implied in the 
contrast with his soteriological antithesis, Cain, who is directly identified as the unrighteous 
(ἄδικος, 10.3).56 Furthermore, though perhaps less obviously, even the apparent 
disqualification of Adam’s moral status (piαραpiτώματος ἰδίου, 10.1), does not completely divest 
him of ‘fittingness’. As Barclay observes, although ‘Adam certainly cannot be credited with 
righteousness…wisdom’s benevolence is not without rationale: his status as ‘the father of the 
world’ is enough to justify wisdom’s intervention on his behalf’.57 The criterion which invites 
Wisdom’s salvific activity in the lives of the five individuals that follow Adam is explicitly 
identified as each person is labeled δίκαιος. In each vignette the righteous are saved from 
something/someone and stand in soteriological antithesis to something/someone. Abraham is 
preserved from and is cast in opposition to the wicked and confused nations (10.5).58 The 
ungodly who perished in the destruction of the Pentapolis serve as a foil to righteous Lot who 
escaped (10.6). Similarly, both Jacob and Joseph were rescued from the malicious intents of 
their brothers and the subsequent tribulations of oppression and false accusation (10.10-12, 13-
14).59 The possible exception to this pattern appears to be Noah, but even here one can detect a 
subtle contrast between the salvation of righteous Noah and the destructive flooding of the 
implicitly wicked earth (10.4).   
Interestingly, this insertion of Wisdom into the text of Genesis makes her the principal 
subject of a narrative sequence in which her agency is originally hidden. Reading between the 
                                                        
55 The repeated αὔτη, together with the phrase ἀpiοστὰς ἀpi᾽ αὐτῆς (10.3), forms a seven part structure 
with each sub-unit providing an example of Wisdom’s soteriological agency: Adam and Cain (10.1-3), Noah and 
the wicked earth (10.4), Abraham and the confused nations (10.5), Lot and the ungodly inhabitants of the 
Pentapolis (10.6-8), Jacob and Esau/oppressors (10.10-12), Joseph and his brothers/false accusers (10.13-14) and 
Israel and Egypt (10.15-21); cf. McGlynn, Divine Judgment, 130 n. 114). 
56 H. Engel, Das Buch der Weisheit (Neuer Stuttgarter Kommentar; Stuttgart: Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk, 
1998), 169; Watson, Hermeneutics, 386 n. 46. The contrast, however, may indicate the innocence of Abel rather than 
the righteousness of Adam.  
57 Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 96. Similarly, Philo casts Adam’s worth in terms of social status, noting that 
he, as the first man, ‘stands beyond comparison with all other mortals’ (Virt. 203).  
58 This brief reference to Abraham probably alludes to the well attested tradition in which Abraham’s 
unique righteousness is set in juxtaposition to either his native culture or the nations more broadly conceived 
(see e.g. Jub. 11.14-12.24; L.A.B. 6.1-18; Josephus Ant. 1.154-185; Apoc. Ab. 1-9; Philo Gig. 62-64, Abr. 70-80, Virt. 212-
16).  
59 These latter tales, especially the Jacob episode, are riddled with moral ambiguity. Wisdom’s black-and-
white reading reflects the hermeneutical pressures exerted by the pre-conception of moral symmetry and a justly 
ordered cosmos. As briefly mentioned above, this pressure, rather than reflecting some arbitrary imposition of 
the author’s theological imaginings, comes from a paradigmatic reading of the Exodus event that itself 
exemplifies the pre-creational order (for more on this see chapter four).  
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lines of divine and human agency, Wisdom detects the unnamed actions of σοφία. As Watson 
perceptively observes, ‘The effect is to uncover a secret [though secondary] divine agency - 
that is, the agency of Wisdom – at points where Genesis knows only of human agency’.60 This 
theological interpolation is especially clear in the accounts of Abraham, Jacob and Joseph. It 
was Wisdom who kept Abraham blameless before God (ἐτήρησεν αὐτὸν ἄμεμpiτον θεῷ) and 
strong in the face of his love for Isaac (10.5). Here, Abraham’s righteousness is defined in terms 
of his blamelessness, especially in relation to the near-sacrifice of Isaac; but these righteous 
actions are infused with the agency of divine Wisdom. Similarly, the righteous conduct of 
Jacob (10.10-12) and Joseph’s abstention from sin (10.13; probably a reference to the incident 
with Potiphar’s wife, Exod 39) are both attributed to the guiding (ὁδηγέω) and delivering 
(ῥύομαι) activity of σοφία. Righteousness, then, which is at least one major qualification of 
human worth, cannot be separated from its divine cause. Although the emphasis on divine 
agency is not as strong as Philo’s exclusivist construal, Wisdom’s location of divine agency 
within the human actions that constitute the prerequisite human worth in the book’s 
soteriology parallels Philo’s insistence that the divine reaction of temporal χάρις is a rational 
response to a prior divine act of creational grace. Wisdom, it seems, both saves the righteous 
and, at least cooperatively, establishes the righteous as such.61 This is an emphatic and radical 
conception of grace, but it is also an explainable and rationale account of God’s giving. For 
Wisdom, grace goes ‘all the way down’; and yet, because God is just and good, and because 
σοφία orders all things well, there is a necessary correspondence between divine benefits and 
human beneficiaries. The Red Sea crossing provides the paradigmatic exemplification of this 
theological reality and the rewritten Genesis narratives are therefore anticipatory and 
canonical concretions of the deep and extravagant and finally just grace of God.   
 
Conclusion: Good Gifts and Rational Redemption 
The retrojected activity of divine Wisdom corresponds to the Exodus paradigm insofar 
as it depicts the symmetrical salvation of the righteous and the destruction of the ungodly.62 
                                                        
60 Watson, Hermeneutics, 388.  
61 Watson, Hermeneutics, 388: ‘Wisdom…co-operates with the righteous to bring their righteousness to 
fruition’.  
62 The parallel, however, is not exact because, unlike the Exodus account (10.15-21), Wisdom’s actions in 
the Genesis episodes seem to reside on the soteriological side of the salvation/judgment divide. Thus, Wisdom’s 
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This pattern of correspondence between soteriological beneficence and recipient functions as 
an historical confirmation of the logic of Wisdom’s rational benefaction in 6.12-9.18 and, 
perhaps even more directly, as a canonical demonstration of the eschatological principles 
announced in 1.1-6.11: ‘unrighteousness leads to death and destruction (1.12; 5.9-14), while 
righteousness leads to life and immortality (1.15; 5.15)’.63 This two-ways soteriology is 
expressed in the contrast between the destructive deal the ungodly make with death and the 
(eternal) life-giving love the righteous have for σοφία. The logic behind the fitting destinies of 
the righteous and the ungodly (Wis. 1-6) is therefore mirrored in the discerning distribution of 
the divine χάρις of Wisdom. The gift of divine Wisdom, as a gift, is necessarily unearned, but it 
is also, as a good gift, necessarily explainable. Human worth and divine χάρις are coordinated to 
ensure a proper fit between the divine benefit and the human recipient. God’s grace, then, like 
Wisdom’s eschatology, is Exodus-shaped: it is divine saving action for the worthy – often 
defined in terms of righteousness – that rescues them from ungodly people and practices (both 
moral and intellectual). Thus, as in the ‘Book of Eschatology’, the ‘Book of Wisdom’ articulates 
a cosmological vision according to which the salvation and destruction of certain persons is 
correlated with their moral, rational and/or social suitability. The orderly cosmos which 
Wisdom established and which she still manages and discloses (Wis. 6-9) demonstrates a 
rational and moral stability from end (Wis. 1-6) to beginning (Wis. 10). All that remains for 
Wisdom to demonstrate is that these protological and eschatological principles are evident 
within the history that moves between these temporal poles.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
proactive destruction of the Egyptians (10.19) is an exception to the Genesis pattern in which the ungodly invite 
their destructive fate by departing from and passing by Wisdom (10.3, 8; see Watson, Hermeneutics, 390).  
63 G.W.E. Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism and Early 
Christianity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 67.  
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Chapter 4 
‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’: History and the Divine Economy 
in Wisdom 10.15-19.22 
 
What’s Past is Past…and Present 
 ‘No poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone. His significance, his 
appreciation is the appreciation of his relation to the dead poets and artists’.1 Such was the 
opinion of T.S. Eliot. Disillusioned by literary criticism and its unquenchable thirst for ‘novelty’ 
– its delight in ‘the poet’s difference from his predecessors’ – Eliot insisted that ‘not only the 
best, but the most individual parts of [a poet’s] work may be those in which the dead poets, his 
ancestors, assert their immortality most vigorously’. The author of Wisdom is this kind of poet, 
displaying what Eliot terms ‘historical sense’ – that trans-temporal ‘perception, not only of the 
pastness of the past, but of its presence’. Wisdom, as Eliot would have expected, is at its 
theological best as it listens most attentively to the whispers of its ‘dead poets’, the sacred 
pentateuchal record. To listen, however, is not simply to repeat: ‘To conform merely would be 
for the new work not really to conform at all; it would not be new’. In contrast to this prosaic 
echoing, Wisdom innovatively reflects the historical reciprocity which captured Eliot’s poetic 
imagination: ‘the past [is] altered by the present as much as the present is directed by the 
past’. This is a profound description of Wisdom’s theological reading of pentateuchal history in 
chapters 10-19. The scriptural past both shapes and is shaped by Wisdom’s theological vision, 
and in this dynamic exchange between creativity and canonical constraints we find, as Eliot 
predicted, ‘not only the best, but the most individual parts’ of our poet. 
 The explicit agency of Wisdom in 10.15-21 connects this passage with the ‘Book of 
Wisdom’, but, as suggested above, this transitional unit looks in both directions. Together with 
19.1-12, the retelling of the Exodus in 10.15-21 forms an inclusio around Wisdom’s theological re-
interpretation of Israel’s deliverance from Egypt and subsequent wanderings in the wilderness. 
This structural frame is also hermeneutical. The Exodus pattern of the condemnation of the 
ungodly and the salvation of the righteous functions as the paradigmatic matrix within which 
Wisdom’s manipulated reactivation of pentateuchal history finds canonical legitimation. While 
                                                        
1 T.S. Eliot, ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’, in Selected Essays (New York: Harcourt, 1950), 4. 
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it is basically accurate to note that Wisdom 11-18 follows the plague cycle of Exodus 7-12,2 
Wisdom’s narrative re-presentation of the biblical material is much more inventive than an 
exegetical game of follow the textual leader.3 The Egyptian plagues are set in antithetical pairs 
(diptychs) with events from Israel’s wilderness sojourn, thereby constructing a symmetrical 
theology of history shaped by the principles of divine justice and moral order that have driven 
Wisdom’s theologising in the book’s first two sections. Within this balanced historiography, the 
ungodly Egyptians consistently meet their inevitable and appropriate destruction whereas 
righteous Israel, while occasionally tested and disciplined, finds salvation in the just mercy of 
God. Thus, the Exodus pattern of symmetrical and fitting destinies that was retrojected into 
the Genesis episodes (Wis. 10.1-14) is here projected into the wilderness material.4 Watson, 
however, is correct to suggest that ‘the scriptural text has to be substantially rewritten’ in 
order for the post-Exodus biblical history to correspond to the ‘Exodus paradigm of salvation 
for God’s people and destruction for their enemies’.5 The content of and motivation for this 
‘rewriting’ of sacred tradition will be the main focus of this section, but before we turn to 
Wisdom’s rearranged reading of the pentateuchal texts it is necessary to consider the two 
extended reflections (11.15-12.27; 13.1-15.19) which interrupt the narrative sequence.6 
                                                        
2 Watson, Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith (London: T & T Clark, 2004), 394. Of the ten plagues two are 
omitted (cattle disease and boils; Exod 9.1-12) and four are combined.  
3 Though scholars continue to label Wisdom’s interpretative method in chapters 10-19 a ‘midrash’ 
(Kolarcik, ‘Universalism and Justice in the Wisdom of Solomon’, 291-297; R.T. Siebeneck, ‘The Midrash of Wisdom 
10-19’, CBQ 22 [1960]: 176-182), Reese is probably right to argue that, unlike Wisdom’s hermeneutical technique, a 
midrash follows its base text in an orderly fashion (Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and its Consequences 
[Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1970], 97-98; see also Lietaert Peerbolte, ‘The Hermeneutics of Exodus in the Book 
of Wisdom’, in The Interpretation of Exodus: Studies in Honor of Cornelis Houtman [BET 44; Leuven: Peeters, 2006], 97-
116). Cheon’s descriptive phrase, ‘a reshaping of the biblical story’, is a definite improvement (The Exodus Story in 
the Wisdom of Solomon: A Study in Biblical Interpretation [JSPSS 23; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997], 150-51), 
though, following Watson’s definition of a ‘reading’ as ‘a construal of the whole from a particular perspective’ 
(Hermeneutics, 515, following David Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology [London: SCM Press , 1975], 102), 
referring to Wisdom’s interpretative product as a ‘reading’ seems to capture Wisdom’s idiosyncrasies without 
introducing the unnecessary methodological constraints associated with certain other genres (e.g. midrash, 
targum, pesher or rewritten Bible).   
4 Watson, Hermeneutics, 394-404, 411.  
5 Watson, Hermeneutics, 399. See also Siebeneck (‘The Midrash of Wisdom 10-19’, 178): ‘the sacred word is 
not merely copied but rather enlarged upon, toned down, or even suppressed in order to bring out better the 
theological themes which are the present preoccupation’.   
6 Most commentators are content with this two-fold division (e.g. Schmitt, Das Buch Der Weisheit – Ein 
Kommentar [Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 1986], 101; Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon [AB, 43; Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1979], 224), but there is some debate about where to locate the transitions (McGlynn, Divine Judgment 
and Divine Benevolence in the Book of Wisdom [WUNT II, 139; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001], 25). Larcher, however, 
appears to see 11.15-15.19 as organically linked to the diptychs and therefore not (strictly) digressions or 
excursuses (Le Livre de la Sagesse, ou La Sagesse de Salomon [Paris : Gabalda, 1983], 224). As will be argued below, the 
term digression indicates both thematic disconnectedness and insignificance, neither of which can properly be 
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The First Reflection: the ‘Mercy Dialogue’ 
 To label the ‘Mercy Dialogue’ (11.17-12.27) and the related polemic against false 
worship (13.1-15.19) digressions is to risk the potentially distorting implication that they are 
thematically insignificant.7 Standing between the first and second diptychs, these 
interconnected reflections certainly intrude upon the narrative progression of the larger unit; 
but they do so because they contain the theological rationale which explains the structural 
and theological shape of Wisdom’s reading of scriptural history (11.1-11.14; 16.1-19.21).8 Wisdom 
11.15-16 functions both as a summary of 13.1-14.31; 15.5-19 and as an invitation to reflect on 
the benevolence of divine justice (11.17-12.27). The animal plagues, which constitute the 
negative side of the second and third diptychs (16.1-4; 16.5-14), are presented as the 
appropriate divine response to the irrational and unrighteous reasoning (λογισμῶν ἀσυνέτων 
ἀδικίας, 11.15) which led the ungodly Egyptians to idolise senseless reptiles and worthless 
beasts (ἐθρήσκευον ἄλογα ἑρpiετὰ καὶ κνώδαλα εὐτελῆ, 11.15). Thus, the seemingly impotent 
exercise of judgment connoted by the sending of paltry creatures (11.5; 16.1-4, 5-14) is in 
reality an expression of judicial equilibrium: δι᾽ ὧν τις ἁμαρτάνει διὰ τούτων κολάζεται 
(11.16).9 For Wisdom, however, this symmetry between crime and punishment is not just a 
manifestation of moral stability and cosmic orderliness. Detecting a pattern of patience and 
gentleness in the apparent trivialness of the animal plagues, Wisdom breaks from its narrative 
re-arrangement in order to locate the hermeneutical logic of its reading of the Pentateuch 
within the merciful justice of an all-powerful God (11.17-12.27).  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
applied to these crucial units. For this reason Angelo Passaro’s suggested label (‘reflection’) will be employed 
throughout (‘The Serpent and the Manna or the Saving Word: Exegesis of Wis 16’, in The Book of Wisdom in Modern 
Research: Studies on Tradition, Redaction, and Theology [DCLY 2005; ed. A. Passaro and G. Bellia; Berlin: de Gruyter, 
2005], 179- 93).   
7 Watson, Hermeneutics, 396 n. 69 correctly notes that the two digressions, a label he is not particularly 
satisfied with, occur within a single discussion of the animal plagues (11.15-16.14).   
8 McGlynn, Divine Judgment, 25-53 argues that the ‘Mercy Dialogue’ is the ‘interpretative key’ to the entire 
book.   
9 The οὐ γάρ which opens 11.17 and a parallel discussion of the divine motivation for the use of 
insignificant animals in Philo (Mos 1.109-12) may indicate that the relationship between this episode and God’s 
justice was, as Barclay remarks, ‘a traditional topic of debate in Jewish philosophy’ (‘Unnerving Grace’, 102 n. 18). 
Philo solves this canonical riddle by, first, arguing that God wished to admonish rather than annihilate the 
Egyptians (Mos. 1.110) and, second, by contrasting the human need to compensate for weakness by choosing the 
strong with the omnipotent God who demonstrates his divine power by waging war with that which is not fit for 
battle (ἄμαχος, Mos. 1.111-12).    
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 It is self-evident that the all-powerful hand (piαντοδύναμος χείρ, 11.17) that created the 
cosmos (κτίσασα τὸν κόσμον, 11.17) is capable of an annihilating exercise of strength (11.17-
20c, 21-22); but (ἀλλά) this creative power is self-constraining, operating within the ordered 
universe it established: piάντα μέτρῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ καὶ σταθμῷ διέταξας (11.20d).10 
Correspondingly, the goodness of God is comprehended within the ultimate proportionality 
and retributive fairness of divine justice. As such, the activity of mercy, which is Wisdom’s 
essential answer to the apparent irrationality and powerlessness of the animal plagues, is 
located within (and is an expression of) this orderly justice. It must be emphasised, however, 
that this contextualisation of mercy is in no way a disqualification of its authenticity. Precisely 
because God’s capability is infinite (ὅτι piάντα δύνασαι, 11.23) he lovingly (ἀγαpiάω, 11.24; cf. 
φιλόψυχος, 11.26) extends a universal mercy (ἐλεεῖς δὲ piάντας, 11.23) which patiently 
overlooks human sin in order to allow for repentance (piαρορᾷς ἁμαρτήματα ἀνθρώpiων εἰς 
μετάνοιαν, 11.23). As the God of limitless power God is necessarily (ὅτι) the God of limitless 
mercy and love (11.23-24). What is more, the act of creation itself implies the unquestionable 
anti-hate (οὐδὲ μισῶ, 11.24) of the creator towards the created. Derivative existence 
presupposes a unilateral act of ontological giving: ‘How would anything have remained if you 
had not desired it? Or how would anything not called forth by you (τὸ μὴ κληθὲν ὑpiὸ σοῦ) 
have been preserved?’ (11.25). In common with much of the Septuagint usage,11 καλέω denotes 
the creative activity of God, thereby establishing an ontological link (12.1) between created 
and uncreated being that requires a corresponding love from the latter to the former (11.26). 
In short, God loves life (φιλόψυχος, 11.26).       
It is within this portrait of the divine personality that the pattern of unhurried and 
progressive judgment evident in the animal plagues makes stable sense. Those who trespass 
are reproved little by little (κατ᾽ ὀλίγον), thereby being reminded and warned about the things 
through which they sin (οἷς ἁμαρτάνουσιν, 12.2) so that they might be freed from wickedness 
and trust the Lord (ἵνα ἀpiαλλαγέντες τῆς κακίας piιστεύσωσιν ἐpiὶ σέ, κύριε, 12.2). This maxim, 
                                                        
10 For a discussion of the debated echoes of Neo-Pythagorean philosophy in this formula see Larcher, Le 
Livre de la Sagesse, 218-232; McGlynn, Divine Judgment, 39-42.  
11 Especially in second/third Isaiah (e.g. 42.6; 43.1; 46.11; 48.15; 51.2) καλέω is often used to express the 
divine act of creation. Cf. S. Chester, Conversion at Corinth: Perspectives on Conversion in Paul’s Theology and the 
Corinthian Church (London: T & T Clark, 2003), 65: ‘the God who calls is the creator God’. For a full discussion of 
καλέω in the Septuagint, see Chester, Conversion at Corinth, 64-70.   
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‘little by little’, is then illustrated by the biblical account from which it is lifted.12 Despite the 
genetic and ineffaceable wickedness of the Canaanites (12.10-11), a depravity manifested in the 
most repulsive of actions (e.g. child-sacrifice and cannibalism, 12.3-7), God – though capable of 
swift and total destruction (12.9) – exercised his merciful judgment by sending wasps (σφῆκας, 
12.8; LXX Exod 23.28) to destroy (ἐξολεθρεύω, 12.8) and judge (κρίνω, 12.10) them little by little 
(κατὰ βραχύ, 12.8, 10). The stated reason for this gradual judgment – an opportunity to repent 
– is logically superfluous in view of the content of the divine foreknowledge: ‘you were not 
unaware that their origin was evil (piονηρὰ ἡ γένεσις αὐτῶν) and their wickedness inborn 
(ἔμφυτος ἡ κακία αὐτῶν), and that their way of thinking would never change (οὐ μὴ ἀλλαγῇ, 
12.10). Wisdom’s willingness to permit this logical tension, however, demonstrates the author’s 
dual commitment to justice and mercy, both of which qualify the exercise of the other.13 
Justice prevents mercy from overriding the necessity of judgment; mercy prevents justice 
from destroying the ungodly (ἀσεβής) by a single blow (ἀpiοτόμῳ ὑφ᾽ ἓν ἐκτρῖψαι, 12.9). 
 There is a rather abrupt rhetorical transition in the middle of 12.11.14 Wisdom seems to 
be preemptively countering a possible reading of the Canaanite episode. Perhaps this 
somewhat risible exercise of divine power was motivated by fear of some unnamed party. 
Wisdom, however, will have none of it: οὐδὲ εὐλαβούμενός τινα ἐφ᾽οἷς ἡμάρτανον ἄδειαν 
ἐδίδους (12.11b). This rhetorical suggestion generates a confrontational apology for the 
unrivaled power and unquestionable justice of God (12.12-18). Divine power is the source of 
divine righteousness (12.16). Together these complementary attributes ensure both the 
rightness (δίκαιος, 12.15) and the gentleness (ἐpiιείκεια, 12.18) of God’s judgment. The 
sovereign freedom which enables divine forbearance (12.18), however, functions within the 
parameters established by this creative power. Thus, it is unthinkable that the δίκαιος God 
who rules all things righteously (δικαίως τὰ piάντα διέpiεις) would either punish the 
undeserving (12.15) or acquit the unrighteous (12.12c). This observation raises a crucial 
question about the definition of mercy within Wisdom’s theological vocabulary. 
                                                        
12 See Exodus 23.30 and Deuteronomy 7.22: κατὰ μικρὸν μικρόν. 
13  Barclay too notices the paradox and correctly detects an emphasising of mercy within it: ‘There is 
some cost to the logic: if God knew in advance that they could not change, it makes little sense for him to give 
them time to do so. That our author risks this logical incoherence is a sign of the stress he [the author of Wisdom] 
wishes to lay on God’s boundless mercy’ (‘Unnerving Grace’, 102 n. 20). Barclay also notes a parallel between the 
‘little by little’ motif and the ‘philosophical discussion concerning time-delays in God’s justice’. He cites Plutarch 
(Mor. 550d-551c) as an example of mercy as a possible solution to this problem (‘Unnerving Grace’, 102 n. 19).    
14 Schmitt, Das Buch der Weisheit, 107.  
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 As Barclay observes, ‘one could hardly ask for a stronger emphasis on the love and 
mercy of God – a love that explicitly excludes hatred (11.24; though cf. 12.4), and a mercy that 
always operates within and alongside God’s judgment’.15 In fact, this correlation of mercy and 
justice is precisely the divine quality that Israel is summoned to reflect: ‘you have taught your 
people that the righteous must be kind’ (δεῖ τὸν δίκαιον εἶναι φιλάνθρωpiον, 12.19-22). This 
mercy, however, in no way oversteps or opposes the symmetrical and rational principles of 
divine justice. It may temper the pace and intensity of judgment, but it cannot, as Barclay 
argues, ‘exclude or overrule judgment’.16 Thus, rather than conceiving of mercy and justice in a 
dialectical tension, Wisdom envisages a synthesis in which mercy is properly understood as a 
qualifying feature of justice (e.g. merciful justice).17 The exercise of this divine benevolence, 
therefore, rather than unsettling the righteous balance, actually ensures that the operations of 
justice and judgment are carried out fairly. This synthetic perspective is evident in the care 
with which God punishes those deserving of death (ὀφειλομένους θανάτῳ, 12.20) and in 
Israel’s expectation of mercy in judgment (κρινόμενοι δὲ piροσδοκῶμεν ἔλεος, 12.22). But this 
merciful justice also means that those who fail to respond to God’s mild rebukes will 
experience fitting divine judgment (ἀξίαν θεοῦ κρίσιν, 12.27). Thus, as in 12.12c, mercy does 
not, indeed cannot, entail the acquittal of the unrighteous (ἀδίκοι ἄνθρωpiοι).  
It is important to recall that this text is addressed to a group in crisis who are expected 
to make a rhetorical association between, on the one hand, their own ‘in crowd’ and the 
righteous and, on the other hand, their persecutors and the ungodly. Within this rhetorical 
narrative, a theology of the justification of the ungodly would be fundamentally bad news. 
From the perspective of the righteous, the goodness and mercy of God is evident not in the 
divine maintenance of the status quo – a status quo in which the wicked prosper at the 
expense of the righteous (cf. Wis. 2-5) – but rather in an act of grace which precisely as such 
restores the balance of justice.18  This harmonisation of divine judgment and mercy, counter-
intuitive though it may be to Paulinists, reflects at least one influential canonical pattern of 
justice. According to Exodus 34.6-7, the God of abounding mercy (piολυέλεος), compassionate 
(οἰκτίρμων) though he is, will in no way clear the guilty (οὐ καθαριεῖ τὸν ἔνοχον). As in 
                                                        
15 Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 103 (italics removed).  
16 Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 103 (italics removed).  
17 As argued above, it is equally true that for Wisdom justice is a qualifying feature of mercy such that it is 
correct to speak both of ‘merciful justice’ and ‘just mercy’.  
18 See the discussion of deuteronomic theodicy and eschatology in the Epistle of Enoch in chapter two. 
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Wisdom, this is a patient (μακρόθυμος) and forgiving (ἀφαιρέω) brand of mercy; but it is 
nevertheless a just mercy – a divine ἔλεος that necessarily redeems and rewards the righteous 
rather than the ungodly. 
          
The Second Reflection: Idolaters and Israel in Wisdom 13-15 
That the wicked are necessarily the objects of fitting divine judgment (ἀξίαν θεοῦ 
κρίσιν, 12.27) rather than ‘merciful’ acquittal is plainly demonstrated in the case of those who 
idolise creatures (12.24) – a passing comment that invites Wisdom’s extended and unrelenting 
polemic against aberrant worship and the subsequent decline into immorality (13.1-14.31, 15. 
7-19). Unleashing his rhetorical attack in three stages, our author moves from the folly of 
nature worship (13.1-9) to idolatry and the ethical corruption it causes (13.10-15.17) and finally 
on to the particularly foolish and debased cultic praxis of the Egyptians (15.18-19). 
Worshipping the created, it seems, reflects an inexcusable intellectual inability (μάταιοι φύσει, 
13.1) to reason from creation to creator: ‘Not even they are to be excused (οὐδ᾽ αὐτοὶ 
συγγνωστοί), if they had the power to know so much as to try to understand the material 
world (αἰών), how did they not find the Lord of these things more quickly?’ (13.8-9). As in 
much of Wisdom’s polemical discourse, the essential fault is grounded in intellectual error (cf. 
2.1, λογισάμενοι οὐκ ὀρθῶς). This religious stupidity is also evident in the morally destructive 
practice of idolatry. Though originating from feelings of loss and/or attempts at homage 
(14.12-21), the idolater is fundamentally dim-witted, requesting as he does safe travel from 
that which cannot move, strength from that which lacks functioning limbs and, most absurdly, 
life from an object that is dead (13.18-19).19 As in the ‘Book of Eschatology’, religious stupidity 
inevitably leads to immorality, such that, for Wisdom, ‘the worship of unnamable idols is the 
beginning, cause, and end of every evil (piαντὸς ἀρχὴ κακοῦ καὶ αἰτία καὶ piέρας ἐστίν, 14.27). 
This may appear unduly harsh or inadequately nuanced, but Wisdom does not hesitate in its 
invective, certain that ‘the ungodly person and his ungodliness (ὁ ἀσεβῶν καὶ ἡ ἀσέβεια αὐτοῦ) 
are equally hateful to God (μισητὰ θεῷ, 14.9). This is especially true of the Egyptians who, in an 
                                                        
19 If 13.11-14.7 focuses on idols of wood, 15.7-17 expands Wisdom’s polemical scope to include objects of 
clay. This sub-section is introduced with a description of a potter making some vessels for clean (καθαρός) uses 
and others for contrary (ἐναντίος, 15.7) purposes. The overlap between this passage and Paul’s employment of the 
potter metaphor in Romans 9.19-24 will be examined in chapter eight.    
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unmatched lack of intelligence, worship the most hateful and ugly animals, those which 
managed to avoid even the praise and blessing of the creator (15.18-19). 
Sandwiched between this rhetorical onslaught, Wisdom offers a brief reminder of the 
immunity of the Jews to this otherwise universal indictment (15.1-6). Just as unintelligence 
was the root of idolatry leading to immorality, Wisdom anchors Israel’s uniqueness in her 
proper knowledge of God. The immortality which the sin of the Gentile world forfeits remains 
on Israel’s eschatological horizon because Israel knows (ἐpiίσταμαι) God, which is the sum of 
righteousness (δικαιοσύνη), and recognises (οἶδα) his power, which is the root of immortality 
(ἀθανασία, 15.3). In language evocative of Exodus 34,20 Wisdom confidently celebrates God’s 
graciousness, which, as promised by Moses (Exod 34.9, LXX), will mean the forgiveness of 
potential sin (15.1-2). But such potential iniquity is an actual impossibility: ‘we will not sin’ 
(15.2). This is a bold employment of Exodus 34. The ‘if we sin’ (ἐὰν ἁμάρτωμεν) of 15.2 anchors 
its (unneeded) hope of future forgiveness in Moses’ words spoken in reference to the Golden 
Calf debacle, thereby activating language from Israel’s paradigmatic act of idolatry in service 
of an argument for the essential non-idolatrousness of Israel.21 It thus comes as no surprise 
that Wisdom has, both here and elsewhere, avoided all mention of the disaster of Exodus 32.22 
As stupidity leads to idolatry (13.1-7) so knowledge of God keeps Israel from it (15.3-4). Thus, 
moving from Israel’s privileged epistemological position to her subsequent moral purity, 
Wisdom is able to conclude that Israel’s past is untainted by the idolatry that characterises the 
ungodly objects of God’s fitting judgment. This inserted discussion of the mental and moral 
immunity of Israel, coupled with the explicit focus on Egyptian idolatry which closes the 
digression (15.14-19), effectively casts Israel and Egypt as, respectively, the righteous and the 
ungodly, thereby preparing the reader to detect in the forthcoming diptychs the symmetrical 
and merciful operations of divine justice.23  
                                                        
20 H. Hübner, Die Weisheit Salomons (ATD Apokryphen 4: Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1999), 
183-84.  
21 J.M.G. Barclay, ‘“I will have mercy on whom I have mercy”: The Golden Calf and Divine Mercy in 
Romans 9-11 and Second Temple Judaism’, EC 1 (2010): 82-106.  
22 This includes both the worship of the Golden Calf and the equally unpalatable slaughter of the 3,000 
that immediately followed.  
23 An extended discussion of the second reflection is not necessary at this point because, strictly 
speaking, it is an expansion of 11.15 and 12.23-34. Though it is thematically related to the animal plagues that 
follow (16.1-14), its disproportionate length and rhetoric seem to result less from careful structural planning than 
from the author’s inability to ignore the polemical opportunity provided by the passing references to animal 
worship and therefore he launches, as Barclay describes it, ‘the most devastating broadside he can direct against 
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In and Out of Egypt: Reading and Writing Justice in(to) Scriptural History  
As the ‘Mercy Dialogue’ has laboured to emphasise, the judgment of God, precisely 
because it is just and benevolent, must condemn the ungodly and rescue the righteous. This 
Exodus-shaped reading of reality, which is itself reflective of a deep pre-creational pattern, 
shapes Wisdom’s construal of the canonical material.24 As Siebeneck points out, Israel’s 
formative history functions as ‘the strata on which the crystallization of the universal maxims 
take place’.25 This, however, implies that pentateuchal history, if and when it appears to 
contradict the principles of balanced and orderly justice, must be manipulated and re-
presented in such a way as to demonstrate rather than problematise the stability of Wisdom’s 
vision of moral symmetry. The remainder of this section will argue that this hermeneutical 
dynamic is the generative force behind Wisdom’s rearranged reading of Israel’s scriptural 
past.26 Classic history is poured through the hermeneutical filter of the ‘Mercy Dialogue’ and 
this process of theological purification produces an imaginatively re-presented canonical 
witness to Wisdom’s basic theological commitments:  
(i) Only the deserving are condemned: 12.15, 20                                                                   
(ii) There is an appropriate causal link between punishment and crime: 11.16 
(iii) The righteous benefit from that which afflicts the ungodly: (11.5)27 
The first diptych (11.1-14) pairs the Exodus accounts of the defiling of the Nile (Exod 
7.14-24) and water from the rock (Exod 17.1-7). The linking of these canonically distant 
episodes reflects a non-linear handling of sacred tradition which indicates an essentially 
theological reactivation of the text. This careful connecting of scriptural events provides a 
complete historical expression of the themes of the ‘Mercy Dialogue’. Egyptians deservingly 
received their fitting judgment (i.e. a polluted river) because of Pharaoh’s abhorrent edict to 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
non-Jewish religion’ (Jews in the Mediterranean Disapora, 186). A closer analysis of this reflection will be provided in 
dialogue with Romans 1.18-2.5 in chapter five.   
24 Noting that two recollections of the Red Sea crossing frame Wisdom 10.15-19.22, Watson (Hermeneutics, 
386) argues that ‘the two exodus passages represent a line of demarcation between divine acts of judgment (the 
plague traditions) and of mercy (the wilderness traditions)’.   
25 Siebeneck, ‘The Midrash of Wisdom 10-19’.  
26 For extended treatments of Wisdom’s reworking of sacred history in chapter 10-19 see especially Cheon, 
The Exodus Story; P. Enns, Exodus Retold: Ancient Exegesis of the Departure from Egypt in Wis 10:15-21 and 19:1-9 (HSMM 
57; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997); Siebeneck, ‘The Midrash of Wisdom 10-19’; Lietaert Peerbolte, ‘The 
Hermeneutics of Exodus’; Watson, Hermeneutics, 380-411; McGlynn, Divine Judgment, 170-219.   
27 Enns argues that many of Wisdom’s exegetical innovations are evident in earlier Jewish literature. Thus, 
for Enns, Wisdom is ‘not so much an interpreter of Scripture…. He is, rather an inheriter [sic] of an interpreted 
Bible’ (Exodus Retold, 142). However, as Enns concedes (Exodus Retold, 144), Wisdom’s peculiar rearrangement of the 
canonical material and unparalleled emphasis on idolatry (cf. Lietaert Peerbolte, ‘The Hermeneutics of Exodus’) 
demonstrates that our author is a creative re-interpreter of his interpreted textual heritage.    
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drown the male children of the Israelites in the Nile (Wis. 11.7). In contrast, Israel, though 
mercifully disciplined (ἐν ἐλέει piαιδευόμενοι, 11.9) with an educational thirst (‘they learned 
how the ungodly were tormented’), received the divine gift of potable water (11.4). In addition 
to pairing these textually remote passages, Wisdom conveniently omits Exodus’s description of 
Israel’s rather whiny lamentation about their thirst (Exod 17.1-7; cf. Neh 9; Ps 78), following 
instead the somewhat white-washed recollections of Psalm 105.28 These hermeneutical tactics 
unite the voices of isolated texts in a common refrain: ‘divine agency is supremely rational in 
its workings’.29     
   Following on from the thematically related reflections, the second and third diptychs 
creatively reconfigure the canonical presentation of the animal plagues (Wis. 16.1-14). Here, 
however, Wisdom is forced to hunt for the positive elements of its antithetical pairs in the 
theologically inhospitable terrain of Numbers. Relating the animal plagues to the Egyptians’ 
animal worship provides a clear demonstration of Wisdom’s perceived symmetry between 
crime and punishment. This is the criterion which enables Wisdom to assert unqualifiedly the 
deservedness (ἀξίως, 16.1) and inevitability (δεῖ, 16.4) of the Egyptians’ punishment. Two of 
Wisdom’s axioms are evident. The Egyptians’ idolatry warranted their punishment (cf. 12.15) 
and the mode of that condemnation matched the specific form of their unrighteousness (cf. 
11.16). What is less obvious is how Israel’s corresponding blessing can be canonically 
substantiated. Wisdom pairs the animal plagues with the (super)-abundance of quail (Wis. 16.1-
4; Num 11.4-35)30 and the incident of the poisonous snakes (Wis. 16.5-14; Num 21.5-9). In order 
to make the diptychs work, however, the moral ambiguity of Israel and the references to 
divine wrath associated with the quail account (Num 11.19-20, 31-34), along with the death 
motif which dominates the snake narrative (Num 21.6), have to be extracted and relocated. 
Wisdom solves this hermeneutical crisis through an exegetical surgery of sorts, performing a 
textual transplant of the troublesome material that problematises the Israel episodes and, to 
                                                        
28 It is often noticed that Wisdom’s morally clean reading has canonical predecessors in, for example, 
Deuteronomy and Psalm 105 (Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 100; Watson, Hermeneutics, 383-84); but these 
hermeneutical forerunners, however influential and legitimating, cannot sufficiently account for Wisdom’s 
dramatic rearrangement of pentateuchal texts. The basic aetiological factor is not exegetical tradition but 
theological conviction.  
29 Watson, Hermeneutics, 395. 
30 McGlynn, Divine Judgment, 191-92 argues that this allusion to the quail episode echoes the positive gift 
of Exodus 16.8, 12-13, but as Watson rightly observes the language of the ‘quails coming up from the sea’ (Wis. 
19.12) and the ‘desire’ motif both come from Numbers 11 (Hermeneutics, 398).  
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use Watson’s term, ‘displaces’ it onto the Egyptians.31 Thus, the overflow of quails is recast as 
an unambiguous exercise of divine beneficence (Wis. 16.1-4), free from the taint of Israelite 
complaint and divine judgment, the latter being replanted in the appetite-suppressing effects 
of the animal plagues (16.3). The punitive character of the deadly snakes is a bit more difficult 
to maneuver around, but Wisdom effectively reinterprets this brief (piρὸς ὀλίγον) trial as a 
pedagogical necessity (16.6, 11),32 which is inseparably tied to its soteriological counterpart.33 
Ignoring the scriptural claim that ‘many of the children of Israel died’ (Num 21.6), Wisdom 
boldly claims that, in contrast to the Egyptians who were killed by the relatively innocuous 
bites of flies and locusts (16.9),34 the fangs of venomous serpents (ἰοβόλων δρακόντων, 16.10) 
did not claim the lives of any Israelites (16.7, 10-14). In this way, the snake incident is read as 
an instantiation of the Exodus paradigm - both in the symmetry of judgment for Egypt and 
salvation for Israel and in the more subtle presentation of this plague and its corresponding 
salvific solution as, in Watson’s words, ‘a single event that is both warning and reminder, with 
the result that judgment is subordinate to salvation and God is manifested as “the Saviour of 
all”’ (16.7).35 A theology shaped by a reading of a text (Exodus) trumps the content of another 
text (Numbers). This, however, is not simply some imposition of ideology; this is a more 
complex instance of a canon within the canon: Exodus provides the hermeneutical vantage 
point from which to properly read and, if necessary, re-read scripture.     
 The next two diptychs allow Wisdom to return to the safer waters of Exodus before 
venturing into the hermeneutical riptide of Numbers one last time. Because the Book of 
Exodus is itself shaped by the bipartite divine activity paradigmatically evident in the Exodus 
event, its contents are naturally amenable to a symmetrical presentation.36 The crop-
destroying plague of fiery precipitation (Wis. 16.15-29; Exod 9.13-35) is straightforwardly 
contrasted with the provision of flame-retardant manna (Exod 16). In the one case, the 
ungodly (ἀσεβής), once again defined in terms of their intellectual error (ἀρνούμενοι εἰδέναι, 
                                                        
31 Watson, Hermeneutics, 397-404.  
32 Cheon, The Exodus Story, 56.  
33 Watson, Hermeneutics, 400: ‘The author’s initial interpretative move is to connect the onset of the 
snakes as closely as possible to the divinely ordained means of healing, both being planned in advance with a 
single goal in mind’.  
34 This is an expansion of the canonical material which knows nothing of the flies and/or locusts biting 
let alone killing the Egyptians (Exod 10.12-20; LXX 8.16-28). This is rightly noted by Cheon, The Exodus Story, 54.   
35 Watson, Hermeneutics, 400 (italics removed).  
36 The glaring exception to this is the Golden Calf incident (Exod 32) which significantly, though not 
surprisingly, is absent from Wisdom’s reading.  
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16.16), were pursued by the judgment of God (θεοῦ κρίσει, 16.18) in the form of unquenchable 
fire. The righteous by contrast, enjoyed the unburnable manna which altered its ‘accidents’ in 
accordance with the preferences of each person’s palate (piρὸς ὅ τις ἐβούλετο μετεκιρνᾶτο, 
16.21). This particular pairing indicates that the very structures of creation, acting in service to 
the will of the creator (16.24a), exhibit and proactively enforce the principles of cosmic 
balance and moral order.37 The universe is the defender of the righteous (ὑpiέρμαχος γὰρ ὁ 
κόσμος ἐστὶν δικαίων, 16.17) and exerts itself to punish the unrighteous (ἐpiιτείνεται εἰς 
κόλασιν κατὰ τῶν ἀδίκων, 16.24a) even while it benevolently loosens its punitive grip on those 
who are rightly persuaded to trust the creator (ἀνίεται εἰς εὐεργεσίαν ὑpiὲρ τῶν ἐpiὶ σοὶ 
piεpiοιθότων, 16.24b).38 This creational metamorphosis, moreover, has a two-sided pedagogical 
purpose that mirrors the two-sidedness of the single divine act of judgment and grace. The 
unnaturalness is intended to teach (μανθάνω, 16.26) the righteous and ensure that the ungodly 
know (οἶδα, 16.18) that it is God who delivers and destroys. As 16.13 confesses – probably 
alluding to Deuteronomy 32.39 - σὺ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου ἐξουσίαν ἔχεις.39       
The brief doxology that introduces the fifth diptych highlights both Egyptian stupidity 
(ἀpiαίδευτος) and the unimpeachable judgments of God: ‘Great are your judgments and hard to 
describe, therefore uninstructed souls have gone astray’ (17.1). This functions as an 
appropriate opening for the contrast between the plague of darkness (Wis. 17.1-18.4; Exod 
10.21-29) and the divine guidance offered Israel in the pillar of fire (Exod 13.21).40 Wisdom 
seems almost to enjoy the irony implicit in the terrifying exposure of the Egyptians’ 
                                                        
37 M. Kolarcik, ‘Creation and Salvation in the Book of Wisdom’ in Creation in the Biblical Tradition (ed. R.J. 
Clifford and J.J. Collins, CBQMS 24; Washington: Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1992), 97-107; D. Winston, 
‘The Book of Wisdom’s Theory of Cosmogony’, HR 11 (1971), 185-202. This theme of creational justice looks back to 
1.14 and, as we shall see below, ahead to 19.18-20.    
38 This image of creation relaxing its penal personality for the sake of those who have confidence in God 
reflects the ‘Mercy Dialogue’s’ depiction of a merciful judgment which is necessarily tied to some condition; in 
this case being persuaded of God’s trustworthiness. According to J.J. Collins, ‘Pseudo-Solomon draws here on Stoic 
cosmology, in which the elements admit of different degrees of tension or relaxation’ (‘The Reinterpretation of 
Apocalyptic Traditions in the Wisdom of Solomon’, in The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research: Studies on Tradition, 
Redaction, and Theology [DCLY 2005; ed. A. Passaro and G. Bellia; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005], 143-57 [151]).      
39 The divine power over life and death evident in 16.13 is immediately contrasted with the 
powerlessness of a depraved (κακία) humanity that, while able to take life, ‘cannot bring back a departed spirit’ 
(ἐξελθὸν piνεῦμα οὐκ ἀναστρέφει, 16.14). Passaro’s overtly theological reading detects ‘an absolute contrast 
between the power of God and the impotence of man; between what God does in his kindness for man and what 
man in his wickedness can do to his fellow man’ (‘The Serpent and the Manna or the Saving Word’, in The Book of 
Wisdom in Modern Research: Studies on Tradition, Redaction, and Theology [DCLY 2005; ed. A. Passaro and G. Bellia; 
Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005] 179-93 [192]).    
40 Larcher, Le Livre de la Sagesse, 945.   
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uneducated presumptions. Fancying themselves master of God’s people (17.2) and their sins 
undetectable (17.3), the horrifying darkness overturned their irrational presumptions and cast 
them into the fearful prison of psychological paralysis (17.2-21). Thus, while Israel, described 
here as the holy ones (τοῖς ὁσίοις, 18.1), followed a great light (μέγιστον ἦν φῶς, 18.1), the 
nation which imprisoned God’s elected broker of the imperishable light of the law (τὸ 
ἄφθαρτον νόμου φῶς, 18.4) deservingly (ἄξιος) experienced the jail of darkness. Canonically, 
these two episodes are unrelated, but Wisdom exploits the common theme of light and 
darkness to unite these narratives in further validation of its theological vision of judicial 
symmetry. 
Returning to Numbers, Wisdom confronts what is perhaps its most formidable canonical 
hurdle: the death of 14,700 Israelites in the aftermath of Korah’s rebellion (Num 16.41-50; LXX 
17.6-15; Wis. 18.5-25). Pairing this problematic event with the slaughter of the Egyptian first 
born (Exod 12.1-32) blunts the sharpness of what appears to be an obvious canonical 
contradiction to Wisdom’s theology; but connecting the death of the Egyptian heirs with their 
murder of the Israelite infants (18.5), while reflecting two of Wisdom’s symmetries (11.16; 12.15; 
cf. 18.7-8), does not solve the riddle of a parallel plague upon Israel. Aware of the severe strain 
this enigmatic episode places upon its central thesis, Wisdom extracts all possible theological 
leverage from the Passover events before facing the wilderness plague head on. The Exodus 
paradigm is prefigured in the diametrical symmetry of the destruction of the Egyptians guilty 
of infanticide (18.5-8) and the protection of the ritually pure and law-observant Israelites (18.7-
9).41 Moreover, the manner in which God acts in judgment is cast in overtly mythic terms. The 
omnipotent Logos (ὁ piαντοδύναμος λόγος) is depicted as a relentless warrior, leaping from 
heaven and filling all things with death (ἐpiλήρωσεν τὰ piάντα θανάτου, 18.15-16).42 The 
presence of this divine executioner is accompanied by dreadful dreams (ὀνείρων δεινῶν) that 
                                                        
41 There is some debate about the implied form of worship and the intended referent of νόμος in 18.9. 
Larcher, Le Livre de la Sagesse, 992 rightly notes that the event in question (i.e. the Passover) is, in canonical form, 
prior to the giving of the law at Sinai. As we have seen, however, Wisdom is unconcerned with chronological 
precision and narrative sequencing. Contextually, it is natural to hear the νόμος of 18.9 as referring back to the 
law of 18.4 – a clear reference to Torah (Winston, Wisdom, 311-12) – which, though imprisoned by Egypt, Israel was 
commissioned to carry to the world.  
42 See J.R. Dodson, The ‘Powers’ of Personification: Rhetorical Purpose in the Book of Wisdom and the Letter to the 
Romans (BZNW 161; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 83-84 for more on Wisdom’s personification of the divine 
Logos.  
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force the terrified Egyptians to confront the cause of their destruction (18.17-19). The 
awfulness of this night appears unparalleled, but diptychs, by definition, require a parallel.     
It seems that in searching for a textual partner for this holocaustic event, Wisdom is 
forced to confront the horror of Numbers 16: ‘The experience of death also touched the 
righteous, and destruction came upon the multitude in the desert’ (18.20; cf. 18.23). The task of 
re-presenting this incident as an expression of rational justice and moral order requires 
Wisdom, much like enrobed Aaron in his battle against the destroyer (Wis. 18.21-22), to don and 
deploy its full quiver of hermeneutical armour and arrows. First, ignoring the canonical 
calculation of the dead (14,700, Num 16.9; LXX 17.4), Wisdom contrasts the innumerable 
(ἀναρίθμητος, 18.12) Egyptian victims of the Passover massacre with the brevity of wrath in 
the wilderness (ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐpiὶ piολὺ ἔμεινεν ἡ ὀργή, 18.20c). Additionally, omitting any reference 
to the rebellion that incited the divine wrath in Numbers 16, Wisdom makes the non-canonical 
claim that this, rather than being an expression of punitive justice, was a mere test (ἦν γὰρ 
μόνη ἡ piεῖρα, 18.25). Recasting the narrative along these lines, our author is able to reemploy 
the strategy that helped him navigate the exegetical maze of the snake plague (Wis. 16.5-14), 
moving swiftly from the acknowledgment of death to the divine act of deliverance – in this 
case Aaron’s intercessory combat against the personified destroyer (ὁ ὀλεθρεύων; cf. τὸν 
κολάζοντα, 18.22). Watson astutely observes that a form of reverse displacement is required to 
make this move, transplanting the ‘angel of death’ from Exodus 12.23 into the Numbers 
account in the place of impersonal wrath (ὀργή).43 Following Exodus’s subtle differentiation of 
the agency of ‘the destroyer’ and the person of the Lord (Exod 12.23), this clever character 
swap allows Wisdom to cast Aaron as God’s warrior, whose battle against the agent of death 
slyly transfers God’s active role in the episode from the negative exercise of punitive wrath 
(Num 16, LXX 17) to the more positive and palatable portrait of redemption and rescue (Wis. 
18.20-25).44 This combination of hermeneutical moves reflects Wisdom’s unshakable 
                                                        
43 Watson, Hermeneutics, 403.  
44 It is possible that a two-way character exchange is implied in the association of the deaths of the 
Egyptian heirs and the agency of God’s all-powerful Logos (ὁ piαντοδύναμός σου λόγος, 18.5). If this is the case, 
especially if Logos here is to be equated with divine Wisdom (McGlynn, Divine Judgment, 209; Dodson, The ‘Powers’ of 
Personification, 86-87), then Wisdom has creatively restructured the Passover and wilderness plague to, as a pair, 
reflect the Exodus paradigm: God, through the Logos/Wisdom, destroys the Egyptians and, through Aaron’s 
priestly combat, delivers Israel (Watson, Hermeneutics, 403-04).   
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commitment to a theology of orderly justice. As Watson argues, ‘If scripture seems to 
contradict [Wisdom’s theological] principles…then scripture must be rewritten’.45 
The seventh diptych provides a suitable finale for Wisdom’s rereading of pentateuchal 
history and, more broadly, the book’s entire hermeneutical project. Returning to the Red Sea, 
Wisdom again contrasts the safe passage of the Israelites with the deserved (ἄξιος, 19.4) 
drowning of the Egyptians (19.1-9). This time, however, the crossing is situated within a larger 
retrospective discussion of the Exodus events (19.10-21). Gathering the various injustices of the 
Egyptians against Israel under the meta-sin of unprecedented inhospitality (19.13-17), Wisdom 
is able to label the Egyptians sinners (ἁμαρτωλός, 19.13), thereby establishing the justness of 
their sufferings (δικαίως ἔpiασχον, 19.13). Foolishly (ἄνοια, 19.3) – though in accordance with 
the divine foreknowledge (19.1) – the Egyptians, moved by the unseen hand of retributive fate 
(ἀνάγκη), pursued those whom they had recently manumitted so that (ἵνα) τὴν λείpiουσαν ταῖς 
βασάνοις piροσαναpiληρώσωσιν κόλασιν (19.4). 
As in 16.17, 24, this moral equitability is evident at an elemental level as creation, in 
defense of God’s children (οἱ σοὶ piαῖδες, 19.6), refashioned its nature (ἡ κτίσις ἐν ἰδίῳ γένει 
piάλιν ἄνωθεν διετυpiοῦτο) and transposed its elements (τὰ στοιχεῖα μεθαρμοζόμενα, 19.18).46 
Philo similarly suggests that God can change the elements into instruments for the destruction 
of the ungodly at a whim (Mos. 1.96). Here, however, Wisdom’s emphasis is the other side of the 
Philonic coin: ἵνα οἱ σοὶ piαῖδες φυλαχθῶσιν ἀβλαβεῖς (19.6). Dodson captures the drama: 
‘Creation itself moves from order to chaos as it unravels in the face of God’s enemies, but it 
complies with God’s command so that it is refashioned from chaos to order for the benefit of 
the pious’.47 This salvation via creation confirms Wisdom’s earlier claim about the soteriological 
character of the world’s generative forces (σωτήριοι αἱ γενέσεις τοῦ κόσμου, 1.14). At work 
here is a subtle reactivation of Genesis 1. As Pierre Beauchamp has observed, the process of 
recreation (19.6) mirrors the Genesis sequence: darkness (19.7) gives way to the emergence of 
                                                        
45 Watson, Hermeneutics, 401-02.   
46 The musical metaphor is correctly noted by Winston, Wisdom, 330-32. A fuller exploration is provided 
by R. Pistone who concludes, ‘Connected to what precedes by the initial γάρ, the text has, together with vv. 19-22, 
the function of anakephalaíosis, of recapitulating in closure of the work’ (‘The Lyre and the Creation: Music Theory 
and Persuasive Strategy in Wisdom 19’, in The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research: Studies on Tradition, Redaction, and 
Theology [DCLY 2005; ed. A. Passaro and G. Bellia; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005], 195-217 [215]).   
47 Dodson, The ‘Powers’ of Personification, 78.  
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dry land out of the water (19.7b), which is then followed by the appearance of animals’.48 Here, 
Genesis 1 is recast in an explicitly Exodus-shaped mold. Recreation (19.6), like creation itself 
(1.14), is soteriological – it punishes the wicked (19.13-17) and rescues the righteous (19.6-12). 49 
Thus, working from end to beginning or, more accurately, from eschatology (final judgment) 
to protological history (creation and Exodus), the sage grounds his hope for a future creational 
soteriology (Wis. 5.17-23) in creation’s historical salvation of the righteous (Wis. 10-19; esp. 
16.15-29; 19.6-10, 18-22). As Dodson concludes:  
For Wisdom, Creation’s activity at the future apocalypse is founded upon its past activity 
in the Exodus. In Wisdom 1-6, the sage places the fools in juxtaposition with the 
righteous; in Wisdom 10-19, the sage places the foolish Egyptians over against righteous 
Israel. The critical role Creation had played in the Exodus event dictates the role it will 
play at the visitation of God.50  
It is only from this retrospective vantage point that we can address a prima facie tension 
noted earlier: Is justice historically realised as Wisdom 10-19 indicates, or is it postponed until 
the eschaton as chapters 2-5 suggest? Assessing Wisdom from its conclusion, what appeared as 
a tension recedes to reveal a coherent theology of history. Grounding his eschatological hope 
in the patterns of the canonical past, our author is implicitly affirming a common theological 
maxim: the end will be like the (canonical) beginning.51 As Giuseppe Bellia and Angelo Passaro 
remark, for Wisdom, ‘salvation lies in bringing the world back to the original plan of the 
Creator’.52 The tension, then, is not between scriptural history and unrealised eschatology. The 
tension is located in the mismatch between the injustices of the present and the justice 
established by the canonical and eschatological poles. For Wisdom, the canonical contours of 
moral order and divine justice that shape the eschatology of chapter 1-6 are derived from a 
reread and rewritten textual canon – or at least, as hinted above and argued below, a canon 
                                                        
48 P. Beauchamp, ‘Le Salut corporel des justes et la conclusion du livre de la Sagesse’, Bib 45 (1964): 491-
526. Beauchamp also detects a reference to plants somewhere within 19.9-11. Such a reference, however, is 
unlikely. The text does refer to the earth producing (19.10), but the reference is to the normal production of 
animals in contrast to the atypical gnats. Also, the somewhat ambiguous reference to luxurious food (ἐδέσματα 
τρυφῆς, 19.11) is lexically more likely to refer to meat (ἔδεσμα), which seems to be confirmed by the provision of 
quail in 19.12.   
49 Collins, ‘The Reinterpretation of Apocalyptic Traditions in the Wisdom of Solomon, 152-53: ‘We might 
infer from these statements about the role of nature in the Wisdom of Solomon, that justice must ultimately 
prevail in the cosmos….The cosmos is programmed to deal with unrighteousness’.  
50 Dodson, The ‘Powers’ of Personification, 74.  
51 Cf. Watson, Hermeneutics, 526: ‘Wisdom draws on narrative material from Genesis, Exodus and Numbers, 
and finds in this narrated past the key to God’s definitive saving action in the eschatological future’.  
52 G. Bellia and A. Passaro, ‘Infinite Passion for Justice’, in The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research: Studies on 
Tradition, Redaction, and Theology (DCLY 2005; ed. A. Passaro and G. Bellia; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005), 307-28 (321).   
73 
 
within the canon. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between canonical history and 
present history. For Wisdom, it seems, the two are of a different type, moving as it were on 
different planes that intersect at the point of theological appropriation. The canonical past, 
because it functions programmatically, is able to address the problems of the present because 
it provides the theological resources with which to construct a canonically legitimated 
eschatology. Far from problematising Wisdom’s pastoral theodicy, its twin appeal to scriptural 
history and a scripturally-shaped eschatology attends to the problem of the present with 
retrospective and prospective reflections on a common theistic refrain: ‘as it was in the 
beginning, is now and ever shall be’; or as Wisdom reworks it, it ever shall be as it was in the 
beginning even if it is not now. Together, these paradigmatic poles ensure present Israel of 
God’s creational, canonically historical and ultimately eschatological commitment to Israel.    
 
All Israel is Israel, but Why?   
Wisdom has concluded the argument. The principles of divine justice and moral order 
are detectable at the canonical and cosmic levels. The only thing left to do is to celebrate the 
basic homiletical point towards which this sustained theological rereading has been moving: 
‘For in everything, O Lord, you have exalted and glorified your people, and you have not 
neglected to help them at all times and in all places’ (19.22). This doxology, however, raises one 
last interpretative question which has been put off until now. It is regularly observed that 
throughout Wisdom’s engagement with scriptural history the canonical characters are never 
named. The most common interpretation of this rhetorical curiosity is the suggestion that 
Wisdom employs the technique of anonymity to departicularise the theological motifs attached 
to the various stories.53 According to this reading, Wisdom’s paradigmatic presentation of 
canonical characters indicates a universalizing interest that creates an anthropological 
dualism between the ‘righteous’ and the ‘ungodly’.54 This, however, insofar as it displaces 
Israel’s particularity, is only half right. Wisdom draws its anthropological dividing-line along 
                                                        
53 Cf. S. Schroer, ‘The Book of Sophia’ in Searching the Scriptures: A Feminist Commentary (ed. E. Schüssler 
Fiorenza; London: SCM Press, 1994), 17-38.  
54 A. Schmitt, ‘Struktur, Herkunft und Bedeutung der Beispielreihe in Weish 10’,  BZ 21 (1977): 1-22; J.J. 
Collins, ‘Cosmos and Salvation: Jewish Wisdom and Apocalyptic in the Hellenistic Age’, HR 17 (1977): 121-42. More 
recently, however, Collins has qualified his position a bit: ‘the author of Wisdom had a stubborn streak of ethnic 
particularism that was not entirely dissolved by his universalizing philosophy’ (‘The Reinterpretation of 
Apocalyptic Traditions in the Wisdom of Solomon’, 153).  
74 
 
moral and religious criteria; but rather than relativising Israel, this indicates the rational and 
judicious basis on which Israel is justifiably regarded as God’s people. Wisdom’s entire argument 
has been aimed at the doxological celebration of God’s perpetual care for his people (τὸν λαόν 
σου, 19.22); but in order to prevent this preferential treatment from appearing arbitrary, Israel 
has been exonerated at every turn.55 This textual purging makes little sense if it is not Israel 
who is perceived as righteous over against their non-Jewish oppressors. By employing non-
ethnic labels, Wisdom indicates that it is not Israel qua Israel that is the object of divine 
benevolence; but rather that God’s people are established as such (i.e. as Israel) in accordance 
with moral and rational criteria. As Barclay argues, ‘God’s people are saved, and their enemies 
punished, not because of their ethnicity…but because in moral and rational terms they deserve 
it’.56 There is a universal paradigm here – God saves Israel because they are righteous and 
condemns her oppressors because they are ungodly – but at no point in Wisdom is this pattern 
transferred from Israel to other nations or persons. Wisdom’s message to Jews in crisis is that 
God always saves Israel, not because Israel is Israel, but because Israel is righteous. This 
message is trans-temporal, but it is not trans-national.  
 
A Canon within the Canon 
Passaro summarises Wisdom’s hermeneutical project: 
[The author] collects Exodus themes with originality and freedom but eliminates the 
violent aspects of the accounts...in an effort to construct an organic discourse which 
does not indulge in facile eirenicism.... the remembrance of past events, re-read and re-
presented but faithful to the Scripture of the ancestors serves...to portray the tender 
concern and the powerful mercy of God for his people. 57 
This carefully nuanced description, while helpful on the whole, does perhaps betray a bit of 
the hermeneutical eirenicism Passaro praises Wisdom for avoiding. ‘Re-reading’ and ‘re-
presenting’ the canonical past in a way that is ‘faithful’ to the ‘Scripture of the ancestors’ is a 
necessarily dynamic hermeneutical process, one which includes, as Passaro recognises, textual 
fidelity and textual manipulation. The tension here is real, but as T.S. Eliot would have 
expected, it is here, in the to and fro between textual tradition and the theology of a talented 
                                                        
55 Note especially the stress on Israel’s abstention from idolatry in 15.1-4 and the white-washing of the 
wilderness traditions, including the complete omission of the Golden-Calf incident.  
56 Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 99; see also Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 183-84.  
57 Passaro, ‘The Serpent and the Manna’, 179.  
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individual, that our author is at his most original and his best. Perhaps Passaro catches the 
subtlety of Wisdom’s theological hermeneutic more fully in his essay with Giuseppe Bellia: The 
author of Wisdom ‘wishes to incorporate in his pages the preceding sacred books of Israel in an 
attempt at a theological re-understanding of a salvation which from history journeys towards 
an eternity which hangs over the present’.58 But even here a distinction needs to be made 
between the sacred pages that are constitutive of Wisdom’s theology and those that require 
emendation in consequence of that theology. 
 To borrow Watson’s phrasing, Wisdom’s theology is its reading of a text – not the 
composite text of the Pentateuch but rather the paradigmatic text of Exodus which establishes 
the meaning of the Pentateuch.59 The dance of Wisdom’s hermeneutical theology is a waltz of 
sorts, a three step movement from the text of Exodus to an Exodus-shaped theology to an 
Exodus-determined reading of Numbers and Genesis. The extraction of the Golden-Calf 
incident might appear to problematise this conclusion, but in fact this rather extreme case of 
Sachkritik is the exception which proves the rule: even the text of Exodus is subject to criticism 
on the basis of the theology expressed in its central event. From this perspective, the 
theological principles articulated in the ‘Mercy Dialogue’ can properly be seen both as a 
product of reading a text (Exodus) and as the hermeneutical lens through which other texts 
are read (Numbers and Genesis).  
  
                                                        
58 Bellia and Passaro, ‘Infinite Passion for Justice’, 328.   
59 See Watson, Hermeneutics, 514. Watson’s comments are made in relation to Pauline theology.  
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Chapter 5 
A Rational Reading, in Retrospect 
Wisdom of Solomon, to risk an overused turn of phrase, is a hermeneutical tour de force. 
Beginning at the end and ending at the beginning, reality is read within a comprehensive 
vision of cosmic order and moral symmetry which is primarily evident in the deserved 
destruction of the ungodly and the suitable salvation of the righteous. The illuminating aid of 
divine Wisdom – God’s fitting gift (Wis. 6-10) – allows this Exodus-shaped construal to peel 
back the hermeneutically distorting veil of the empirical injustice of death (Wis. 1-6) and the 
apparent canonical contradictions of the pentateuchal narrative (Wis. 10-19) to reveal a stably 
structured universe in which history, from cosmogony to eschatology, follows a predictable 
pattern of divine activity. Detecting an ever present correspondence between the content of 
divine action – either judgment or salvation – and the moral, rational and/or social suitability 
of the objects of that agency, Wisdom effectively locates God’s soteriological action within the 
cosmological operations of moral order and divine justice. This synthetic conclusion implies 
that this deep and pre-creational pattern is the generative and organising nucleus of Wisdom’s 
theology. Put this way, however, our conclusion is little more than a confirmatory restatement 
of our opening thesis: Wisdom’s reading of text and world operates within the theological 
boundaries marked off by a vision of cosmic order that σοφία fashioned, manages and reveals 
and in which the operations of divine justice ensure the stable and rational distribution of 
fitting salvation and judgment. Summation, however, needs to move beyond affirmation. This 
chapter intends to address this need by gathering the various theological threads from the 
preceding three chapters under three thematic rubrics: 1) the irreducible anthropological 
distinction between Jew and non-Jew, 2) the definition of and relationship between divine 
justice and God’s gifts, and 3) the Exodus-shaped and protologically-grounded hermeneutic 
evident in Wisdom’s rereading and rewriting of pentateuchal history. The hope is that this 
topical distillation will both sharpen the profile of Wisdom’s sweeping theological vision and, in 
so doing, prepare the way for the forthcoming dialogue between Wisdom and Paul’s letter to 
the Christians in Rome.   
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There is a Distinction: Israel and Idolaters 
 Whatever Paul may conclude in Romans 3.22, for Wisdom there is an anthropological 
distinction. In fact, there has to be. The logic of the Exodus demands a two-group 
anthropology which necessarily corresponds to the bipartite divine action: salvation for the 
righteous; judgment for the wicked. For Wisdom, this dialectic shapes both the problem of the 
present and the eschatological solution. Wisdom’s theological crisis is a result of the present 
imbalance between these anthropological and soteriological dualisms. In contrast to the 
symmetry of the Exodus event, Wisdom’s present is characterised by the flourishing of the 
wicked and the empirical suffering of the righteous (cf. 3.13-4.9). This means that the problem 
of the present – to anticipate a tension with Pauline theology – can be stated in terms of the 
unjust connection between sinners and soteriological blessing and the corresponding link 
between the righteous and the covenant curses. Grounding its eschatological hope in the just 
mercy of God paradigmatically exemplified in the Exodus, Wisdom’s solution to this felt 
theodicy is to assert the eschatological reestablishment of the just lines between, on the one 
hand, the righteous and blessing and, on the other hand, the wicked and curses. The gospel 
according to Wisdom, then, is not that the ungodly will be blessed – that is today’s horrifying 
headline! – but rather that the righteous will be delivered from the ungodly. This distinction 
between the injustice of the present soteriological blessing of the ungodly and the justice of 
the eschatological salvation of the righteous from the ungodly lies at the very centre of 
Wisdom’s pastoral theology (cf. 10.15). The goodness of God consists in his canonical portrayal 
as the one who in mercy rescues the righteous and in judgment destroys the sinners. Wisdom’s 
comforting word to his suffering kinsfolk is that the God who acted with perfect justice in the 
Exodus will again act with soteriological symmetry at the eschaton.  
 Crucially, then, it must be the righteous who are blessed and the wicked who are 
cursed. Or even more fundamentally, the righteous and the wicked must be. This theodicy 
demands a rational soteriology. But a soteriology whose rationality is Exodus-shaped demands 
a dualistic anthropology. For Wisdom, the distinction between the righteous and the wicked 
corresponds to the distinction between Israel and non-Israel. As argued in the previous 
chapter, however, this is an ethical and religious claim, not merely an ethnic one. Watson is 
right to observe that Wisdom’s re-narration of Exodus and Numbers is shaped by the Exodus 
event: ‘[Wisdom] finds here a virtually unqualified distinction between God’s saving action 
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towards the holy people and his punitive action towards their enemies’.1 But in order for this 
overtly Exodus-shaped historiography to function as an Exodus-shaped theodicy, Israel, as the 
object of divine rescue, must be re-presented as consistently righteous in contradiction to 
their unrighteous oppressors. Wisdom 13-15 establishes this contrast by juxtaposing Israel’s 
innocence with respect to idolatry and immorality with the false worship and sinfulness that 
characterises the Gentile world: the function of the polemic against false worship is to 
reinforce the distinction between Israel and non-Israel on the basis of their respective 
identifications as non-idolaters and idolaters. That Wisdom is willing to remove incidents like 
the Golden Calf from Israel’s canonical history in an effort to preserve the justice implied by 
the correspondence between divine action and anthropological status demonstrates the 
hermeneutical pressure exerted by the theological grammar of the Exodus event. For Wisdom, 
the Exodus is not simply the salvation of Israel and the destruction of Egypt; it is the salvation 
of Israel because they are a ‘holy people’ and the destruction of Egypt because their idolatry and 
immorality required it (16.1; 19.4). In other words, the Exodus event is the paradigm of divine 
justice precisely because in it God’s bipartite act of mercy and judgment corresponds to the 
two anthropological options of righteousness and wickedness.  
 
Divine Justice and God’s Pre-conditional Χάρις 
 The semantic range of ‘justice’ and ‘grace’ are determined by the theological pattern of 
the Exodus event. This means that divine justice operates as a duality of divine action: 
judgment is an act of justice directed towards those worthy of death (cf. 1.16); grace is a just 
act directed towards those worthy of Wisdom (cf. 6.16).  
For Wisdom, the Exodus is the paradigmatic instantiation of an anthropological 
distinction and a corresponding soteriological distinction. As Wisdom retells the story (10.15-
21; 19.1-21), a bipartite humanity (δίκαιοι and ἀσεβεῖς, 10.20) encounters, respectively, 
deliverance and destruction (cf. 10.18-19). The Red Sea crossing is thus the principal 
exemplification of divine justice because it is the righteous who are rescued and the wicked 
who are drowned. Implied in this reading of righteousness is a particular definition of God’s 
                                                        
1 F. Watson, Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith (London: T & T Clark, 2004), 411.  
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justice: the righteousness of God is located in the correspondence between divine action and the 
human subject(s).2 
As observed in the preceding chapters, the single criterion of correspondence can be 
met by a range of moral, rational and social criteria. Wisdom rescues those who are righteous 
(10.4-14), is found by those who seek and love her (6.12), and protects the first-formed father 
of the world (10.1). Conversely, it is the ungodly (3.10) and the irrational (2.1) that Wisdom 
avoids and who are therefore the objects of divine judgment. However, while this catalogue of 
criteria specifies the various points of correspondence, Wisdom’s usual manner of signaling the 
congruence between the form and object of divine action is ἄξιος-terminology (1.16; 3.5; 6.16; 
9.12; 12.7; 12.26; 16.9; 18.4; 19.4).3 As the one who rules righteously, God can be said to be 
righteous (δίκαιος ὢν δικαίως τὰ piάντα διέpiεις, 12.15) because his judgments operate 
according to ‘fit’ (ἀξίαν θεοῦ κρίσιν, 12.26). In other words, the rightness of divine action is 
identifiable in and as the affinity between what God does and the worth of those towards 
whom that action is directed. This, however, does not translate into an un-nuanced iustitia 
distributiva. As argued in chapter four, the ‘Mercy Dialogue’ (11.17-12.27) insists that divine 
judgment is always accompanied and tempered by a non-salvific mercy that reflects God’s 
universal love (11.23-12.11). Thus, while mercy cannot exclude, overturn or in any way oppose 
the exercise of justice, it does complement and qualify its execution. At this point, Wisdom’s 
determined insistence on the universality of divine love pushes it beyond the strict symmetry 
of the Exodus event to the details of the text. The gradual judgment of the plague cycles 
indicates that even the necessary exercise of judgment is flooded with mercy. In this way, 
mercy and justice appear as qualifying rather than competing phenomena – cooperative and 
inseparable aspects of God’s operations in the world. This means that mercy, rather than 
interrupting or unsettling the patterns of justice by linking sinners with soteriological 
blessings, operates in the coincidence between the anthropological and soteriological 
symmetries seen in the Exodus event. Mercy affects the execution of judgment, not the objects 
of judgment.  
                                                        
2 Philo makes a similar point by insisting that δικαιοσύνη works κατ’ ἀξίαν (Leg. 1.87; Mos. 2.9; Sobr. 40). 
For more on this, see chapter seven.  
3 Even in 12.15, where Wisdom departs from its typical ἄξιος-language, ὀφείλω is used almost 
synonymously as it serves to indicate the point of correspondence between the divine act of judgment and the 
objects (or non-objects) of that judgment, thereby grounding God’s forensic fairness (cf. 12.20)  
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Thus, precisely while emphasising the mercy and love of God, Wisdom’s author 
maintains the Exodus-shape of God’s saving activity: the unrighteous (ἄδικος) cannot be 
acquitted (12.12) and the undeserving (τὸν μὴ ὀφείλοντα) cannot be condemned (12.15).4 For 
this reason, mercy as the rescue of the unrighteous or, to borrow the Pauline parlance, the 
justification of the ungodly would, within Wisdom’s moral reasoning, be an oxymoronic 
absurdity – a disqualification of God’s goodness because it would destabilise the moral 
structures of the cosmos that Wisdom fashioned and orders. A deviation from the moral and 
rational symmetry concretised at the Red Sea is not, for Wisdom, an expression of mercy; it is a 
disruption of the elemental order of the universe and thus an aberrant indication that the 
cosmos is governed not by the stability and goodness of divine justice but by the anarchic 
horrors and chaos of irrationality. Wisdom’s homiletical word of hope to the suffering righteous 
is finally a promise that, as in the canonical past, divine justice will be eschatologically evident 
in the overcoming of chaos with correspondence – that is, God will act in saving justice to 
reconnect the congruence between righteousness and redemption and ungodliness and 
judgment. Grace lives on the salvific side of this just duality. 
    According to Giuseppe Bellia and Angelo Passaro, sapiential theology must compare 
‘itself loyally both with its cultural context and in continuity with the theological heritage 
carried from the fathers’.5 This dual comparison is clearly present in Wisdom’s employment of 
Middle-Platonism to explicate and re-narrate Jewish theology and history, but it is also 
evident, perhaps less obviously, in Wisdom’s portrayal of the gift of divine Wisdom. As argued 
in chapter three, Wisdom’s insistence on the rational correspondence between gift and 
recipient – σοφία, the gift (8.21), seeks those who are worthy (ἄξιος) of her (6.16) – is at home 
in the ancient economy of gift-exchange. Just as Seneca and Philo insist on the social and 
theological necessity of an affinity between benefit and beneficiary, so in Wisdom God’s χάρις is 
directed towards ‘his holy ones’ (τοῖς ὁσίοις αὐτοῦ, 4.15; cf. 3.9) and it is the law-observant (ὁ 
                                                        
4 A similar point could be made from Wisdom’s dramatic rewriting of the Exodus-Numbers narrative in 
Wisdom 10.15-19.21. In this context, God’s favour towards Israel is qualified by moments of punitive testing (18.25) 
and pedagogical discipline (16.6, 11), but these ‘qualifications’ are situated within a redactional procedure that 
consistently presents the recipients of divine blessing (Israel) as οἱ δίκαιοι in contradistinction to the targets of 
God’s wrath (Egypt) who are both called and depicted as οἱ ἀσεβεῖς.   
5 G. Bellia and A. Passaro, ‘Infinite Passion for Justice’, in The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research: Studies on 
Tradition, Redaction, and Theology (DCLY 2005; ed. A. Passaro and G. Bellia; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005), 307-28 (307).    
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μὴ ἐργασάμενος ἐν χειρὶ ἀνόμημα) and faithful eunuch to whom God gives (δίδωμι) his χάρις 
(3.14).  
Interestingly, however, Wisdom’s cited authority for the shape of this divine benefaction 
is not some social custom or commonsense; it is the logic of the Exodus and the paradigmatic 
gifting of Wisdom to Solomon. As Wisdom rereads and rewrites the Exodus event, the objects of 
Wisdom’s gracious Red Sea rescue (ῥύομαι) are identified as a ‘holy people and blameless race’ 
(λαὸν ὅσιον καὶ σpiέρμα ἄμεμpiτον, 10.15) and their deliverance is therefore describable as a 
‘reward’ (μισθός, 10.17) for their labours. It is important to insist, however, that the use of 
μισθός here does not indicate a mixing of metaphors or a transition from a gift to a pay 
economy. In this context, the ‘reward’ of rescue is emphatically a gift – or more precisely the 
saving work of the gift (8.21; 10.15) –, but because it is a good gift – that is, because it finds 
fitting recipients – it is classifiable as both χάρις and μισθός, the former term indicating the 
unearned beneficence of God and the latter term signaling the equitability and rationality of 
that beneficence.6 This double-stress on the graciousness and fittingness of God’s gifts is 
exemplified in the giving of σοφία to Solomon. This paradigmatic gift is both explainable – 
Solomon was good (ἀγαθός) – and unearned – σοφία is genuinely a gift (χάρις) and thus her 
bestowal requires an authentic act of divine giving (δίδωμι, 8.21).7 The logic here, as argued in 
chapter three, is not properly described as synergistic as Wisdom’s material interest is less 
(cooperative) agency than affinity. That the insistence on the congruence of gift and recipient 
is contextually locatable within the economy of ancient gift-exchange and theologically 
anchored in a scriptural pattern confirms Barclay’s claim that the expectation of an affinity 
between divine action, whether judgment or salvation, and the object of that action ‘expresses 
the absolutely basic universal theistic presumption that the universe is fitly and morally 
ordered’.8 In this sense, Wisdom’s emphasis on the patterned coincidence between God’s 
benefits and their human beneficiaries is not a qualification of some univocal definition of 
grace as unconditioned and unfitting; it is an emphatic celebration of the gift-giving God that 
preserves his goodness and justice by addressing the theodicy question that discriminant 
benefaction raises: why does God give to some and not others? To insist that God’s χάρις is pre-
                                                        
6 For more on the use of μισθός in a gift-economy, see chapter seven.  
7 Wisdom 9.5-6 suggests that even though Solomon can be considered a ‘fitting’ recipient of God’s gift, he 
is nevertheless an undeserving object of divine grace. Cf. Philo’s appeal to Deuteronomy 9.5 in De sacrificiis Abel et 
Caini 57.   
8 Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 104.  
82 
 
conditional – that there is a necessary fit between gift and recipient – is to insist that all God’s 
actions, rather than being arbitrary and unfair, are good and loving and just. For Wisdom, grace 
does not trump or disrupt the ordered and equitable universe σοφία fashioned and manages; 
grace, because God is just and good, instantiates the essential cosmological and theological 
reality that God ‘arranged all things by measure and number and weight’ (11.20).     
 
Σοφία and Sachkritik 
 The old riddle about the ontological priority of the chicken or the egg can be applied to 
Wisdom’s hermeneutic: what came first, theology or reading? As with the ornithological 
enigma, simple questions do not necessarily invite straightforward answers. A chicken both 
comes from and creates an egg. And so it is with hermeneutics – theology is both a product and 
producer of readings. Consequently, a theological reading of a theological reader can only 
hope to assess the hermeneutical circle by entering it.  
Wisdom’s hermeneutical roundabout (forgive the mixing of metaphors) has three 
entrances. The first approaches Wisdom from the end – that is, from eschatology (Wis. 1-6). 
Starting here, which admittedly is where Wisdom starts, Wisdom appears to have a pre-existent 
eschatology whose soteriological symmetry is confirmed by the education of the divine σοφία 
(Wis. 6-10) and the canonical pattern of the Exodus event (Wis. 10-19). Read this way, theology 
comes first. On the other hand, if approached from the beginning – that is, from canonical 
history (Wis. 10-19) – the impression is rather different. The readings of the Exodus event that 
frame this re-narration of the scriptural past (10.15-21; 19.1-21) appear to provide the 
paradigm of dialectical divine action which then finds an antecedent analogy in the primeval 
activity of Wisdom (Wis. 6-10) and therefore generates the eschatological hope of a future 
divine act of salvation and judgment (Wis. 1-6). Within the logic of this construal, reading 
comes first.  
There is, however, a third entrance, restricted to the worthy and entering the 
hermeneutical scene neither from the end nor the beginning, but, as it were, from above. This 
is the educational agency of divine Wisdom, the one who is ‘the fashioner all things’ and from 
whom the author of Wisdom was gifted ‘unerring knowledge’ (Wis. 7.17-22). As Watson remarks, 
‘In the Wisdom of Solomon, the writer has himself experienced Sophia’s transforming 
illumination, reading scripture in light of it….. [he] moves freely between the transforming 
83 
 
event, its attestation in scripture, and its eschatological realization’.9 It is because the sage has 
learned ‘the beginning and end and middle of times’ (7.18) from the one who ‘orders all things 
well’ (8.1) that he knows to read history in past and future tenses as a recurrent concretion of 
the theological and cosmological fact that God ‘has arranged all things by measure and number 
and weight’ (11.20). In other words, the ‘all things’ which Wisdom fashioned (7.22) includes 
hermeneutical competence: Wisdom teaches the sage how to read. By unveiling the judicial 
symmetry that structures the protological order and by exposing her own agency in and under 
the Genesis narrative, Wisdom points to the Exodus as the paradigmatic instantiation of a deep 
and ultimately ineluctable pre-creational pattern: divine justice is defined by the 
correspondence between God’s actions and human subjects and so enacted as the rescue of the 
righteous and the judgment of the ungodly. This is both a theological and a hermeneutical 
lesson: the Exodus pattern, because it exemplifies the protological order, functions as the 
canon by which all other assertions, whether canonical or contemporary, are to be tested. Put 
another way, within Wisdom’s Sachkritik, the Sache is the pre-creational pattern that is 
principally see-able in the Exodus event. This explains both Wisdom’s rejection of the empirical 
rationality of the ungodly (Wis. 2-5) and the radically reconfigured presentation of canonical 
history (Wis. 10-19). In both cases traditional dogmas are critiqued because they do not 
conform to the logic of the cosmos exemplified in the Exodus.  
This suggests that within Wisdom’s hermeneutical grammar, Wisdom comes first. The 
formal content of Wisdom’s instruction is a reread Pentateuch, but the material content is 
Wisdom herself – the one who fashions, orders and teaches all things. In other words, while 
the divine gift of σοφία comes wrapped in the pages of Genesis, the pages have been infiltrated 
by the gift. Wisdom is now the subject of a programmatic narrative sequence and her acts of 
rescuing the righteous and avoiding the wicked anticipate and point to the paradigmatic 
function of the Red Sea crossing. In this way, reading comes second; but it also comes fourth. If 
Wisdom teaches the worthy to properly read the Exodus pattern as the principal 
exemplification of the protological order, then the theology produced by this reading is in turn 
the producer of the canonical re-presentation of Wisdom 10-19 and the counter-empirical 
eschatology Wisdom 1-6. We can thus summarise the hermeneutical process: 1) Wisdom teaches 
the worthy. 2) The education of the worthy includes a hermeneutical lesson in rereading the 
                                                        
9 Watson, Hermeneutics, 530.  
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Exodus as the paradigmatic instantiation of the pre-creational order. 3) This paradigmatic 
rereading grounds and generates an Exodus-shaped theology. 4) This Exodus-shaped theology 
functions as the hermeneutical touchstone for subsequent readings of canonical texts and 
contemporary and future history. If canonical history or contemporary crises contradict the 
structures of moral order and divine justice disclosed (by σοφία) in the Exodus event, then 
they are necessarily subject to theological criticism (Sachkritik). The protological principle 
determines the hermeneutical pattern: the God of illimitable love is immutably just. 
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Part II 
Wisdom and Romans in Conversation 
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Chapter 6 
Announcing the Human: Israel Against and As the Ungodly in Wisdom 
13-15 and Romans 1.18-2.111 
 
Part two of this thesis will reread pivotal sections of Romans in conversation with the author 
of Wisdom. While the dialogue is neither dependent nor based on Paul’s use or indebtedness to 
Wisdom, the conversation will begin at the point where most readers of Romans and Wisdom 
have heard the texts talking to each other. This chapter will therefore compare and reconsider 
the relationship between the polemics against idolatry and immorality in Wisdom 13-15 and 
Romans 1.18-2.11. Chapter seven will then consider the theological location, definition and 
relationship of divine justice and God’s grace, two concepts that are central to both texts. 
Finally, chapter eight will compare the rereadings of Israel’s scripture in Wisdom 10-19 and 
Romans 9-11 in an effort to uncover their respective hermeneutical rationales and theological 
contours.  
  
Us and Them, or Us: Wisdom 13-15 and Romans 1.18-2.5  
 The story of sin starts in Eden (Wis. 2.23-24; Rom 5.12). If the beginning of a story was 
the whole story, then Romans and the Wisdom of Solomon would have a similar tale to tell; and 
many have assumed that they do. Since Eduard Grafe alerted the world of Pauline scholarship 
to the unusually close connection between Romans 1.18-32 and Wisdom 13-14,2 readers of 
Romans have typically read Romans 1.18-32 as a condensed but consistent restatement of 
Wisdom’s anti-idolatry polemic. Anders Nygren’s Romans commentary problematised this 
textual relationship by extending the comparison into Romans 2 and Wisdom 15, but even here 
                                                        
1 A revised and compressed version of this argument appeared as J.A. Linebaugh, ‘Announcing the 
Human: Rethinking the Relationship Between Wisdom of Solomon 13-15 and Romans 1.18-2.11’, NTS 57.2 (2011): 
214-37.  
2 E. Grafe, ‘Das Verhältniss der paulinischen Schriften zur Sapientia Salmonis’ in Theologische 
Abhandlungen: Carl von Weizsäcker zu seinem siebzigsten Geburtstage 11. December 1892 gewidmet (Freiburg: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1892), 251-86. W. Sanday and A.C. Headlam, The Epistle to the Romans (ICC; New York: Scribner’s, 1896), 51-
52, 267-69 introduced these parallels to English-speaking scholarship. For a detailed survey of scholarship, see J.R. 
Dodson, The ‘Powers’ of Personificaiton: Rhetorical Purpose in the Book of Wisdom and the Letter to the Romans (BZNW 
161; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 4-13.  
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the theological affinity between Romans 1.18-32 and Wisdom 13-14 was affirmed and exploited.3 
According to his programmatic reading – a reading that dominates modern commentaries4 – 
Romans 1.18-32 reactivates Wisdom’s polemical attack on Gentile idolatry and immorality and 
then (Rom 2.1-11), in what Richard Hays calls a rhetorical ‘sting operation’,5 establishes the 
hamartiological equality of Jew and Gentile. Interpreted this way, Romans 1.18-32 is still about 
Gentile sin; 2.1-11 simply undermines Wisdom’s immunization of Israel (Wis. 15.1-4) by pointing 
to the impartiality of divine judgment (2.6-11) and the presence of sin within the elect nation 
(2.1-5, 21-24). Douglas Campbell, following the unpopular proposals of Schmeller6 and Porter,7 
has recently radicalised this interpretative trend, arguing that the affinities between Romans 
1.18-32 and Wisdom 13-14 contribute to his conclusion that Romans 1.18-32 is ‘an instance of 
piροσωpiοpiοιία’ in which Paul assumes the persona of his opponent – ‘the Teacher’ whose 
theology reflects a ‘dependence on at least large parts’ of Wisdom – and ‘summarizes…the 
Teacher’s usual opening – his arresting piροοίμιον or exordium’.8 The crucial point for our 
purposes is that these construals, despite their diversity, assume that while Paul critiques 
Wisdom 15.1-4 in Romans 2.1-11, Romans 1.18-32 stands as a compressed but theologically 
faithful re-presentation of Wisdom 13-14. 
 In this respect, Kathy Gaca is something of an outlier. As she reads Romans 1.18-32, 
Paul, while speaking within the ‘tradition of Hellenistic Jewish polemic’, has introduced a 
‘problematic innovation’: whereas the polemical tradition charges the Gentiles with 
theological ignorance, Paul ascribes received theological knowledge to Gentiles, thereby 
accusing them not just of ignorance but of apostasy.9 For Gaca, however, while Paul alters the 
accusation (apostasy not ignorance), the identity of the accused (Gentiles) remains unchanged.    
                                                        
3 A. Nygren, Commentary on Romans (trans. C.C. Rasmussen; London: SCM Press, 1952), compare page 112 
with 114-17.  
4 J.D.G. Dunn, Romans 1-8 (WBC 38a; Waco: Word, 1988), 82-83; J.A. Fitzmyer, Romans (AB 33; London: 
Geoffrey Chapman, 1992), 298; D.J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 133; E. 
Lohse, Der Brief an die Römer (KEK 4; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003), 86, 99.     
5 R.B. Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1996), 389.  
6 T. Schmeller, Paulus und die ‘Diatribe’: Eine vergleichende Stilinterpretation (Münster: Aschendorf, 1987), 225-
86.  
7 C.L. Porter, ‘Romans 1.18-32: Its Role in the Developing Argument’, NTS 40 (1994): 210-28.  
8 D.A. Campbell, The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul (Grand Rapids, 
Eerdmans, 2009), 542-93 (542, 595).  
9 K.L. Gaca, ‘Paul’s Uncommon Declaration in Romans 1.18-32 and its Problematic Legacy for Pagan and 
Christian Relations’, HTR 92: 2 (1999): 165-98. Others (e.g. R. Bell, No One Seeks for God: An Exegetical and Theological 
Study of Romans 1.18-3.20 [WUNT 106; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998], 76) have noticed that Romans 1.18-32 differs 
from Wisdom in a number of ways, but this has generally been used as evidence against Pauline interaction with 
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The terms in which Paul’s rhetorical trap is sprung, however, invite a reconsideration 
of Paul’s polemical target in Romans 1.18-32. The one who judges the other (κρίνεις τὸν ἕτερον, 
2.1) – the other being the presumed target of the invectives of 1.18-32 – is liable to 
condemnation because he is guilty of the other’s sins (τὰ αὐτὰ piράσσεις, 2.1; piοιῶν αὐτά, 2.3). 
The effect of this rhetorical move is to eliminate the self-imposed distance between the judge 
and the other, thereby subjecting the judge to his own condemnation (σεαυτὸν κατακρίνεις, 
2.1). Functionally, then, the indictment of Romans 1.18-32 becomes, at least retroactively, an 
indictment of the Jew as much as the Gentile.10 It is this implication that necessitates a 
reexamination of Romans 1.18-32, one which attends more closely to the dramatis personae Paul 
actually presents and exhibits a corresponding sensitivity to the inclusion of Israel within the 
scope of Israel’s own polemical tradition.11  
Because this reading is retrospective – occasioned as it is by the terms of the rhetorical 
turn at 2.1-11 – it is necessary to allow our argument to develop in parallel with Paul’s own 
rhetorical strategy. For this reason, our (brief) first pass through Romans 1.18-32 will 
emphasise the similarities between this unit and Wisdom 13-14 in an effort to highlight the 
crucial break which occurs at 2.1. What makes this investigation unique, however, is that it 
intends to take up the invitation to reread Romans 1.18-32 in light of the polemical twist of 
Romans 2. This rereading will attempt to situate Paul’s accusatory announcement of 1.19-32 
within the kergymatic progression of Romans 1.16-18 and will consider the rhetorical function 
and theological significance of Paul’s alterations to the Hellenistic Jewish polemical tradition. 
It will be argued that the contextualisation of the Pauline polemic within the apostle’s 
apocalyptic keryma (Rom 1.16-18), together with his ‘supra-natural theology’ (1.19-20), allusive 
inclusion of Israel within the history of sin (1.23), insertion of divine agency into the causal 
link between idolatry and immorality (1.24, 26, 28), and collapsing of  Wisdom's  differentiation 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Wisdom. However, as Francis Watson (Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith [London: T & T Clark, 2004], 405 n.77) notes, 
this assumption ‘implies that “influence” and “differences” are mutually limiting…. In fact…the depth of Paul’s 
engagement with this text is evident precisely at the points he also differs from it’.  
10 That the interlocutor of Romans 2.1-16 is the same figure explicitly identified as a self-proclaimed Jew 
in 2.17 will be argued below.    
11 R. Jewett, Romans (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), 152-54, like R. Dabelstein, Die 
Beurteilung der “Heiden” bei Paulus (BBET 14; Bern: Lang, 1981), 73-79 before him, argues for the inclusion of Israel 
within the polemical scope of Romans 1.18-32, but this argument is made at the expense of Paul’s engagement 
with Wisdom rather than, as this chapter intends, on the basis of a close comparison between Romans 1.18-32 and 
Wisdom 13-15. 
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between types of idolatry (1.24-25) require an interpretation of Romans 1.19-32 according to 
which its polemical target includes, as 1.18 indicates, ‘all…humankind’. 
Thus, my thesis: Paul’s polemic in Romans 1.18-32, rather than standing as a 
compressed but consistent restatement of Wisdom 13-14, serves the opposite rhetorical and 
theological function of Wisdom 13-15. This is not to say that these texts exhibit no continuity. 
On the contrary, the often noted lexical, thematic and argumentative parallels between 
Romans 1.18-2.5 and Wisdom 13-15 indicate an engagement which is situated within an 
antithetical argument. Textual dependence serves the rhetorical function of establishing 
theological difference. Whereas Wisdom’s polemic serves to reinforce the anthropological 
distinction between Jew and Gentile (qua non-idolaters and idolaters), Paul reworks the 
aniconic tradition to establish the essential unity of humanity.12    
 
Romans 1.19-2.5 and Wisdom 13-15: An Initial Reading 
 The language of Diaspora Judaism, when directed towards its non-Jewish neighbors, 
often took the form of polemical denunciation. Contra Apionem, De specialibus legibus, the 
Sibylline Oracles, the Letter of Aristeas, Ps-Phocylides – these texts are part of a diverse polemical 
tradition within which Romans 1 and Wisdom 13-15 find their contextual voices. It is possible, 
therefore, that the thematic and lexical connections between Romans and Wisdom, though 
significant,13 are a product of a shared tradition rather than evidence of any textual 
engagement. As will become clear, however, the links between Romans and Wisdom are not 
reducible to the common themes and vocabulary of what used to be called the ‘propaganda 
literature’,14 but extend to the level of argumentative structure. In Watson’s words, ‘The 
argument of Romans 1.18-32 develops in parallel to Wisdom 13.1-14.31’15 and, as Campbell 
correctly observes, ‘the two argumentative progressions are unique to the Wisdom of Solomon 
and Romans 1’.16 Both texts argue from a squandered creation-related knowledge of God to a 
                                                        
12 C.E.B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans [2 vols. ICC; 
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975], 104 n.1) seems to have intuited a similar reading, but he never developed it 
outside a footnote.  
13 For a detailed list of the lexical parallels between Wisdom and Romans 1.18-2.5, see Laato, Paul and 
Judaism, 94-95; cf. also Sanday and Headlam, Romans, 51-52.  
14 G. Klein, Der älteste christliche Katechismus und die jüdische Propaganda-Literatur (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1909).  
15 Watson, Hermeneutics, 405.  
16 Campbell, Deliverance of God, 360. While this argumentative sequence is particular to Romans and 
Wisdom, Philo’s De decalogo offers something of a parallel to Wisdom in that its denunciation of false-worship moves 
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corresponding turn to idolatry that in turn occasions a litany of social and moral perversities, 
thereby inviting an appropriate exercise of divine judgment. This broad structural continuity 
conceals a host of significant theological differences that will be explored after the rhetorical 
turn of Romans 2.1 has been considered. Situating this discontinuity, however, requires that 
the following analysis emphasise the points of contact between Romans and Wisdom in order to 
underline the dramatic twist of Romans 2, which will then point us back to Paul’s unique 
reworking of the polemical tradition in Romans 1. 
 
(i)  A (possible) creation-related knowledge of God has been squandered: Wisdom 13.1-9; Romans 1.19-20. 
Wisdom’s claim that the animal plagues function as the appropriate divine recompense for 
Egyptian animal worship (11.15-16; 12.23-27; 15.18-16.1) invites an extended reflection on the 
origin of idolatry and the corresponding divine judgment that confronts it (13.1-15.13).17 
Theological knowledge is universally available because, as Wisdom 13.5 states, ‘the greatness 
and beauty of the created’ (κτίσμα) provide an ‘analogous perception (ἀναλόγως θεωρεῖται) of 
the creator’ (ὁ γενεσιουργός). Similarly, Paul insists that the knowledge of God (τὸ γνωστὸν 
τοῦ θεοῦ) has been evident since the creation of the world (ἀpiὸ κτίσεως κόσμου) because his 
eternal power and divinity (θειότης, cf. Wis. 18.9) are perceivable in the things that have been 
created/done (τοῖς piοιήμασιν, Rom 1.19-20). In both texts, however, this (possible) knowledge 
of the creator is forfeited by worthless (μάταιος, Wis. 13.1; ματαιόω, Rom 1.21) fools who either 
fail to reason from creation to creator (Wis. 13.1-9) or neglect to honour the God they know 
(Rom 1.21-22). Stupidity, however, is ‘no excuse’; both the ignorant idolaters of Wisdom and the 
rebels against revelation of Romans are ἀναpiολόγητος (Wis. 13.8; Rom 1.20). 
 
(ii)  This wasted opportunity to know the true God manifests itself in false religion: Wisdom 13.10-14.11, 
15-21 (and 15.7-13); Romans 1.21-23. Paul and Wisdom appear to agree that humans are 
fundamentally worshipers, and thus turning from true worship can only be a turning to its 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
from the less deplorable act of worshiping heavenly elements or bodies (52-56; Wis. 13.1-9) to the absurd practice 
of worshiping created images (66-77, Wis. 13.10-10; 14.15-21; 15.7-13) that finds its most risible expression in 
Egyptian animal-worship (77-81; Wis. 15.18-19); cf. J.M.G. Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Disapora: From Alexander 
to Trajan (323 BCE – 117 CE) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 186.     
17 For a detailed analysis of this section see M. Gilbert, La critique des dieux dans le Livre de la Sagesse (Sg 13-
15) (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1973); cf. M. McGlynn, Divine Judgement and Divine Benevolence in the Book of 
Wisdom (WUNT II.139; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 132-69; D. Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon (AB, 43; Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday, 1979), 247-91. 
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opposite – idolatry. Wisdom offers a detailed review of the origin of idolatry: leftover lumber 
becomes a household god (13.10-19), a sailor’s fear of the sea provokes prayer to the powerless 
(14.1), an image designed to console a bereaved father gains religious momentum until it 
achieves legal apotheosis (14.15-16a), the absence of a monarch occasions the fashioning of his 
image which slips from respect to worship in the popular imagination (14.16b-21), profiteers 
trade in idols, actively capitalizing on the senseless piety of their customers (15.7-13) and, most 
deplorably, Egyptians worship animals that even God failed to bless (15.18-19).18 Paul, choosing 
succinctness over subtlety, condenses this complex genesis of idolatry into a single sentence: 
καὶ ἤλλαξαν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου θεοῦ ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνος φθαρτοῦ ἀνθρώpiου καὶ 
piετεινῶν καὶ τετραpiόδων καὶ ἑρpiετῶν (Rom 1.23). Paul’s compactness has the advantage of 
emphasising the oppositeness of idolatry and true worship implicit in much of Wisdom’s 
rhetorical devaluation of the natural origin and impotence of idols. Artifacts which are created 
by human artisans are obviously, if only implicitly, not themselves creators (cf. Isa 44.9-20) and 
thus, as creatures of creatures, are powerless in response to prayer (Wis. 13.16-14.1 drawing on 
Ps 115.5-7). Paul captures this contrast between the creator and the creature in the antithetical 
presentation of the incorruptible God (ἄφθαρτος θεός) and the corruptible human (φθαρτὸς 
ἄνθρωpiος). Furthermore, Paul’s focus on creaturely idolatry (i.e. animals rather than artifacts) 
appears to follow the distinctive emphasis of Wisdom’s aniconic polemic which ultimately has 
Egyptian animal worship as its target.19     
   
(iii)  The turn to idols occasions a corresponding decline into immorality: Wisdom 14.12-14, 22-29; 
Romans 1.24-31. The point is explicit in Wisdom: ‘For the idea of idols was the beginning of sexual 
perversion (ἀρχὴ piορνείας) and the discovery of them was the destruction of life’ (14.12); and 
again, ‘for the worship of nameless idols is the beginning and cause and end (ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία καὶ 
piέρας) of every evil’ (14.27). Without compromising this basic aetiology (idolatry leads to 
immorality), Paul emphasises the divine agent within the causal process. God delivers idolaters 
over to sin because (διό, 1.24; cf. 1.26, 28) they exchanged his glory and truth and failed to 
acknowledge his divinity (1.23, 25, 28). The effect, in Romans, is an ethical decline, rooted in 
the meta-sin of idolatry, which spirals downwards into sexual sin (1.24, 26-27) and then 
                                                        
18 For a detailed tracing of Wisdom’s polemic see Gilbert, La critique, 245-257; cf. C. Larcher, Le Livre de la 
Sagesse, ou, La Sagesse de Salomon (Paris: Gabalda, 1983), 1.122.  
19 Watson, Hermeneutics, 407.  
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overflows into a smorgasbord of non-sexual immorality (1.29-31). While Wisdom mixes sexual 
and non-sexual sins (14.23-26), the Pauline emphasis on gender/sexual denaturalization is 
reflected in Wisdom’s vice list as it repeatedly refers to the defilement of marriage (14.24), sex 
inversion (γενέσεως ἐναλλαγή), marital disorder (γάμων ἀταξία) and adultery (μοιχεία, 14.26).  
The connection at this point is deeper than parallel content. Romans and Wisdom agree 
that idolatry leads to immorality, but they also reflect a similar theological understanding 
about the logic of this causal connection. It is axiomatic for Wisdom that ‘one is punished by the 
very things by which one sins’ (11.16). In relation to the anti-idolatry polemic of Wisdom 13-15, 
this penal quid pro quo is evident as the animal-worshiping Egyptians are said to be deservingly 
(ἀξίως) punished through the creatures they idolise (16.1). An analogous dynamic is evident in 
Romans 1. What Klostermann has described as ‘die adäquate Vergeltung’20 is expressed in a 
cluster of wordplays that exemplify the principle announced in 1.27: ‘receiving back in 
themselves the necessary repayment for their sins’ (τὴν ἀντιμισθίαν ἣν ἔδει τῆς piλάνης αὐτῶν 
ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀpiολαμβάνοντες). In Romans 1.23-24, the exchanging of the glory (δόξα) of God 
results in the dishonouring (ἀτιμάζω) of the idolator’s body.21 This proportionality is even 
clearer in 1.25-27: idolaters exchanged (μεταλλάσσω) the truth of God and therefore are given 
over to a corresponding exchange (μεταλλάσσω) of natural sexual practice for that which is 
contrary to nature (τὴν φυσικὴν χρῆσιν εἰς τὴν piαρὰ φύσιν). Equally obvious in the Greek, 
though difficult to capture in translation, is the contrast in Romans 1.28 between those who 
did not consider God worthy (οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν τὸν θεὸν) and who are therefore handed over to 
an unworthy mind (ἀδόκιμον νοῦν).22 In both texts, then, the causal movement from idolatry 
to immorality is, to borrow Campbell’s terms, ‘equivalent and proportional’.23  
               
(iv) A fitting divine judgment awaits those guilty of idolatry and the corresponding immorality: Wisdom 
14.30-31; Romans 1.32. Divine judgment upon sin is evident within the historical depreciation of 
                                                        
20 E. Klostermann, ‘Die adäquate Vergeltung in Röm 1, 22-31’, ZNW 32 (1933): 1-6.  
21 S.J. Gathercole (‘Sin in God’s Economy: Agencies in Romans 1 and 7’, in Divine and Human Agency in Paul 
and His Cultural Environment [ed. J.M.G. Barclay and S.J. Gathercole; London: T&T Clark, 2006], 158-72) notes that 
the connection of δόξα and τιμή in Romans 2.7 confirms the lexical suspicion that these two words function as 
‘virtual synonyms’ in Romans 1.   
22 J.D.G. Dunn (Theology of Paul the Apostle [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998], 123) expresses this well: ‘The 
consequence of thinking God unfit for human knowing is that the organ of human knowing…itself is rendered 
unfit’.  
23 Campbell, Deliverance of God, 361.  
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human religion and ethics, but in neither Romans nor Wisdom is God’s confrontation with the 
sinner reducible to anthropological history. In Wisdom, those whose history is characterised by 
the movement from idolatry to immorality will be overtaken by ‘just penalties’ (τὰ δίκαια),24 
not because their idols are powerful, but because ‘the just penalty’ (ἡ δίκη) for their sins will 
‘always overtake the transgression of the unrighteous’ (14.30-31). It is difficult to fix the 
juridical context for this coming judgment, but 14.11 appears to indicate that Wisdom, 
consistent with its earlier eschatology (Wis. 2-5), expects a future divine visitation upon 
idols/idolaters. According to Paul, idolaters, though theologically ignorant (1.22), are 
nevertheless aware of the divine decree ‘that the ones who practise such things [i.e. the 
idolatry and immorality catalogued in 1.23-31] are worthy of death (ἄξιοι θανάτου, Rom 1.32; 
cf. Wis. 1.16). That the execution of this decree awaits an eschatological act of divine judgment 
is explicitly stated in Romans 2.5-10.  
 
The Rhetorical Turn  
In Romans 2.1 Paul addresses a generic individual (ἄνθρωpiος) who is characterised by 
an ironic combination of judging the people depicted in 1.19-32 and practising the vices of 
1.19-32. The effect of this combination – a combination that is paradoxically expressed in the 
contrast between ἕτερος and αὐτός – is to remove the self-imposed distance between the judge 
and the other. The judge’s condemnation of the other, because the judge does the same things 
(τὰ αὐτὰ piράσσεις), is necessarily self-condemnation (σεαυτὸν κατακρίνεις). To expose this 
identification of the judge and the other, however, Paul does not introduce a new set of criteria 
by which the judge’s religion and morality is assessed. On the contrary, the judge’s judgment is 
shown to be self-referential on the basis of the theological principles that shaped the polemic 
of 1.19-32.25 The repeated use of piράσσω (2.1, 2) and piοιέω (2.3) in conjunction with αὐτός (2.1) 
and τοιοῦτος (2.2, 3) includes the judge within the pattern of idolatry and immorality outlined 
in 1.18-32 and, in particular, with the phrasing of 1.32 (οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα piράσσοντες). Effectively, 
then, by the judge’s own standards, he is an object of the revelation of divine wrath (1.18) and 
thus under the divine death sentence of Romans 1.32. 
                                                        
24 Codex Alexandrinus (A) has ἀδίκα instead of δίκαια; see McGlynn, Divine Judgement, 158 n.73. 
25 Campbell, Deliverance of God, 548 helpfully refers to this rhetorical tactic as ‘universalization’ – ‘an 
argumentative concession that can be forced onto the proponents of any position by insisting that the principles 
within that position...be applied consistently to its proponents’.   
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The judge, however, appears to disagree. This raises the dual question of the judge’s 
identity and the rationale behind his assumed immunity from both the logic of his own 
judgment and, more fundamentally, the judgment of God (τὸ κρίμα τοῦ θεοῦ, 2.3). As to 
identity, despite some continued scholarly protest,26 the generic judge of 2.1-5 should be 
associated with the Jew of 2.17. While the evidence for this assertion includes matters of genre, 
scriptural quotation and the thematic links between 2.1-6 and 2.17-24,27 the most compelling 
(and relevant) evidence is that Paul’s argument assumes that the judge of 2.1-5 endorses his 
critique of false-religion in 1.18-32 and thus the entirety of 2.1-24 operates within the 
parameters of what Wischmeyer calls ‘der innerjüdische Israel-Diskurs’.28 More specifically, 
Romans 2.1-5, as will be demonstrated below, engages with Wisdom by arguing from theological 
principles articulated in Wisdom. Thus, to say that the judge is a Jew is only a partial answer. 
Paul’s continued engagement with Wisdom in Romans 2.1-5 establishes both the Jewishness of 
his interlocutor’s theology and, more specifically, forces us to say with Käsemann that 2.1-11 
‘ist einzig als Polemik gegen jene jüdische Tradition begreiflich, welche sich am deutlichsten 
und teilweise mit gleicher Begrifflichkeit in Sap. Sal 15,1ff. äußert’.29 In other words, Paul’s 
Jewish interlocutor is neither a generic human nor a generic Jew; he is a Jew in the theological 
tradition of the Wisdom of Solomon.  
 This association of the judge and the theology of Wisdom is evident in his implicit 
affirmation of the polemical content of 1.18-32, his presumed immunity from divine judgment 
and the language in which Paul launches his critique. Paul’s indication that his interlocutor 
assumes he will ‘escape the judgment of God’ (Rom 2.3) alludes to and attacks one of Wisdom’s 
central theological convictions: Israel is different because Israel is not idolatrous. Paul’s 
polemical turn towards Israel in Romans 2.1 occurs at the same argumentative moment (and in 
much the same language) as Wisdom’s polemical pause in relation to Israel at 15.1-4: 
But you our God are kind (χρηστός) and true, patient (μακρόθυμος) and managing all 
things in mercy. 
For if we sin we are yours, knowing your power; but we will not sin, knowing that we 
are reckoned as yours. 
                                                        
26 See e.g. S.K. Stowers, A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, and Gentiles (New Haven: Yale, 1994), 101-104. 
27 So Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 198; S.J. Gathercole, Where is Boasting? Early Jewish Soteriology and 
Paul’s Response in Romans 1-5 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 198-99. 
28 O. Wischmeyer, ‘Römer 2.1-24 als Teil der Gerichtsrede des Paulus gegen die Menschheit’, NTS 52 
(2006): 356-376 (359).  
29 E. Käsemann, An die Römer (HNT 8a; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1973), 49. 
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For to understand you is complete righteousness, and to know your power is the root of 
immortality. 
For neither has the evil intent of human art deceived us, nor the useless labour of 
painters…     
Here, as in Exodus 34.6-9 which this paragraph echoes,30 divine patience and mercy anchor an 
assurance that sin does not disqualify Israel from being God’s people (cf. σοί ἐσμεν, σοὶ 
λελογίσμεθα, Wis. 15.2 with ἐσόμεθα σοί, Exod 34.9, LXX). As Barclay notes, ‘the reference to sin 
(“even if we sin”) picks up Moses’ confidence that “you will forgive our sins and our iniquities” 
(Exod 34.9, LXX)’.31 However, whereas Moses utters these words in the wake of the Golden Calf 
episode, Wisdom contextualises this confidence within an assurance that Israel does not and 
will not worship idols because they know God’ (‘we will not sin’, 15.2b; ‘the evil intent of 
human art has not deceived us’, 15.4). Thus, while Wisdom echoes Exodus 34.6-9, it 
decontextualises divine mercy: ‘Wisdom does not make, and could not make, reference to the 
Golden Calf’.32 Unlike the ungodly who are ignorant of God (13.1) and thus caught in the 
inevitable movement from idolatry to immorality (14.12-14, 22-31), Israel knows God and 
therefore ‘will not sin’ (15.2b). The function of 15.1-4 within Wisdom’s critique of false-religion 
is therefore to establish the irreducible difference between Jew and Gentile on the basis of the 
non-idolatry of the former and the false-worship of the latter. More concisely, Wisdom’s 
anthropological dualism is built on Israel’s immunity from idolatry. It is this foundational 
presumption that Paul challenges in Romans 1.18-2.5.33 
 Paul’s reference to the kindness (χρηστότης) and patience (μακροθυμία) of God (Rom 
2.4) echoes Wisdom’s echo of Exodus 34. Paul, however is quick to remind his interlocutor of an 
essential element of Wisdom’s theology: God mercifully ‘overlooks human sin for the sake of 
repentance’ (εἰς μετάνοιαν, Wis. 11.23; cf. Rom 2.4).34 Whereas Wisdom 15.1-4 suggests that an 
awareness of the divine attributes renders potential sin an actual impossibility, Paul, like 
Exodus 34, locates the operations of divine kindness and patience within the matrix of human 
idolatry and immorality. Paul thus disputes the assumed immunity of the judge who, in 
                                                        
30 Larcher, Livre, 3.847-49; cf. H. Hübner, Die Weisheit Salomons (ATD Apokryphen 4: Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 183-84.  
31 J.M.G. Barclay, ‘“I will have mercy on whom I have mercy”: The Golden Calf and Divine Mercy in 
Romans 9-11 and Second Temple Judaism’, Early Christianity 1 (2010): 82-106 (91).  
32 Barclay, ‘I will have mercy’, 91 
33 Gathercole, Where is Boasting, 211 notes that Romans 2.21-24 and 3.9-18 also provide what he terms 
‘phenomenological evidence’ and ‘scriptural evidence’ for Israel’s sinfulness.  
34 On Paul’s use of Wisdom’s theology and language against his interlocutor, see Watson, Hermeneutics, 410. 
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Romans 2.1-4, appears to base his self-differentiation vis-à-vis the other on the same religious 
and ethical criteria Wisdom employs to construct the Jew/Gentile dualism.35 Assuming that the 
history of Romans 1.18-32 is not his history, the judge affirms Paul’s theologoumenon: οἱ τὰ 
τοιαῦτα piράσσοντες ἄξιοι θανάτου (Rom 1.32). As Paul’s repeated claim that the judge ‘does the 
same things’ (2.1, 3) implies, however, Paul’s reading of anthropological history includes his 
interlocutor within the narrative of Romans 1.18-32. In other words, for Paul, in opposition to 
Wisdom, ‘the difference between Jew and Gentile’ – a difference which Paul maintains (e.g. Rom 
1.16; 3.1; 9.1-5) – ‘is not’, as Watson observes, ‘the difference between the righteous and the 
unrighteous’.36 In Wisdom 15.1-4 Israel is different because the nation is not guilty of the 
idolatry and immorality catalogued in Wisdom 13.1-14.31. In Romans the gap between the 
Jewish judge and the other is erased because Paul’s interlocutor is guilty of the idolatry and 
immorality catalogued in Romans 1.19-32. This inclusion of Paul’s Jewish dialogue partner 
within the scope of what initially sounds like a Jewish polemic against non-Jews invites a 
reconsideration of the subtle but substantive differences between Wisdom 13-15 and Romans 
1.18-32. To state our thesis in advance, the rhetorical contextualisation of Romans 1.19-31 
within the kerygmatic proclamation of 1.16-18, together with the Pauline alterations to 
Wisdom’s critique of non-Jewish religion, broadens the target of Paul’s polemic to include Israel 
and thus, as Paul announces in 1.18, piᾶσα ἀσέβεια καὶ ἀδικία ἀνθρώpiων. 
 
Rereading Romans 1.18-32 
 Watson speaks for most scholars when he says that ‘there is nothing distinctively 
Pauline’ in Romans 1.18-3237 and that there ‘appears to be little or nothing in either [Romans 
1.18-32 or Wisdom 13-14] with which the author of the other texts would have disagreed’.38 
Others, however, have observed a degree of difference between the Pauline polemic and 
                                                        
35 Pace K. Yinger (Paul, Judaism and Judgement According to Deeds [SNTSMS 105; Cambridge, CUP, 1999], 152-
53) who argues that Paul is not disputing a Jew ‘claiming “we have not sinned”…but Jews or Jewish Christians 
claiming that they will not be treated the same way as the “sinners” in the judgement’. This reflects a 
representative tendency among Pauline scholars (e.g. B.W. Longenecker, Eschatology and the Covenant: A Comparison 
of 4 Ezra and Romans 1-11 [JSNTSup 57; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1999], 182; U. Wilckens, Der Brief an die Römer [3 vols; 
EKKNT; Neukirchen: Benziger, 1978-82], 1.121-24) to abstract Wisdom 15.2a (‘even if we sin’) from the more basic 
insistence that ‘we will not sin’ (15.2b) and ‘human art has not misled us’ (15.4).    
36 Watson, Hermeneutics, 410.  
37 Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 195.    
38 Watson, Hermeneutics, 408.  
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Wisdom 13-14. We have already noted Gaca’s claim that Paul introduces a ‘problematic 
innovation’ into the Hellenistic Jewish polemical tradition,39 and Bell and Bornkamm, both 
noting Paul’s polemical peculiarity, use this identification of difference as an argument against 
textual dependence.40 Difference and dependence, however, are not mutually exclusive. In fact, 
as will be argued presently, Paul’s active engagement with Wisdom is evident especially as he 
departs from Wisdom because his textual dependence is situated within a larger demonstration 
of theological difference. This rereading will attempt to situate Paul’s accusatory 
announcement of 1.19-32 within the kergymatic progression of Romans 1.16-18 and consider 
the rhetorical function and theological significance of Paul’s alterations to the Hellenistic 
Jewish polemical tradition. It will be argued that this rhetorical location, together with Paul’s 
divergence from Wisdom’s anti-idolatry critique, contribute to a universalising of Paul’s 
polemical target. The anthropological effect is the essential identification of Jew and Gentile as 
they confront the divine verdict, not as non-idolatrous Jew or idolatrous Gentile, but as 
ἄνθρωpiοι.41       
 
The Kerygmatic Context of Romans 1.19-32 
 Wisdom’s anti-idolatry polemic is situated within an extended reflection on Egyptian 
animal worship and functions primarily as an argument for Israel’s avoidance of idolatry over 
against non-Jewish religion (12.23-15.18). Paul’s polemic finds its rhetorical context within the 
proclamation of a gospel that addresses both Jew and Gentile with the news of God’s saving 
righteousness (Rom 1.16-17). This contextual contrast generates a difference in genre which 
Bornkamm identifies as a distinction between ‘Hellenistic apologetic’ (Wisdom) and ‘prophetic 
accusation’ (Romans).42 Understood within the double-apocalypse of divine righteousness 
(1.17) and wrath (1.18), the Pauline proclamation announces an event. Such a claim, however, 
states a conclusion ahead of its evidence. To situate the polemic of Romans 1.19-32 within its 
                                                        
39 Gaca, ‘Paul’s Uncommon Declaration in Romans 1:18-32’, 165.  
40 Bell, No One Seeks for God, 76; G. Bornkamm, ‘The Revelation of God’s Wrath’, in Early Christian Experience 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 47-70.  
41 While it would be over-determined to argue from Paul’s use of ἄνθρωpiος to the broadening of his 
polemical target, it is nevertheless suggestive that ἄνθρωpiος is explicitly and intentionally inclusive in Romans 
3.28 (cf. Gal 2.16) and 5.12-19. Even in Romans 2.1 where ἄνθρωpiος is limited to the Jewish judge, Paul argues from 
within  ‘der innerjüdische Israel-Diskurs’ to  ‘eine universale Verurteilung’, and therefore his use of ἄνθρωpiος has 
‘universal-anthropologische Dimensionen’ (Wischmeyer, ‘Römer 2.1-24’, 376). 
42 Bornkamm’s, ‘The Revelation of God’s Wrath’, 54. 
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apocalyptic and kerygmatic context it is necessary to take a step back and consider the 
grammatical and theological progression of Romans 1.16-18. 
 The apocalypse of wrath in Romans 1.18 is connected to the gospel of 1.16 through an 
argumentative chain linked by successive uses of the explanatory γάρ. Paul is not ashamed of 
the gospel because (γάρ) it is the divine power for salvation because (γάρ) the righteousness of 
God is revealed in it; for (γάρ) the wrath of God is revealed. Grammatically, the γάρ of 1.18 
relates ἀpiοκαλύpiτεται ὀργὴ θεοῦ directly to the syntactically similar and ultimately salvific 
(1.16) revelation of divine righteousness in 1.17. The crucial question for our purposes is what 
this grammatical connection indicates about the theological link between the revelations of 
wrath and righteousness in relation to the gospel.  
Answers to this question, while diverse, generally take one of two approaches: 
juxtaposition or progression. According to the former, wrath and righteousness relate as 
opposites.43 This reading has always been puzzled by the presence of γάρ in 1.18,44 but 
Campbell’s radicalised version of this interpretation explains the γάρ as contributing to the 
structural parallel between the revelations of wrath and righteousness which, according to his 
reading, represent two antithetical gospels.45 As Cranfield observes, however, ‘there would 
seem to be no justification (apart from a theological presupposition that it is appropriate to 
contrast δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ and ὀργὴ θεοῦ)’ to read Romans 1.17 and 1.18 antithetically.46 In 
Campbell’s case at least, his exegesis is clearly driven by a disinclination to permit a 
theological association between the syntactically linked revelations of righteousness and 
wrath. In his words, Romans 1.17 and 1.18 express ‘fundamentally different conceptions of 
God’.47 This theological interpretation, however, appears to put asunder that which the apostle 
has joined together. In 1 Thessalonians 1.10 and Romans 5.9, to cite but two examples, 
salvation is defined as deliverance from divine wrath. Similarly, the natural force of the 
                                                        
43 P. Stuhlmacher, Gerechtigkeit Gottes bei Paulus (FRLANT 87; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), 
80-81.  
44 M.-J Lagrange (Saint Paul: Épitre aux Romains [Étbib 13; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1922], 21) translates the γάρ with 
‘car’, but argues that in this context is has ‘une légère opposition’ (cf. C.H. Dodd, The Epistle to the Romans [MNTC; 
London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1932], 45 who refers to the ‘adversative conjunction but in 1.18’).  
45 The Pauline gospel (1.17), defined by a saving righteousness, is set in juxtaposition to the ‘Teacher’s’ 
gospel (1.18), which is centred on an eschatological exercise of retributive wrath  (Campbell, Deliverance of God, 
542-43). This construal requires reading Romans 1.18-32 as a summary of the rhetorical opening of Paul’s 
opponent whose theology is decisively shaped by Wisdom. Such a thesis is seriously called into question by the 
numerous and significant differences between Romans 1.18-32 and Wisdom 13-14.   
46 Cranfield, Romans, 1.106-107.  
47 Campbell, Deliverance of God, 543. 
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repeated γάρ of Romans 1.16-18 coordinates the saving righteousness of God with that from 
which it saves. Thus, in the interpretative tradition of Sanday and Headlam,48 we can say that 
the γάρ of 1.18 explains the revelation of righteousness by citing the reason it is required; but 
we can also say more.  
This initial answer may appear to imply a movement from wrath to saving 
righteousness which in turn would seem to support a progressive reading in which the era of 
wrath precedes the era of righteousness.49 There are, however, two related reasons why this 
cannot be sustained. First, as Bornkamm observes, world history prior to the gospel event is 
not characterised as an era of wrath; rather, for Paul, the time before the revelation of divine 
righteousness is the period of patience (Rom 3.25-26; cf. 2.4).50 It is this time of divine 
forbearance that is brought to an end in the present (ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ, 3.26) demonstration of 
divine righteousness that is the cross of Christ Jesus (3.24-26). The correlation between εἰς 
ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ (3.25, 26) and δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ ἀpiοκαλύpiτεται (1.17), together 
with the identical time references indicated by ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ (3.26) and the present tense of 
ἀpiοκαλύpiτω (1.17), indicate that it is, as the connection between 1.16 and 1.17 suggests, in the 
gospel event that the divine righteousness is revealed. What then of the revelation of wrath in 
1.18? The structural parallelism between the revelations of wrath and righteousness, especially 
the identical present passive form of ἀpiοκαλύpiτω, suggests that the dual revelations are tied 
to a single reality.51 Read this way, the apocalypse of divine wrath is not only the reason for the 
revelation of saving righteousness; it is the dark side of the one event that reveals both.52 The 
antithesis between wrath and righteousness, therefore, does not indicate the presence of two 
                                                        
48 Sanday and Headlam, Romans, 40. 
49 H. Lietzmann, An die Römer (3rd ed. HNT 8; Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1928), 31. A variant of this reading 
does not relate the two eras chronologically but views wrath and righteousness as two spheres of existence 
corresponding to being outside (wrath) or inside (righteousness) the gospel (e.g. T. Zahn, Der Brief des Paulus an die 
Römer [KNT 6; Leipzig: Deitchert, 1910], 86-87).  
50 Bornkamm, ‘The Revelation of God’s Wrath’, 49.  
51 Campbell, Deliverance of God, 542-43, attempts to soften the syntactical connection between 1.17 and 
1.18 by interpreting the present tense verb of 1.18 as ‘a rare future present’ (cf. Bell, No One Seeks for God, 14; H.-J. 
Eckstein, ‘ “Denn Gottes Zorn wird vom Himmel her offenbar warden”. Exegetische Erwägungen zu Röm 1,18’, 
ZNW 78 [1987]: 74-89), but the present time reference of the identical occurrence of ἀpiοκαλύpiτεται in 1.17 makes 
this unlikely.  
52 Cf. K. Barth, A Shorter Commentary on Romans (trans. D.H. van Daalen; London: SCM Press, 1959), 24-26 
(see also CD I/2, 304-305). While Barth’s explicit association of the revealed wrath of Romans 1.18 and the cross is 
theologically appropriate, it is exegetically premature. Though divine wrath finds its eschatological manifestation 
on Golgotha, Romans 1.18-3.20 is that part of the apostolic kerygma which announces God’s wrath which properly 
stands over humankind and which, as Paul only later reveals, is enacted and exhausted on the cross. 
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gospels (contra Campbell); rather it represents the two words of the single apostolic 
announcement: wrath and righteousness, condemnation and salvation, death and life, no and 
yes. In Pauline terms, the cross is the divine enactment of judgment on ungodliness and 
therefore the justification of the ungodly (see chapter seven). Accordingly, the revelation of 
wrath is, in relation to the gospel, a novum – something heretofore concealed but now 
unveiled.53 
This brings us back to the difference between Wisdom 13-14 and Romans 1.18-32. In 
Wisdom the anthropological situation is fundamentally knowable. Non-Jewish humanity has 
foolishly failed to exercise their rational potential, but this failure renders them ignorant, not 
epistemologically incapable. In Wisdom’s words, the non-Jewish world should have known that 
‘a corresponding perception of the creator’ is derivable ‘from the greatness and beauty of 
created things’ (Wis. 13.5), but, being ‘foolish by nature’, they failed to think from ‘the good 
things’ to ‘the one who exists’ (13.1). Reading Romans 1.18-32 as if it were Wisdom 13-14, 
Campbell detects what he considers an un-Pauline parallel in the anthropology of Romans 
1.18-32. According to Campbell, the polemic of Romans 1 presupposes an epistemological 
openness to the existence and demands of God which is itself the presupposition for the 
rational transition from wrath to grace.54 Thus interpreted, the content of Romans 1.19-32 is 
essentially and antecedently known, or at least knowable. This, however, is precisely the 
reading which the apocalyptic and kerygmatic context of 1.18 will not allow.     
In contrast to Wisdom’s invitation to reason ‘from below’, Paul’s apocalyptic accusation 
pronounces the gospel’s verdict on the world. The revelation of wrath is thus a constituent 
part of the Pauline proclamation (cf. Rom 2.16; 1 Thess 1.9-10). Read this way, solution and 
plight do not exist in a linear relationship that can be plotted in terms of an epistemological 
process. There can be no sense of a natural, rational awareness of the anthropological situation 
which somehow functions as a soteriological preface to the proclamation of the gospel. Paul is 
not arguing from plight to solution or solution to plight; he is, as Seifrid observes, announcing 
                                                        
53 R. Jewett, Romans (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), 150-52. This is not to suggest that 
God’s wrath is not operative prior to the gospel events (cf. Rom 1.24, 26, 28).   
54 Campbell, Deliverance of God, 16-17. Campbell’s theological concern is to combat a ‘prospective 
soteriology’ (i.e. plight to solution) which he insists rests on a faulty epistemology that requires an essentially 
rational rather than revelatory apprehension of the human condition. (This is contrasted with a ‘retrospective 
soteriology’ [i.e. solution to plight] which allows the liberating gospel to inform its object about its prior 
captivity.) This epistemological criticism, however, is neutralised if the anthropological content of Romans 1.19-
3.20 is situated within the revelatory disclosure of 1.16-18.   
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both the solution (1.16-17) and the corresponding plight which it presupposes.55 There is, then, 
between solution and plight what we might call an antithetical affinity – the problem and the 
answer fit. However, an apprehension of this fit – this correspondence between the severity of 
the crisis and the drama of the divine saving act – is the epistemological product of the 
theologia crucis. It is the event and proclamation of the cross that reveals both sin and salvation, 
both wrath and saving righteousness. Within this kerygmatic context, the revelation of divine 
wrath is not, in contrast to Wisdom, reducible to a process of rational deduction. The revelation 
of divine wrath is, to risk stating the obvious, a revelation.    
            
Paradise Lost: Created-Theology in Romans 1.19-21 
Romans 1.19-32 narrates the history of ἀσέβεια and ἀδικία against which the divine 
wrath of 1.18 is revealed. Within the movement of this basic plotline, Romans 1.19-21 
establishes humanity as recipients of divine truth, thereby legitimating the accusation that 
people ‘suppress the truth’ (1.18). While these verses have often been read as a straightforward 
articulation of a developed tradition of natural theology, the revelatory context of Paul’s 
polemic has major implications for the interpretation of 1.19-21. As Karl Barth remarks, ‘We 
must bear in mind that the very words which are so often regarded as an opening or a 
summons to every possible kind of natural theology are in reality a constituent part of the 
apostolic kerygma’.56 Paul’s reference to ‘the knowledge of God’ (τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, 1.19) 
that has been evident ‘since the creation of the cosmos’ (ἀpiὸ κτίσεως κόσμου, 1.20), suggests 
that, for Paul, the act of creation is the establishment of the divine-human relationship.57 
Within this context, ‘natural theology’ is more properly ‘created-relationality’ – it is the 
theological knowledge presupposed in the original relationship between human creature and 
divine creator. For Paul, however, what is primal is past (and prologue).  
According to Wisdom 13.1-9, knowledge of God is an unactualised potential. Creation 
offers a corresponding knowledge of the creator (13.5), but the non-Jewish world failed to 
reason from ‘the good’ to ‘the one who exists’ (13.1). In Romans 1 by contrast, τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ 
θεοῦ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς; and this because ὁ θεὸς αὐτοῖς ἐφανέρωσεν. Here knowledge of 
                                                        
55 M.A. Seifrid, ‘Unrighteous by Faith: Apostolic Proclamation in Romans 1.18-3.20’, in Justification and 
Variegated Nomism: Volume 2, The Paradoxes of Paul (ed. Carson et al.; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), 105.  
56 Barth, CD I/2, 306.  
57 For a fuller treatment of this theme, see F. Watson, Text and Truth: Redefining Biblical Theology 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), 242-67.  
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God is a reality on account of divine revelation (cf. 1.21). As Markus Barth replies to his own 
question – ‘What is suppressed’? – it is ‘the factual knowledge of God’.58 In both Wisdom and 
Romans this possible (Wisdom) or actual (Romans) theological knowledge is tied to creation, 
but it is notable that whereas Wisdom argues for a possible theological knowledge derived 
‘from’ (ἐκ, 13.1, 5) creation, Paul indicates only that God’s revelatory activity has been 
occurring ‘since’ (ἀpiό, Rom 1.20) the creation of the cosmos and that this self-disclosure is 
somehow related to ‘the things that have been made’. There is, then, a sharp contrast between 
Wisdom’s insistence that though people could and should have known God they are 
nevertheless ignorant of God (13.1) and Paul’s declaration that people, γνόντες τὸν θεόν, have 
failed to honour him. In the one case the knowable God is unknown (Wisdom); in the other the 
unknowable God (τὰ ἀόρατα, 1.20) is known (Romans).59  
‘For although they knew God…’ (1.21). This, for Paul, is the problem – not that humanity 
is ignorant of God, but that humanity knew God. Wisdom asserts that Israel’s knowledge of God 
will prevent sin (15.2) and the ungodly are defined as such on the basis of their theological 
ignorance (e.g. 2.1). From a Pauline perspective, knowledge of God does not prevent sin; it is 
the precondition for creaturely rebellion.60 As Watson observes, ‘we learn in Rom. 1.19-20 that 
to be human is to be the recipient of God’s self-disclosure’;61 but in Romans 1.18-23 we also 
learn that to be human in history is to be a rebel against this creational revelation. ‘Suppressing 
the truth’ (Rom 1.18) presupposes ‘knowledge of God’ (1.19). The διότι which connects the two 
clauses indicates that Paul’s emphasis on the actuality of theological knowledge serves to 
establish the reality of human rebellion and the legitimacy of divine judgment. By relating 
divine revelation to creation, Paul effectively includes all humanity within its scope and 
therefore makes each person a potential rebel. Thus, in contrast to Wisdom’s charge that people 
are ‘without excuse’ because they failed to exercise their epistemic potential and therefore 
know God, Paul insists that humanity is ‘without excuse’ because the self-revealing God is 
                                                        
58 M. Barth, ‘Speaking of Sin’, SJT 8 (1955): 288-96.  
59 Cf. H. Bietenhard, ‘Natürliche Gotteserkenntnis der Heiden? Eine Erwägung zu Röm 1’, ThZ 12 (1956): 
275-88.  
60 Bornkamm, ‘The Revelation of God’s Wrath’, 59.  
61 Watson, Text and Truth, 258.  
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known. To adapt Gaca’s provocative proposal, Wisdom’s polemic targets idiots; Paul aims at 
apostates.62  
This construal captures the implicit plot of Paul’s polemical proclamation. There is a 
definite movement from knowledge of God to ignorance, idolatry and immorality. Thus, in 
contrast to Wisdom’s summons to reason ‘from below’ (from creation to creator); Paul 
announces a revelation ‘from above’. Moreover, whereas Wisdom envisages a process of 
epistemological ascent, Paul tells a story of anthropological decline. As Bell remarks, Romans 
1.19-31 narrates a ‘fall’.63 In Watson’s words, ‘the effect of the primal revelation was, simply 
and solely, its own distortion into idolatry’.64 For Paul, then, idolatry is not a step in the right 
religious direction; it is the rejection of revelation. The movement of false religion is not from 
theological ignorance to the almost excusable worship of creation (as in Wisdom); it is the 
distortion of divine self-disclosure – a suppression of theological truth (1.18) and the exchange 
of that truth for a lie (1.25). 65 Consequently, within the Pauline polemic an original, creation-
related knowledge of God does not represent an alternative route to theological knowledge. 
This original revelation is fundamentally rejected revelation (it is past). Its function is 
therefore not to contribute to theological knowledge but to establish the reality of human 
‘excuselessness’66 and therefore to ground the necessity of the re-creative revelation of 
Romans 3.21-22 (it is prologue).  
 
Adam, Israel and Everyone: Allusive Inclusion in Romans 1 
 Allusions are elusive: they are difficult to identify and, once identified, their meaning 
and rhetorical function is not always clear. The following analysis of the allusive presence of 
Adam and Israel in Romans 1 concedes the initial ambiguity of the allusions. It is possible that 
Paul’s account of human sin draws freely and somewhat indiscriminately from biblical 
resources. In this broad sense, Westerholm is correct to describe Romans 1.18-32 as ‘a 
dramatized depiction of the human condition, recalling many a biblical account…but not 
                                                        
62 Gaca, ‘Paul’s Uncommon Declaration in Romans’, 165-98. Barth (CD I/2, 304) anticipates Gaca in his 
suggestion that the gospel’s universality implies a corresponding crisis in which ‘the complaint of apostasy is now 
expressly and seriously leveled against them all’.  
63 Bell, No One Seeks for God, 94.  
64 Watson, Text and Truth, 261.  
65 Cf. Watson’s observation that the Pauline affirmation of primal revelation occurs within a theological 
interpretation of the phenomena of idolatry (Text and Truth, 274 n.41).  
66 Cranfield, Romans, 116.  
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retelling any one story’.67 However, it is precisely as Paul is drawing together these various 
stories that he effectively constructs a single story – the human story. As argued above, the 
terms of the rhetorical turn at 2.1-5 force a rereading of Romans 1.18-32 which is alert to the 
inclusion of unexpected characters within the narrative. The following argument should thus 
be read as an exegetical attempt to re-read Romans 1.18-32 in light of the implications of 2.1-
11.   
 In Wisdom 13-15, the ignorant idolaters do not include Israel (15.2b-4). Paul’s polemic 
permits no such limitations. Subsuming his polemical addressees under the single term 
ἄνθρωpiος, Romans 1.18-32 tells the tragic tale of human history ‘since the creation of the 
cosmos’ (ἀpiὸ κτίσεως κόσμου, 1.20). This creational context is the first indication that the 
humanity in question is, both broadly and specifically, Adamic humanity. God’s self-revelation 
began in the beginning (1.20). This brings Adam into the story, but the ingressive ἀpiό keeps the 
narrative moving. Put another way, the story of a primordial knowledge of God which is 
exchanged for a lie is Adam’s story; but for Paul, Adam’s story is never Adam’s story alone.68 
 In Romans 5.12 Paul traces human sin and the death that accompanies it back to Adam: 
‘Therefore, just as sin came into the world through the one man (δι᾽ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώpiου), and 
death through sin, so death spread to all because all sinned’. In Pauline theology, the Adamic 
trespass means death (5.15), condemnation (5.16, 18) and the status of ‘sinner’ (5.19) for the 
many who, through Adam’s sin, are subjected to the reign of death (5.17, 21).69 But this 
universalism also has a particularity. While ‘all sinned’ (5.12), not all sinned ‘in the likeness of 
                                                        
67 S. Westerholm, Perspectives Old and New: The ‘Lutheran’ Paul and His Critics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2004), 386.  
68 Those who find Adam in Romans 1 include J. Jervell, Imago Dei: Gen 1,26f. im Spätjudentum, in der Gnosis 
und in den paulischen Briefen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960), 317-18; M.D. Hooker, ‘Adam in Romans I’, 
NTS 6 (1959-60): 297-306; Bell, No One Seeks for God, 26; Dunn, Theology of Paul the Apostle, 91-93; J.R. Levison, ‘Adam 
and Eve in Romans 1.18-25 and the Greek Life of Adam and Eve’, NTS 50 (2004): 519-534. However, see the cautionary 
article by A.J.M. Wedderburn, ‘Adam in Paul’s Letter to the Romans’, in Studia Biblica 1978 III (JSNTSup 3; ed. E.A. 
Livingstone; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1980), 413-30. The strongest evidence for the presence of Adam in Romans 1 is 
1) 1.23 probably echoes Genesis 1.26a (LXX) in which ἄνθρωpiος, εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις (a possible synonym with 
Paul’s ὁμοίωμα) are all coordinated,  2) the references to ‘exchange’ (Rom 1.23, 25), ‘desire’ (1.24) and creaturely 
subservience (1.25) may be allusions to Genesis 1-3 which have been, as Levison (‘Adam and Eve’, 523) argues, 
‘refracted through the lens of a tradition such as we find in the Greek Life of Adam and Eve’, 3) the possible 
reflection of Jewish traditions about the tree of the knowledge of good and evil in the contrast between presumed 
wisdom and actual folly in 1.22, 24) the points of contact between Paul’s references to sexual immorality and 
traditions (e.g. 4 Macc. 18.7-8; 2 En. 31.6) about Eve’s temptation relating to unchastity.   
69 While Wisdom explains the entrance of death in relation to the devil’s agency in Eden (2.23-24), Adam’s 
particular theological significance is not as the archetypal sinner, but rather as the first figure in a long history of 
Wisdom saving those who are ‘worthy of her’ (10.1-2; cf. 6.16).  
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Adam’s trespass’ (ἐpiὶ τῷ ὁμοιώματι τῆς piαραβάσεως Ἀδάμ, 5.14). That dubious honour had to 
await the coming of the Mosaic Law (5.13-14) and therefore is a distinction unique to Israel. As 
Gathercole remarks, ‘Here we see that the primeval “fall” of Adam and Eve has…been brought 
into association with sin under the Law in the life of the people of Israel’.70  
 Romans 7.7-12 makes precisely this point. As in Romans 1, multiple stories appear to be 
intermixed. The prohibition against desire (ἐpiιθυμία, 7.7),71 the emphasis on deception 
(ἐξαpiατάω, 7.11; cf. Gen 3.13) and, most notably, the reference to a prior period of aliveness 
apart from the law (ἐγὼ ἔζων χωρὶς νόμου piοτέ, 7.9) indicate the allusive presence of Adam.72 
However, as Moo and Watson argue, the primary focus of Romans 7.7-12 is Israel’s encounter 
with the Mosaic Law.73 In Watson’s words, ‘The topic here is not the fall but the coming of the 
law, and the commandment, “You shall not desire” (v.7) is drawn not from Genesis but from 
the Decalogue (Exod 20.17)’.74 The absence of an object in relation to the prohibition indicates, 
as in Philo (Decal. 142-153) and 4 Maccabees. 2.6, that the tenth commandment is cited here as, 
in Moo’s phrase, ‘a representative summation’ of the law.75 The coming of this command (7.9) 
is the event of the law’s coming, the conclusion of the period referred to in Romans 5.14 (ἀpiὸ 
Ἀδὰμ μέχρι Μωϋσέως). This association of Adam and Israel enables Paul to recast Israel’s 
confrontation with the law in Edenic terms. In this respect, the selection of the prohibition 
against desire, rather than forcing a choice between a focus on Israel or Adam, has the effect of 
                                                        
70 Gathercole, ‘Sin in God’s Economy’, 161 n.3; cf. N.T. Wright, The Climax of the Covenant: Paul and the Law in 
Pauline Theology (London: T&T Clark, 1991), 39. 4 Ezra 3.7, 20-27 offers a similar account of the replication of 
Adamic sin in Israel’s history.     
71 Jewish sources (e.g. Apoc. Mos. 19.3; Apoc. Abr. 24.9) commonly cite ‘desire’ as the root of all sins and 
therefore link the prohibition against desire to the Eden narrative (Dunn, Theology of Paul the Apostle 87-88, 98-99).  
72 G. Bornkamm, ‘Sin, Law and Death: An Exegetical Study of Romans 7’, in Early Christian Experience (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1969), 87-104; H. Hübner, Das Gesetz bei Paulus. Ein Beitrag zum Werden der paulinischen Theologie 
(FRLANT 119; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978), 66-69; Käsemann, An die Römer, 186. 
73 D.J. Moo, ‘Israel and Paul in Romans 7.7-12’, NTS 32 (1986): 122-135; Watson, Hermeneutics, 335-380. This 
is established primarily on the basis of Paul’s use of νόμος, the similarity between the narrative sequence of this 
text and, in Moo’s words (123), ‘a Pauline theological pattern having to do with the redemptive-historical 
experience of Israel, the citation of the tenth commandment, the link between the law and life (cf. Lev 18.5; Sir. 
45.5) and the connection between “desire” and Israel’s experience in the desert (cf. 1 Cor 10.1-10)’.  
74 Watson, Hermeneutics, 359.  
75 Moo, ‘Israel and Paul in Romans 7.7-12’, 123 n.8.  
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bringing Sinai and Eden together.76 As Chester remarks, Paul ‘creates a fusion between the 
giving of the command not to eat in the Garden of Eden [and] the giving of the law at Sinai’.77  
By linking desire and death, however, Paul does more than connect the Eden episode 
and Israel’s sin; he connects quite specifically the Adamic trespass and Israel’s experience 
under the law in the wilderness. As Watson has thoroughly demonstrated, the ‘correlation of 
desire and death derives…from Numbers’.78 1 Corinthians 10.1-10, reading Numbers 11 in a 
similar fashion to Psalm 105.14-15, associates Israel’s desire in the desert (1 Cor 10.6) with the 
destruction of nearly the entire wilderness generation (10.5). Here, the first manifestation of 
this sin-causing illicit desire is the idolatrous incident of the Golden Calf: ‘Do not be idolaters 
as some of them were; as it is written, “The people sat to eat and drink and rose to play”’ (1 Cor 
10.7, quoting Exod 32.6). This indicates that the story of desire leading to death that is 
allusively narrated in Romans 7.7-12 is in large part the story of Israel’s sin and death at Sinai 
and in the wilderness. This, crucially, is the story Wisdom cannot tell.                   
 This brings us back to Romans 1. Paul, by including Israel within the history of Adamic 
sin, confronts the realities of Israel’s past that Wisdom is forced to erase or displace. As argued 
above, Wisdom alludes to Moses’ confident words in the aftermath of the Golden Calf, but in the 
same sentence Wisdom exonerates Israel from idolatry (Wis. 15.2-4). That Paul faces precisely 
this history is strikingly evident in the double allusion of Romans 1.23. We have already noted 
the probable echo of Genesis 1.26a here; but, in keeping with the Pauline association of Adamic 
and Israelite sin, the primary reference of this verse is to the allusion to the Golden Calf in 
Psalm 105.20 LXX:  
And they exchanged the glory (καὶ ἠλλάξαντο τὴν δόξαν) that was theirs for the 
likeness (ὁμοίωμα) of a grass-eating ox (Ps 105.2) 
And they exchanged the glory (καὶ ἤλλαξαν τὴν δόξαν) of the immortal God for the 
likeness (ὁμοίωμα) of the image of a mortal man and of birds and four-footed animals 
and creeping creatures (Rom 1.23)  
                                                        
76 G. Theissen, Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology (trans. J. Galvin; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1987), 204-
206; S.J. Chester, Conversion at Corinth: Perspectives on Conversion in Paul’s Theology and the Corinthian Church (SNTW; 
London: T&T Clark, 2003), 186 n.29.  
77 Chester, Conversion at Corinth, 187 n.129.  
78 Watson, Hermeneutics, 363.  
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Here, to adapt a well-known phrase, we have an echo of Israel in the polemic of Paul.79 This 
allusive inclusion of Israel stands in the sharpest possible contrast to Wisdom’s claim that Israel 
is innocent of idolatry (15.4). There is no room for the Golden Calf in Wisdom’s anthropological 
dualism. The wilderness is the site of blessing and testing for the holy, idolatry-free nation in 
symmetrical contrast to the plagues which fittingly befell the unrighteous Egyptians (Wis. 11-
19). As Barclay remarks, ‘the God-aware people of Israel are in principle averse to idolatry, and 
hardly liable to worship a Golden Calf’.80 But Paul, as Watson comments, ‘faces the fact that the 
author of Wisdom strives to suppress: that the holy nation is itself deeply complicit in the 
idolatry and ungodliness that it prefers to ascribe to the Gentiles’.81 As we have seen, for 
Wisdom, Jew and Gentile are irreducibly different qua non-idolaters and idolaters. 
Consequently, Paul’s inclusion of Israel within the human history of idolatry effectively 
eliminates the basis on which Wisdom’s anthropological dualism is constructed. 
 Romans 1.18-32 is a polyvalent narrative. The story of the sin of Adamic humanity is 
told in the Gentile-directed style of the Wisdom 13-15, but, in contrast to that tradition, the 
polemical target is broadened to include Israel. Dunn captures this dynamic when he refers to 
a ‘blending of traditions’ that produces a ‘twofold indictment’, a reference first to ‘the 
characteristic Jewish condemnation of Gentile religion and sexual practice’ and, secondly, to a 
‘reminder that Israel itself falls under the same indictment’.82 The effect of Romans 1.18-32 is 
therefore the opposite of Wisdom 13-15. Whereas Wisdom explicitly disassociates Israel and 
idolaters, Romans 1.18-32 highlights Israel’s idolatry, thereby collapsing the harmartiological 
difference between Jew and Gentile. The contrast is thus between two theological 
anthropologies: Wisdom’s irreducible, binary distinction between the righteous (Israel) and the 
ungodly (non-Israel) is confronted by Paul’s anthropological universalism that reduces the 
Jew/Gentile distinction to a single denominator: homo peccator. 
   
 
                                                        
79 Barth, ‘Speaking of Sin’, 291: ‘All that Paul says about the foolishness of those that think themselves to 
be wise, and of the fabrication of quadripedal idols, he says by allusions to OT sayings’.  
80 Barclay, ‘I Will Have Mercy’, 93. 
81 Watson, Hermeneutics, 411.  
82 Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle, 93. Dunn appears to overlook the oddity of having these two 
indictments side by side and that the presence of such a phenomenon represents a significant Pauline alteration 
to the polemical tradition from which he draws.  
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Introducing Divine Agency: Romans 1.24, 26 and 28 
 Stanley Stowers observes that ‘interpreters have not placed enough emphasis on God’s 
action in [Romans] 1.18-32’.83 We have already considered the contextualisation of Romans 
1.19-32 within the apostolic announcement of an ultimately salvific divine act and the explicit 
references to divine self-revelation that ground the claims about a primal theological 
knowledge. In Romans 1, however, God’s agency is not only evident in acts of salvation and 
revelation; it is also active in judgment. Wisdom’s explanation of the origin and effects of sin, at 
least in chapters 13-15, is strictly anthropological.84 According to Romans 1.24, 26 and 28, by 
contrast, ‘the human situation depicted in Rom 1 derives’, as Beverly Gaventa argues, ‘both 
from human rebellion against God and from God’s own active role in a cosmic conflict’.85 The 
‘and’ makes all the difference. 
 Paul’s introduction of divine agency into the causal link between idolatry and 
immorality is unique in the Hellenistic Jewish polemical tradition.86 The significance of this 
innovation is underlined by the triple use of the phrase ‘God handed them over’ (ὁ θεὸς 
piαρέδωκεν, 1.24, 26 and 28).87 Gaventa’s consideration of both biblical and non-biblical uses of 
piαραδίδωμι convincingly, if unsurprisingly, demonstrates that ‘handing over virtually always 
involves a handing over to another agent’.88 This raises two related questions: whom did God 
hand over and to whom did he deliver them? 
 Taking the latter question first, Romans 1.24, 26 and 28 all identify that to which people 
were delivered with an εἰς + accusative clause: εἰς ἀκαθαρσίαν (v.24), εἰς piάθη ἀτιμίας (v.26) 
and εἰς ἀδόκιμον νοῦν (v.28). According to this reading, the phrase ἐν ταῖς ἐpiιθυμίαις τῶν 
καρδιῶν αὐτῶν that separates the piαραδίδωμι and εἰς clauses in 1.24 is interpreted causally. 
This is consistent with both the Pauline (1 Cor 10.6) and early Jewish  opinion that ‘desire is the 
origin of every sin’ (Apoc. Mos. 19.3; cf. Jas 1.15)89 and means that God hands people over to 
‘uncleanness’, ‘dishonourable passions’ and a ‘worthless mind’ because of the desires of their 
hearts. While these sound more like descriptions of human misbehaviour or depravity than 
                                                        
83 Stowers, A Rereading of Romans, 93.  
84 Wisdom 2.24 does introduce a supra-human cause within the account of death’s origin, but here the 
non-human is demonic (διάβολος) not divine.  
85 B.R. Gaventa, Our Mother Saint Paul (Louiseville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 113 (italics added). 
86 Cf. Gaventa, Our Mother Saint Paul, 114.  
87 Cf. Gathercole, ‘Sin in God’s Economy’, 162-66.  
88 Gaventa, Our Mother Saint Paul, 114. 
89 This was often tied to the Eden narrative (see above).  
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agents, the reappearance of these motifs in Romans – Gaventa cites 6.19-20, 7.5 and 8.6-7 – 
seems to subsume these unnatural disorders under the power of sin. This is not quite the same 
as saying, as Gaventa does, that ‘uncleanness, dishonorable passions, and a deformed mind are 
instances of synecdoche; they refer to the anti-God powers, especially the power of Sin’;90 but it 
does imply that these human conditions are, in part, the effects of sin and therefore point to 
its sinister agency. 
 There is, then, a linking of desire and the implicit agency of sin in Romans 1.24. 
Following a now recurring pattern, this subtly connects the histories of sin in Romans 1.18-32 
and Romans 7.7-12.91 Personified Sin is the main character of Romans 7.8-11. With the coming 
of the prohibition against desiring (ἐpiιθυμέω, 7.7) Sin sprang to life and produced ‘all desire’ 
(piᾶσα ἐpiιθυμία, 7.8) in the “I”, thus deceiving and murdering him (7.11). The parallel 
movement from desire (ἐpiιθυμία) to the effects of sin’s agency and ultimately death (1.32) in 
Romans 1.24-28 suggests that Israel, the main focus of Romans 7, is not excluded from the 
account of God handing humanity over to the destructive power of sin in Romans 1.24-28. 
Otherwise expressed, tying the effects of sin to the causal effects of desire, with all its 
associations with Adam and Israel, contributes to the bringing together of Jew and Gentile 
under the single term ἄνθρωpiος. Thus, in answer to our second question, God handed over 
humans – Jew and Gentile – to the effects of sin’s agency. In Romans 1.18, ἄνθρωpiος means 
ἄνθρωpiος; it is an inclusive reference and as such the tragic history of human sin is precisely 
the human story.   
 
Unsubtle Subversion: Romans 1.25 
 ‘God’s wrath strikes man’s religion’.92 This is true in both Wisdom 13-15 and Romans 1; 
but again, there are crucial differences. There is a subtle differentiation between two types of 
false worship in Wisdom 13.1-9 and 13.10-19. The initial focus (vv.1-9) is on those things created 
by the divine artisan. Fire, water, air, wind, stars – these ‘created things’ (κτίσμα, 13.5) were 
taken to be gods (13.2) with the result that Gentile religion became fixed on the penultimacy of 
the created rather than its divine cause (13.1, 3-5, 9). In 13.10-19 the focus is no longer on the 
works of the divine creator, but rather on the artefacts created by humans (cf. 14.15-21; 15.7-
                                                        
90 Gaventa, Our Mother Saint Paul, 119.  
91 Cf. Gathercole, ‘Sin in God’s Economy’, 159-69.   
92 Barth, ‘Speaking of Sin’, 290.   
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13). Under this general topic, Wisdom demonstrates an awareness of various forms of idolatry: 
personal piety (13.11-19), legal cult (14.15-16) and emperor worship (14.17-21).93 This 
differentiated reflection on non-Jewish cult displays a level of acculturated sophistication and 
subtlety.94 
 Whatever Paul is in Romans 1, he is certainly not subtle. In contrast to Wisdom’s careful 
distinguishing of types of false worship, Paul’s account reduces idolatry to images of living 
creatures (Rom 1.24). A similar lack of subtlety is evident as Paul, unlike Wisdom’s sensitive 
evocation of Israel’s aniconic tradition, offers an apparently novel interpretation of idolatry as 
service to the creature (1.25). Wisdom’s emphasis on the human origin of certain idolatrous 
artefacts (13.10-19; 15.7-13) evokes what Watson calls the ‘craftsman motif’ from Isaiah 44.9-20, 
and the satirical polemic against the lifeless impotency of idols derives from Psalm 115.5-7.95 
Paul’s interpretation, by contrast, seems to come from nowhere. It may be, however, that 
Paul’s language of ‘exchange’ and its connection to, as Levison writes, ‘the inversion of the 
human dominion that is established in Gen. 1.26’ reflects an interpretative tradition that 
includes ‘the exchange of human dominion for subservience to animals’ as an effect of the 
Edenic fall.96 In the Greek Life of Adam and Eve the wild animals address the woman after her 
rebellion: ἡμῶν αἱ φύσεις μετηλλάγησαν (11.2). That this exchange includes the forfeiting of 
Adamic dominion is confirmed both by an extra-biblical linking of the Edenic sin with animal 
rebellion (24.3) and an eschatological promise that Adam’s rule will be reestablished (39), thus 
indicating that the loss of that rule is presupposed. This connection between Romans 1.23, 25 
and an interpretative tradition associated with the Eden narratives further confirms the 
significance of Adam within Paul’s polemic. Importantly, however, Adam himself is not the 
polemical target. Paul accuses ἄνθρωpiοι not Ἀδάμ. Accordingly, the effect of this (possible) 
allusion to Eden is not to focus on humanity’s progenitors, but rather to reduce humanity to a 
commonality and thereby to address Jew and Gentile as ἄνθρωpiος, as Adamic humans. 
                                                        
93 Watson (Hermeneutics, 407) notes a similar distinction in Philo between ‘worship of created being and 
idols’, though in Philo this distinction is connected ‘to the first two commandments of the Decalogue’ (Decal. 66; 
Spec. 1.13-22).  
94 J.M.G. Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora: From Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE – 117 CE) (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1996), 392.  
95 Watson, Hermeneutics, 407.  
96 Levison, ‘Adam and Eve’, 530, 533. 
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 Read within this rhetorical and theological intention, Paul’s apparently crude 
collapsing of types of idolatry takes on new significance. Hidden within Paul’s undifferentiated 
description of false worship is what we might call an unsubtle sophistication – a subversively 
un-nuanced account of cultic practice which has the effect of collapsing both the difference 
between types of religion and the associated differences between their practitioners.97 In 
Wisdom, false religion exists on something of a sliding-scale which moves from mildly 
condemnable (μέμψις ὀλίγη, 13.6 ) to ‘most foolish’ (piάντες ἀφρονέστατοι, 15.14) – that is, 
from nature worship (13.1-9) to Egyptian animal-worship (15.18-19). It is the object of cultic 
devotion that distinguishes Egyptian from Greek, and ultimately Egyptian and Greek from Jew.  
In this variegated religious scheme, Israelite religion is set in contrast to a highly 
differentiated assortment of false religion. In other words, although all non-Jewish religion is 
false insofar as it is not directed to the one God of Israel, the object of one’s worship remains 
theologically relevant. Worshiping the works of the creator is closer to the truth than idolising 
animals that even the creator did not bless (15.18-19). In this sense, there is true religion 
(Israel) and progressively less true religion. 
Paul’s perspective is different. Those who worship human images, birds, four-footed 
animals and reptiles are all guilty of the single religious sin of serving the creature rather than 
the creator (Rom 1.23). Thus, for Paul, cultic practice is not a definitive distinguishing mark of 
Greeks, Jews and Egyptians. The formal differences between types of false religion only serve 
to conceal a fundamental material identity. The particular image of cultic devotion is 
ultimately inconsequential. Either one worships the one God, or one does not. By relativising 
the anthropological significance of religious differences Paul effectively broadens his 
polemical scope. In contrast to Wisdom’s portrayal of Israel in juxtaposition to a range of false 
religion (15.1-4; 18.9), for Paul there is only true worship and its opposite. Despite its diversity 
non-Jewish religion is essentially a singular entity; and insofar as Israel is complicit in Adamic 
humanity’s history of idolatry – a reality that Paul’s allusion to the Golden Calf episode in 
Romans 1.23 forces the reader to concede – Israel is placed on the wrong side of the true/false 
worship divide. Here again, Paul’s alterations to the Hellenistic Jewish polemical tradition have 
the effect of producing an antithetical anthropology in relation to Wisdom’s Jew/Gentile 
                                                        
97 Watson (Hermeneutics, 407 n.82) considers this possibility: ‘The Pauline conflation might be regarded 
either as a crude misunderstanding or as a sign of theological sophistication’.  
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dualism. Whereas Wisdom contrasts Israel with various types of idolaters, Paul reduces idolatry 
to terms reflected in Israel’s original sin at Sinai and thereby includes Israel within humanity’s 
common hamartiological history.                       
  
Conclusion 
 In the words of Romans 3.22, ‘there is no distinction’. But for Wisdom, there is a 
distinction. Anthropology is reducible no further than the difference between Jew and Gentile 
because Jews know God and Gentiles are idolatrous. Wisdom 13-15 serves to reinforce this 
division by contrasting the idolatry and immorality of non-Jews with Israel’s innocence in 
relation to idols and the consequent immorality. Paul’s engagement with Wisdom 13-15 makes 
precisely the opposite point. The contextualisation of the Pauline polemic within the 
apocalyptic and kerygmatic context of Romans 1.16-18, together with the various alterations 
Paul introduces into the polemical tradition, serve the single rhetorical and theological aim of 
eliminating the difference between Jew and Gentile by eliminating the imagined difference 
between non-idolatry and idolatry. The story of Romans 1.18-32, even as it tells the diverse 
stories of Adam, Israel and the Gentiles, is, as 1.18 states, the story of the ἄνθρωpiος. By 
narrating these various stories within and as a single story Paul effectively creates a common 
human history.  Thus, in contrast to Wisdom’s irreducible anthropological dualism, Paul 
announces the essential oneness – coram deo – of all persons; he announces the human.  
 But whence and whither: where does Paul’s universalism come from and where does it 
go? This is not the place to answer these questions in full; but we can say, by way of 
anticipating our next chapter, that both questions have the same answer: the divine act that is 
the single and saving history of Jesus Christ. The implicit event of Romans 1.16-18 
simultaneously identifies the human qua human as the object of divine wrath and divine 
saving righteousness. Read from Wisdom’s theological perspective, Paul’s universalism is both 
different and dangerous. For Wisdom, an anthropological dualism is the presupposition of a 
corresponding soteriological symmetry: ‘Wisdom brought the righteous through the Red Sea 
but she drowned their enemies’ (10.18-19). Paul’s destabilisation of Wisdom’s anthropology 
necessarily entails the disqualification of its soteriology. If humanity as such is under the 
wrath of God (Rom 1.18), then, from Wisdom’s perspective and in its language, no one will 
survive the Red Sea of divine judgment. Expressed in Pauline terms, because Romans 1.18-31 is 
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the human story, the human is ‘worthy of death’ (1.32). It is precisely this totalising and 
condemnatory point that comes to explicit expression in Romans 3.9, 23. Unaccountably, 
however, Paul’s absolute announcement of the desperate human condition occurs within a 
kerygmatic context that proclaims an ultimately salvific revelation of divine righteousness. 
From all that Paul has said so far, and from all that Wisdom says, this sounds oxymoronic. 
‘Those who do such things are worthy of death’. But, to anticipate our next chapter, it is, as 
Bornkamm might say, by God’s grace that he does not bring humankind to this end in any 
other way than in the death of his Son.98 It is in this paradox between deserved death and 
promised life – between the reality of sin and the announcement of salvation – that we 
encounter an anticipation of the shape of Paul’s soteriology that will be the focus of our next 
chapter. 
  
                                                        
98 Bornkamm, ‘The Revelation of God’s Wrath’, 63.  
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Chapter 7 
Soteriological Semantics: Righteousness and Grace in Wisdom and 
Romans 
 
Le paradoxe de la foi doit être produit tel quel, porté par la prose 
à la lumière de sa  nouveauté radicale. – Alain Badiou1 
 
 ‘There is no distinction’ (Rom 3.22b). This Pauline assertion is both a summary of the major 
argumentative thread of Romans 1.18-3.20 and a summary of the anthropological debate 
between Wisdom and Romans discussed in the previous chapter. In contrast to Wisdom’s 
repeated assertion that humanity exists in an irreducible dualism consisting of the righteous 
(Israel) and the ungodly (non-Jews), Paul, by declaring that no one is righteous (3.9-10), 
reduces humanity to the single category of the human. As in the rhetorical movement of 
Romans, however, this announcement functions within our argument as both conclusion and 
introduction: just as the universally condemning ‘no distinction’ grounds the corresponding 
‘but now’, the anthropological disagreement between Wisdom and Paul implies a corresponding 
soteriological tension. Because Wisdom’s balanced conception of a bipartite humanity relates 
symmetrically to an Exodus-shaped construal of divine saving action – ‘Wisdom brought them 
[the righteous] over the Red Sea…but she drowned their enemies’ (Wis. 10.18-19a). The Pauline 
removal of the righteous (Rom 3.9-10) is therefore more than an anthropological unbalancing; 
it entails a consequent destabilisation of Wisdom’s carefully calibrated soteriology. Stated 
axiomatically – and thus somewhat overstated – whereas Wisdom’s Wisdom saves the fitting, 
Paul’s God justifies the ungodly. 
 But, as remarked earlier in this thesis, nothing comes from nothing, or at least 
nowhere. For Wisdom, the Exodus event is the paradigmatic instantiation of a deep structural 
pattern embedded within the created order and guaranteed by pre-creational Wisdom. The 
symmetry of the Red Sea is, in other words, the central soteriological expression of a repeated 
and predictable cosmic rationality: divine justice takes the dual form of mercy for the 
righteous and judgment (tempered by a non-salvific mercy) for the ungodly. Paul too locates 
                                                        
1 A. Badiou, Saint Paul: La fondation de l’universalisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997), 35; ET: 
Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism (trans. R. Brassier; Standford: Standford University Press, 2003), 33.  
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the instantiation of divine justice and grace in an event, but unlike Wisdom’s theological 
activation of the Exodus, the event from which Pauline theology is derived is more revolution 
than confirmation. Whereas Wisdom reads the Exodus as the principal historical manifestation 
of a pre-temporal and immutable theological pattern and thus as an affirmation of the 
received canons of justice, Pauline theology responds to an event that enters history as a 
rupture – an interruption that, rather than affirming the ‘ordinary’ notions of justice and 
grace, fundamentally alters their meaning and parameters. The name of this event is Jesus 
Christ. 
While chapter eight will compare the Exodus-shaped and christological hermeneutics 
of Wisdom and Paul, the aim of this chapter is to reintroduce the Exodus-soteriology of Wisdom 
(especially as it is articulated in the vindication of the persecuted righteous person [Wis. 2-5] 
and the fitting agency of divine σοφία [Wis. 7-9/10]) in order to initiate a conversation between 
Wisdom and Paul on the topic of divine justice and grace. To facilitate this dialogue, the 
aforementioned sections of Wisdom will be considered in relation to portions of Romans in 
which Paul reflects on the revelation of divine righteousness and grace (esp. 3.21-26, but also 
2.1-16, 5.6-21 and 8.3-4). Stated as a thesis, the argument of this chapter is that in contrast to 
the symmetrical soteriology Wisdom identifies in the Exodus event, Paul’s location of the 
revelation of God’s righteousness and grace in the giving of Christ for the ungodly occasions a 
contextually radical redefinition of the shared theological terms. As Pascal famously observed, 
‘Les mots diversement rangés font un divers sens’.2 Applying this dictum to the meaning of 
righteousness and grace in Romans and Wisdom, δικαιοσύνη and χάρις reflect a common 
vocabulary that is deployed in distinct theological grammars.3 In this sense, the authors of 
Wisdom and Paul are both theologians of grace and righteousness, but the grace and 
righteousness about which they theologise are ultimately incommensurable.4 This 
                                                        
2 Blaise Pascal, Pensées (Brunschvicg edition, 1897), I.23.  
3 Both Plato (Cratylus) and Aristotle (On Interpretation) recognised that discourse (λόγος) required not just 
a word, but a conjunction of words in the form of a predicative link. Words need other words to ‘mean’, and 
therefore it is the sentence that functions as the basic unit of discourse. Translated into the terms of modern 
linguistics the difference between word and sentence is the difference between semiotics and semantics. For our 
purposes, the crucial distinction is that, as Paul Ricoeur argues, ‘the object of semiotics [i.e. the sign/word] is 
merely virtual. Only the sentence is actual as the very event of speaking’ (Interpretation and Theory: Discourse and 
the Surplus of Meaning [Fort Worth: TCU Press, 1976], 7).   
4 E.P. Sanders (Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion [Minneapolish: Fortress 
Press, 1977], 551) recognises this incompatibility in relation to Jewish and Pauline ‘righteousness’ language – 
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identification of lexical continuity situated within semantic discontinuity provides an ice-
breaker of sorts, a shared interest for Wisdom and Paul to discuss and debate. If, as argued in 
part one, Wisdom conceives of divine justice as grace for the righteous and judgment for the 
ungodly, then, as also argued in part one, it follows that grace, while not reducible to justice, 
operates within and exhibits the patterns of justness, of congruence between benefit and 
beneficiary. Grace, in other words, is an exercise of divine favour directed toward a fitting 
(ἄξιος) recipient. From this perspective, the Pauline location of the revelation of God’s grace 
and righteousness in a divine act that justifies the ungodly sounds like a confused and 
dangerous declaration that grace has lost its goodness and divine justice is manifested in an 
instance of double-injustice (i.e. the death of a righteous person and the analytically 
inaccurate labeling of the unrighteous as the righteous). This chapter will explore this tension 
under two headings: ‘righteousness revealed’ and ‘grace redefined’.   
  
Righteousness Revealed 
  ‘There are two kinds of righteousness’.5 These well known words of Martin Luther 
aptly summarize the thesis of this section. Wisdom reads the Exodus as a paradigmatic 
affirmation of a created moral order which is established and sustained by pre-creational 
Wisdom and, thus guaranteed, can be projected into the soteriological future. The critical 
feature of this event is the correspondence between its anthropological and soteriological poles: 
the righteous are rescued and the ungodly are destroyed. In other words, the Exodus manifests 
God’s righteousness because the dual divine acts of saving and drowning coincide with the 
respective character of the human subjects. Paul, by contrast, encounters the Christ-event, not 
as a reaffirmation of received notions of justice, but as a revelation and consequent 
redefinition of divine righteousness. In opposition to Wisdom’s insistence that divine 
righteousness operates within the parameters of a necessary correspondence between divine 
act and human subject, Paul locates the demonstration of God’s righteousness in the 
disjunctive declaration that God justly justifies the unjust. We can thus imagine the beginning of 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
‘righteousness itself is a different righteousness’ – but his failure to extend this observation to include the 
differing definitions of ‘grace’ has led to a muting of Paul’s peculiarity on this point.  
5 M. Luther, LW 31, 293-306.  
117 
 
a conversation: ‘Ἀγαpiήσατε δικαιοσύνην’, Wisdom invites (1.1). ‘What δικαιοσύνη?’, Paul 
responds…   
 
One Kind of Righteousness: Wisdom (and Romans 2) 
Romans 2.6-8 is a somewhat crude but accurate précis of Wisdom’s soteriology. Crude 
because it captures none of the qualifying nuances of the so-called ‘Mercy Dialogue’ (Wis. 
11.17-12.27); 6  accurate because for all its subtlety Wisdom, like Romans 2.6-8, anchors the 
rightness of God’s righteousness within an identifiable correspondence between divine action 
and the quality of the human subject.  
 As argued in part one, ‘righteousness’ is a central theme in Wisdom, and the Exodus 
event functions as its principal definition.7 In contrast to Paul’s conclusion in Romans 3.22b, 
the Exodus announces a distinction. More precisely expressed, the Exodus is the paradigmatic 
instantiation of an anthropological distinction and a corresponding soteriological distinction. 
As Wisdom retells the story (10.15-21; 19.1-21), a bipartite humanity (δίκαιοι and ἀσεβεῖς, 10.20) 
encounters, respectively, deliverance and destruction (cf. 10.18-19). It is important to insist, 
however, that this is more than a phenomenology of divine action; it is an argument for the 
essential rightness of God’s salvific activity. The Red Sea crossing is a demonstration of divine 
justice because it is the righteous who are rescued and the wicked who are drowned. Implicit in 
this inductive argumentation is a particular understanding of righteousness: God’s 
righteousness is located in the correspondence between divine action and the human subject(s).  
Before tracing the contours of correspondence in Wisdom, it is important to note that 
calling this understanding of righteousness particular is not to say that it is peculiar. In fact, as 
can be demonstrated from a range of sources, δικαιοσύνη is often conceptually determined by 
correspondence. Thus, to cite an example in which the point is made lexically, 2 Chronicles 
6.23 (LXX) can redundantly say τοῦ δικαιῶσαι δίκαιον τοῦ ἀpiοδοῦναι αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν 
δικαιοσύνην αὐτοῦ. This correlation of cognates, together with the use of κατά + accusative 
(κατὰ τὴν δικαιοσύνην), express a strict correspondence: the righteous are righteous, and thus 
                                                        
6 See chapters two and four for a full discussion.  
7 For the centrality of justice in Wisdom see G. Bellia and A. Passaro, ‘Infinite Passion for Justice’, in The 
Book of Wisdom in Modern Research: Studies on Tradition, Redaction, and Theology (DCLY 2005; ed. A. Passaro and G. 
Bellia; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005), 307-28. For the hermeneutical priority of the Exodus see chapter four of the 
present work.  
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rightly declared righteous, according to their righteousness.8 Similarly, Aristotle, with his 
famed commonsense, describes the process of becoming righteous: τὰ μὲν δίκαια piράττοντες 
δίκαιοι γινόμεθα (Eth. nic. II.i.4).9 It is hard not to hear Aristotle’s maxim in the words of Wisdom 
6.10: οἱ γὰρ φυλάξαντες ὁσίως τὰ ὅσια ὁσιωθήσονται. Here, as in Aristotle, there is a 
correspondence between ontology and action. In the language of Ezekiel 18.5 (LXX), the 
δίκαιος is the one who does (ὁ piοιῶν) δικαιοσύνη.10 It is precisely this correspondence that 
Philo – bringing us closer to Wisdom temporally, geographically and conceptually – is eager to 
preserve. With the language of Stoic definitions of justice (cf. SVF 3.262) he repeatedly insists 
that, as a matter of principle, δικαιοσύνη works κατ’ ἀξίαν (Leg. 1.87; Mos. 2.9; Sobr. 40).11 
According to John Barclay, though ‘ἄξιος and its cognate verb ἀξιόω’ are often translated with 
the language of ‘worth’ and (more misleadingly) ‘merit’ – thereby evoking images of 
Reformation cartoons and corresponding papal bulls – ‘ἄξιος’, at least in Philo (and Wisdom), ‘is 
a relational term, describing the “fit” between one thing and another’.12 To say, then, that 
δικαιοσύνη works κατ’ ἀξίαν is to indicate that divine righteousness operates according to an 
affinity between the objects of divine action and the form of that action. As Barclay clarifies, 
                                                        
8 The insistence of R. Bultmann (Theology of the New Testament [trans. K. Grobel; Waco, TX: Baylor 
University Press, 2007], 1.272-73) that δικαιοσύνη ‘is a forensic-eschatological term’ that applies adjectivally 
(δίκαιος) to one who has been acknowledged to be righteous (δικαιόω) obscures the link between verb, noun, and 
adjective. As Sanders (Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 494) and Westerholm (Perspectives Old and New, 264-65 n.7) have 
argued – though they perhaps downplay the futurity of the justifying verdict –, the status of the righteous 
(δίκαιος) is established independent of their forensic treatment. The righteous (δίκαιος) are those who should be 
declared righteous (δικαιόω) because they are righteous. In this sense, the operations of δικαιοσύνη are, to use 
Kant’s categories, analytic rather than synthetic. 
9 Commenting on the universal acceptance of Aristotle’s dictum, Eberhard Jüngel suggests that it 
‘expresses a common opinion which it apparently did not occur to anybody to dispute’ (E. Jüngel, Justification: The 
Heart of Christian Faith [trans. J.F. Cayzer; London: T&T Clark, 2001], 247).    
10 A similar note of correspondence can be observed in relation to the verb (δικαιόω). The proper object 
of the verb is δίκαιος (e.g. Deut 25.1: δικαιώσωσιν τὸν δίκαιον), a point which is often made negatively in the 
condemnation of the act of acquitting the ungodly (e.g. Exod 23.7; 34.7; Sir. 9.12). 
11 In Philo, ἄξιος-language functions as non-specific index of possible criteria of fit (e.g. social status, Opif. 
45; intelligence, Migr. 56-57; need, Post. 142-47; nobility, Leg. 3.79-82; virtue, Leg. 3.88-89). Combining the above 
observations with the excursus in chapter three on Philo and gift, it becomes clear that the issue for Philo is that 
divine benefaction must operate within the limits of δικαιοσύνη, and as such must function κατ’ ἀξίαν. Within 
this logic, the various criteria of fit function as indications of correspondence between gift and recipient and thus 
as affirmations of the justice and rationality of God’s grace. Walther Völker misreads Philo on this point because 
he misconstrues the Philonic emphasis on correspondence in terms of the post-Reformation polemic against 
synergism (Fortschritt und Vollendung bei Philo von Alexandrien [Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1938], 115-22). Völker is rightly 
criticised by both D. Zeller, Charis bei Philon und Paulus (Stuttgarter Bibelstudien, 142; Stuttgart: Katholisches 
Bibelwerk, 1990), 65-72 and J.M.G. Barclay, ‘Grace Within and Beyond Reason: Philo and Paul in Dialogue’, in Paul, 
Grace and Freedom: Essays in Honour of John K. Riches (ed. P. Middleton, A. Paddison and K. Wenell; London: T&T 
Clark, 2009), 9-21. 
12 J.M.G. Barclay, ‘Grace Within and Beyond Reason’, 11-12.  
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‘both verb and adjective describe a relationship of correspondence (not necessarily equivalence) 
between two entities’,13 and as such ἄξιος-language functions to identify the point of 
congruence between what God does and those to whom he does it.   
This brings us back to Wisdom. Although Wisdom can indicate correspondence in 
multiple ways,14 Wisdom’s author, like Philo after him, employs ἄξιος-terminology to signal the 
coincidence between divine action and the human subject (1.16; 3.5; 6.16; 9.12; 12.7; 12.26; 16.9; 
18.4; 19.4). As the one who rules righteously, God can be said to be righteous (δίκαιος ὢν 
δικαίως τὰ piάντα διέpiεις, 12.15) because his judgments operate according to ‘fit’ (ἀξίαν θεοῦ 
κρίσιν, 12.26). This, however, does not translate into an un-nuanced iustitia distributiva. As 
argued in chapter four, the ‘Mercy Dialogue’ (11.17-12.27) insists that divine judgment is 
always accompanied and qualified by a non-salvific mercy that reflects God’s universal love 
(11.23-12.11). Nonetheless, when all his moving and modifying words about mercy and love 
have been written, Wisdom’s author maintains the Exodus-shape of God’s saving activity: the 
unrighteous (ἄδικος) cannot be acquitted (12.12) and the undeserving (τὸν μὴ ὀφείλοντα) 
cannot be condemned (12.15). It is this strict symmetry, unqualified by the complexities of 
canonical history (10.15-19.21) and the subtleties of theory (11.17-12.27), which determines 
Wisdom’s eschatology (2.1-5.23).  
The depiction of the persecuted and subsequently vindicated righteous person in 
Wisdom 2-5 is a test and, ultimately, an affirmation of Wisdom’s Exodus-shaped conception of 
divine justice.15 In this scene the ungodly (ἀσεβεῖς, e.g. 3.10) conspire to oppress and finally 
murder the righteous (δίκαιος, 2.12) in order to examine the truthfulness of his theology 
(ἴδωμεν εἰ οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῦ ἀληθεῖς, 2.17). While temporal experience appears to legitimate the 
Epicurean-like assumptions of the ungodly – life is short, death is final, might is right and 
pleasure is proper (2.1-11) – this nearsighted rationality is twisted (λογισάμενοι οὐκ ὀρθῶς, 
2.1) precisely because it implies a disjunctive δικαιοσύνη. Taking the implicit non-
correspondence evident in the empirical links between wickedness and prosperity and, 
conversely, righteousness and oppression to instantiate the real/true, they witness to their 
theological ignorance (οὐκ ἔγνωσαν μυστήρια θεοῦ, 2.22). Properly understood, the justice of 
                                                        
13 J.M.G. Barclay, ‘Grace Within and Beyond Reason’, 12 (italics added).    
14 In Wisdom 10.1-14, for example, five of the six characters rescued by Wisdom are labeled δίκαιος 
whereas Adam, presumably debarred from that label by his Edenic transgression, is described with the honorific 
title piρωτόpiλαστον piατέρα κόσμου. See chapter three for a full discussion.  
15 See chapter two for a detailed discussion.  
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God’s saving actions is locatable within a soteriology of correspondence: μισθὸν ὁσιότητος; 
γέρας ψυχῶν ἀμώμων (2.22).16 It is this righteousness that Wisdom summons its audience to 
love (1.1), and it is this righteousness that will be definitively reestablished at the eschaton. 
With the apocalyptic prose of a Daniel or an Enoch, Wisdom announces the coming revelation 
of God’s righteousness (5.15-23) as the day of counter-empirical salvation (τῷ piαραδόξῳ τῆς 
σωτηρίας) for the righteous (5.2) and total destruction (καταδαpiανάω) for the wicked (5.13). 
The Exodus-shape of this dual divine act is the revelation of God’s righteousness because, as 
Philo would insist, δικαιοσύνη works κατ’ ἀξίαν. Thus, the ungodly will be punished in 
accordance with their reasoning (3.10) which entails finding their fitting (ἄξιος) end in the 
company of death (1.16). Conversely, the righteous (δίκαιος), having been found worthy (ἄξιος, 
3.5) of God, will live with him (3.1), thereby embodying Wisdom’s principal soteriological axiom: 
δικαιοσύνη ἀθάνατός ἐστιν (1.15).  
This is the sense in which Romans 2.6-8, however crude, is an accurate summary of 
Wisdom’s soteriology. 17 Romans 2.1-16, like Wisdom 2-5, presupposes and describes an 
eschatological judgment.18 With Wisdom (cf. 12.15), Paul ties the righteousness of God’s 
judgment (δικαιοκρισία τοῦ θεοῦ, Rom 2.5) to an eschatological principle of soteriological 
                                                        
16 The apparent digression about the barren woman, eunuch and righteous who die early in 3.13-4.15 
serves to illustrate this principle of counter-empirical soteriological correspondence. The barren woman is 
blessed because she is undefiled (3.13), the eunuch is blessed because his hands have done no lawless deeds (3.14) 
and the righteousness of those who die early occasions a redefinition of longevity because they are fit to receive 
that blessing (4.7-9).   
17 This is intended descriptively, not as a claim that Paul is intending to summarise Wisdom. It is necessary 
to emphasise that the theological affinity between Romans 2 and Wisdom does not imply that the content is un-
Pauline (contra D. Campbell, The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul [Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2009], 547-50). Campbell is right to stress the discontinuity between Romans 2 and 3, but this tension is 
not between ‘fundamentally different conceptions of God’ (706; cf. 543); it reflects the incommensurability of two 
theological paradigms whose sequential existence is an effect of the ‘apocalypse of Jesus Christ’. The language of 
‘incommensurable paradigms’ is borrowed from Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (3rd ed.; 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 103, 198-204. For the incommensurable though interdependent 
relationship between Romans 2 and 3, see S. Westerholm, Perspectives Old and New: The ‘Lutheran’ Paul and His Critics 
[Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004], 283-84; cf. U. Wilckens, Der Brief an die Römer [3 vols; EKKNT; Neukirchen: 
Benziger, 1978-82], 1.132).    
18 The limited focus of this section (i.e. demonstrating the logic of correspondence that comes to 
expression in Romans 2.6-10, 13) prevents an adequate discussion of the numerous debates that surround this 
passage (e.g. the identity of Paul’s interlocutor [cf. chapter six] and the existence or otherwise of those who do the 
good/law in 2.7, 10, 13-15). That this judgment is more than a rhetorical fiction seems clear from 2.16 in which 
judgment is said to be through Christ Jesus and according to Paul’s gospel, but the possibility of the positive 
outcome described in 2.7, 10 and especially 2.13 appears to be the very possibility Paul declares impossible outside 
of Christ in 3.20 (note the lexical and thematic links between 2.13 and 3.20). The various interpretive options for 
Romans 2.1-16 are helpfully summarized by R. H. Bell, No One Seeks for God: An Exegetical and Theological Study of 
Romans 1.18-3.20 (WUNT 106; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 132-36. 
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correspondence: ἀpiοδώσει ἑκάστῳ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ (2.4-6; cf. Ps 61.13 LXX; Prov 24.12 LXX).   
The present is a period of divine patience (ἀνοχή, Rom 2.4), but this era will end with the 
eschatological unveiling of God’s δικαιοκρισία in the form of recompense according to human 
actions. As Kent Yinger observes, ‘Paul is concerned here with the necessary congruence (κατά) 
of deeds and judgment’.19 Positively, this means that those who by patience in well-doing (καθ᾽ 
ὑpiομονὴν ἔργου ἀγαθοῦ) seek honour, glory and, Wisdom’s favourite, incorruption (ἀφθαρσία, 
cf. Wis. 2.28; 6.18, 19) are linked with eternal life (Rom 2.7). Negatively, the unrighteous (οἱ 
piειθομένοι τῇ ἀδικίᾳ) encounter wrath and more wrath (ὀργὴ καὶ θυμός, Rom 2.8).20 This 
appears to be a fair restatement of Wisdom’s soteriological insistence that the righteous 
(δίκαιος), having been found worthy (ἄξιος, 3.5) of God, will live with him (3.1), whereas the 
ungodly (ἀσεβεῖς) will meet their fitting (ἄξιος) end in the company of death (1.16). In both 
texts divine righteousness (cf. Rom 2.5; Wis. 12.15a) is linked to an identifiable 
commensurability between the form of divine action, whether judgment or grace, and the 
corresponding human subject. In this essential sense, Wisdom and Romans 2, along with the 
other texts surveyed above, operate within the same (theo)logical paradigm: righteousness 
operates according to a principle of correspondence.21    
 Romans 2, however, is more than a restatement of Wisdom 2-5. Returning briefly to the 
theme of our previous chapter, Wisdom would be scandalized to find Paul detaching this 
soteriological symmetry from its anthropological counterpart. From Wisdom’s perspective, 
Romans 2.7 describes Israel and Romans 2.8 describes non-Israel. In keeping with the 
anthropological universalism discussed in chapter six, however, Paul proceeds in Romans 2.9-
10 to cite both the negative (2.9) and positive (2.10) soteriological possibilities as possibilities 
for both Israel and non-Israel (Ιουδαίου τε piρῶτον καὶ Ἕλληνος, 2.9, 10).22 This provides an 
                                                        
19 K. Yinger, Paul, Judaism, and Judgment According to Deeds (SNTS 105; Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), 175 (italics original).  
20 Together with 2.9-10, vv.7-8 form a chiasmus that serves to emphasise the symmetry and two 
possibilities of judgment according to works (O. Kuss, Der Römerbrief [3 vols.; Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet; 
1957-78], 1.65).   
21 Nietzsche witnesses to the universality of this perspective precisely in his subversion of it. By his own 
account, his ‘new language…sounds strangest’ in the assertion that ‘the falsest judgments (to which synthetic 
judgments a priori belong) are the most indispensable to us’ (Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the 
Future [trans. R.J. Hollingdale; London: Penguin Books, 1973], 35).      
22 J.M. Bassler (‘Divine Impartiality in Paul’s Letter to the Romans’, NovT 26 [1984]: 43-58), rightly 
emphasises the importance of divine impartiality in this context (cf. 2.11), but (pace Bassler) impartiality, rather 
than being an a priori legal necessity, is a theological consequence of the justification of the ungodly which is itself 
derived from the shape of the Christ-event (see below; cf. R. H. Bell, No One Seeks for God, 144).  
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important clue as to the function of Romans 2.1-16 within the larger argument of Romans. 
Whereas Wisdom locates an irreducible anthropological dualism within the just 
correspondence of the Exodus event, Paul’s use of the notion of forensic correspondence is 
situated within an argument that moves from the establishment of the initially neutral 
soteriological equality of Jew and Gentile (2.1-29) to the universally condemning declaration 
that all, Jew and Gentile, are ὑφ᾽ ἁμαρτίαν (3.9-20; cf. 3.22b-23; 11.32a).23  
More directly relevant for our purposes is Paul’s location of the criterion of 
correspondence in the Jewish law. The general principle that ‘God will repay each one 
according to his or her deeds’ (Rom 2.6) is particularised in Romans 2.13: οἱ piοιηταὶ νόμου 
δικαιωθήσονται. ‘Doing the law’ names the abstract activity of ‘doing the good’ (2.10). The 
divine act of eschatological justification (δικαιωθήσονται) corresponds to the human act of 
doing the law (οἱ piοιηταὶ νόμου).24 The singularity of this criterion of correspondence cuts 
across other possible identifications of affinity between divine verdict and human status. The 
operations of this righteous-judgment (Rom 2.6) extend to Jew and Gentile (2.9-10), and 
therefore the identifying mark of ethnicity (circumcision) is relativized in relation to law-
doing (2.25-27). Similarly, Paul refuses to apply the adjective δίκαιος to those who merely hear 
the law (2.13a); rather, he insists that it is the ‘doers of the law’ – a designation that transcends 
ethnic boundaries (2.14-15) – who are, before God (piαρὰ [τῷ] θεῷ, 2.13a), properly recognised as 
righteous (δικαιόω, 2.13b). The structure of this verse implies that, if only in this context, 
δικαιόω is synonymous with being δίκαιοι piαρὰ [τῷ] θεῶ.25 In other words, God’s 
                                                        
23 Wherever one locates the previous demonstration that ‘all are under sin’, Paul’s ability to write these 
words implies that the argument from 1.18 onwards, even when engaging Wisdom (1.18-2.4) and arguing from 
shared conceptualities (2.5-8), moves in direct opposition to Wisdom’s insistence that there is an anthropological 
distinction and thus an actual, corresponding soteriological distinction.  
24 N.T. Wright, ‘On Becoming the Righteousness of God: 2 Corinthians 5.21’, in Pauline Theology (vol. 2; ed. 
D.M. Hay; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 200-208 is right to insist that this provides a covenantal context for Paul’s 
righteousness language, but he overstates his case by equating ‘righteousness’ with ‘covenant membership’ (‘The 
Book of Romans’, in NIB X [Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2002], 491). A covenantal context does not dilute the notion 
of normativity which δικαιοσύνη conveys (Seifrid, ‘Paul’s Use of Righteousness Language’, 44); it locates and 
particularises the norm. Thus Gathercole’s correction: ‘righteousness’ should not be understood ‘in terms of 
membership within the covenant’ but ‘as doing what God requires within the covenant’ (‘The Doctrine of Justification 
in Paul and Beyond: Some Proposals’, in Justification in Perspective: Historical Developments and Contemporary 
Challenges [ed. B.L. McCormack; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006], 237).      
25 Westerholm, Perspectives Old and New, 267.  Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 545 notes Paul’s 
preference for the verb (δικαιόω) relative to the early Jewish prioritization of the adjective. However, comparing 
Wisdom and Romans confirms Westerholm’s qualifying observation that ‘the priority of the adjective applies to 
Paul’s understanding of ordinary dikaiosness as well as to Judaism’ (Perspectives Old and New, 277 n.38). Wisdom is 
able to assume a definition of δίκαιος in antithesis to both ἁμαρτωλός and ἀσεβής that is reflected in Romans 5.6-
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eschatological identification of the righteous corresponds to their law-defined righteousness. In 
this sense, ‘justification by works of law’ (Rom 3.20) and the functionally equivalent phrase 
‘the righteousness of the law’ (Rom 10.5; Phil 3.9) are uniquely Pauline ways of articulating the 
common soteriological paradigm encapsulated in Philo’s insistence that δικαιοσύνη operates 
κατ’ ἀξίαν. Thus from Wisdom’s perspective (and in Wisdom’s theological practice; e.g. 3.1, 5; 
10.4-14), Paul’s use of δίκαιος/δικαιόω names the basis on which the objects of God’s 
justification are ἄξιος relative to the divine verdict. It is the righteous who are ‘fit’ to be 
declared righteous.  
But ‘no one is righteous’ (οὐκ ἔστιν δίκαιος, Rom 3.10). This does not disqualify the 
principle of correspondence, but it does radically and dangerously destabilise it.  If ‘doing the 
law’ names the human action that constitutes one’s fittingness for the divine act of 
justification, then the claim that no one is righteous, implying as it does that no one is a ‘doer 
of the law’, is necessarily a claim about the universal unfittingness of humanity vis-à-vis divine 
saving action. In other words, to say no one is righteous is to say that no one corresponds to the 
divine word of justification (analytic as it appears to be in Romans 2.13). It is this implied 
consequence that Paul makes his explicit conclusion in Romans 3.20: ἐξ ἔργων νόμου οὐ 
δικαιωθήσεται piᾶσα σὰρξ ἐνώpiιον αὐτοῦ. Chris VanLandingham rightly notes that in both 
Romans 2.13 and 3.20 the verb δικαιόω ‘accurately describes the moral state of the subject(s)’, 
but in 3.20 this analytical accuracy is maintained by the negation of the verb.26 It is the ‘doers 
of the law’ who are righteous before God (piαρὰ [τῷ] θεῷ, 2.13), but since no one is righteous on 
this basis (3.10), no one will be justified before God (ἐνώpiιον αὐτοῦ, 3.20). From all that Paul 
has said since Romans 1.18, and from all that Wisdom says, this universal lack of positive 
correspondence can only mean the universal presence of negative correspondence. For all its 
diversity of expression, correspondence is the conditio sine qua non of this (theo)logical 
paradigm. Thus, as Wisdom might say, if none are righteous then all are properly objects of the 
Red Sea of divine judgment (Wis. 10.19). Similarly, Paul’s exclusion of the righteous erases the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
8. The equation of verb and adjective in Romans 2.13 is understandable in these terms and thus it is the breaking 
of the link between ‘doing the law’ and ‘being righteous’ in Romans 3.20 that occasions Paul’s paradoxical use of 
the verb in Romans 3.24, etc.  
26 C. VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification in Early Judaism and the Apostle Paul (Peabody: Hendrickson, 
2006), 226. His attempt to reconcile these two verses by suggesting that 2.13 refers to believing Gentiles whereas 
3.20 refers to unbelieving Jews fails to account for the dynamic of Romans 3.19: the law speaks to Jews so that the 
entire world (piᾶς ὁ κόσμος) might be accountable to God.  
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possibility of the positive soteriological outcomes described in Romans 2.7, 10 and 13. If no one 
will be justified then all will be condemned (cf. Rom 2.8, 9; 3.20). For Wisdom this is the end. For 
Paul this is the new beginning.   
    
Another Kind of Righteousness: Romans 3.21-26 
 ‘How’, Nietzsche parodies the metaphysicians, ‘could something originate in its 
antithesis? Truth in error, for example…. Such origination is impossible’.27 Romans 3.9-20 
establishes the universality of the antithesis of righteousness: ‘all are under sin’ (3.9), ‘no one is 
righteous’ (3.10), ‘no one does the good’ (3.12), ‘the entire cosmos is answerable to God’ (3.19), 
‘by works of law no flesh will be justified before God’ (3.20).28 To adapt Nietzsche’s question, 
how can righteousness originate in unrighteousness? Such origination is impossible. ‘But now’, 
out of its antithesis, ‘the righteousness of God is revealed’. Whether or not this announcement 
of ‘the impossible possibility’29 promises ‘a revaluation of all antique values’30 is beyond the 
scope of this thesis; but it will be argued that from Wisdom’s perspective this Pauline 
declaration does require a revaluation of the antique value of righteousness. 
 The preceding section established two relevant points for the interpretation of Romans 
3.21-26: 1) δικαιοσύνη is conceptually determined by correspondence; 2) Paul locates this 
required correspondence principally in the Jewish law. These mutually-interpreting 
propositions condition the reader of Romans to expect a revelation of righteousness according 
to the law or, in Pauline terms, ἐξ ἔργων νόμου.31 As noted above, however, it is precisely this 
                                                        
27 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 33.  
28 F. Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles: Beyond the New Perspective (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 219-
31 argues, rightly in my opinion, that the conclusion of 3.19-20, following on as it does from the catena of 3.10-18, 
is the voice of the law speaking through its canonical interpreters, announcing the failure of its own project and 
thereby testifying to the righteousness apart from law.  
29 K. Barth, The Epistle to the Romans (trans. E.C. Hoskyns; Oxford: OUP, 1933), 92.  
30 Nietzche, Beyond Good and Evil, 75.  
31 Whether ἔργα νόμου refers generally to the performance of the law (e.g. D.J. Moo, The Epistle to the 
Romans [NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996], 209) or more narrowly to those elements of the Mosaic code 
which functionally separate Jew and non-Jew (e.g. J.D.G. Dunn, ‘The New Perspective on Paul’ BJRL 65 [1983]: 95-
122) is relatively inconsequential for the present argument. Both interpretations preserve the requisite element 
of correspondence in that both law-doing and social-definition via the law provide a criterion of law-defined fit 
for the objects of divine saving action. That being said, the conceptual and lexical links between Romans 2.13 and 
3.20, together with the grounds on which justification by works of law is ruled out (i.e. the universality of sin; 
Rom 3.9-19) and the action verbs regularly associated with νόμος (e.g. piοιέω, piράσσω, φυλάσσω, τελέω) suggests 
that general law-observance is indicated. This interpretation appears to be confirmed by Paul’s generalization of 
this terminology in Romans 4.2-6; 9.11-12, 32; 11.5-6 and the early interpretations of this Pauline language in 
James 2.14-26, Ephesians 2.8-9, 1 Timothy 1.9 and Titus 3.5.  
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possibility that Romans 3.20 declares impossible: ἐξ ἔργων νόμου οὐ δικαιωθήσεται piᾶσα σάρξ. 
The impossibility of this possibility is the context out of which Paul proclaims the possibility of 
the impossible: νυνὶ δὲ χωρὶς νόμου δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ piεφανέρωται (Rom 3.21). A revelation of 
righteousness ‘apart from law’, in a context in which the law names the required criterion of 
fit, is necessarily a revelation of righteousness ‘without correspondence’. It is, to adapt Philo’s 
phrase, the arrival of a divine δικαιοσύνη that does not work κατ’ ἀξίαν, but, strangely, 
operates χωρὶς ἀξίας (to adapt a Pauline phrase). Wisdom’s reply is not hard to imagine: how is 
a revelation of righteousness devoid of the correspondence that determines the concept 
anything other than an irrational instance of calling injustice justice? This question provides 
the heuristic context for the dialogical exegesis of Romans 3.21-26 that follows.32  
 
The Justification of God and the Godless 
 Luther’s autobiographical reminiscence describes the exegetical experience of 
countless readers of Romans: ‘I had been captivated with a remarkable ardour for 
understanding Paul in the epistle to the Romans…. but a single saying in chapter one 
[δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ]…stood in my way’.33 When the phrase δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ first appears in 
Romans (1.17), Paul’s syntax (γάρ) suggests that his reference to ‘the righteousness of God’ is 
explanatory, but the spilt ink and blood in which the Wirkungsgeschichte of this Pauline concept 
is written tells a different story: this part of Paul is ‘hard to understand’ (2 Pet 3.16). But 
Luther’s question – what does δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ mean? – would not be Wisdom’s first question 
(though it might be its last; see below). Wisdom’s definition of δικαιοσύνη is pre-determined by 
the protological order. The meaning of divine δικαιοσύνη is therefore a given: God’s 
righteousness is the consistent correspondence between the form and objects of his actions. 
This pre-historical definition, however, necessarily comes to historical expression. As argued 
above (chapter four), the Exodus event is for Wisdom the principal exemplification of divine 
justice, not because it reveals righteousness de novo, but because it instantiates the 
                                                        
32 Markus Bockmuehl’s lament about ‘the interpretative jungle’ of Mark 12.1-9 applies at least as well to 
Romans 3.21-26: ‘critical problems abound, and the academic bibliography on [Romans 3.21-26] is vastly 
overpopulated even by the standards of the anthill known as New Testament studies’ (Seeing the Word: Refocusing 
New Testament Study [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006], 215). For our purposes, the proposed topics of 
conversation (i.e. justice and grace) provide a measure of interpretative focus by allowing the dialogue, rather 
than the debate(s) du jour, to determine the relevance of the numerous cruces interpretum.   
33 M. Luther, Preface to the Complete Edition of Luther’s Latin Writings, in LW 34 (ed. L.W. Spitz; Philadelphia: 
Muhlenberg, 1960), 336-37.  
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correspondence between divine act and human subject that defines δικαιοσύνη.34 It is thus the 
location, rather than the definition, of δικαιοσύνη that would shape Wisdom’s question: where is 
the righteousness of God revealed? 
 Working from this question, a two-word Pauline phrase again presents itself. Instead of 
beginning with δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, this section will start with ἐν αὐτῷ (Rom 1.17). The argument 
will unfold in three stages. First, filling in the gospel content of ἐν αὐτῷ, the Pauline location 
of the revelation of divine righteousness will be considered: δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is revealed in the 
divine act that is the single and saving history of the crucified and risen Christ. Second, the 
telos of this event will be explored as it comes to expression in Romans 3.25-26: the Christ-
event, in addition to disclosing (Rom 1.17; 3.21), also demonstrates and establishes – and thus 
(re)defines – the righteousness of God. Finally, taking our cue from the καί that links the 
justification of God and the justification of the ungodly (3.26b), the meaning of δικαιοσύνη 
θεοῦ in Romans 3.21-22 will be addressed: the righteousness of God enacted in the gospel event 
includes and grounds the disjunctive declaration that sinners who are ἐκ piίστεως Ἰησοῦ are 
righteous before God.35 Thus, in contrast to Wisdom’s reading of the Exodus as an 
exemplification of a pre-defined, because pre-creational, justice, Paul ‘reads’ the Christ-event 
as a genuine revelation and thus radically rethinks and redefines divine righteousness in 
consequence of and in connection with the ‘redemption that is in Christ Jesus’ (3.24). 
   
(1) The righteousness of God is revealed in the crucified and risen Christ.  
 Approaching Romans from Wisdom invites a methodology that works from the Pauline 
location of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ to its Pauline definition. This interpretative movement from 
‘where’ to ‘what’ is not especially innovative. Beginning with the pioneering work of Cremer, a 
religionsgeschichtliche method (working from antecedents to contextual meaning) has 
underwritten the hermeneutical assumption that defining δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ in Paul requires 
finding δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ outside of and before Paul.36 In other words (and in contrast to the 
                                                        
34 For Wisdom’s rewriting of Genesis and Numbers as, respectively, anticipations and recapitulations of 
the Exodus logic see chapter four.  
35 This exegetical strategy of working back to δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is similar to Campbell, The Deliverance of 
God, 683.  
36 H. Cremer, Die paulinische Rechtfertigungslehre im Zusammenhange ihrer geschichtlichen Voraussetzungen 
(Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1899). For recent examples of this methodological tendency see M.F. Bird, The Saving 
Righteousness of God: Studies on Paul, Justification and the New Perspective (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2006), 15; G. 
Turner, ‘The Righteousness of God in Psalms and Romans’, SJT 63.3 (2010): 285-301 and N.T. Wright, ‘The Book of 
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present search for the Pauline location of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ), the ‘where’ question posed by the 
method especially associated with Ernst Käsemann’s 1961 address to the Oxford Congress37 
concerns the pre-Pauline location of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ. The methodologically representative 
thesis of Cremer and Käsemann is that the meaning of Paul’s ‘righteousness of God’ phrases is 
locatable within the religious context and theological lexicon of the Old Testament and Early 
Judaism. In Käsemann’s programmatic words, ‘I begin my own attempt to interpret the facts by 
stating categorically that the expression’, and Stuhlmacher would add ‘the concept’,38 
‘δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ was not invented by Paul’.39 Thus, in a manner somewhat analogous to 
Wisdom’s assumption that God’s righteousness is built into the order and logic of creation and 
therefore pre-defined, Cremer and his interpretative heirs argue that δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, 
because it pre-dates Paul, has a pre-defined trajectory of use into which Paul’s usage can be 
slotted and within which Paul’s usage can be interpreted. To quote Käsemann again, 
δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is a ‘formulation which Paul has taken over’40 –  a formulation which, as 
Brauch summarises the then ‘recent German discussion’, ‘Paul uses…for a new interpretation 
of the Christian salvation-event’.41 In other words, from where Paul stands in the history of his 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Romans’, in NIB X (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2002), 403. What is notable is not that these scholars agree on what 
‘the righteousness of God means’ – Wright, for example, explicitly argues for a covenantal orientation against 
Käsemann’s creational focus –, but that the method of determining this definition by working to Paul from lexical 
and conceptual antecedents is broadly consensual.   
37 E. Käsemann, ‘“The Righteousness of God” in Paul’, in New Testament Questions Today (trans. W.J. 
Montague; London: SCM, 1969), 168-82. Käsemann’s lecture-turned-essay crystalized the earlier work of A. Oepke 
(‘∆ικαιοσύνη Θεοῡ bei Paulus, TLZ 78 [1953]: cols. 257-63) and was subsequently expanded and defended by C. 
Müller, Gottes Gerichtigkeit und Gottes Volk (FRLANT 86; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964); K. Kertelge, 
‘Rechtfertigung’ bei Paulus (Münster: Aschendorff, 1967); P. Stuhlmacher, Gerechtigkeit Gottes bei Paulus (FRLANT 87; 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965).    
38 Cf. P. Stuhlmacher, Reconciliation, Law and Righteousness: Essays in Biblical Theology (trans. E. Kalin; 
Philadephia: Fortress, 1986), 82. 
39 Käsemann, ‘“The Righteousness of God”’, 172. The formula stems from Deuteronomy 33.21 and, on the 
evidence of T. Dan 6.10 and 1QS 10.25; 11.12, is said to be a staple of Jewish apocalyptic (Käsemann, Romans, 30). As 
Campbell notes, attempts ‘to broaden the lexical base for Käsemann’s analysis’ and thereby expand the textual 
base for his thesis have been ‘only partially successful’ (The Rhetoric of Righteousness in Romans 3.21-26 [JSNTSup.; 
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992], 146).   
40 Käsemann, ‘“The Righteousness of God”’, 173.  
41 M.T. Brauch, ‘Perspectives on “God’s Righteousness” in Recent German Discussion”, in E.P. Sanders, 
Paul and Palestinian Judaism (Minneapolis, Fortess, 1977), 534. See also, Turner, ‘The Righteousness of God’, 285: ‘Far 
from rejecting [his] Old Testament inheritance, Paul takes over this doctrine of “righteousness through 
faithfulness” as it stands in the Psalms’. 
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religion, δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is a given – a ‘feste Formel’42 – which Paul employs to interpret God’s 
act in Jesus. 
Reading Romans in conversation with Wisdom, however, exposes a kind of double-irony 
embedded in the approach of Käsemann and his hermeneutical kin. First, working from Paul’s 
textual tradition to the Pauline texts supposes that Paul, like Wisdom, works with and from an 
antecedently defined conception of divine righteousness. This tendency is especially apparent 
in Stuhlmacher where the interpretation of ‘the expression “God’s righteousness”…in Paul’s 
letters’ is essentially reduced to determining what ‘“God’s righteousness” in the Old Testament 
and early Judaism means’.43 But Paul’s texts stubbornly refuse explanation in these terms. As 
Romans 9.30-10.4 demonstrates, Paul’s scriptural and theological heritage names δικαιοσύνη 
and incites Israel to pursue it (Rom 9.31), but, for Paul, the content of God’s righteousness 
cannot be abstracted from its revelation in Christ (Rom 1.17; 3.21-26; 10.4). In other words, 
although Paul, in using the expression δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, is speaking the language of 
Deuteronomy, David, Deutero-Isaiah and Daniel,44 it is, as Paul interprets the crisis of his 
present, precisely the readers of these scriptural texts who are ‘ignorant of the righteousness 
of God’ (ἀγνοοῦντες τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην, Rom 10.3; cf. Phil 3.4-9). Thus, while ‘the law 
and prophets witness to the righteousness of God’, it is not in the law and the prophets that 
the righteousness of God is revealed. Rather, ‘the righteousness of God is revealed in the 
gospel’ (Rom 1.17).45 Consequently, and here we arrive at our second irony, to locate the 
meaning of Paul’s ‘righteousness of God’ phrases in their scriptural and intertestamental 
                                                        
42 E. Käsemann, ‘Gottesgerechtigkeit bei Paulus’, ZThK 58 (1961): 367-78. The claim of Oepke, Käsemann 
and Stuhlmacher that δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is a terminus technicus is seriously problematised by the limited number of 
Old Testament and Early Jewish texts that actually contain the formula (Deut 33.21; T. Dan 6.10; 1QS 10.25, 11.12; 
1QM 4.6 and less certainly 1 En. 71.14) and the linguistic flexibility with which Paul expresses the correlation of 
δικαιοσύνη and θεός (Rom 1.17; 3.5, 21, 22, 25, 26; 10.3; 2 Cor 5.21; Phil 3.9; see especially E. Güttgemanns, ‘ 
“Gottesgerechtigkeit” und strukturale Semantik: Linguistische Analyse zu δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ’, Studia linguistica 
Neotestamentica, BEvTh 60 [Munich, 1971], 5-98).    
43 P. Stuhlmacher, Revisiting Paul’s Doctrine of Justification: A Challenge to the New Perspective (trans. D.P. 
Bailey; Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2001), 18-19.  
44 Richard Hays is probably correct to detect an echo of Psalm 97.2 (LXX) in Romans 1.16-17 (Echoes of 
Scripture in the Letters of Paul [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989], 36), but this linguistic allusion should not 
be allowed to determine Paul’s theological semantics in abstraction from his overt scriptural citation (Hab 2.4 in 
Rom 1.17b; so rightly Watson, Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith, 47-53) and his ‘localizing’ reference to the 
‘righteousness of God’ that is revealed ‘in the gospel’ (cf. M.A. Seifrid, Christ, Our Righteousness: Paul’s Theology of 
Justification [NSBT 9; Leicester: Apollos, 2000], 46).   
45 For a critique of defining δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ on the basis of the concept’s ‘prehistory’ see H. Conzelmann, 
‘Current Problems in Pauline Research’, Int 22 (1968): 170-86 (80); cf. S.K. Williams, ‘The “Righteousness of God” in 
Romans’, JBL 99 (1980): 241-90 (244).   
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antecedents is to find δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ in a place Paul never put it. For Paul, ‘the righteousness 
of God’ is not a conceptual a priori that enables him to gauge the soteriological significance of 
Jesus’ history. Rather, ‘the righteousness of God’ is that which ‘has been made visible’ 
(φανερόω) in the event Paul calls ‘the redemption that is in Christ Jesus’ (Rom 3.21a, 24) and 
‘continues to be unveiled’ (ἀpiοκαλύpiτω) in the revelatory proclamation of the same (Rom 
1.16-17).46 In the (all but forgotten) words of the first edition of Barth’s Römerbrief, ‘Die 
Wirklichkeit der Gerechtigkeit Gottes im Christus ist das Neue im Evangelium’.47  
Thus, to suggest that Paul theologises from an inherited notion of divine righteousness 
to an interpretation of the Christ-event is to read Paul backwards. Paul does not use 
δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ to make sense of what happens in Jesus; for Paul, δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ just is what 
happens in Jesus (cf. 1 Cor 1.30). As Campbell writes, ‘what Christ has achieved and therefore 
disclosed...must be the content of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ’.48 In linguistic terms, while the semiotics of 
divine righteousness are of Old Testament and early Jewish stock, Jesus, in his saving 
singularity, is the semantics of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ.49 The interpretative movement, then, is not 
from a pre-existent conceptuality to an articulation of the gospel in its pre-defined terms. 
Rather, Paul deduces a definition of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ from its revelation in the gospel. As 
Luther might say, ‘omnia vocabula in Christo novam significationem accipere’.50 
 Contained within this methodological contrast is a formal answer to Wisdom’s question 
about the specifically Pauline location of ‘the righteousness of God’: Paul does not locate 
δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ in the preexisting theological grammar of his textual tradition; for Paul, ‘the 
righteousness of God is revealed in the gospel’ (Rom 1.17).  Formal answers, however, beg 
                                                        
46 J.M.G. Barclay, ‘Paul’s Story: Theology as Testimony’, in Narrative Dynamics in Paul: A Critical Assessment 
(ed. B.W. Longenecker; Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002), 146 captures the dynamic relationship 
between the past and present of the Christ-event: ‘Although the crucifixion of Christ was indeed an event in 
history, it punctures other times and other stories not just as a past event recalled but as a present event….In the 
preaching of the gospel, time becomes, as it were, concertinaed, and the past becomes existentially present’. It is 
this interplay between the event’s ‘own time’ and its persistent ‘timeliness’ that Jüngel attempts to express with 
the (somewhat infelicitous) definition of the gospel as the ‘eschatological Time-Word of God’ (Justification, 68).  
47 K. Barth, Der Römerbrief (Erste Fassung) 1919 (Gesamtausgabe II: Akademische Werke; edited by Hermann 
Schmidt; Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1985), 23.  
48 Campbell, The Deliverance of God, 683.  
49 This of course implies that there is something about these semiotics that makes them apropos as the 
lexical articulation of the new semantics of the Christ-event (see below). In this sense, tracing linguistic 
trajectories is useful so long as the data such an investigation yields are utilised within a framework that imagines 
the possibility that experience and/or event can generate a word-usage that breaks out of, though does not 
therefore necessarily lose all contact with, an expression’s previous employment (cf. Seifrid, ‘Paul’s Use of 
Righteousness Language’, 39-40, 58).   
50 M. Luther, Disputatio de divinitate et humanitate Christi (1540; WA 39/II, 94, 17f.).  
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material questions. More concretely, the formal assertion that ‘the righteousness of God is 
revealed in the gospel’ raises a material question about the content of the Pauline gospel. 
According to the opening lines of Romans, ‘God’s son [Jesus Christ]’51 is the subject matter of 
‘God’s gospel’ (εὐαγγέλιον θεοῦ… piερὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, 1.1, 3).52 However, as the ‘complex 
double statement’53 separating τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ and Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ indicates, the name Jesus 
does not signal an abstract state of being. Rather, as Barth suggests, ‘the name Jesus defines an 
historical occurrence’.54 Between Jesus’ identity as God’s son (1.3) and risen Lord (1.4) stands a 
comprehensive and constitutive history: the one who is Jesus Christ is ‘the one who was born of 
the seed of David’ and ‘the one who was designated Son of God by resurrection’ (1.3-4).55 The 
‘gospel concerning God’s son’ is thus identical to this son’s history. As Ferdinand Hahn puts it, 
‘Das Evangelium hat einen konkreten Inhalt: Es ist die heilstiftende Botschaft vom Handeln 
Gottes in der Geschichte Jesu Christi’.56 In Pauline terms, the εὐαγγέλιον θεοῦ… piερὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ 
αὐτοῦ (Rom 1.1, 3) is the εὐαγγέλιον ὃ εὐηγγελισάμην of 1 Cor 15.1-4: Χριστὸς ἀpiέθανεν…καὶ 
ἐγήγερται.    
For Paul, then, the events of Jesus’ life – especially the events of the cross and 
resurrection - are not just, or even primarily, sequential saving events on the horizontal stage 
of human history; they are christological predicates. Just as the participial phrases that 
separate τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ and Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ suggest that, as Watson remarks, ‘Jesus is his own 
                                                        
51 Cranfield, Romans, 1.65 rightly notes that Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ is in apposition to τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ.   
52 Richard Hays (Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989], 85) 
suggests taking piερὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ with γραφαῖς ἁγίαις rather than εὐαγγέλιον θεοῦ, but the christological focus 
of 1.3-4 indicates that piερὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ identifies the subject matter of the gospel (so most commentators, e.g. 
Calvin, Cranfield, Dunn, Käsemann). However, as J.R. Daniel Kirk notes (Unlocking Romans: Resurrection and the 
Justification of God [Grand Rapids: Eerdmanns, 2008], 44-45 n.56), Gal 3.1-18 and especially 1 Corinthians 15.1-4 
demonstrate the interdependence of scripture and gospel in Pauline theology: the gospel of the crucified and 
resurrected Son of God accords with and is pre-promised in Israel’s scriptures (cf. Wilckens, Römer, 1.63-64).   
53 Wright, ‘Romans’, 416.  
54 Barth, Romans, 29.  
55 That Jesus’ identity as God’s Son (τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, 1.3) both pre-exists and is established by his history 
(τοῦ ὁρισθέντος υἱοῦ θεοῦ, 1.4) resists the common charge of adoptionism (pace Käsemann, Romans, 13) and 
reflects an ontology in which being and becoming are dynamically rather than diametrically related. As is 
regularly noted, the transition from ‘God’s Son’ to ‘God’s Son in power’ indicated by ὁρίζω is probably best 
understood in terms of messianic eschatology, drawing both on enthronement theology (L.W. Hurtado, Lord Jesus 
Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003], 104) and resurrection theodicy (i.e. 
this is a prolepsis of the expected ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν; Wilckens Römer, 1.65).    
56 F. Hahn, Theologie des Neuen Testament (2 Vols.; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 1.202.  
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life-story; his identity is not detachable from his history’,57 Paul’s use of relative clauses (Rom 
4.25) and substantival participles (Rom 8.34) indicate that the ‘who’ of Jesus’ identity cannot be 
abstracted from the ‘what’ of Good Friday and Easter. In Paul’s words, Jesus is ‘the one who was 
handed over...and was raised’ (ὃς piαρεδόθη…καὶ ἠγέρθη, Rom 4.25); or as Romans 8.34 has it, 
Jesus is ‘he who died’ and ‘he who was raised’ (Χριστὸς [Ἰησοῦς] ὁ ἀpiοθανών, μᾶλλον δὲ 
ἐγερθείς; cf. 2 Cor 5.15; 13.4).  In this sense, the christological content of the gospel is 
inseparable and finally identical with the evangelical-event that is the cross and resurrection. 
Jesus is the crucified and risen one and therefore the gospel about God’s son is the gospel of 
Golgotha and the empty grave. To gloss Romans 1.17 in these terms, the righteousness of God 
is revealed in the event of the crucified and risen Christ.  
As Wisdom would read that final clause, it is the ‘and’ that joins the cross and 
resurrection that would render the Pauline claim to revealed righteousness nonsensical. The 
story of the persecuted and vindicated righteous person (Wis. 2-5) is an ancient parable of 
Badiou’s recent axiom: ‘the event is not death; it is resurrection [immortality]’.58 Within 
Wisdom’s theodicy, the death of the righteous, rather than revealing the righteousness of God, 
contradicts the principle of correspondence and thus implicitly generates a (Pauline) question: 
Is there injustice with God? As argued in chapter two, Wisdom’s μὴ γένοιτο takes the form of 
the promise of immortality (Wis. 3.4), but, as indicated above, this is more than an 
eschatological trumping of death; it is the definitive reestablishment of the correspondence 
between human subject and divine action. The death of the righteous is an historical 
manifestation of injustice because it implies an incongruity between the righteousness of the 
victim and the inactivity of God: εἰ ἐστιν ὁ δίκαιος υἱὸς θεοῦ, ἀντιλήμψεται αὐτοῦ (2.18; cf. 
2.20). Immortality is thus an expression of divine justice because it replaces the disjunction 
between righteousness and death with the congruent conjunction of δικαιοσύνη and ἀθάνατος 
(1.15: δικαιοσύνη ἀθάνατός ἐστιν). 
                                                        
57 F. Watson, ‘The Quest for the Real Jesus’, in The Cambridge Companion to Jesus (ed. M. Bockmuehl, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 166. Cf. H. Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ: The Hermeneutical Bases of 
Dogmatic Theology (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 1997), 186.  
58 Badiou, Saint Paul, 66. Badiou’s concern is to avoid the Hegelian tendency to construe the cross and 
resurrection dialectically and, less overtly, to guard against Nietzsche’s charge of a Pauline fascination with 
suffering and death. However, as Stephen Chester argues, Badiou’s presentation of the cross as a non-evental 
‘condition of immanence’ blunts his own reading because it denies the Pauline basis for the ‘exclusion of all 
existing discourses of truth’: it is Christ crucified that is a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles’ 
(‘Who Is Freedom For? Martin Luther and Alain Badiou on Paul and Politics’, in Paul, Grace and Freedom: Essays in 
Honour of John K. Riches [London: T&T Clark, 2009], 109-10).   
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Read from this perspective, Paul’s location of the revelation of divine righteousness in 
the death and resurrection of ‘the one who knew no sin’ (2 Cor 5.21) appears, to give it a 
Pauline twist, both scandalous and foolish. The cross – both in terms of its content (the death 
of the righteous) and, to anticipate our exegesis below, its effects (the justification of ungodly) 
– is a contradiction. This means, for Wisdom, the event of the cross is necessarily in conflict 
with the principle of correspondence which, by pre-definition, determines the meaning of 
δικαιοσύνη. And, in the Rock-Paper-Scissors of Wisdom’s theology, ‘pre’ beats ‘but now’. For 
Paul, by contrast, ‘but now’ signals a semantic revolution. Whereas Wisdom would know the 
cross to be an instance of injustice because, as a contradiction, it conflicts with the pre-
definition of righteousness as correspondence, Paul deduces the definition of δικαιοσύνη from 
the divine act that manifests (φανερόω, Rom 3.21a),59 demonstrates (ἔνδειξις, 3.25, 26a) and 
establishes (εἰς τὸ εἶναι, 3.26b) the righteousness of God. For this reason, the ‘and’ that joins 
cross and resurrection is not, as a christological reading of Wisdom 2-5 might suggest,60 a 
Badiou-like concession that death is the requisite condition – the ‘mortal site’ – for the event 
Paul calls Resurrection.61 The cross, rather, as the explicit naming of the divine subject in 
Romans 3.25 and the implied subject of the passive verbs and participles of Romans 4.25 and 
8.34 suggest, is, with the resurrection, the divine act that constitutes the evangelical identity of 
Jesus. In Bultmann’s precise formulation, ‘Jesus Christ the Crucified and Risen One’ is ‘God’s 
eschatological act’.62  
 Romans 3.21-26, at least in part, is Paul’s attempt to define ‘the righteousness of God’ by 
describing the act of God in Christ that reveals, shows and constitutes it. It is God who ‘put 
Jesus forward as a ἱλαστήριον’ and thus, for Paul, the cross is a divine action and as such an 
instance of divine self-disclosure. The exegetical implication, as Jüngel rightly notes, is that we 
must let Paul ‘decide on what a righteous God is like, not on the basis of the normal use of 
                                                        
59 The perfect tense of the verb φανερόω, as Jewett following Bockmuehl (‘Das Verb φανερόω im Neuen 
Testament: Versuch einer Neuauswertung’, BZ 32 [1988]: 87-99), argues, ‘points to the historical salvation event in 
Jesus Christ’ (R. Jewett, Romans [Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007], 273 n.37.    
60 See e.g. Barnabas 6.7, Justin Martyr (Dial. 17), Augustine (Civ. Dei 17.20.1).  
61 Badiou, Saint Paul, 68-73.  
62 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, 1.3. Barth, similarly, refers to the gospel as ‘God’s act fulfilled 
in him for us’ (CD IV/1, 137). Barth’s addition of ‘for us’ picks up the pro nobis orientation of, for example, Romans 
4.25 and 1 Corinthians 15.3-4. Jesus’ identification with his saving history ‘for us’ problemitises Wright’s claim 
that the gospel is ‘Jesus Christ is Lord’ and thus not ‘you can be saved’ (‘New Perspectives on Paul’, in Justification 
in Perspective: Historical Developments and Contemporary Challenges [ed. B.L. McCormack; Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2006], 249). For Paul, Jesus just is ‘the righteousness of God for us’ (1 Cor 1.30).  
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concepts, but only on the basis’ of the event that ‘justifies [God and] the ungodly’.63 This means 
that an exegetical definition of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ in Paul will be deductive and descriptive in 
form; it will, with Paul, define ‘the righteousness of God’ from (deductive) and as (descriptive), 
to anticipate our argument, God’s justifying act of judgment in Christ.  
 
(2) The telos of the Christ-event is the demonstration and establishment of God’s righteousness. 
 ‘The righteousness of God’ is revealed in the divine act that is the singular and saving 
history of the crucified and risen Christ. Thus far our argument. In Romans 3.24-26, however, 
the divine act that is ‘the redemption that is in Christ Jesus’ and in which the righteousness of 
God is revealed does not just contain the cross; it centres on it. As Paul’s thrice repeated 
purpose clause indicates, the divine act of putting Jesus forward as a ἱλαστήριον is teleological: 
ὃν piροέθετο ὁ θεὸς ἱλαστήριον…εἰς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ…piρὸς τὴν ἔνδειξιν τῆς 
δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ…εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν δίκαιον (Rom 3.25-26). In other words, within the 
singular yet complex history of Jesus, the cross is the decisive and defining disclosure of 
δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ.64 Thus, to take up Jüngel’s exegetical invitation to allow Paul to ‘decide on 
what a righteous God is like…on the basis’ of the event that ‘justifies [God and] the ungodly’ is 
necessarily to define divine righteousness by describing the death of Jesus in which that 
righteousness is demonstrated (ἔνδειξις, 3.25, 26a) and established (εἰς τὸ εἶναι, 3.26b).  
Before attempting this descriptive and deductive act of interpretation, however, it is 
worth recalling, as emphasised above, that Wisdom would hear this Pauline assertion as a 
confused claim that the definitive demonstration of divine justice is located in the event, 
which according to Wisdom 2.17-20, is the acme of injustice. How, Wisdom would no doubt ask, 
can the death of ‘the one who knew no sin’ (2 Cor 5.21) be anything other than, to borrow 
Kant’s famous characterisation of the cross, a ‘moral outrage’65 – a bizarre and threatening 
inversion of the logic and goodness of the created order? To answer this question in Pauline 
                                                        
63 Jüngel, Justification, 78. Cf. Seifrid, ‘Paul’s Use of Righteousness Language’, 59: ‘The Christ-event itself 
provides the final definition of the language’.    
64 In this sense, the kerygmatic act of announcing the gospel is the ever present apocalypse of divine 
righteousness (Rom 1.17) precisely as ‘the word of the cross’ (1 Cor 1.18). Thus, while Robert Jenson is right to 
challenge Schleiermacher’s claim that the resurrection ‘does not belong to foundational elements of faith in 
Christ’ (see F. Schleiermacher, Der Christliche Glaube, 99.2), he overstates his correction by saying ‘the Crucifixion is 
God’s salvific action just in that God overcomes it by the Resurrection’ (Systematic Theology: Volume I [Oxford: OUP, 
1997], 182).  
65 I. Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), 164.  
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terms is to exegete Romans 3.25-26.66 My thesis can be summarised as follows: Romans 3.25-26, 
interprets the cross as the actualisation of the eschatological judgment described in Romans 
2.4-10; but, whereas Romans 2.4-10 portrays a future judgment in accordance with human 
worth, Romans 3.25-26 announces the enactment of that future judgment in the ‘now’ of Jesus’ 
death. 
 As discussed more fully above (and in chapter six), Romans 2.4-11 reminds the 
anthropologically deluded judge (2.1-3) that divine patience and kindness intends, as Wisdom 
11.23 agrees, repentance (εἰς μετάνοιαν, 2.4). This suggests, as Romans 2.5 explicitly states, 
that God’s forbearance, because it is telic, is temporary. The present is the period of patience 
(χρηστότης, ἀνοχή, μακροθυμία, 2.4), but this era ends ‘on the day of wrath which is the 
revelation of the righteous-judgment of God’ (ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὀργῆς καὶ ἀpiοκαλύψεως δικαιοκρισίας 
τοῦ θεοῦ, 2.5). The form of this δικαιοκρισία is a future judgment in which one’s fate (ζωή 
αἰώνιος or ὀργὴ καὶ θυμός) corresponds (κατά + accusative) to one’s subjective (τὰ ἔργα) worth 
(ὁ ἐργαζόμενος τὸ ἀγαθόν or ὁ κατεργαζόμενος τὸ κακόν, 2.6-10). At this stage in the rhetorical 
progression of Romans, life and wrath are both imagined as soteriological options in 
accordance with the respective possibilities of human virtue and vice. As the argument 
unfolds, however, it becomes evident that, in terms of the specific criterion of correspondence 
(i.e. doing the law’, 2.13), ‘all are under sin’ (3.9) and thus ‘no one is righteous’ (3.10). 
Correspondingly, God’s righteousness (θεοῦ δικαιοσύνη) takes the form of wrath (ὁ θεὸς ὁ 
ἐpiιφέρων τὴν ὀργήν, 3.5). Thus, when the eschatological judgment is re-described in Romans 
3.19-20 the reality of universal unrighteousness meets the consequence of the principle of 
correspondence: ἐξ ἔργων νόμου οὐ δικαιωθήσεται piᾶσα σὰρξ ἐνώpiιον αὐτοῦ.   
                                                        
66 The various hapax legomena (ἱλαστήριον, piάρεσις, piρογεγονότα ἁμαρτήματα), together with some 
unusual word usage (piροτίθημι, αἷμα) and apparent Pauline interpolations (διὰ [τῆς] piίστεως) are strong 
indicators that Paul here incorporates a pre-Pauline (hymnic) formula. E. Lohse (Märtyrer und Gottesknecht. 
Untersuchungen zur urchristlichen Verkündigungen vom Sühntod Jesu Christi [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1995], 149-150) is probably right to limit the fragment to Romans 3.25-26a (cf. Jewett, Romans, 270-71; E. Lohse, Der 
Brief an die Römer [KEK 4; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003], 131-32). While tradition-historical 
considerations will rarely feature in the following analysis, the forthcoming suggestion that Romans 3.25-26 be 
interpreted in a kind of dialectical dialogue with Romans 2.4-5 suggests that Paul, in employing and adapting this 
traditional formula, did so, not just because of its familiarity or because he wished to correct a Jewish-Christian 
tradition (pace Müller, Gottes Gerichtigkeit, 109-11), but because it suited his rhetorical and theological purposes (cf. 
Wright, ‘Romans’, 417).     
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‘Accordingly’ can encounter ἀδικία only as a word of condemnation. From all Paul has 
said thus far, and from all Wisdom says, there would appear to be nothing more to say. ‘But’ – 
which is quite a different word than ‘correspondingly’ – Paul speaks again: God’s righteousness 
(3.25-26) has met human unrighteousness (3.23), not with the ‘accordingly’ of condemnation, 
but with the ‘nevertheless’ of justification (3.24). In Barth’s memorable and profoundly Pauline 
words, ‘The righteousness of God is that “nevertheless” by which He associates us with Himself 
and declares Himself to be our God.67 This “nevertheless” contradicts every human logical 
“consequently”’. But, we can imagine Wisdom asking Nietzsche’s question, ‘how can something 
originate in its antithesis’? One way to give a Pauline answer to this question is to read Romans 
3.25-26 in light of Romans 2.4-5. 
While commentators occasionally note the lexical link between Romans 2.4 and 3.26a, 
the way in which ἀνοχή functions within parallel plotlines is rarely observed.68 The use of 
ἀνοχή to characterise an era in contrast to a time defined by the disclosure of divine 
righteousness (δικαιοκρισία τοῦ θεοῦ, 2.5; δικαιοσύνη αὐτοῦ, 3.26) signals the telling of a 
similar story. As Bornkamm remarks, in Romans ‘the periods of salvation history’ are ‘placed in 
contrast to each other as the time of patience and the time of the showing of righteousness’.69 
In context, this observation is offered by Bornkamm as an exegesis of Romans 3.25-26, but, as it 
stands, it functions as an equally apt description of the implicit plotline of Romans 2.4-5. As 
discussed above, Romans 2.4 characterises the present as the time of God’s kindness and 
patience and contrasts this with the coming apocalypse of God’s righteous-judgment (2.5). 
Within this narrative sequence, the end of the era of divine patience is the arrival of the 
eschaton in the form of a future judgment (2.5-10).   
 Romans 3.24-26 tells a sequentially similar though drastically different story. Whereas 
Romans 2.4-5 contrasts the present era of patience with the future enactment of justice in the 
form of a judgment κατὰ τὰ ἔργα, Romans 3.25-26 presents the past as the time of the ἀνοχή 
τοῦ θεοῦ, the time in which God delayed the revelation of his righteous-judgment ‘by passing 
over former sins’ (διὰ τὴν piάρεσιν τῶν piρογεγονότων ἁμαρτημάτων)70 and juxtaposes this era, 
                                                        
67 Barth, Romans, 93  
68 Cranfield, Romans, 1.211 is a partial exception; cf. Seifrid, Christ, Our Righteousness, 65. 
69 G. Bornkamm, ‘The Revelation of God’s Wrath’, in Early Christian Experience (New York: Harper and Row, 
1966), 49.  
70 The connection between Romans 2.4-5 and 3.25-26 tells decisively against W. G. Kümmel’s insistence 
that piάρεσις should be translated ‘forgiveness’ rather than ‘passing over’ (Πάρεσις und ἔνδειξις. Ein Beitrag zum 
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not with the future ‘day of wrath’, but with the present demonstration of divine righteousness 
that is the cross. Thus, in narrative terms, God’s act of putting Jesus forward as a ἱλαστήριον is 
functionally parallel to ‘the revelation of God’s righteous-judgment’.71 In other words, – and 
here we arrive at this section’s central thesis – the ‘now’ (ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ) of Jesus’ death is 
the eschatological enactment of the future judgment; it is, in Balthasar’s words, ‘the full 
achievement of the divine judgment’.72 Expressed in terms of the parallel between Romans 2.5 
and 3.25-26a, the present ‘demonstration of divine righteousness’ (ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης 
αὐτοῦ, 3.25, 26a) is the actualisation of the promised ‘revelation of God’s righteous-judgment’ 
(ἀpiοκαλύψεως δικαιοκρισίας τοῦ θεοῦ, 2.5).73 The ‘now’ of the cross is the ‘day of wrath’, and it 
is precisely as such that it is the act/event of God’s righteousness (cf. Rom 3.5).74 According to 
the righteous decree of the righteous God (Rom 2.5; 3.5-6), sinners ‘are worthy of death’: τὸ 
δικαίωμα τοῦ θεοῦ…ὅτι οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα piράσσοντες ἄξιοι θανάτου εἰσίν (Rom 1.32). The death of 
Jesus, at least in the first instance, is the demonstration of divine righteousness because it is 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Verständis der paulinschen Rechtfertigungslehre’, in Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte: Gesammelte Aufsätze. 1933-1964 
[ed. W. G. Kümmel; Marburg: Elwert Verlag, 1965], 260-70).    
71 This implies that the metaphorical function of ἱλαστήριον within Paul’s account of the atonement in 
Romans 3.25-26 operates within the interpretation of the cross as eschatological judgment. It is not just that 
liberative (ἀpiολύτρωσις) and cultic (ἱλαστήριον) metaphors function as independent though complementary 
‘lines of approximation’ (Barth, CD IV/1, 274) to the ultimately non-metaphorical truth of God’s salvific act. 
Rather, in Romans 3.25-26 ἱλαστήριον and ἀpiολύτρωσις are coordinated by, and thus contribute to, an account of 
the cross as the event of divine judgment. For a dogmatic account of the ordering of atonement metaphors in 
similar terms see J. Terry, The Justifying Judgement of God: A Reassessment of the Place of Judgement in the Saving Work of 
Christ (Paternoster Theological Monographs; Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2007).    
72 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale (trans. A. Nichols; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), 119. Cf. P.T. 
Forsyth, The Justification of God (London: Latimer House, 1948), 183; H. Ribberbos, Paul: An Outline of His Theology 
(trans. J.R. de Witt; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), 168.  
73 This does not mean, as Barth mistakenly claims (A Shorter Commentary on Romans [trans. D.H. van 
Daalen; London: SCM Press, 1959], 24-26), that the ‘day’ of Romans 2.5 (cf. 1.18; 2.16) refers to the cross; but it does 
suggest, however paradoxically, that the future judgment referred to in 2.5-10 occurs on the cross (cf. Seifrid, 
Christ, Our Righteousness, 65-66). Thus, while Paul continues to affirm the futurity of judgment (Rom 14.10-12; 1 Cor 
3.12-15; 4.4-5; 2 Cor 5.10), his consideration of its soteriological shape in Romans 8.31-34 is determined by God’s 
prior and ongoing act in his Son. The relationship between present and future justification is thus exactly the 
reverse of what Wright suggests: present justification is not an accurate ‘anticipation of the future verdict’ 
(Wright, ‘The New Perspective on Paul’, 260); the future word of justification is an echo and effect of the justifying 
judgment enacted in the cross (cf. n.87).   
74 This suggests that ἱλαστήριον should be interpreted as a metaphorical expression of the cross as 
judgment. While this would tend to support a propitiatory reading, ‘propitiation’ remains a potentially misleading 
translation: 1) Jesus does not act to appease God’s wrath; rather God acts in Jesus to savingly resolve his 
contention with sinful humanity. 2) The language of ‘appeasement’ can distract from the sense in which the cross 
is the enactment of divine wrath operative within the definitive demonstration of divine love (Rom 5.8). ‘Place of 
atonement’ is probably the best we can do as a translation as it contains this propitiatory focus without 
eliminating the expiatory echo in the reference to ‘former sins’ and it captures the reference to the ‘mercy-seat’ 
(Exod 25.17-22; Lev 16.1-34; see D. Bailey, ‘Jesus as the Mercy Seat: The Semantics and Theology of Paul’s use of 
Hilasterion in Romans 3:25’ [PhD diss., University of Cambridge, 1999]).    
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the enactment of this decree.75 As Romans 8.3-4 indicates, for Paul, the cross is the 
condemnation of sin and as such the fulfillment of τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου. Preston Sprinkle 
rightly notes that ‘given the emphasis on divine agency’ in 8.3 and the passive form of piληρόω, 
‘it is unlikely that piληρωθῇ ἐν ἡμῖν refers to the active fulfillment of the law by believers, but 
to the act of God in satisfying the…requirements of the law’.76 What Sprinkle fails to notice, 
however, is that the passive fulfillment of ‘the righteous requirement of the law’ in and 
through the death of Jesus suggests that God’s act of condemning sin in the flesh of his Son 
fulfills the τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου (8.4) as τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ θεοῦ (1.32). In other words, while it 
is right to read the singular form in 8.4 as a reference to ‘sum-total of what the law requires’,77 
the law’s requirement in its confrontation with human sin is οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα piράσσοντες ἄξιοι 
θανάτου εἰσίν (Rom 1.32; cf. Gal 3.10). In this sense, the death of Jesus as the condemnation of 
sin and the judgment of sinners is the revelation of the righteousness of God.78  
 Herein lies Paul’s answer to Wisdom’s question: the cross is the demonstration of divine 
righteousness, not as the salvific antithesis to divine judgment, but as the proleptic occurrence 
of the promised ‘revelation of God’s righteous-judgment’ and thus the enactment of the divine 
decree (Rom 1.32) and the fulfillment of the law’s condemnatory requirement (Rom 8.3-4).   
The death of Jesus, in other words, is not the circumvention of God’s contention with sinful 
humanity (Rom 1.18; 3.9-20); it is the completion of that contention in the eschatological 
judgment that is God’s condemnation of sin in the flesh of his Son.79 In this sense, the cross is 
the ‘correspondingly’ that necessarily links human unrighteousness and divine wrath (Rom 
3.5), but – and here we approach what Jüngel calls ‘the deepest secret of God’s righteousness’80 
– the ‘correspondingly’ of divine judgment contains and effects, not as its counterpart but as 
                                                        
75 Cf. J.A. Linebaugh, ‘Debating Diagonal ∆ικαιοσύνη: The Epistle of Enoch and Paul in Theological 
Conversation’, Early Christianity 1 (2010): 107-128.  
76 P. Sprinkle, Law and Life: The Interpretation of Leviticus 18.5 in Early Judaism and in Paul (WUNT II.241; 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 188.  
77 Sprinkle, Law and Life, 188 n.89; cf. Moo, Romans, 481 n.55.  Others have suggested that the singular form 
anticipates the love-command of 13.8-10 (e.g. A.J. Bandstra, The Law and the Elements of the World: An Exegetical Study 
in Aspects of Paul's Theology [Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1964], 107-08; R.W. Thompson, ‘How Is the Law Fulfilled in Us? An 
Interpretation of Rom. 8.4’, Louvain Studies 11 [1986]: 31-40), but this is questionable considering the absence of the 
love-command from the immediate context, and the passive verb implies a salvation historical rather than ethical 
orientation (so rightly, Sprinkle, Law and Life, 188 n.90; cf. Wright, Romans, 580).  
78 For a recent interpretation of Romans 3.21-26 that reads ‘the righteousness of God’ as both ‘iustitia 
distributiva’ and ‘iustitia salutifera’, see G. Theißen, Erleben und Verhalten der ersten Christen: Eine Psychologie des 
Urchristentums (Munich: Gütersloher, 2007), 315-16.   
79 Seifrid, Christ, Our Righteousness, 66.  
80 Jüngel, Justification, 87.  
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its consequence, the ‘nevertheless’ of justification (Rom 3.24, 26b). It is therefore accurate to 
gloss ‘the righteousness of God’ as iustitia salutifera,81 not because it is opposed to or the 
overcoming of divine judgment, but because in the death of Jesus, as Seifrid comments, ‘the 
contention between the Creator and the fallen creature is decided in God’s favor and yet 
savingly resolved’.82 The condemnation of sin (Rom 8.3) grounds the non-condemnation of the 
sinner (Rom 8.1). In this sense, the Christ-event has a two-part telos: ‘God put Jesus forward as a 
ἱλαστήριον…in order to demonstrate his righteousness’ (Rom 3.25), but this same act 
(piαραδίδωμι) is also διὰ τὰ piαραpiτώματα ἡμῶν (and the inextricably linked raising of the 
crucified is διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν [Rom 4.25; cf. 1 Cor 15.3-5]). The cross, then, is both pro deo 
and pro nobis. In the words of Paul’s final and strongest purpose clause: God put Jesus forward 
as a ἱλαστήριον…εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν δίκαιον καὶ δικαιοῦντα (Rom 3.26b).83 The death of Jesus is 
thus the establishment of God’s justice as the event of divine judgment and the establishment 
of God as the justifier as the event of justification. As Barth puts it, ‘the right of God’ is enacted 
in his judgment and ‘the justification of man takes place in the eventuation of this judgment’.84 
Justification is therefore a consequence of judgment. In other words (and to anticipate our 
next section), the God who judges ungodliness on the cross is, in that way, the God ‘who 
justifies the ungodly’ (Rom 4.5).   
  
 
 
                                                        
81 Cremer, Die paulinische Rechtfertigungslehre, 33.  
82 Seifrid, ‘Paul’s Use of Righteousness Language’, 59. Seifrid goes on to note that while Old Testament and 
early Jewish descriptions of God’s righteousness imagine the enactment of saving righteousness for God’s people 
and condemning righteousness for God’s enemies (e.g. Pss 7.1-17; 89.5-18; Isa 11.3-5), ‘there is no [antecedent] 
definition of “righteousness”…which adequately accounts for the simultaneity of righteous wrath and the gift of 
righteousness of which Paul speaks’ (59). The scholarly tendency to equate righteousness and salvation (see e.g. 
Bird, The Saving Righteousness of God, 14-5; cf. Stuhlmacher, Gottesgerechtigkeit, 98), while correctly emphasising the 
salvific orientation of much biblical and early Jewish usage (e.g. Ps 98.1-3; Isa 46.13; CD 20.20; 1 En. 99.10), is 
reductionistic insofar as it fails to account for the dual possibilities of salvation and condemnation. (It is notable, 
as Seifrid observes, that the LXX never translates ‘קדצ - terms with a word based on the σωτ- root’; ‘Paul’s Use of 
Righteousness Language’, 51-52).       
83 The apparent contradiction in this formulation suggests that Wisdom’s author would likely read the καί 
as concessive (e.g. Moo, Romans, 242); but while this interpretation captures the incongruity between divine 
justice and the objects of justification (see below), the grounding of this dual-predication (just and justifier) in the 
single event of the cross that judges and justifies supports an explicative reading of the καί: God is righteous as 
and in that he justifies those who are ἐκ piίστεως Ἰησοῦ (cf. Campbell, Deliverance of God, 673; Jewett, Romans, 292; 
Jüngel, Justification, 75; Käsemann, Romans, 101).   
84 Barth, CD IV/1, 528.  
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(3) The righteousness of God enacted in the crucified and risen Christ includes and effects the 
justification of the ungodly. 
 Thus far we have argued that Paul locates the righteousness of God in the divine act 
that is the one, redemptive history of Jesus and that, within this single and saving history, the 
cross is the central and defining demonstration of divine righteousness because it is the 
enactment of God’s eschatological judgment. As noted above, however, the καί that links the 
divine predicates ‘just’ and ‘justifier’ (Rom 3.26b) indicates that the death of Jesus is 
simultaneously the event of judgment and justification; it is, to borrow Justyn Terry’s phrase, 
‘the justifying judgment of God’.85 Thus, to both summarise and anticipate our argument, ‘the 
righteousness of God’, as it is revealed and enacted on the cross, is God’s eschatological 
judgment against ungodliness and God’s eschatological justification of the ungodly. The 
previous section focused on the justification of God in and as the judgment of the cross; this 
section will consider the disjunctive justification of sinners that this judgment effects and 
includes.  
 As argued above, Paul’s righteousness language in Romans 2.1-3.20, like Wisdom’s usage 
throughout, is determined by the correspondence between divine act and human worth: God’s 
righteous-judgment (δικαιοκρισία) will be revealed when he repays each human subject in 
accordance with her or his subjectivity (ἀpiοδώσει ἑκάστῳ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ, Rom 2.5-6). It is 
thus the ‘doers of the law who will be justified’ (οἱ piοιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται, 2.13), but on 
the basis of this criterion of correspondence οὐκ ἔστιν δίκαιος οὐδὲ εἷς (3.10). Correspondingly, 
God’s righteousness (θεοῦ δικαιοσύνη) necessarily encounters human unrighteousness (ἡ 
ἀδικία ἡμῶν) in the form of wrath (ὀργή, 3.5). In this hamartiological context, divine and 
human justification are mutually exclusive: the justification of God (3.4-5) entails the non-
justification of sinful humanity (3.19-20).  
But, as argued above in relation to Romans 3.25-26, the divine act that is the death of 
Jesus establishes God as ‘just’ and ‘justifier’ and thus effects the impossible – the concurrent 
justification of God and sinful humanity. Here, as in Romans 2.13 and 3.19-20, divine and 
human justification are located in an event of eschatological judgment; but in Romans 3.24-26 
eschatological justification takes the present tense (δικαιούμενοι; cf. 3.28 and the aorist of 
                                                        
85 Terry, The Justifying Judgement of God; cf. P. Stuhlmacher, ‘The Theme of Romans’, in The Romans Debate 
(ed. K.P. Donfried; Peabody: Hendrickson, 1977), 333-45 (339): the justification of ‘sinners who believe is…the 
result and effect of the righteousness which God himself demonstrates in the surrender of his Son’.    
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δικαιόω in 5.1, 9) because it is effected by the arrival of the eschatological judgment in the now 
of the cross.86 This judgment, however, unlike Romans 2.13; 3.20, is fundamentally disjunctive: 
God demonstrates his righteousness in an event that grounds and effects the forensically 
nonsensical declaration that sinners (Rom 3.23) are righteous (Rom 3.24, 26b). The tension 
here with the theological grammar of Romans 2.1-3.20 and Wisdom suggests that δικαιοσύνη 
has lost its supposed univocity; but this is merely to raise again the question of the whence and 
whither of Paul’s contextually peculiar theological semantics.    
The arrival of this alternate reality is signaled by the νυνὶ δέ of Romans 3.21. 
Contextually, the adversative δέ serves what Jochen Flebbe terms a ‘logisch-rhetorischen 
Funktion in der Opposition zu V.20’, but what Flebbe fails to ask – and thus to answer – is what 
generates and grounds this logical-rhetorical contrast.87 The structural antithesis between 
Romans 3.20 and 3.21 suggests that the soteriological pattern of the apart-from-law-
manifestation of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ (3.21) relates antithetically to the (excluded) possibility of 
justification before God by works of law (3.20).88 In this sense, νυνὶ δέ announces a theological 
actuality that Romans 2.13 and 3.19-20 declare a logical impossibility – the disclosure of divine 
righteousness apart from the criterion of correspondence (χωρὶς νόμου). But – and this is the 
point Flebbe misses – the logical contrast between Romans 3.20 and 3.21 is not between two 
abstract soteriological theses; rather, Romans 3.21 describes an event that appears illogical 
from the theological perspective of Romans 2.1-3.20 (and Wisdom). In other words, the logical 
fault-line that divides Romans 3.20 and 3.21 is generated by the more elemental and 
                                                        
86 Stuhlmacher (Justification, 14) is therefore right to argue that ‘justification involves an act of judgment’ 
and is ‘decidedly located in the final judgment’, but he underemphasises the Pauline stress on the ‘now-ness’ of 
this justifying judgment. Even more problematic is Wright’s already-noted insistence that present justification is 
‘an anticipation of the future verdict’ to be rendered at the final judgment (‘New Perspective on Paul’, 260; cf. P.F. 
Esler, Conflict and Identity in Romans: The Social Setting of Paul’s Letter [Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003], 161). For Paul, 
present justification does not anticipate the verdict of final judgment; it is that verdict effected by the arrival of 
God’s eschatological judgment in the now of Jesus’ death (and resurrection; cf. Rom 4.25). Thus, while future and 
present justification/judgment are logically (and chronologically) distinguishable (compare Rom 3.24-26, 28; 5.1, 9 
with Rom 8.33-34), they are not, at least for Paul, separable.  
87 J. Flebbe, Solus Deus: Untersuchungen zur Rede von Gott im Brief des Paulus an die Römer (BZNW 158; Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 68.  
88 It may be possible to trace this antithetical parallelism in chiastic form: 
A  ἐξ ἔργων νόμου 
      B  οὐ δικαιωθήσεται ἐνώpiιον αὐτοῦ 
           C  διὰ νόμου 
           C1 χωρὶς νόμου 
      B1 δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ 
 A1 διὰ piίστεως Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ 
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eschatological dialectic between reality ante and post Christum. The ‘now’ of Romans 3.21 
anticipates the ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ of 3.26a and thus the manifestation of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ (3.21) 
cannot be isolated from the demonstration of God’s righteousness in the divine judgment that 
is the death of Christ (3.25-26). The contrast between Romans 3.20 and 3.21 is thus properly 
eschatological: νυνὶ δέ names the arrival of the eschaton in the divine saving act that is 
identical to the single and saving history of Jesus.89 The logical contrast between Romans 3.20 
and 3.21 is therefore deduced from and descriptive of the event that Romans 3.21-26 announces 
– an event that both is and effects the illogical: the demonstration of divine righteousness in 
the death of ‘the one who knew no sin’ (see above) and the concurrent declaration that sinners 
are righteous (see below).  
 Romans 3.21-26 can thus be said to describe an event and the new reality it creates. The 
first indications of the new-ness of this theological reality are the so-called particulae exclusivae 
– that is, the mutually-interpreting assertions that δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is manifested χωρὶς νόμου 
and is δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ διὰ piίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (3.21a, 22a). We will return to the positive 
coordination of righteousness and ‘faith of Jesus Christ’ below; for now our interest is in the 
expression χωρὶς νόμου.90 For Dunn, because he contrasts χωρὶς νόμου with the phrase ἐν τῷ 
νόμῳ in Romans 3.19, ‘“Without the law”…means outside the national and religious 
parameters set by the law’,91 it means, to quote Gathercole’s summary of Dunn, ‘outside the 
sphere of the law…in a sociological sense’.92 However, as the brief structural analysis of the 
antithetical parallelism between Romans 3.20 and 3.21 above suggests, the contrast is not 
between righteousness ‘in the law’ and ‘without law’, but between righteousness ‘by works of 
law’ and ‘apart from law’ – that is, between a righteousness that is determined by 
                                                        
89 Käsemann, Romans, 93 rightly notes the significance of the duration indicated by the perfect tense of 
φανερόω: ‘the eschaton is paradoxically present but the present is not the eschaton’.  
90 It is often supposed that the radicality of this statement is qualified by Paul’s ‘balancing’ clause in 
3.21b: μαρτυρουμένη ὑpiὸ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τῶν piροφητῶν. However, as I have argued elsewhere (Linebaugh, 
‘Debating Diagonal ∆ικαιοσύνη’, 121 n.43) it is unlikely that νόμος has the same reference in 3.21a and 3.21b. The 
latter refers to the entire Pentateuch, as is evident from its use within a common taxonomy referring to the 
Jewish scriptures as a whole (“the law and the prophets”; e.g. Matt 7.12; John 1.15; Acts 13.15). The former, by 
contrast, takes its cue from 3.20 in which the νόμος in question is the same as in Romans 2 where it was qualified 
by verbs such as piοιέω (v. 13), piράσσω (v. 25), and τελέω (v. 27) and understood as a series of commandments, all 
taken from the Decalogue in 2.20-23, which one can transgress (piαραβάτης, 2.25, 27). This νόμος is therefore 
better understood in the more limited sense of the Sinaitic legislation. Paul is thus saying that the entire sacred 
corpus, including the Pentateuch (νόμος), witnesses to the revelation of God’s righteousness apart from the law 
given at Sinai (νόμος).    
91 Dunn, Romans, 1.165.  
92 Gathercole, ‘Justified by Faith’, 151.  
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correspondence (ἐξ ἔργων νόμου) and a righteousness that is disjunctive (χωρὶς νόμου).93 The 
correspondence that connects divine righteousness and human unrighteousness can only be 
expressed in an illocutionary act of non-justification: οὐ δικαιωθήσεται piᾶσα σάρξ (Rom 3.20; 
cf. 3.5). In this sense, the righteousness of the law is what Wisdom would call the ‘fitting 
judgment’ (ἀξία κρίσις, 12.26) of the ungodly. But Paul announces a demonstration of divine 
righteousness that is at once the enactment of God’s judgment against ungodliness (Rom 1.17-
18; 3.25-26; 8.3-4; cf. 2 Cor 5.21) and the justification of the ungodly (Rom 4.5). Paul’s 
declaration that δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is manifested χωρὶς νόμου, because it eliminates the 
criterion of correspondence, opens up the possibility of this apparently unjust justification of 
sinners; Romans 3.23-24 names this possible impossibility as a theological actuality. 
 As argued at length in the previous chapter, for Paul, in contrast to Wisdom, there is no 
anthropological distinction (οὐκ ἐστιν διαστολή, Rom 3.22b). This is true positively in terms of 
soteriology – the righteousness of God through Christ-faith is εἰς piάντας τοὺς piιστεύοντας 
(Rom 3.22a, see below) – and negatively in terms of hamartiology - piάντες ἥμαρτον καὶ 
ὑστεροῦνται τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ (Rom 3.23). In this latter sense, the righteousness revealed in 
God’s act in Christ is an affirmation of Romans 1.18 and 3.9-20 before it is their antithesis – ‘all 
sinned’. Thus, to quote Wilckens, ‘Die Ausschaltung des Gesetzes bedeutet nicht seine 
Umgehung’.94 However, as Romans 3.25-26 indicates (and as I have argued elsewhere), ‘the 
judgment of the sinner contains within it, not as its complement but as its consequence, the 
justification of the judged’.95 The objects of the divine saving action implied in the passive 
participle δικαιούμενοι (3.24) are the sinners of 3.23,96 and therefore as Dunn rightly and 
paradoxically remarks, ‘it is precisely those who have sinned and fallen short of God’s glory 
who are justified’.97 Sharply put, the righteousness of God that is revealed apart from law does 
                                                        
93 This does not mean that χωρὶς νόμου does not contain revolutionary sociological potential. As will be 
argued below, the dissociation between righteousness and the expected criterion of correspondence implied by 
χωρὶς νόμου erases any and all lines of anthropological distinction (Rom 3.22b) and thus grounds the universality 
of this disjunctive δικαιοσύνη – it is εἰς piάντας (Rom 3.22a, 29-30).    
94 Wilckens, Römer, 1.186.  
95 Linebaugh, ‘Debating Diagonal ∆ικαιοσύνη’, 119.  
96 Following Cranfield (A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans [2 vols. ICC; 
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975], 1.205), I take as the subject of 3.24 the ‘all’ of 3.23 while recognizing that 3.24 
continues the main theme from 3.21-22. Campbell (The Rhetoric of Righteousness, 86-92) is probably correct to see 
the anthropological statement of 3.23 as an elaboration of the “all the believing ones” of 3.22 such that the subject 
of the passive form of δικαιόω in 3.24 is doubly qualified by the ‘all of faith’ and the ‘all sinned’. 
97 Dunn, Romans, 1.168. So also Wilckens, Römer, 1.188 n.39: “die Sünde aller [ist] also der Ort, an dem die 
Gottesgerechtigkeit wirksam wird”. 
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not follow the expected pattern of correspondence; for Paul, δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ operates at and 
is operative as the disjunction between divine act and human subject: piάντες ἥμαρτον… 
δικαιούμενοι.98 In contrast to the analytic agency of justice in Wisdom 1.8-11 (cf. 5.18), the 
righteousness of God that Paul proclaims locates and labels unrighteousness in order to create 
its opposite (creatio ex contrario).99 Thus, for Wisdom, the Pauline link between piάντες ἥμαρτον 
and δικαιούμενοι can only be interpreted as a theological oxymoron, an instance of forensic 
schizophrenia in which the judge accurately and analytically identifies sinners as sinners (3.23) 
only to overturn this just judgment with the apparently unjust declaration of justification. For 
Paul, however, this contradiction is contained within and communicative of the divine act that 
manifests, demonstrates and establishes God’s righteousness.  
 The acuteness of this tension between Wisdom and Paul provides something of an 
apology for Bultmann’s admittedly overstated assertion that the Pauline concept δικαιοσύνη 
θεοῦ is ‘eine Neuschöpfung des Paulus’.100 However much we might want to qualify Bultmann’s 
claim, it remains the case that at this stage of the argument of Romans Paul is – to risk my own 
hyperbole – operating within a theological universe that is fundamentally incommensurable 
with the ordered cosmos Wisdom’s author carefully constructs. Wisdom’s world is built on two 
dualisms (righteous/ungodly; salvation/condemnation) and the consistent correspondence 
between them (righteous – salvation; ungodly – condemnation), and it is precisely the final 
immutability of this cosmic symmetry that underwrites the summons to ‘love justice’ (Wisdom 
1.1). By contrast, Pauline theology, with its paradoxically inverted connection between 
anthropology and soteriology (sinner – justification), occurs within the ‘new creation’ (καινὴ 
κτίσις, Gal 6.15) Paul announces; but, crucially, the first movement of this new creation is an 
act of de-creation: the crucifixion of the cosmos by the cross (ἐν τῷ σταυρῷ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν 
                                                        
98 For a similar account, see Westerholm’s discussion of what he calls ‘extraordinary righteousness’ 
(Perspectives Old and New, 273-84).   
99 In this respect, justification is rightly understood as an actus forensis effected by a verbum efficax (cf. 
Luther, LW 5.140). For Paul, as for Luther after him, the God who justifies the ungodly (Rom 4.5) is the God who 
gives life to the dead and calls non-being into being (Rom 4.17). The linking of these liturgical predications 
suggests an analogous form of divine activity in the acts of creation, resurrection and justification (Seifrid, Christ, 
our Righteousness, 56), which implies that justification is a constitutive – that is, creation-like – act: the divine word 
of justification creates the reality it speaks (cf. Rom 5.19; see Barth, Romans, 102; Jüngel, Justification, 210-11; 
Käsemann, Romans, 123). Wright’s suggestion (New Perspectives on Paul, 258) that justification is a judicial 
recognition ‘declaring that something is the case, rather than…making something happen or changing the way 
something is’ mutes the immediacy of the Pauline connection between the divine act of justification and the 
human objects of justification: piάντες ἥμαρτον… δικαιούμενοι (Rom 3.23-24); ὁ δικαιῶν τὸν ἀσεβῆ (Rom 4.5); cf. 
Romans 5.6-10.      
100 R. Bultmann, ‘∆ΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗ ΘΕΟΥ’, JBL 83 (1964): 12-16 (16).     
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Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ…κόσμος ἐσταύρωται, Gal 6.14). In other words (and to repeat what was said 
above in relation to the logical contrast between Romans 3.20 and 3.21), the fault-line between 
Wisdom and Pauline theology after the ‘but now’ is a world-breaking and -building event – that 
is, the divine enactment of eschatological judgment and justification in the crucified and risen 
Christ.   
 We have thus circled back to our starting point: Paul locates the revelation of divine 
righteousness in God’s action that is Jesus’ history. This, however, is not just a repetition of the 
above argument; it is an (anticipatory) exegesis of Romans 3.22a. Location and definition 
merge at this point: the righteousness of God is not only located in the Christ-event; for Paul,   
the righteousness of God is δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ διὰ piίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. This, as I will argue 
presently, is a divine righteousness that is negatively defined by non-correspondence (διὰ 
piίστεως) and positively defined by Christology (Ἰησοῦς Χριστός). While it is not my intention 
to enter into an extended discussion of the piίστις Χριστοῡ debate, this focused discussion of 
‘the righteousness of God’ will take the form of a reply to two common arguments against the 
objective genitive reading: 1) the objective genitive makes human faith a material condition 
for divine saving action,101 and 2) the grammatical difference between the objective genitive 
and subjective genitive reflects a theological difference between anthropocentric (objective 
genitive) and christocentric (subjective genitive) construals of Pauline theology.102 In place of 
these misleading characterisations I will suggest: 1) faith is, in the first instance, the negation 
of correspondence and thus the affirmation rather than the disqualification of the 
unconditionality of divine saving action, and 2) the objective genitive interpretation and the 
solifidianism103 it generates function to ‘designate the [christological] object of faith as the 
ground of justification’.104  
                                                        
101 See e.g. Campbell, Deliverance of God, 77-78; P.M. Sprinkle, ‘Πίστις Χριστοῡ as an Eschatological Event’, 
in The Faith of Jesus Christ: Exegetical, Biblical and Theological Studies (eds. M.F. Bird and P.M. Sprinkle; Peabody: 
Hendrickson, 2009): 165-84 (166).   
102See e.g. R.B. Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ: The Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3.1-4.11 (2nd ed.; Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmanns, 2002), xxix; J. L. Martyn’, ‘The Apocalyptic Gospel in Galatians’, Int 54 (2000): 246-66 (250).    
103 J.A. Null, Thomas Cramner’s Doctrine of Repentance: Renewing the Power of Love (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 5: 
‘Derived from sola fide, solifidianism is the technical term for adherence to justification by faith alone’.  
104 Ribberbos, Paul, 172. Once these theological objections are countered, the strong semantic case for 
something like the objective genitive can be heard: 1) Paul’s instrumental faith clauses are derived from the ἐκ 
piίστεως of Habakkuk 2.4, which does not (pace R.B. Hays, The Conversion of the Imagination: Paul as Interpreter of 
Israel’s Scripture [Grand Rapids: Eerdmanns, 2005], 119-142) employ ὁ δίκαιος as a christological title but as a 
reference to the generic, believing human (Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 240). 2) In Paul, Jesus is never the 
subject of the verb piιστεύω (Esler, Conflict and Identity, 157) and Paul’s habit of interpreting an instance of the verb 
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(i) The Righteousness of Faith as Non-Correspondence: Paul does not present faith as an abstraction; 
he presents it in an antithesis: ‘a person is not (οὐκ) justified by works of law (ἐξ ἔργων νόμου) 
but (ἐὰν μή) through faith in Jesus Christ (διὰ piίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, Gal 2.16; cf. Rom 3.28). 
This antithesis is reflective of a Pauline pattern: piίστις and/or piιστεύω is set in contrast to 
νόμος and/or ἔργα and, as Matlock observes, ‘the middle term is δικαιόω or δικαιοσύνη’.105 
This syntactical structure becomes theologically significant at Romans 3.21-22. The 
righteousness of God to which the law and the prophets witness and which the gospel reveals 
is both χωρὶς νόμου and διὰ piίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. The coordination of these mutually-
interpreting assertions suggests, as Gathercole argues, ‘that χωρίς in verse 21 is clearly the 
opposite of διά in verse 22’.106 In other words, χωρὶς νόμου functions as a negative definition of 
διὰ piίστεως: ‘“By faith” means “apart from law”’;107 or, expressed in terms of our dialogue with 
Wisdom, ‘by faith’ means ‘without correspondence’. Thus, to gloss ‘the righteousness of God’ as 
δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ διὰ piίστεως is, in the first instance, to define δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ in terms of the 
non-correspondence.  
 Romans 4.3-5 clarifies this point.  As Paul’s citation of Genesis 15.6 indicates (ἐpiίστευσεν 
δὲ Ἀβραὰμ τῷ θεῶ…), Abraham is the unambiguous subject of the verb piιστεύω (4.3), and yet 
the antithesis of Romans 4.4-5 makes it impossible to interpret this human act as a criterion of 
correspondence. Precisely as the subject of piιστεύω, Abraham is ὁ μὴ ἐργαζόμενος – he is 
χωρὶς ἔργων (4.6) – and his justification is therefore the act of ‘the one who justifies the 
ungodly’. Here, as in Romans 3.21, piίστις, as an anthropological action, is an anthropological 
negation – it is the act of the ungodly in the absence of works (4.5, 6); it is what is present and 
possible when the criterion of correspondence (νόμος) is not. In this sense, ‘the righteousness 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
in a citation with reference to the noun (e.g. Rom 4.3, 5; 9.32-33 10.5-11, 16-17) indicates that the meaning of the 
noun and verb have not drifted apart (R.B. Matlock, ‘Detheologizing the ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ Debate: Cautionary 
Remarks from a Lexical Semantic Perspective’, NovT 42 [2000]: 1-23 [13-14]; cf. Watson, Paul, Judaism and the 
Gentiles, 243). 3). The question of redundancy in Romans 3.22, Galatians 2.16, 3.22 and Philippians 3.9 points to ‘a 
much wider pattern of repetition of piίστις/piιστεύω in Galatians and Romans, rooted in Genesis 15.6 and 
Habakkuk 2.4’ (R. B. Matlock, ‘Saving Faith: The Rhetoric and Semantics of piίστις in Paul’, in The Faith of Jesus 
Christ: Exegetical, Biblical and Theological Studies (eds. M.F. Bird and P.M. Sprinkle; Peabody: Hendrickson, 2009): 73-
89 (89).    
105 Matlock, ‘Saving Faith’, 77 notes Galatians 2.16, 19, 20, 21; 3.2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 18, 21, 22, 24, 26; 
5.4, 5; Romans 3.20, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31; 4.3, 6, 11, 13, 14, 16; 5.1; 9.30, 32; 10.5, 6; Philippians 3.9; cf. Romans 4.4-
5; 9.32 (Eph 2.8-9).  
106 Gathercole, Where is Boasting, 224. He adds, ‘the “righteousness of God revealed apart from the Law” in 
3.21 is equivalent to “the righteousness of God through faith” in 3.22’.  
107 Watson, Hermeneutics, 72 (italics original).  
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of faith’ – the righteousness that was reckoned to Abraham – is a disjunctive δικαιοσύνη; it is, 
in Westerholm’s concise phrase, ‘the righteousness of sinners’ (3.23-24; 4.6-8).108  
 In this context, faith is not a new point of correspondence between divine saving action 
and human subjects; 109 it is an affirmation of the contradiction between the form and object of 
God’s activity: God justifies the ungodly, gives life to the dead and calls non-being into being 
(Rom 4.5, 17). Thus, in Barth’s words, ‘sola fide’ is the ‘great [anthropological] negation’;110 it is 
the site of non-correspondence – of ungodliness, deadness and nothingness (Rom 4.5, 17, 19) – 
at which the righteous God operates ex contrario. In this sense, faith is a human ‘yes’ to the 
divine ‘no’ that is the enactment of judgment in the death of Jesus.111 Faith is an 
anthropological negation as an affirmation that the death of Jesus for sinners is the deserved 
death of sinners (Gal 2.20; Rom 6.3-8; cf. Rom 1.32; 6.23). But, to recapitulate the argument 
above, the object of faith is the God who acts in Jesus to judge and justify the ungodly. Faith 
lives in this contradiction: it is an anthropological ‘no’ because it says ‘yes’ to the 
eschatological judgment of the cross; but, to anticipate our argument below, it is also a 
theological ‘yes’ because it is directed to the God who, in the resurrection of the crucified (Rom 
4.25), speaks (and thereby effects: verbum efficax) the inexplicable (and from Wisdom’s 
perspective, illogical) ‘yes’ of justification.  
 
(ii) The Righteousness of Faith in Christ as Applied Christology: In the introduction to the second 
edition of The Faith of Jesus Christ, Richard Hays argues that ‘the greatest weakness of the 
traditional post-Reformation understanding of “faith” and “justification” in Paul is…that it 
offers no coherent account of the relation between the doctrine of justification and 
christology’.112 In context, what Hays means is that the interpretative decision to read Christ as 
the object rather than the subject of faith contributes to the anthropocentric construal of 
                                                        
108 Westerholm, Perspectives Old and New, 281.   
109 For a representative expression of the theological nervousness about the objective genitive making 
faith a material condition for divine action and thereby making soteriology contingent on human agency, see 
Sprinkle, ‘Πίστις Χριστοῡ as an Eschatological Event’, 166. This fear is based on an historical misreading. Calvin for 
example, while never referring to faith as a causa materialis, speaks of faith as the causa instrumentalis only in 
conjunction with the word that evokes it (Rom 10.17): ‘verbum cum fide instrumentum’ (J. Calvin, ‘Acts 14-28 and 
Romans 1-6’, in Calvin’s Commentaries Volume XIX [trans. J. Owen; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003], 138 n.2).   
110 Barth, CD IV/1, 621.  
111 Seifrid, Christ, our Righteousness, 66: ‘In faith, one takes the side of God in his claim against oneself’.  
112 Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ, xxix.  
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justification he associates with Bultmann,113 whereas his (subjective genitive) reading of piίστις 
Χριστοῡ restores the Pauline relationship between Jesus and justification.114 This, however, is a 
misreading of both Paul and Protestant theology. 
 For Paul, as argued above, faith is, in the first instance a negation; it the denial of 
anthropological correspondence and therefore the disqualification of anthropocentricity. For 
this reason, ‘faith’, to quote Ribberbos, ‘does not justify because of that which it is in itself, but 
because of that to which it is directed’.115 And this is the theological import of the objective 
genitive: Jesus Christ, the object of faith, is designated as the sole condition and cause of 
justification: δικαιούμενοι… ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ (Rom 3.24). In this sense, faith is both ‘the great 
[anthropological] negation’ and the great christological (and theological) affirmation.116  
 Romans 4 is again instructive. The Pauline antitheses that express the negative 
significance of faith also emphasise the centrality of its object. As Halvor Moxnes observes, the 
antithesis between ‘works’ and ‘faith’ in Romans 4.4-5 is asymmetrical because of the addition 
of the predication ‘the one who justifies the ungodly’ which directs the reader ‘not to faith per 
se, but to God, in whom one believes’.117 The salvific subject here is not believing Abraham (he 
is ὁ μὴ ἐργαζόμενος) but the justifying God. This pattern reverberates throughout the chapter. 
Abraham’s faith lives at the disjunction between the content of God’s promise (‘so shall your 
offspring be’, Rom 4.18) and empirical reality (νέκρωσις, 4.19); but the grounds for this ‘hope 
against hope’ (4.18) is not an autonomous act of faith – even Abraham’s believing subjectivity 
is generated by God through the promise (cf. the passive forms of ἐνδυναμόω and 
piληροφορέω, 4.20, 21)118 – but the one in whom Abraham believes: ‘the God who makes alive 
the dead and calls non-being into being’ (Rom 4.17). Faith, in other words, is both an 
affirmation of the contradiction between anthropology and soteriology and an identification 
of the God who operates out of the opposite.   
                                                        
113 Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ, xxv-xxvi.  
114 Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ, xxix.  
115 Ridderbos, Paul, 172.  
116 Cf. Watson, Hermeneutics, 169: ‘Paul sets faith on the border between despair and hope and sees it 
facing in both directions. Faith is both despair of human capacity and hope in [the] saving act of God’.  
117 H. Moxnes, Theology in Conflict: Studies in Paul’s Understanding of God in Romans (NovTSup 53; Leiden: Brill, 
1980), 42.  
118 M.A. Seifrid, ‘The Narrative of Scripture and Justification by Faith: A Fresh Response to N.T. Wright’, 
CTQ 72 (2008): 19-44 (43): ‘Faith for Paul is nothing other than the word of promise performing its work in those 
who believe’.  
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A similar dynamic is evident in Romans 3.21-22. The symmetrical contrast between 
‘law’ and ‘faith’ is unbalanced by the identification of faith’s object: Jesus Christ. The effect, as 
in Romans 4.4-5, is to emphasise and identify the exclusivity of the solus Christus (or, in 4.5, the 
solus Deus). Faith responds to and is comprehended within the prior divine action that Paul 
calls ‘the redemption that is in Christ Jesus’ and thus, as the grammar indicates, the salvific 
agent here is not ὁ ἐκ piίστεως Ἰησοῦ, but the one who acts in and through Jesus to be ‘just and 
justifier’ – that is, ὁ θεός. The negation implied by the διὰ piίστεως is therefore an affirmation 
of the divine accomplishment of justification in Jesus: the function of the doctrine of 
righteousness by faith in Pauline (and Protestant) theology is to clarify and communicate the 
soteriological significance of Jesus for sinners. As Barth puts it, ‘What is the sola fide but a faint 
yet necessary echo [and, I would add, effect] of the solus Christus?’. Or again, ‘It is impossible to 
see how the solus Christus…can have any other correlative than the fides Christi, as the sola fides, 
which absolutely excludes all other helpers or helps’.119 In other words, to say that ‘the 
righteousness of God’ is ‘the righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ’ is to say that 
God’s eschatological act of judgment and justification is irreducibly and exclusively singular – 
it is Jesus Christ. Rather than qualifying this christological singularity (solus Christus) and the 
concomitant unconditionality (sola gratia, Rom 3.24; see below), the sola fide is their apophatic 
affirmation: διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ piίστεως, ἵνα κατὰ χάριν (Rom 4.16).120    
Paul’s redefinition of divine righteousness as δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ διὰ piίστεως Ἰησοῦ 
Χριστοῦ is thus an instance of what Käsemann calls ‘applied Christology’:121 ‘the righteousness 
of God’ is a description of (and its disjunctive definition is deduced from) God’s act in Jesus.122 It 
is this event – this name – that divides Paul from Wisdom. Whereas Wisdom operates with a pre-
definition of δικαιοσύνη that is exemplified in the correspondences of the Exodus event 
(righteous – saved; ungodly – destroyed), Paul redefines δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ in consequence of 
the contradictions contained within the divine act that reveals, demonstrates and establishes 
                                                        
119 Barth, CD IV/1, 632.  
120 Käsemann, Romans, 101: ‘Precision is given to sola gratia by sola fide’. Cf. Jüngel, Justification, 149-226, 
236-59 who demonstrates that the Reformational solas are ordered in such a way as to preserve solus Christus. The 
common charge that the objective genitive reading of piίστις Χριστοῡ is anthropological rather than christological 
is simply false at the level of historical theological description: the function of the sola fide is to safeguard and 
negatively affirm (not by human agency) the sola gratia and the solus Christus. 
121 Käsemann, Romans, 96. Bultmann’s similar sounding phrase, ‘Paul’s teaching of justification is…his real 
Christology’ (‘The Christology of the New Testament’, in Faith and Understanding [ed. R.W. Funk; London: Harper 
and Row, 1969], 262-85 [279]) is an overstatement insofar as it reduces Pauline Christology to justification.  
122 Cf. Campbell, Deliverance of God, 687: ‘δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is a way of describing the Christ event for Paul’.  
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it (Christ – cross; judgment – justification). In other words, for Paul ‘the righteousness of God’ 
is the enactment of God’s eschatological judgment against ungodliness in Jesus and the 
effectuation of God’s eschatological justification of the ungodly in Jesus. Or, more to the point, 
‘the righteousness of God’, precisely as ‘the righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ’, 
is the divine act that is Jesus’ single and saving history. 
    
Grace Redefined 
 The word χάρις in Romans 3.24 was consciously underemphasised in the foregoing 
exegesis of Romans 3.21-26. The ‘redemption that is in Christ Jesus’ which effects the 
justification of sinners as it demonstrates and establishes God’s righteousness is, according to 
3.24, the event of divine grace (δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι). That God’s grace can manifest God’s 
justice is a maxim Wisdom would happily affirm, but the notion that grace can take the form of 
a judgment against ungodliness that effects the justification of the ungodly (see above) points 
to a crucial difference. Whereas Wisdom locates the justice of divine benefaction in the 
correspondence between gift and recipient, Romans 3.23-24 names sinners as the incongruous 
beneficiaries of the Christ-gift. This section will explore this tension between fitting (Wisdom) 
and unfitting (Romans) grace and argue that in parallel to the incommensurable definitions of 
righteousness identified above, Wisdom and Romans articulate ultimately incompatible 
theologies of God’s grace.123 
 
Congruous and Conditioned Χάρις: Wisdom and the Fitting Gift124 
 As argued above, Wisdom conceives of divine justice as a duality of divine action: 
judgment for the ungodly and salvation for the righteous. It is the salvific side of this dualism 
                                                        
123 John Barclay (‘Believers and the Last Judgment in Paul: Rethinking Grace and Recompense’, 8) has 
recently noted that while there have been numerous reconsiderations of the place of ‘works’ and ‘law’ in Pauline 
theology, there have been ‘surprisingly few attempts to deconstruct inherited assumptions about grace’. Partial 
exceptions to this trend can be found in Westerholm, Perspectives Old and New, 341-351 and H.-M. Rieger, ‘Eine 
Religion der Gnade: Zur “Bundesnomismus”-Theorie von E.P. Sanders’, in Bund und Tora: Zur theologischen 
Begriffsgeschichte in alttestamentlicher, frühjüdischer und urchristlicher Tradition (eds. F. Avemarie and H. 
Lichtenberger; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996) 129-61 (both cited by Barclay). This section is a far cry from the 
‘wholescale reconsideration of what Paul meant by this terminology, in his ancient Jewish and Graeco-Roman 
context’ (8 n.20; underlining original), but together with our earlier discussions of ‘grace’ in Philo and Seneca, the 
present dialogue between Paul and Wisdom is at least part of this ‘reconsideration’. 
124 Wisdom’s theology of grace was detailed in chapter three. The purpose of this section is to reintroduce, 
in summary form, the basic contours of Wisdom’s ‘gift-theory’ in order to facilitate a conversation with Paul on 
this topic.  
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that Wisdom calls grace.125 In other words, divine grace, because it is, at least in part, a facet of 
divine justice, exhibits a patterned correspondence between God’s saving gift and its human 
recipients. Thus, in Wisdom 4.15, God’s χάρις is directed towards ‘his holy ones’ (τοῖς ὁσίοις 
αὐτοῦ; cf. 3.9). Similarly, in 3.14, it is the law-observant and faithful eunuch to whom God gives 
(δίδωμι) his χάρις. In both cases, the justness of divine benefaction is displayed in the 
identifiable affinity between benefit and beneficiary. The justice of grace, however, does not 
disqualify the graciousness of grace.126 As demonstrated in conversation with Philo and Seneca 
in chapter three, the conceptual context for Wisdom’s grace-discourse is the social and 
theological realm of ‘gift’. While Seneca relates the necessity of giving to the ‘worthy’ (dignus) 
to the social function of establishing and fostering relationships by the discriminant exchange 
of benefits, Philo’s insistence that God’s gifts are coordinated with human ‘worth’ (ἀξία) serves 
a decidedly theological purpose. For Philo, the ἄξιος-χάρις link does not imply that the 
‘worthy’ earn divine grace, a thought Philo explicitly repudiates (Sacr. 54);127 rather the ‘fit’ 
between God’s gifts and recipients ensures that divine action, benefaction included, reflects 
the rationality, justice and fairness of the God who is φιλόδωρος (Leg. 3.166). 
 A similar dynamic is evident in Wisdom’s meditation on the educational and salvific 
activity of divine σοφία, God’s ultimate gift (ἡ χάρις, 8.21). As one who works in concert with, 
though is distinguishable from, personified δίκη (1.6-8), Wisdom, precisely as χάρις, operates 
within the parameters of the cosmic moral order she established and sustains. This means, in 
Exodus-like fashion, she avoids the ungodly (1.4; cf. 7.25) and associates with the righteous 
(6.12; 7.27; 10.4, 5, 6, 10, 13). Thus, while Wisdom is proactively self-disclosing (φθάνει 
piρογνωσθῆναι, 6.13), her seeking is selective: τοὺς ἀξίους αὐτῆς αὐτὴ piεριέρχεται ζητοῦσα 
(6.16). While this single criterion of ‘fittingness’ (ἄξιος) can be met by a variety of human 
actions directed toward Wisdom (e.g. seeking [6.12, 17; 8.2], desiring [6.13, 17, 20; 8.2], 
requesting [7.7.; 8.21; 9.1-18], loving [6.12, 17; 8.2], serving [10.9]), none of these verbs imply a 
cooperative soteriology. Human worth is a condition of divine grace, but it is never its cause; 
                                                        
125 God’s love (ἀγαpiάω, 11.24) and mercy (ἐλεέω, 11.23) are said to extend to the objects of God’s 
judgment, but this mercy, rather than saving the ungodly, takes the form of decelerated destruction (12.8-11; cf. 
12.2).  
126 Both Seneca (De Beneficiis I.15.6) and Philo (Post. 142-47) indicate that it is in fact the absence of the 
discriminate matching of benefit to beneficiary that renders the gift a non-gift.  
127 Cf. De Vita Mosis 2.242 where the χάρις given to those who are ‘considered worthy’ (ἀξιόω) remains a 
gift (δόμα) not payment (οὐδ’ ἀpiοδώσεις). 
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that role belongs exclusively to Wisdom (8.5). Σοφία may only save the ‘fit’, but it is σοφία who 
saves (τῇ σοφίᾳ ἐσώθησαν, 9.18). As argued in chapter three, this is not salvation by human 
worth; this is salvation for those who are worthy. Thus Solomon, though he was good (ἀγαθὸς 
ὤν, 8.20), recognised that Wisdom was genuinely a gift (χάρις) and thus that his obtainment of 
her required an act of divine giving (δίδωμι, 8.21).  
This correspondence between God’s gift of Wisdom and the human recipients of her 
saving activity is portrayed both in the Exodus-shape of Wisdom’s re-reading of Genesis (10.1-
14) and in the introduction of Wisdom into the Exodus event itself (10.15-21). Again, it is 
emphatically Wisdom who saves (σοφία ἐρρύσατο), but the objects of her salvific benefaction 
are ‘those who care for her’ (τοὺς θεραpiεύοντας αὐτήν, 10.9). In order to demonstrate this link 
between benefit and beneficiary, Wisdom identifies (an often non-canonical) criterion of ‘fit’ in 
each of its subjects. The suitability of Noah, Abraham, Lot, Jacob and Joseph is signified by the  
label ‘righteous’ (δίκαιος, 10.4, 5, 6, 10, 13), a criterion of fit which eludes the disobedient Adam 
(10.1c) whose worth is nevertheless ensured by his  status as ‘father of the world’ (piατέρα 
κόσμου, 10.1a).128 Similarly, though perhaps more explicitly, Wisdom’s rewritten Exodus depicts 
the objects of Wisdom’s gracious Red Sea rescue (ῥύομαι) as a ‘holy people and blameless race’ 
(λαὸν ὅσιον καὶ σpiέρμα ἄμεμpiτον, 10.21) whose deliverance can be called a ‘reward’ (μισθός, 
10.17) for their labours. This use of μισθός, however, does not signal that Wisdom has 
transitioned from a gift-economy to a commercial metaphor. 129 That μισθός functions in both 
discourses, meaning either earned pay (e.g. Mos. 1.141, 2; Spec. 1.156; cf. Gen 29.15; Sir. 34.22; 
Luk 10.7) or fitting gift (Wis. 5.15; 10.17; cf. Spec. 4.98; Gen 15.1?),130 indicates that the economies 
are not antithetical; but neither are they indistinguishable. The difference between payment 
and gift is succinctly stated by Barclay: ‘Pay was based on calculable equivalence; it was 
contractual, legal and therefore necessary. By contrast, gifts were ill-defined in value, were 
personal and voluntary, and were therefore inherently noble’.131 Wisdom’s classification of the 
                                                        
128 In each instance, the duality of the Exodus pattern is reflected in the contrast between the fitting 
whom Wisdom rescues and the destruction of those who either pass by or depart from Wisdom. In this sense, 
these episodes are vignettes of divine justice in that they narrate the simultaneity of fitting grace and deserved 
destruction.    
129 A similar misreading occurs when Philo’s conjunction of χάρις and ἄξιος is interpreted as a 
deprecation of grace (D.A. Carson, ‘Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility in Philo’, NovT 23 [1981]: 148-64) 
or a confusion of categories (VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification, 27). 
130 Philo can also use γέρας and cognates in benefaction-discourse (e.g. Mos. 1.148). 
131 Barclay, ‘Believers and the “Last Judgment in Paul” (2010, unpublished), 9.  
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Exodus-event as a μισθός clearly belongs on this benefaction side of this economic divide. The 
Exodus is a gift, or more precisely the saving work of the gift (8.21; 10.15); but because it is 
fitting gift, it is both χάρις and μισθός, the latter indicating not so much earning – this is the 
wrong economy for that – as the equitability and rationality of divine beneficence.        
As argued above, the Exodus is the event of divine justice: the righteous are rescued and 
the ungodly are destroyed (10.18-19). It is the first half of this bipartite proposition that names 
the event of divine grace: διεβίβασεν αὐτοὺς θάλασσαν ἐρυθρὰν (10.18). Grace, then, while not 
reducible to and capable of qualifying justice, is operative within the parameters of justice.132 
God graciously saves the righteous (δίκαιοι, 10.20), not primarily because they are righteous, 
but because God is righteous (cf. 12.15). In this sense, the conditionality of divine grace evident 
in the necessary correspondence between gift and recipient is not about a calculable 
equivalence between human worth and subsequent divine benefaction (it is gift, not pay); it is 
about the stability of the cosmos and the goodness and justice of God. In other words, the 
patterned congruence between God’s gifts and those who receive them answers the theodicy 
question discriminant divine giving implicitly evokes: why does God give to some and not to 
others? The ἄξιος-χάρις link is thus an insistence that rather than being arbitrary, unfair and 
chaotic, God’s gracious activity coheres with the unalterably just moral universe he created: 
piάντα μέτρῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ καὶ σταθμῷ διέταξας, 11.20.  
 
Incongruous and Unconditioned Χάρις: Paul and the Unfitting Christ-Gift   
 Τῷ δὲ ἐργαζομένῳ ὁ μισθὸς οὐ λογίζεται κατὰ χάριν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ὀφείλημα (Rom 4.4). 
So says Paul, and so most assume. Gift and reward are supposed to be opposites and so, 
supposedly, speak different languages (e.g. χάρις, δωρεάν, χάρισμα and δίδωμι over against 
μισθός, ὀφείλημα, ἄξιος and γέρας). But, as demonstrated above, these allegedly antithetical 
lexical clusters combine in the single discourse of ancient benefaction. Χάρις is given to the 
ἄξιος and this gift is called a reward (μισθός, Wis. 10.17; γέρας, Mos. 1.148). However, rather 
than allowing this un-Pauline grammar to deconstruct assumptions about the univocity of 
grace, post-Pauline readers have often responded to this ‘fusion of opposites’ with incredulity. 
D.A. Carson, for example, betrays his semantic presuppositions by ‘correcting’ the Philonic 
                                                        
132 M.A. Seifrid’s (Justification By Faith: The Origin and Development of a Central Pauline Theme [Leiden: Brill, 
1992], 131) observation regarding the concept of mercy in the Psalms of Solomon is a bit too strong for Wisdom: 
‘The term no longer serves to express deliverance in spite of justice, but deliverance as justice rendered by God’.  
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phrase ‘worthy of grace’ with the theologically suggestive sic.133 Similarly, Chris 
VanLandingham argues from an assumed definition of grace to a disqualification of Philo’s use 
of the concept. Because God’s covenant with Abraham, which Philo interprets both as a 
particular gift and as a symbol of divine grace (Mut. 52), is depicted as ‘the reward for his 
search for God’ (citing Migr. 77), VanLandingham concludes that ‘considering what “grace” 
means, Philo’s portrayal of Abraham’s election cannot be characterized as such’.134 But what 
does grace mean? As noted above (and as argued at length in chapter three), for Wisdom, along 
with Seneca and Philo, grace means precisely what Carson and VanLandingham think it cannot 
mean: grace is an unearned though explainable benefit given to a suitable recipient. To 
criticize this conception of χάρις in terms of a categorical contrast between reward and grace 
is to miss both Paul’s peculiarity (see below) and the theological function of the ἄξιος- χάρις 
link: the fittingness of grace is not an indication of commercial exchange; it is a reflection of 
the rationality and goodness of the gift-giving God. 
 Read against this ubiquitous understanding of gift/grace in Paul’s social and theological 
context, Romans 4.4 sounds less like a platitude. To say that a reward (μισθός) for work is pay 
(ὀφείλημα) not gift (χάρις) is not to say the obvious; it is to say the possible. A μισθός can be 
either ὀφείλημα or χάρις (see above). It is this possible difference that Paul reframes as a 
categorical difference. Reward for work (τῷ ἐργαζομένῳ ὁ μισθός), or so Paul’s argument goes, 
is, by definition, not grace. But read in dialogue with Wisdom, especially Wisdom’s classification 
of the saving grace of the Exodus as a ‘reward for labour’ (μισθὸν κόpiων αὐτῶν, 10.17), this 
Pauline ‘definition’ presents itself as a re-definition. (A similar point could be made with 
regards to Romans 11.6: εἰ δὲ χάριτι, οὐκέτι ἐξ ἔργων, ἐpiεὶ ἡ χάρις οὐκέτι γίνεται χάρις.  
Interpreted in conversation with Wisdom, the seemingly self-evident claim that the 
introduction of works disqualifies the graciousness of grace reads more like an innovation in 
theological semantics than an argument from a universal a priori.) But where does this 
semantic innovation come from? Expressed in terms of our ongoing dialogue, if Wisdom can 
explicitly call the grace of the Exodus a ‘reward for labour’ why does Paul insist that a reward 
for work is not grace (χάρις)? One indication of an answer to this question comes in the 
                                                        
133 Carson, ‘Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility in Philo’, 160-62. 
134 VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification, 27.   
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antithesis between Romans 4.4 and 4.5.135 Grace is not reward for work (though Wisdom is able 
to describe the event of grace in those terms); grace is the justification of the ungodly. But this 
provocative prediction is not self-authenticating. To name God ‘the one who justifies the 
ungodly’ (ὁ δικαιῶν τὸν ἀσεβῆ) is not, as Dunn suggests, to ‘restate a theologoumenon’;136 it is 
to describe God’s justifying character in consequence of the event that effects justification. In 
other words, to say that God justifies the ungodly is to read the divine act that justifies sinners 
into the identity of God.137 Put this way, the antithesis between Romans 4.4 and 4.5 points 
behind itself to the event of grace which grounds justification, the event which Paul calls ‘the 
redemption that is in Christ Jesus’ (Rom 3.24).  
 As argued above, νυνὶ δέ identifies a rupture, a world-breaking and -building event that 
divides history and draws a line in the sand between contrasting theologies. Our previous 
discussion, however, was limited to the Pauline claim that this apparently illegal occurrence 
reveals, demonstrates and establishes the righteousness of God. What was not explored is that 
this justification of God and the godless is accomplished by what Alan Badiou calls ‘evental 
grace’.138 Whereas Wisdom subsumes the operations of divine grace within the parameters of 
divine justice, Paul describes the judgment that reveals God’s righteousness with the language 
of grace because it is a judgment that effects justification. In this sense, grace and 
righteousness are inextricably linked as mutually-interpreting ways of talking about the divine 
act that is Jesus’ history.139 Consequently, the grace that grounds justification (δικαιούμενοι 
δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι) is not reducible to a divine disposition; it is the Christ-event. In 
Bultmann’s words, ‘Righteousness…has its origin in God’s grace – i.e. in His act of grace 
                                                        
135 Jewett, Romans, 313 rightly describes the relationship between Romans 4.4 and 4.5 as antithetical.   
136 J.D.G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 367. Dunn’s attempt to 
neutralize the radicality of this Pauline claim in relation to the repeated prohibition against justifying the 
ungodly (e.g. Exod 23.7; Prov 17.15; 24.24; Isa 5.3; Sir. 9.12; CD 1.19) by appealing to the necessity of grace and the 
mechanisms of mercy in Israel’s scripture does little to blunt the offense of Paul’s predication.  
137 Read this way, Paul’s description of God as ‘the one who justifies the ungodly’ is a rethinking of God in 
relation to his action in Christ. As an interpretation of the Christ-event, and thus as Christology and theology, ‘the 
justification of the ungodly’ can properly be called a central Pauline theme (cf. Jüngel’s response to Barth’s 
insistence that ‘the articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae is not the doctrine of justification but its basis and 
culmination: the confession of Jesus Christ’ [CD IV/1, 527]: ‘this is precisely the function of justification: to convey 
the being and work of Christ for us’ [Justification, 28-29; italics added]).  
138 ‘Evental’ translates Badiou’s événementielle (e.g. Saint Paul, 7, 59). Though Badiou can say that the ‘pure 
event is reducible to this: Jesus died on the cross and resurrected’ (63), he qualifies this claim in his insistence that 
the cross is not part of the event but the ‘site’ of the event which is reducible to Jesus’ resurrection (70). As the 
following analysis of Romans 3.21-24 and 5.6-10 will show, to disassociate cross and event is to read against the 
grain of the Pauline text (cf. n. 60).    
139 Cf. Barth, CD II/1, 383.  
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accomplished in Christ’.140 To gloss Romans 3.24 accordingly, this is ‘justification by (a singular, 
evental) grace, (the content of which is) the redemption that is in Christ Jesus’. Grace then, to 
borrow a phrase from John Barclay, is the ‘Christ-gift’,141 an evental grace pro nobis that is 
simultaneously the Father’s gifting of the Son (Rom 8.32) and the Son’s gifting of himself (Gal 
2.20). It is the strangeness of this gift that occasions Paul’s redefinition of God’s grace (and, as 
noted above, his rethinking of the gracious God). 
 Romans 3.21-24 reveals two oddities about this gift, the latter of which produces a re-
description of God (Rom 4.5, see above) and a redefinition of God’s grace (5.6-10, see below). 
First, the Christ-gift is ‘apart from law’.142 As argued above, the revelation of divine 
righteousness is located in the christological gospel: the righteousness of God is revealed in 
and redefined as the divine act that is the single and saving history of Jesus. Klaus Haacker is 
thus mistaken to limit the theological range of χωρὶς νόμου to the rejection of the theory of 
justification by works.143 Because the apart-from-law revelation of God’s righteousness occurs 
in an event, that event is necessarily χωρὶς νόμου. Consequently, just as ‘apart from law’ 
signals the non-correspondence of the Christ-event and thus requires a rethinking of 
righteousness, the ‘trans-legality’ of the Christ-event, here interpreted as the Christ-gift, 
points to an incongruity between benefit and beneficiary which unavoidably entails a 
redefinition of χάρις. If, as argued above, ‘law’ names the condition of correspondence, a gift 
that is given χωρὶς νόμου is necessarily incongruent and unconditioned.  
This has two immediate consequences. First, if the Christ-gift is given apart from the 
criterion of correspondence and thus without prior condition – if all preset requirements of fit 
including the Jewish law are eliminated – then each person, however unfit, is a possible 
recipient of this particular grace. In other words, to repeat an observation made above, ‘no 
distinction’ (Rom 3.22b) is applicable both negatively with regard to anthropology (3.23) and 
                                                        
140 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, 284.  
141 Barclay, ‘Grace Within and Beyond Reason’, 17; cf. Barth, Romans, 31: ‘Grace is the gift of Christ’.  
142 Badiou describes the Pauline conception of grace as both ‘trans-legal’ and ‘illegal’ (Saint Paul, 76, 42). 
The latter classification, while a legitimate realisation of the potential meaning of χωρὶς νόμου, is ill suited to 
communicate the Pauline dialectic between God’s grace-in-Christ which is simultaneously χωρὶς νόμου and τέλος 
νόμου. As argued above, the Christ-event comes from outside the law, but it includes within its effects the 
fulfillment of the righteous requirement of the law (τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου, Rom 8.4). This two-sidedness is 
present in the insistence that the ‘law and the prophets’ witness to the apart-from-law event (Rom 3.21) and in 
the assertion that faith, rather than nullifying the law, actually establishes it (νόμον ἱστάνομεν, Rom 3.31). This 
dynamic will be more fully considered in chapter eight.  
143 K. Haacker, Der Brief des Paulus an die Römer (ThHK 6; Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1999), 93.  
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positively with regard to soteriology (3.22). In this sense χωρὶς νόμου grounds εἰς piάντας (3.21, 
22): the unconditionality implied by the absence of the criterion of correspondence erases any 
and all lines of anthropological division - οὐ...ἐστιν διαστολή.144  In this sense, the phrase εἰς 
piάντας τοὺς piιστεύοντας is not a mere repetition of ‘faith in Christ’ with the slight (but 
admittedly significant) addition of ‘all’;145 it is an assertion deduced from the mutually-
interpreting particulae exclusivae: if the revelation God’s righteousness occurs independently of 
the criterion of correspondence (χωρὶς νόμου) and as the Christ-gift (διὰ piίστεως Ἰησοῦ 
Χριστοῦ) then it is necessarily ‘for all’.146  
It is this dynamic that explains the link between Romans 3.21-28 and 3.29-30. It is not 
enough to say that Paul’s universalism derives from a rethinking of monotheism,147 nor is it 
sufficient to suggest that, in the interest of ‘Gentile rights’,148 Paul broke through the 
particularism of his religious heritage with the message of divine impartiality.149 The essential 
though regularly unasked question is, Why? – why did Paul rethink the implications of 
monotheism and why did he conclude that Gentile as well as Jew (and slave as well as free and 
female as well as male) were equally ‘qualified’ to receive God’s grace?150 The contrast with 
Wisdom here is suggestive. Whereas Wisdom insists that the benefaction of the one and gracious 
God is conditioned by the ethnic (Israel not Egypt), social (the father of the world, 10.1), 
intellectual (Wisdom’s pupils not those who reason wrongly, 2.1; 3.10) and moral (the 
                                                        
144 Lohse (Der Brief an die Römer, 132), correctly distinguishes between conditionality and the necessity of 
faith: ‘Gottes Gnadenerweis wird ohne jede Bedingung als Geschenk allen denen zugeeignet, die im Glauben den 
Zuspruch seines rechtfertigenden Urteils empfangen’.  
145 See e.g., Wright, Romans, 470.  
146 Badiou, Saint Paul, 77: ‘There is for Paul a fundamental link between universalism and charisma…. an 
essential link between the “for all” of the universal and the “without cause” [χωρὶς νόμου]’.   
147 N.T. Wright, for instance, refers to the echo of the Shema in Romans 3.30a and argues that Paul deduces 
from the oneness of God the necessary oneness of the family of God (‘Romans’, 482). What Wright does not say is 
why no one else praying the Shema came to this conclusion or why Paul did.  
148 This phrase alludes to Krister Stendahl’s well-known claim that ‘justification by faith was hammered 
out by Paul for the very specific and limited purpose of defending the rights of Gentile converts’ (Paul Among Jews 
and Gentiles [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976], 2).  
149 Especially influential in this regard is J.M. Bassler, Divine Impartiality: Paul and a Theological Axiom 
(SBLDS 59; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1982); cf. C.H. Cosgrove, Elusive Israel: The Puzzle of Election in 
Romans (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1997).  
150 D. Boyarin, A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994) is 
an exception to this trend as he notices the radicality of Paul’s universalism and thus asks why Paul mobilizes 
monotheism in this contextually unique way. However, his explanation in terms of a Pauline blending of the 
singularity of Israel’s God and the Hellenistic idea of the One differs significantly from the present christological 
emphasis. It should also be noted that while the current interpretative trend to emphasise Paul’s Gentile mission 
as the Sitz im Leben for Paul’s anthropological and soteriological universalism is correct to identify and stress 
Paul’s social and theological context, it often submerges the question about the motivation and rationale for 
Paul’s subversive theology and social practice.   
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righteous not the ungodly) worth of its recipients, the redemption that Paul proclaims 
operates apart from the criterion of correspondence and thus as an unconditioned gift (χωρὶς 
νόμου… δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι, 3.21, 24). It is because the Christ-gift requires no prior 
criterion of worth, including worth defined in terms of Jewish ethnicity and/or law-
observance, that it can extend to the unworthy, ‘Gentile sinners’ included (Gal 2.15). As Barclay 
remarks, ‘It is the call of this inexplicable grace…that forms the theological rationale for 
[Paul’s] culturally revolutionary communities of Jew and Gentile in Christ’.151 In other words, 
the impartiality of the one God is not for Paul a theological a priori; it is a deductive 
consequence of the impartial and unconditioned act of this one God in the giving of his Son. 
Grammatically, εἷς ὁ θεός is modified by the relative clause ὃς δικαιώσει piεριτομὴν ἐκ piίστεως 
 καὶ ἀκροβυστίαν διὰ τῆς piίστεως and thus, theologically, the one God is named or, to borrow 
an expression, ‘picked out’ by his act of justifying Jews and Gentiles by faith.152 The application 
of the Shema in 3.29-30a is therefore grounded in the singular soteriology of Romans 3.30b: 
God is the God of Jews and Gentiles because he is the one who justifies both by faith. It is 
therefore not monotheism per se that accounts for Pauline universalism; it is his 
reinterpretation of the implications of divine oneness in light of God’s unconditioned gift that 
grounds the salvific ‘no distinction’. 
That ‘no distinction’ is applied both positively (Rom 3.22) and negatively (3.23) brings 
us to our second implication of the non-correspondence of this event and, in turn, directs us to 
the second oddity of the Christ-gift. The implied incongruity of the apart-from-law gift points 
to an impossible possibility: incongruous and unconditioned grace. It is this implied 
incongruity that is made explicit in the connection between sinners and justification in 
Romans 3.23 -24. The positive linking of ‘for all’ and ‘no distinction’ (Rom 3.22) gives way to a 
negative connection between ‘no distinction’ and ‘all sinned’ (Rom 3.23).153 From Wisdom’s 
perspective, this is the end of grace; no fit means no gift. But, to fill one of Badiou’s more 
                                                        
151 Barclay, ‘Grace Within and Beyond Reason’, 16-17.  
152 The citation is from B.D. Marshall, ‘Christ and the Cultures: The Jewish People and Christian Theology’, 
in The Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine (ed. Colin E. Gunton; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 81-100 (96).  
153 Though rarely translated this way, the aorist of ἁμαρτάνω in conjunction with the loss of δόξα 
probably alludes to the complicity of all humanity in the Edenic trespass (cf. Rom 1.23; so Lohse, Der Brief an die 
Römer, 131; Wright, ‘Romans’, 470). If this is correct, then the connection between the Edenic fall and justification 
in Romans 3.23-24 may anticipate the extended reflection on Adam and Christ in Romans 5.12-19 in which the 
language of grace/gift and righteousness is again prevalent.   
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penetrating phrases with some Pauline content, ‘Paul names an unheard-of possibility’ (piάντες 
ἥμαρτον… δικαιούμενοι), ‘one dependent on evental grace’ (διὰ τῆς ἀpiολυτρώσεως τῆς ἐν 
Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ).154 As argued above, the objects of the divine saving action implied in the 
passive verb δικαιούμενοι (3.24) are the sinners of 3.23. This is a χάρις that cannot be called a 
μισθός. Whereas Wisdom uses reward language to identify the affinity between benefit and 
beneficiary and thus to underline the fittingness of the gift, the χάρις that Paul announces is 
emphatically not a μισθός because it evinces a contradiction rather than a correspondence 
between God’s gift and those who receive it. In other words, because the Christ-gift has sinners 
as its incongruous recipients, it is a nova gratia, an unfitting gift.155 This lack of fit between 
benefit and beneficiaries confirms Bultmann’s memorable phrase: ‘The paradox of grace is that 
it is precisely the transgressor, the sinner, to whom it applies.156  
As Wisdom would read Romans 3.23-24 this is precisely the paradox. It is not the 
existence of sinners or the graciousness of God that would surprise Wisdom; it is the application 
of divine grace to sinners that would not only surprise but indeed shock and scandalise 
Wisdom. In fact, Philo and Seneca would not even call this Pauline paradox grace. For Seneca, a 
benefit is not a benefit if it is not prompted by the rational selection of an appropriate 
recipient (De Beneficiis I.15.6). Similarly, Philo insists that gifts that are not given to appropriate 
beneficiaries, rather than being gifts, are, as Barclay summarises, ‘an empty display of wealth 
or even an act of misanthropy’ (Post. 142-47).157 Paul, however, is emphatic that it is the event 
which effects this disjunctive justification of sinners that is determinative for the definition of 
grace (δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι).158 To return to a text discussed above, because the Christ-gift 
is given to and justifies sinners, Paul can argue deductively from this event and claim, in 
                                                        
154 Badiou, Saint Paul, 43. Romans 5.17 interprets this gift-effected justification as itself a gift of 
righteousness (τῆς δωρεᾶς τῆς δικαιοσύνης). N.T. Wright (What Saint Paul Really Said: Was Paul of Tarsus the Real 
Founder of Christianity? [Grand Rapids: Eerdmanns, 1997], 98) is right to highlight the ridiculousness of receiving 
righteousness as if it was ‘a substance or a gas which can be passed across the courtroom’; but, as Westerholm 
(Perspectives Old and New, 275 n. 31) notes, ‘the absurdity of it all in no way alters the fact that Paul speaks of 
“receiving the abundant overflow of grace and of the gift of righteousness”’. For Paul, the ‘gift of righteousness’ is 
the Christ-gift – that is, Jesus who became righteousness for us (1 Cor 1.30).  
155 Haacker (Der Brief des Paulus an die Römer, 97) is of course right to emphasise that grace is not a novum, 
but his related claim that the only Pauline innovation is the connection between grace and Jesus fails to recognise 
its own ramifications. It is precisely the rethinking of grace in connection with the Christ-gift that occasions 
Paul’s radical redefinition.  
156 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, 282 (italics original).  
157 Barclay, ‘Grace Within and Beyond Reason’, 12.  
158 Lohse (Der Brief an die Römer, 132) notes that the gift-character of justification ‘wie sowohl durch 
δωρεὰν wie auch durch τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι unterstrichen wird’.  
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contrast to Wisdom, that a μισθός for work is not χάρις (Rom 4.4). Again, this is not because a 
reward for work could never be construed as grace (Wisdom explicitly demonstrates that it 
could); it is because the gift is not a reward for work. For Wisdom, to call a gift a reward is not to 
call it payment; it is to call it congruent, conditioned and fitting. It is because Paul daringly, 
and from Wisdom’s perspective dangerously, deduces the definition of grace from the 
incongruous, unconditioned and unfitting giving of Christ that he insists on the semantic 
separation of μισθός and χάρις. In other words, it is because the Christ-gift justifies sinners 
apart from law that Paul redefines grace in opposition to reward for work and as ‘the 
justification of the ungodly’ (Rom 4.4-5; cf. 11.5-6). The Pauline conception of unconditioned 
grace is grounded in the unconditioned gift.   
Rather than qualifying this radical redefinition, Paul, in Romans 5.6-10, parades the 
incongruity of the Christ-gift. Romans 5.15-21 is Paul’s most concentrated discussion of 
grace,159 but the repeated references to gift/grace in this paragraph refer back to 5.6-10. The 
content, effect and incongruity of this gift all point in this direction. First, in terms of content, 
the gift is christological. God’s grace (ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ) is inseparable from the Christ-gift (ἡ 
δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι τῇ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώpiου Ἰησοῦ Χριστου, 5.15).160 Second, the gift effects 
justification (τὸ χάρισμα…εἰς δικαίωμα, 5.16; cf. 5.17-19). Third, the gift is given incongruously 
(χάρισμα ἐκ piολλῶν piαραpiτωμάτων, 5.16).161 This christological, justification-effecting and 
incongruous gift directs us back to Romans 5.6-10 where both the content and the 
contradiction of the Christ-gift are given their sharpest (and most shocking) focus. 
The gift to which Romans 5.15-17 refers is named in Romans 5.6-10; it is the justifying 
(5.9) and disjunctive (5.6-8) death of Christ. Elsewhere Paul can flaunt the logically foolish and 
theologically scandalous content of this event (1 Cor 1.18-23), but in this context, as in Romans 
3.23-24, it is the objects of grace that signal its oddity. The grammar of 5.6-8 makes this point. 
The explanatory γάρ that opens v.7 promises an explication of the claim of v.6,162 but the 
                                                        
159 χάρισμα, 5.15, 16; χάρις, 5.15 (2X), 17, 20, 21; δωρεά, 5.15, 17; δώρημα, 5.16.  
160 Jewett, Romans, 381: ‘The χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ…is depicted in tandem with ἡ δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι’.     
161 Cranfield, Romans, 1.286: ‘that the accumulated sins and guilt of all the ages should be answered by 
God’s free gift, this is the miracle of miracles, utterly beyond human comprehension’. It should be stressed, 
however, that the ‘miracle’ here is not that God is gracious; it is that God’s gift ‘follows many trespasses’ and thus, 
as the contradiction between piαράpiτωμα and δικαίωμα implies, has trespassers as its incongruous recipients. A 
similar pattern is evident in Romans 5.20 where the abundance of sin (ἐpiλεόνασεν ἡ ἁμαρτία), rather than 
disqualifying the operations of divine grace, is met with a super-abundance of grace (ὑpiερεpiερίσσευσεν ἡ χάρις).        
162 Moo, Romans, 308 n.72.   
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adversative δέ of v.8 indicates that this explanation is made by way of antithesis:163 the grace 
which Paul proclaims is not self-sacrifice for the righteous and/or the good.164 As with Romans 
4.4 and 11.6, however, this antithesis is not as obvious as it first appears. Rather than being 
something other than grace, the ‘gift of death’ (to borrow a Derridean phrase)165 for noble 
persons and righteous causes was regularly regarded as the epitome of benefaction.166 While 
the quality of the beneficiaries of this supreme act of self-giving render the gift explainable, it 
remains emphatically unearned. Explainable but unearned, this is precisely what Wisdom calls 
χάρις. But this is merely to raise again the question about the peculiarly Pauline definition of 
χάρις: if self-sacrifice for the righteous and/or good is theoretically gracious, why does Paul 
contrast (δέ) divine grace with this hypothetical act of heroism (5.7-7)? The answer, as above, 
is not that the gift of one’s life for a worthy person is not a gift (that is exactly what Wisdom 
would call it); the answer is that the gift is not a death for the righteous and/or the good. The 
gift is Christ crucified for the ungodly (ὑpiὲρ ἀσεβῶν ἀpiέθανεν, 5.6). 
In antithesis to the fitting gift of Romans 5.7 Paul announces the utter incongruity of 
God’s grace-in-Christ. Following Käsemann through the syntactical thickets of 5.6, the two 
appearances of ἔτι,167 taking the first with the genitive absolute (ὄντων ἡμῶν ἀσθενῶν) and 
the second with the verb (ἀpiοθνῄσκω), ‘present the same paradox’.168 The time of the cross 
was the time of human weakness and ungodliness. Thus, in Käsemann’s words, ‘Christ did his 
saving work at an unexpected and, morally considered, even inappropriate moment’.169 ‘Christ 
                                                        
163 Jewett, Romans, 360.  
164 Regardless of whether or not δίκαιος and ἀγαθός are synonymous, Paul’s point is unambiguously that, 
however unlikely in practice, it is reasonable to imagine the possibility of self-sacrifice for a righteous and/or 
good person. For the synonymous reading see O. Kuss, Der Römerbrief übersetzt und erklärt (3 vols; Regensburg: 
Pustet, 1957-78), 1.208-209; F. Wisse, ‘The Righteous Man and the Good Man in Romans v.7’, NTS 19 (1972-73): 92-
93. Those who distinguish between the two terms include Dunn, Romans, 1.255; A.D. Clarke, ‘The Good and the Just 
in Romans 5.7’, TynB 41 (1990): 128-32.    
165 This phrase is taken from the title of Derrida’s well known essay on gift, The Gift of Death (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995).  
166 Jewett (Romans, 360 n.158) cites Isocrates Arch. 107; Lycurgus Leoc. 86.2; Philo Agr. 3.156; Diodorus 
Siculus Hist. 9.2.6.3. Stuhlmacher (Romans, 81) adds Plato, Apology 32a; Dio Cassius 80.20; Sirach 4.28; 1 Clement 
55.1. J.R. Harrison (Paul’s Language of Grace in its Greco-Roman Context [WUNT II.172; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003], 
225) references a number of additional sources, but his reading assumes that ὁ ἀγαθός of Romans 5.7b refers to a 
benefactor (which seems too narrow in this context) and thus his parallel texts are restricted to instances of a 
beneficiary dying for his benefactor.   
167 While the variant in B copsa (εἴ γε...ἔτι) is smoother than the double ἔτι it is difficult to account for the 
repetition in terms of scribal innovation. Thus, as it is both the lectio difficilior and the reading with the 
substantially stronger external evidence, the following exegesis takes ἔτι γὰρ...ἔτι as its textual base. 
168 Käsemann, Romans, 137.   
169 Käsemann, Romans, 137. 
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died for the ungodly’, writes Calvin, ‘when we were in no way worth (dignus) or fit (idoneus)’. 170 
Read this way, κατὰ καιρόν is not an apocalyptic reference to ‘the right time’, but indicates 
that the moment of the cross coincides with the ungodliness of those for whom Christ died (ἔτι 
κατὰ καιρὸν ὑpiὲρ ἀσεβῶν ἀpiέθανεν).171 The καιρός of the cross excludes the possibility of prior 
human fittingness. Entering the ‘still’ (ἔτι) of post-Adamic history (5.12-19), the Christ-gift 
cannot come as a ‘correspondingly’; it is necessarily a ‘nevertheless’.172 This is the sense in 
which 5.7 provides an antithetical explication of the Christ-gift. The gift of Christ crucified 
does not have the righteous and/or the good as its reasonable beneficiaries. On the contrary, 
at a time when the ungodly and weak were precisely that, Christ died for the ungodly 
(Χριστὸς…ὑpiὲρ ἀσεβῶν ἀpiέθανεν).173 The δέ of 5.8 confirms this contrast and further flaunts 
the inexplicability of the Christ-gift. Whereas Wisdom’s eschatological reactivation of the 
Exodus implies that God’s salvific love rescues the righteous, Paul proclaims the death of Christ 
for sinners (ἁμαρτωλῶν ὄντων) – an inclusive class of humanity that is contrasted with the 
δίκαιος of v.7 – as the definitive demonstration of divine love (συνίστησιν δὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ 
ἀγάpiην εἰς ἡμᾶς ὁ θεός).174  
The tension here is acute. Paul locates the demonstration of divine love (5.8) and 
righteousness (3.21) in a gift given to those whom Wisdom consistently depicts as the fitting 
recipients of divine judgment (ἀξίαν θεοῦ κρίσιν, Wis. 12.26). While the righteous are rescued, 
their ungodly (ἀσεβής, 10.20) and sinful (ἁμαρτωλός, 19.13) enemies (ἐχθρός, 10.19) are 
destroyed. Paul, of course, can grant the deservedness of this destruction (τὰ ὀψώνια τῆς 
ἁμαρτίας θάνατος, Rom 6.23a; cf. 1.32), but the gift he announces does not ‘fit’; it is given to 
those whose proper payment is death, but the incongruous gift is eternal life in Christ Jesus  
(τὸ δὲ χάρισμα τοῦ θεοῦ ζωὴ αἰώνιος ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησου, 6.23b). It is thus, in Wisdom’s terms, 
those who are the objects of God’s fitting judgment who are also the recipients of his unfitting 
                                                        
170 Calvin, Romans, 195. Benefits given to those who are not dignus is exactly the social problem Seneca’s 
De Beneficiis attempts to redress (cf. I.1.2) 
171 Wilckens, Römer, 1.295 n.973; Jewett, Romans, 358.  
172 K. Barth, Christ and Adam: Man and Humanity in Romans 5 (SJTOP 5; trans. T.A. Smail; Edinburgh: Oliver 
and Boyd, 1956), 2: ‘In the death of Christ God has intervened on our behalf in the “nevertheless” of His free 
grace’.   
173 Lohse, Römer, 170: ‘Christus aber starb nicht nur für einen einzelnen und dazu auch guten Menschen, 
sondern für diejenigen, die in gar keiner Weise Liebe verdient hätten. Er gab sein Leben für Gottlose, für Sunder 
dahin’.  
174 Harrison, Paul’s Language of Grace, 225 notes the radicality of this Pauline claim vis-à-vis systems of 
benefaction: ‘In the view of Paul, the death of Christ surpasses in scope all contemporary Graeco-Roman 
beneficence precisely because it was conditioned by ἀγάpiη rather than reciprocity [or perhaps better, worth]’.   
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gift of righteousness – that is, the gift of Jesus Christ who became righteousness for us (1 Cor 
1.30). The Christ-gift, rather than locating the worthy (cf. Wis. 6.16), encounters the ungodly 
(ἀσεβής, 5.6), the sinner (ἁμαρτωλός, 5.8), the enemy (ἐχθρός, 5.10) and re-names its 
beneficiaries ex contrario: it justifies sinners (5.9a) and reconciles enemies (5.10a).175   
Wisdom’s author would no doubt interject at this point. As emphasised above, Wisdom’s 
is a theology of grace, but not this grace. Paul cites an incongruous and unconditioned gift as 
the revelation of divine righteousness and love. But for Wisdom it is precisely that which Paul 
negates (i.e. the correspondence between God’s gifts and human worth) that ensures that the 
benefaction of the gifting God is just and good. Thus, from Wisdom’s perspective, Paul’s 
redefinition of χάρις is simultaneously deluded and dangerous. Paul, however, would resist this 
a priori argumentation. The gracious God and the grace of God are not abstractions; God and his 
grace are known in his gift. As Watson indicates, ‘For Paul, the question who God is can best be 
answered by reference to what God does…. Divine being and divine action are inseparable from 
one another, and no distinction is drawn between how God is in se and ad extra’.176 Paul names 
God (in se) with verbal predicates (ad extra). God is ‘the one who raised Jesus from the dead’ (ὁ 
ἐγείρας Ἰησοῦν ἐκ νεκρῶν, Rom 4.24b), ‘who did not spare his own Son but gave him up for us 
all (ὅς γε τοῦ ἰδίου υἱοῦ οὐκ ἐφείσατο ἀλλὰ ὑpiὲρ ἡμῶν piάντων piαρέδωκεν αὐτόν, Rom 8.32), 
and thus ‘who justifies the ungodly’ (ὁ δικαιῶν τὸν ἀσεβῆ, Rom 4.5). God, in other words, is the 
God of the Christ-gift; the one who ‘was in Christ reconciling the world to himself’ (θεὸς ἦν ἐν 
Χριστῷ κόσμον καταλλάσσων ἑαυτῷ), and this in spite of their trespasses (μὴ λογιζόμενος 
αὐτοῖς τὰ piαραpiτώματα αὐτῶν, 2 Cor 5.19). Paul’s theology of God’s grace and the gracious God 
is thus a daring, and from Wisdom’s perspective dangerous, deduction. Paul theologises from the 
Christ-gift to the definition of divine grace. It is this risky, a posteriori theo-logic that accounts 
for the contextually non-commonsensical assertion of Romans 4.4 (and 5.7; 11.6). Grace, for 
Paul, is not reward for work or heroic self-sacrifice; grace is that which is given to and justifies 
the ungodly. But this is not because the former conceptions are intrinsically ungracious; it is 
because the Christ-gift, which is given to and justifies the ungodly, is determinative for Paul’s 
                                                        
175 The Qal waḥomer argument (or a minori ad maius inference) in 5.9, 10 further emphasises the 
inexplicable effect of the gift (Wilckens, Römer, 1.298). As Cranfield suggests, the eschatological salvation of those 
whom God calls righteous is ‘very easy’ when compared to the ‘really difficult thing’ that is the creative and 
incongruous gift that grounds this re-naming (Romans, 1.266).   
176F. Watson, ‘The Triune Divine Identity: Reflections on Pauline God-Language, in Disagreement with 
J.D.G. Dunn’ JSNT 80 (2000): 99-124.  
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theology. In other words, Paul does not argue from a definition of grace; he argues for a 
definition of grace in consequence of God’s act of grace. It is thus the unconditionality (χωρὶς 
νόμου) and incongruity (ἀσεβής, ἁμαρτωλός, ἐχθρός) of the Christ-gift that determines the 
Pauline vision of unconditioned and incongruous grace.  
 
Conclusion: Descriptive and Deductive Definitions 
 Contemplating the puzzle of the doctrine of justification, Karl Barth asks what ‘the 
concepts grace and right’ mean and how they relate.177 The thesis of this chapter has been that 
Romans and Wisdom, though they both employ the conceptualities of grace and righteousness, 
provide fundamentally different answers to these questions: grace and righteousness are not 
univocal concepts. For Wisdom, the answer to these heuristic questions is anchored in the pre-
creational moral order and paradigmatically instantiated in the Exodus. God’s righteousness is 
the consistent correspondence between the form of divine action (salvation or destruction) 
and those towards whom he acts (righteous or ungodly). Within these parameters, grace, while 
capable of qualifying and therefore not reducible to justice, operates within and exhibits the 
patterns of justness, of congruence between benefit and beneficiary. In this sense, divine 
benefaction is an instantiation of divine justice: grace is an unearned though explainable 
exercise of divine favour directed towards a fitting recipient that demonstrates the justness of 
the gracious God. 
 For Paul, the righteousness and grace of God are not exemplified in an event; divine 
righteousness and grace are an event. More precisely, righteousness and grace are Pauline 
ways of describing the divine act that is the single and saving history of Jesus. For this reason, 
the Pauline notions of grace and righteousness are inextricably linked – to speak of divine 
grace is to speak of divine righteousness, and vice versa, because both forms of speech are 
mutually-interpreting ways of talking about Jesus. For Paul, the righteousness of God and the 
grace of God just are the divine saving act that is identical to Jesus’ single history. It is because 
the righteous and gracious act of God in Jesus is a saving grace that is given to sinners in the 
form of a righteousness that enacts judgment and effects justification that Paul rethinks the 
meaning of grace and righteousness. Consequently, the Pauline definitions of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ 
                                                        
177 Barth, CD IV/1, 519.  
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and χάρις are re-definitions; they are deduced from and descriptive of the Christ-gift: 
disjunctive δικαιοσύνη and unconditioned χάρις. Barth captures this:   
The Christian message [or at least the Pauline gospel] does not at its heart express a 
concept or an idea, nor does it recount an anonymous history to be taken as truth and 
reality only in concepts and ideas…. it recounts a history…in such a way that it declares 
a name, binding the history strictly and indissolubly to this name and presenting it as 
the story of the bearer of this name. This means that all the concepts and ideas used in this 
report [Barth mentions grace but we could no doubt add righteousness] can derive their 
significance only from the bearer of this name and from his history, and not the reverse. They 
cannot have any independent importance or role based on a quite different prior 
interpretation. They cannot say what has to be said with some meaning of their own or 
in some context of their own abstracted from this name. They can serve only to describe 
this name – the name of Jesus Christ.178 
  
                                                        
178 Barth, CD IV/1, 16-17 (italics added).  
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Chapter 8 
With the Grain of the Universe: History and Hermeneutics in Wisdom 
10-19 and Romans 9-11 
 
If the Bible is right, this world’s gonna explode – Bob Dylan 
 
The author of Wisdom of Solomon and the Paul of Romans read the same texts, yet they read 
them differently.1 This is both an introduction to this chapter and an explanation of the wide 
continuity and deep discontinuity that characterised the conversation between Paul and 
Wisdom imagined in the previous two: the recurrent points of contact are not coincidences of 
formal convergence but products of a shared textual inheritance; the recurrent points of 
debate are not accidental material divergences but products of different readings. In other 
words, what connects Paul and Wisdom is a canon – they read the same texts – 
what separates them is a hermeneutic – they read them differently.2  
The conversation between the author of Wisdom and Paul has thus far been marked by a 
movement from dialogue to debate. Wisdom and Paul are both concerned with the bipartite 
structuring of humanity, but whereas Wisdom works to reinforce the Jew/Gentile distinction 
Paul attempts to reduce that anthropological fraction to a single denominator, homo 
peccator (chapter six). Wisdom and Paul both use the words χάρις and δικαιοσύνη, but they 
deploy them in incommensurable theological grammars – Wisdom to describe and guarantee 
the moral order, Paul to describe the event that justifies the ungodly (chapter seven). In both 
cases, it was suggested that the essential fault-line is christological: Paul reinterprets the 
human situation in the shadow of the cross and redefines grace and righteousness as 
descriptions of Jesus’ single and saving history. What was underemphasised in those chapters, 
                                                        
1 This is an adaption of Francis Watson’s methodological observation: ‘Paul and his fellow-Jews read the 
same texts, yet read them differently’ (Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith [London: T&T Clark, 2004], ix).  
2 Watson notes that ‘In Romans 3.1-2, Paul views the reception, preservation and propagation of the texts 
of scripture as the primary reason to reaffirm the unique significance of Jewishness’ and argues that ‘Paul remains 
Jewish as he argues [with other Jews]...not because many other Jews were saying the same thing (they were not), 
but because Paul…is concerned wholly with intra-Jewish issues of scriptural interpretation and hermeneutics’ 
(Hermeneutics, ix, 27). Cf. J.A. Linebaugh, ‘Paul’s (Re)Reading of Israel’s Scripture: 2 Corinthians 3.6b-14’, Trinity 
Journal for Theology and Ministry 3 (2009): 111-130: ‘Paul’s Jewish identity is hermeneutically significant because, as 
a Jew, his theology is hermeneutical’.  
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however, is that Paul’s christologically-determined anthropology and theological vocabulary 
come to expression in and as interpretations of Israel’s scripture: the unveiling of the single, 
sinful human under the Jew/Gentile divide (Rom 3.9) is announced in the voice of the 
psalmists, sages and prophets (Rom 3.10-18), and the redefining of righteousness takes the 
form of a rereading of Habakkuk 2.4 and Genesis 15.6 (Rom 1.17; 3.21-4.25). In this sense, 
Richard Hays is right: ‘Israel’s Scripture is the “determinative subtext” that plays a constitutive 
role in shaping [Paul’s] literary production’.3 But again, to sharpen the point, it is precisely this 
‘determinative subtext’ that Wisdom and Paul have in common: Israel’s scripture is constitutive 
of the radically dissimilar theologies of Romans and Wisdom. For this reason, Hays’ quite 
correct observation that Pauline theology is ‘intertextual in character’4 is, in comparative 
terms, to raise rather than answer the hermeneutical question. Because Wisdom and Romans 
are both instances of intertextual theology and, to borrow a concept from Watson, because 
both texts are locatable within a ‘single intertextual field’5 – i.e., because they read the same 
texts – the crucial comparative question is: why do the author of Wisdom and the Paul of 
Romans read the same texts differently?    
The aim of this chapter is to answer this question by comparing the similar yet deeply 
different retellings of Israel’s history in Wisdom 10-19 and Rom 9-11. My thesis is that the 
hermeneutical fault-line that divides Wisdom 10-19 and Romans 9-11 is identical to the 
christological fault-line identified in the previous chapters: Wisdom’s hermeneutic is Exodus-
shaped; Paul’s hermeneutic is Christ-shaped.6 More fully expressed, Wisdom reads under the 
                                                        
3 R.B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 16. I would 
thus want to join Hays in distancing myself from Harnack’s insistence that Paul’s engagement with scripture is 
only an ad hoc missionary reaction to Judaizing opponents (‘Das Alte Testament in den paulinischen Briefen und 
in den paulinischen Gemeinden’, Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-
historische Klasse [1928]: 124-41, quoted in Hays, Echoes, 7 n.16). Closer to the mark is J.R. Wagner’s suggestion 
that Paul’s reading of Israel’s scripture was shaped by his apostolic mission and message and that his apostolic 
mission and message were informed by his reading of Israel’s scripture (Heralds of the Good News: Isaiah and Paul ‘In 
Concert’ in the Letter to the Romans [NovTSup 101; Leiden: Brill, 2002], 3). Watson is therefore correct to argue for a 
dialogical rather than unilateral relationship between Paul’s gospel and Paul’s interpretative activity 
(Hermeneutics, 16-17), but, as will become evident below, the relationship between Christ and scripture is both 
reciprocal and asymmetrical: ‘[Paul’s] hermeneutic’, as J.L Martyn remarks,  ‘works from the previously unknown 
and foolish gospel of the cross to the previously known and previously misunderstood scripture’ and, as Martyn 
does not say, back again (‘John and Paul on the Subject of Gospel and Scripture’, in Theological Issues in the Letters of 
Paul [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997], 221).    
4 Hays, Echoes, 16.  
5 Watson, Hermeneutics, 5.  
6 To call Wisdom’s hermeneutic ‘Exodus-shaped’ is a short-hand for referring to the paradigmatic function 
of Wisdom’s symmetrical construal of the Rea Sea crossing examined in chapter four (see Wis. 10.15-21; 19.1-22). 
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educational agency of σοφία (Wis. 7.7, 13, 17-22) and thereby learns to construe history as 
anticipations and recapitulations of Exodus’ paradigmatic exemplification of the stable and 
lawful creational order (Wis. 10.1-11.16; 16.1-19.21).7 Paul’s reading, by contrast, is occasioned 
by, oriented towards, and patterned after God’s act of raising the crucified Jesus from the dead 
for the justification of sinners. Thus, whereas the author of Wisdom has learned ‘the beginning 
and end and middle of times’ (ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος καὶ μεσότητα χρόνων, 7.18) from the ‘fashioner 
of all things’ (ἡ piάντων τεχνῖτις, 7.21) and therefore rereads and rewrites history as a repeated 
concretion of the theological and cosmological fact that God has ‘ordered all things by measure 
and number and weight’ (11.20),8 Paul reads Israel’s scripture as a typological testimony to the 
cosmos-crucifying-and-recreating Christ-event (Gal 6.14) and so interprets history according 
to a destabilising dialectic: life out of death, justification out of ungodliness, creation out of 
nothing. Stated as a thesis, Paul’s hermeneutic is determined by the centrifugal significance of 
the Christ-event: the divine act that is the single and saving history of Jesus constitutes 
scripture’s ‘now of legibility’,9 the time at which the ‘law and prophets’ are recognisable as 
witnesses to God’s act in Christ, as that singular event uncovers anticipations of itself in the 
Old Testament.10 Thus, to answer my heuristic question, the author of Wisdom and the Paul of 
Romans read the same texts differently because Paul reads post Christum.11    
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Paul, as will be evident below, has his own interpretation of elements of the text of Exodus (see especially Rom 
9.15-23).    
7 See chapters four and five for a full discussion of Wisdom’s rereading and rewriting of the pentateuchal 
narrative.  
8 Cf. J.M.G. Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace: Approaching Romans 9-11 from The Wisdom Solomon’, in Between 
Gospel and Election (WUNT 257; ed. F. Wilk and J.R. Wagner; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010): 91-110.  
9 Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans (tran. P. Dailey; 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 145 uses the phrase ‘Das Jetzt der Lesbarkeit’ to summarise and define 
the hermeneutic of Walter Benjamin. See W. Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, in Illuminations: 
Essays and Reflections (ed. H. Arendt; trans. H. Zohn (New York: Schocken Book, 1968), 253-64; idem, The Arcades 
Project (ed. H. Arendt; trans. H. Eiland and K. McLaughlin; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 463.   
10 Cf. D. Harink, ‘Time and Politics in Four Commentaries on Romans’, in Paul, Philosophy, and the 
Theopolitical Vision: Critical Engagment with Agamben, Badiou, Žižek, and Others (ed. D. Harink; Eugene: Cascade, 2010): 
282-312 (306).   
11 For a similar account of Paul’s hermeneutic, one which sees ‘Das Alte Testament als  integraler 
Bestandteil des Evangelium’ while insisting that the Old Testament is ‘ein integrales Element’ of the gospel ‘in 
seiner Interpretatio Christiana’, see F. Hahn, Theologie des Neuen Testament (2 Vols.; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 
1.195-201; cf. 2.38-142.  
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Christomorphic Historiography: Romans 9-11 
 Paul’s apostolic kerygma, which is identical to the proclamation of Jesus Christ,12 is a 
revelation of a mystery that Israel’s scriptures silently contained but now (νῦν) publicly speak 
(Rom 16.25-26). According to Romans 1.1-4, the ‘holy scriptures’ are God speaking the gospel of 
his Son Jesus Christ in promissory form, but, as Romans 3.21 indicates, the hermeneutical 
transition from promise to witness occurs in the ‘now’ of the revelation of God’s righteousness 
in and as the Christ-event: νυνὶ δὲ…δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ piεφανέρωται μαρτυρουμένη ὑpiὸ τοῦ 
νόμου καὶ τῶν piροφητῶν. In other words, the ‘law and the prophets’ are a pre-saying of the 
gospel and so, for Paul, the apostolic act of speaking the gospel entails a christological re-
saying of Israel’s scripture.13 Romans 9-11, I want to argue, is this kind of christological re-
saying. 
 Wisdom 10-19 and Romans 9-11 are in many ways parallel texts.14 In general terms, both 
texts respond to a present crisis by appealing to a programmatic canonical pattern that 
provides hope as it is projected into the future. More specifically, both uncover this pattern 
through a series of exegetical case-studies (Wis. 10.1-14; Rom 9.6-18) and both finally insist that 
God is unalterably committed to Israel (Wis. 10.15; 19.22; Rom 9.6; 11.1, 26). Both authors are 
preoccupied with divine mercy and its relationship to God’s righteousness and power, and, as 
Barclay notes, ‘both make appeal in this context to God’s will (Wis. 11.25; 12.18; Rom 9.18), 
God’s patience (Wis. 12.8-10; Rom 9.22) and God’s call (Wis. 11.25; Rom 9.7, 12, 25)’.15 Both texts 
assert the categorical difference between created and uncreated being, both employ the image 
of the potter (Wis. 15.7; Rom 9.21) and both assert the unquestionable freedom of God (Wis. 
11.21; 12.12; Rom 9.19-21). In short, there is a wide continuity between Wisdom 10-19 and 
Romans 9-11.  
                                                        
12 R. Jewett, Romans (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), 1005: the phrase τὸ κήρυγμα Ἰησοῦ 
Χριστοῦ (Rom 16.25) is a ‘clarification of “gospel” as “the preaching of Jesus Christ”’. Jewett argues extensively for 
regarding Romans 16.25-27 as an interpolation (Romans, 998-1002), but even if this argument is accepted, the 
doxology recapitulates the hermeneutical point of Romans 1.1-4 and therefore, for our purposes, can be read as 
Pauline in theological content, if not literary construction.   
13 That Romans is, at least in part, an epistolary fulfillment of Paul’s desire to preach the gospel in Rome 
(Rom 1.15) helps to account for its high concentration of scriptural citations and allusions. According to Dietrich-
Alex Koch, fifty-one of the eighty-nine quotations from the Old Testament in the undisputed Pauline letters occur 
in Romans (Die Schrift als Zeuge des Evangeliums: Untersuchungen zur Verwendung und zum Verständnis der Schrift bei 
Paulus (BHT 69; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1986), 21-24. 
14 W. Sanday and A.C. Headlam, The Epistle to the Romans (ICC; New York: Scribner’s, 1896), 267-69; Barclay, 
‘Unnerving Grace’, 104-105.  
15 Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 105.  
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But there is also deep discontinuity. This chapter will offer a reading of Romans 9-11 in 
conversation with Wisdom 10-19 in an attempt to uncover this discontinuity and identify its 
christological basis. In contrast to Wisdom’s σοφία-taught and Exodus-shaped hermeneutic, I 
intend to argue that the three major sections of Romans 9-11 (9.6-29; 9.30-10.21; 11.1-32)16 are 
christologically occasioned and christologically ordered: Paul’s historiography has its centre of 
gravity in the Christ-event (Rom 9.30-10.21), Israel’s scriptural past is a typological and 
prophetic testimony to this singular occurrence (9.6-29) and Israel’s present and future is an 
effect of this concrete christological cause (11.1-32).17 Put another way, Paul’s hermeneutic is 
‘christomorphic’18 – Jesus’ history is the mould in which all history is cast. And it is this 
christological recasting of Israel’s past, present and future that accounts for the contrast 
between the thoroughgoing rationality and stability of Wisdom’s pentateuchal rewrite and 
Paul’s deeply unsettling and deeply hopeful historiography.  
 
The Christ-Shaped Pattern of Election: Romans 9.6-29 
‘To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it “the way it really was”. 
It means to seize hold of memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger’.19 This thesis of 
Walter Benjamin captures the pathos and present-tense of Paul’s historiography in Romans 
9.6-29. The confident exclamation about the unchangeable and unconquerable love of God that 
closes Romans 8 gives way, without grammatical warning, to ‘great pain’ and ‘constant grief’ 
(Rom 9.2). Paul’s present is defined by the contradiction between Israel’s possession of God’s 
covenant privileges and promises (Rom 9.4-5) and the unnerving irony that the advent of 
Israel’s Christ (cf. 9.5) has occasioned Israel’s stumble (9.32; cf. 11.11, 17). In the face of this 
catastrophic contradiction, Paul, like Moses in the aftermath of the Golden Calf disaster (Exod 
                                                        
16 Cf. Florian Wilk’s proposal that Romans 9-11 should be divided into two main sections, one 
argumentative (9.6-10.21), the other paraenetic (11.1-24) (‘Rahmen und Aufbau Römer 9-11’, in Between Gospel and 
Election (WUNT 257; ed. F. Wilk and J.R. Wagner; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010): 227-253.   
17 Watson distances himself from the tradition of relating Romans 9 and Romans 10 in terms of divine 
sovereignty and Israel’s responsibility (e.g. C.K. Barrett, ‘Romans 9.30-10.21: Fall and Responsibility of Israel’, in 
Essays on Paul [London: SPCK, 1982], 132-53; J.A. Fitzmyer, Romans [AB 33; London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1992], 576; E. 
Lohse, Der Brief an die Römer [KEK 4; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003], 270, 284). Watson’s suggestion 
that Romans 9.6-29 and 9.30-10.21 relate as ‘the scriptural testimony to election/rejection and its concrete 
realization in Christ’ is similar to my proposal (Hermeneutics, 21 n.41).   
18 J.M.G. Barclay, ‘Paul’s Story: Theology as Testimony’, in Narrative Dynamics in Paul: A Critical Assessment 
(ed. B.W. Longenecker; Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002), 153.   
19 W. Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, 255.  
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32.30-32), wishes he could be ἀνάθεμα ἀpiὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ for the sake of his ‘kinsfolk according 
to the flesh’ (Rom 9.3).20 It is in the context of this crisis that Paul rereads Israel’s scripture. To 
adapt Benjamin’s thesis, Paul’s articulation of the past in Romans 9 occurs in ‘a moment of 
danger’ – that is, Paul’s reinterpretation of Israel’s history (9.6-18) and reactivation of Israel’s 
prophetic traditions (9.19-29) is motivated by, oriented towards and, as I will argue, patterned 
after the present christological crisis. 
 
(1) The Typological Testimony: Romans 9.6-1821 
Wisdom concludes its re-narration of pentateuchal history with a confident celebration 
of God’s immutable faithfulness to Israel (Wis. 19.22). Paul begins his reinterpretation of Israel’s 
scriptural past with a similar thesis: Οὐχ οἷον δὲ ὅτι ἐκpiέpiτωκεν ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ (Rom 9.6).22 
These similar sounding assertions, however, summarize fundamentally different readings of 
history. Wisdom’s conclusion is built on the stable and symmetrical activity of God in 
accordance with the worth of respective human subjects – σοφία brought the holy people 
through deep waters and drowned their ungodly enemies (Wis. 10.17-20). Paul’s thesis, when 
read from the vantage point of Wisdom, introduces a rereading of scripture that appears intent 
on destabilising and denying the possibility of explaining the divine acts of rejection and 
election according to any criteria of human worth. By constructing his own series of diptychs 
                                                        
20 U. Wilckens, Der Brief an die Römer (3 vols; EKKNT; Neukirchen: Benziger, 1978-82), 2.187; Jewett, Romans, 
83; J.M.G. Barclay, ‘Grace Within and Beyond Reason: Philo and Paul in Dialogue’, in Paul, Grace and Freedom: Essays 
in Honour of John K. Riches (ed. P. Middleton, A. Paddison and K. Wenell; London: T&T Clark, 2009), 9-21 (13).  
21 A brief note on my use of typology: whereas Giorgio Agamben argues that the type/antitype 
conceptuality indicates ‘a caesura that divides the division between times…in which the past is dislocated into the 
present’ and thus points to the ‘inseparable constellation’ of typos and antitypos (The Time that Remains, 74), my 
usage, following Erich Auerbach, maintains the ‘Innergeschichtlichkeit’ of, in Auerbach’s terms, the figura and the 
fulfillment (‘Figura’, Istanbuler Schriften 5, Neue Dantestudien [Istanbul, 1944]: 11-71 [54]). Agamben is right to 
suggest that typology describes the way ‘Paul establishes a relation…between every event from a past time and ho 
nyn kairos’ (The Time That Remains, 74), but this typological relation is not one of temporal dislocation; it is, rather, 
that the gospel event unveils what John David Dawson calls the ‘gospelness’ of prior events (Christian Figural 
Reading and the Fashioning of Identity [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002], 134). As John Barclay 
suggested to me in personal conversation, Paul’s typological hermeneutic could be described as uncovering 
‘echoes of the gospel in the scriptures of Israel’. Cf. Hahn, Theologie, 1.197-98; 2.119-23.  
22 For Romans 9.6a as the thesis of Romans 9-11 see C.E.B. Cranfield A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on 
the Epistle to the Romans (2 vols. ICC; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975) 2.473; J.D.G. Dunn, Romans 9-16 (WBC 38B; 
Dallas: Word Books, 1988), 539; Lohse, Der Brief an die Römer, 270; Jewett, Romans, 573. Jochen Flebbe rightly notes 
that Romans 9.6 indicates that the ‘Israelproblem’ is, for Paul, a ‘Gottesfrage’ (J. Flebbe, Solus Deus: Untersuchungen 
zur Rede von Gott im Brief des Paulus an die Römer [BZNW 158; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008], 268-69).   
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(Ishmael and Isaac, Rom 9.7-9; Esau and Jacob, 9.10-13; Pharaoh and Moses; 9.14-18),23 Paul 
produces an exegetical argument that is at once structurally parallel and diametrically 
opposed to the catalogue of contrasting pairs in Wisdom 10.1-14: Wisdom identifies the 
correspondence between Wisdom’s saving benefits and human beneficiaries; Paul insists that 
divine decision operates irrespective of and counter to the canons of human worth.   
Paul’s axiomatic introduction – ‘the word of God has not failed’ – is underwritten by 
deconstruction: οὐ γὰρ piάντες οἱ ἐξ Ἰσραὴλ οὗτοι Ἰσραήλ (Rom 9.6b). The word of God, which 
in this context is identical to the voice of scripture (9.7, 9, 12, 13, 15, 17), is not invalidated by 
the present reduction of Israel to a remnant (9.27) because, as Paul argues, the divine word has 
always operated selectively, constituting Israel by a speech-act of judgment and grace. To 
make this point, Paul begins in the beginning. Repeating the οὐ…piάντες from 9.6b, Romans 9.7 
indicates that the divine word recorded in scripture – ἐν Ἰσαὰκ κληθήσεταί σοι σpiέρμα (Gen 
21.12) – establishes a curious genealogical fact: not all of Abraham’s children are children (9.7). 
Paul clarifies his meaning (τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν) with the first of three οὐ...ἀλλά antitheses in this 
section: ‘it is not the children of the flesh (τέκνα τῆς σαρκός) who are the children of God, but 
the children of the promise (τὰ τέκνα τῆς ἐpiαγγελίας) are reckoned as his seed’ (9.8). In the 
case of Isaac, the status ‘son’ is not constituted by lineal descent; it is created or called into 
being (καλέω, 9.7; cf. 4.17)24 by the ‘word of promise’ (9.9). There is no indication here that the 
ascription (λογίζομαι, 9.8) of divine sonship corresponds to pre-established worth; Isaac is a 
‘child of God’ because he is born as such by God’s future-tense word: ‘I will return and there 
will be…’.25 According to Paul’s interpretation, the promise of Genesis 18.10, as Seifrid writes, 
provides ‘the pattern (or type) of God’s saving dealings: in the face of human unbelief – Sarah’s 
laughter – the word announces that which is humanly impossible’.26  
This provocative reading of the Ishmael and Isaac narrative legitimates the thesis of 9.6 
by demonstrating that, from their foundation, Israelites are not God’s children on the basis of 
                                                        
23 F. Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles: Beyond the New Perspective (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 308-
309.  
24 For the creative connotations of καλέω in Paul, see S.J. Chester, Conversion at Corinth: Perspectives on 
Conversion in Paul’s Theology and the Corinthian Church (SNTW; London: T&T Clark, 2003), 59-112; cf. B.R. Gaventa, ‘On 
the Calling-into-Being of Israel: Romans 9.6-29’, in Between Gospel and Election (WUNT 257; ed. F. Wilk and J.R. 
Wagner; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 255-69 (260-61).  
25 Cf. Barclay, ‘Within and Beyond Reason’, 14.  
26 M.A. Seifrid, ‘Romans’, in Commentary on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament (ed. G.K. Beale and 
D.A. Carson; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 640.  
172 
 
their natural ethnic or genealogical relation to Abraham; God’s children are ‘creatura verbi 
Dei’.27 In Beverly Gaventa’s words, ‘the entity known as “Israel”…is not a biological but a 
theological category’.28 The selective operations of God’s word are inexplicable in terms of the 
human criteria of lineage or race. Paul’s only explanation for the scriptural speech-acts of 
rejection and election are that God’s creative word is scandalously self-explanatory: divine 
speech constitutes the reality it promises. 
Paul’s next pair, Jacob and Esau (Rom 9.10-13), intensifies this scandal. As Wisdom reads 
the Jacob story, it is an account of rescuing of the righteous (δίκαιος), thereby teaching him 
that ‘godliness (εὐσέβεια) is more powerful than anything’ (Wis. 10.9-12). Paul’s retelling, when 
considered in conversation with Wisdom, reads like an antagonistic alternative. Emphasising 
the natural and genetic similarity of Jacob and Esau (Ῥεβέκκα ἐξ ἑνὸς κοίτην ἔχουσα, Ἰσαὰκ 
τοῦ piατρὸς ἡμῶν), Paul insists that the twins ‘are made dissimilar only by the divine words 
recorded in scripture’: ‘The greater/older will serve the lesser/younger’ (Gen 25.23; Rom 9.12); 
‘Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated’ (Mal 1.2-3; Rom 9.13).29 Thus, as in the case of Isaac, lineage is 
excluded as a human criterion for election, but here relative ‘greatness’ and/or primogeniture 
are added to the list of eliminated explanations. As Sigurd Grindheim observes, in this case, 
‘God’s choice is not only free…[it] runs directly counter to anything that might be construed as 
a qualification for election’.30 In other words, election operates according to the out-of-the-
opposite logic of justification explored in the previous chapter: ‘God’s choice consistently 
embraces that which is not choice’.31   
Paul’s focus in Romans 9.10-13, however, is not status-worth; it is a refutation of the 
reason for election identified by Wisdom – that is, Jacob was δίκαιος (Wis. 10.10). Working from 
the scriptural word to Rebecca ‘before the twins were born’ and thus before they ‘had done 
anything good or bad’ (piραξάντων τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαῦλον), Paul constructs his second antithesis: 
                                                        
27 M.A. Seifrid, Christ, Our Righteousness: Paul’s Theology of Justification (NSBT 9; Leicester: Apollos, 2000), 153. 
Westerholm rightly notes that Paul does not deny a relation between Abrahamic descent and divine election; he 
only insists that Abrahamic descent is not the basis for nor identical with being a child of God (‘Paul and the Law 
in Romans 9-11’, in Paul and the Mosaic Law (ed. J.D.G. Dunn; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996), 215-37 (221-22).  
28 Gaventa, ‘On the Calling-into-Being of Israel, 59.   
29 Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 309-10.  
30 S. Grindheim, The Crux of Election (WUNT II.202; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 145.   
31 Grindheim, The Crux of Election, 145 n.36. Cf. F. Siegert, Argumentation bei Paulus gezeigt an Röm 9-11 
(WUNT 34; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1985), 127.  
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οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦντος (Rom 9.11-12).32 In diametric contrast to Wisdom’s linking 
of Wisdom’s rescue and Jacob’s righteousness, Paul insists that the temporal location and 
content of God’s promise (cf. Gen 25.23) precludes any correlation between the divine decision 
and human worth, particularly worth established by human action.33 The emphasis here is less 
on the ‘who’ of election than the ‘how’ – that is, Paul is concerned to trace the process and 
pattern of election and interprets the Jacob and Esau narrative as an exemplification of the 
autonomy and initiative of God’s word: God’s pre-natal choice does not respond to or recognise 
an antecedent human reality; it is, in Gaventa’s words, ‘a calling into existence, an act of 
creation’.34 This emphasis on ‘the creative initiative of God’ is, as Barclay remarks, ‘underlined 
in the purpose clause embedded awkwardly in 9.11: ἵνα ἡ κατ᾽ ἐκλογὴν piρόθεσις τοῦ θεοῦ 
μένῃ’.35 The piρο- prefix indicates that divine choice precedes and therefore precludes any and 
all pre-existent human criteria. Thus, as Paul reads Genesis 25.23, rejection and election 
neither correspond to nor are contingent upon prior human difference; they are humanly 
unconditioned and therefore humanly inexplicable scriptural speech-acts. Rather than 
attempting to explain the rationale of God’s selective will, Paul concludes with a ruthless 
restatement of God’s ‘pre-choice’ from Malachi 1.2-3: ‘Jacob I loved, Esau I hated’ (Rom 9.13).36     
The question Paul raises at Romans 9.14 is exactly what Wisdom would ask at this point 
in Paul’s argument: ‘What then shall we say, is there injustice (ἀδικία) with God?’37 For Wisdom, 
God’s justice is evident in Genesis precisely as the logic of the Exodus is anticipated in the 
                                                        
32 Dunn argues that ‘works’ in Romans 9.12 should be interpreted as a shorthand for ‘works of law’ 
(Romans 9-16, 543), but this restriction appears to ignore the general reference to good or bad conduct in 9.11.  
33 Philo, alert to the destabilising potential inherit in God’s pre-natal and unexplained choice of Jacob 
over Esau, appeals to divine foreknowledge and thus argues that while God’s election of Jacob precedes his deeds, 
it is nevertheless proleptically based on them (Leg. All. 3.88-89). For this, see my ‘Rational or Radical: Origen on 
Romans 9.10-14’, Studia Patristica 52 (forthcoming). Cf. Jubilees 19 in which the ante-natal choice is erased and the 
Jacob and Esau narrative is rewritten to highlight the correspondence between divine choice and human 
character.    
34 Gaventa, ‘On the Calling-into-Being of Israel’, 260. As in the citation of Genesis 21.21 in Romans 9.7, the 
use of καλέω here, especially as a divine predicate (ὁ καλῶν, 9.12), recalls the predication of God as ὁ καλῶν τὰ μὴ 
ὄντα ὡς ὄντα (Rom 4.17) and thereby evokes the creational connotations of the Pauline ‘calling’ motif.    
35 Barclay, ‘Within or Beyond Reason’, 15.  
36 Jewett, Romans, 508: ‘The quotation fulfils the vital rhetorical function of sharpening to an excruciating 
degree the focus on the selectivity of God’s word’.  
37 The history of interpretation of Romans 9.6-14 is, in large part, a history of answering this question for 
Paul. Chrysostom, in his Homiliae in epistulam ad Romanos, Homily 16 on Romans 9, followed Philo and explained 
election in relation to divine foreknowledge. Origen, who, like Augustine after him (see e.g. De Spiritu et Littera), 
rightly read ‘not by works’ as categorical rather than time-specific, still argued that the election of Jacob and 
rejection of Esau ‘did not happen without a reason’ (quomodo haec non extra rationem fiant) by insisting that 
Jacob was considered ‘worthy of God’s love’ before birth ‘according to the merits of his previous life’ 
(praecedentis videlicet vitae meritis, De Principiis II.9.7).  
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correspondence between divine saving benefaction and human beneficiaries (Wis. 10.1-21), a 
correspondence that Romans 9.7-13 seems designed to deny. Thus, Paul’s μὴ γένοιτο, while 
also appealing to the events and text of Exodus, takes a different form. While the independent 
operations of the divine word and the exclusion of genealogical, status and moral explanations 
for divine selectivity in Romans 9.7-13 invite the impression that God’s choice is chaotic and 
capricious,38 Paul insists that there is a rationale – a kind of theo-logic – behind rejection and 
election. Just as Wisdom’s essential answer to the time-delay of divine justice is divine power 
and the prerogative of divine mercy (Wis. 11.15-12.27), ἔλεος is Paul’s ultimate reply to the 
question of ἀδικία. For Paul, however, divine mercy is scripturally defined in the event Wisdom 
deletes from Israel’s history – namely, the Golden Calf debacle.39 Grounding (γάρ) his denial of 
divine injustice in God’s words to Moses in Exodus 33.19, Paul argues that God is not unjust 
because, as he programmatically announced, ‘I will have mercy on whom I have mercy and I 
will have compassion on whom I have compassion’ (Rom 9.15). In other words, Paul’s answer to 
the charge of ἀδικία is the apparently arbitrary mercy of God. The form of God’s promise 
indicates that the objects of mercy are unspecifiable (ὃν ἄν) and its application is 
indeterminately future-tense (ἐλεήσω; οἰκτιρήσω). Here, as in the narrative of Exodus 32-34 
that Wisdom erases and Paul exploits (cf. 1 Cor 10.7; 2 Cor 3.6-18; cf. Rom 1.23; 9.3), mercy is not 
the restoration of the righteous; it is the re-birth of the unrighteous – ‘the generative divine 
force that brings something into existence’.40 ‘Therefore’ (ἄρα οὖν), as Paul’s third antithesis 
deduces from the Exodus quotation, ‘it is not of the one who wills, or of the one who runs, but 
of the God who has mercy’ (9.16). The references to θέλω and τρέχω add human disposition 
and achievement to the list of excluded explanations for election, but the more striking thing 
about this antithesis is the proposed rather than precluded explanation. In tune with Paul’s 
explanation of God’s call solely in terms of God identity as ‘the one who calls’ (9.12), his 
accounting of the operations of divine mercy is reducible to a predication: God is ‘the one who 
has mercy’.41  
                                                        
38 Grindheim, The Crux of Election, 144-50.  
39 For the Golden Calf narrative as the allusive context of Romans 9.15-16, see Wagner, Heralds of the Good 
News, 52-53.  
40 J.M.G. Barclay, ‘“I will have mercy on whom I have mercy”: The Golden Calf and Divine Mercy in 
Romans 9-11 and Second Temple Judaism’, EC 1 (2010): 82-106 (100). For Exodus 32-24 as an account of Israel’s re-
creation parallel to Genesis 6-10, see W. Moberly, At the Mountain of God: Story and Theology in Exodus 32-34 (JSOTSup 
22; Sheffield: JSOT 1983, 91-93; quoted in Barclay, ‘The Golden Calf and Divine Mercy’, 100 n.57.   
41 Cf. Wagner, Heralds of the Good News, 50-52.  
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However, as the ὃν ἄν from Exodus 33.19 intimates, the autonomous agency of the 
divine ‘I’ is double-sided.42 God’s word to Moses has its counterpart in God’s word to Pharaoh: 
εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐξήγειρά σε ὅpiως ἐνδείξωμαι ἐν σοὶ τὴν δύναμίν μου καὶ ὅpiως διαγγελῇ τὸ 
ὄνομά μου ἐν piάσῃ τῇ γῆ (Rom 9.7). This is an adapted quotation of Exodus 9.16 LXX, 
substituting ἐξεγείρω for διατηρέω and δύναμις for ἰσχύς.43 As Gaventa notes, the first of these 
alterations signals an emphasis on divine agency: ‘it is not simply that God permitted Pharaoh 
to continue to live (ἕνεκεν τούτου διετηρήθης in Exod 9.16 LXX) but that God actually provided 
Pharaoh – brought Pharaoh on the scene (ἐξήγειρά σε ὅpiως in Rom 9.17)’.44 Thus, whereas 
Wisdom identifies the ungodliness of the Egyptians as an explanation for their fitting 
destruction (Wis. 15.14-16.1), Paul introduces Pharaoh, the paradigmatic Egyptian, without any 
reference to his stubborn and oppressive history. As Paul reads Exodus – and the use of 
σκληρύνω indicates that Paul is reading Exodus, not just Exodus 9.1645 – Pharaoh is less an 
acting subject than an object of divine action – he is ‘raised up’ and ‘hardened’. Interpreted this 
way, God’s word to Pharaoh is reread as an exact contrast to God’s word to Moses: ‘God has 
mercy (ἐλεέω) on whom he wills, and hardens (σκληρύνω) whom he wills’ (9.18). Here, as in 
the contrast between election/love and rejection/hate in 9.10-13, the divine decision is double-
sided: mercy and hardening. This duality suggests that divine mercy is fundamentally free; it 
is, as Barclay recognises, ‘a matter of choice and will, not necessity’.46 But this, when read with 
Wisdom, is only to sharpen the scandal. Wisdom’s affirmation of divine justice takes the form of 
identifying ‘why’ God operates selectively; Paul’s answer to the question about divine injustice 
is the sheer ‘thatness’ of God’s selectivity: God has mercy; God hardens.  
The contrast is stark: Wisdom’s rereading of Israel’s scripture is a rewriting of Israel’s 
history that uncovers and underlines the rationale for divine action by naming the fit between 
God’s acts and human subjects; Paul’s retelling of foundational moments in Israel’s history 
excludes a series of possible explanations for the duality of divine decision (e.g. birth, status, 
morality, success) and celebrates the utter and autonomous singularity of God’s initiative. 
                                                        
42 For the divine ‘I’ in Romans 9-11, see H. Hübner, Gottes Ich und Israel (FRLANT 126; Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984).   
43 See, Wagner, Heralds of the Good News, 55 n.36.  
44 Gaventa, ‘On the Calling-into-Being of Israel’, 264.  
45 The verb σκληρύνω does not occur in Exodus 9.16 LXX, but is, as Wagner remarks, ‘a notable feature of 
the exodus narrative’. See Wagner, Heralds of the Good News, 54 n.35 for a full tabulation.   
46 Barclay, ‘The Golden Calf and Divine Mercy’, 101.  
176 
 
Considered from this comparative vantage point, Romans 9.6-18 reads like an intentional and 
flagrant unraveling of the fabric of Wisdom’s stable and just moral universe, a reduction of 
Wisdom’s intricate and ordered historiographic tapestry to the single and humanly inexplicable 
thread of divine mercy. The rhetorical question of Romans 9.19 can thus be asked in Wisdom’s 
voice: ‘Why does God find fault? For who can resist his will (βούλημα)?’ To Wisdom’s ears, the 
reduction of the difference between divine mercy and hardening to the sheer fact that ‘God 
wills’ (θέλει, 9.18) would sound like the replacement of the immutably just and therefore 
predictable operations of God in history with a crude and chaotic voluntarism. Paul, it seems, 
anticipates this kind of concern and suspends his exegesis of Exodus 9.16 in order to address 
it.47 His answer, however, is not an explanation for the doubleness of the divine will; it is an 
assertion of what Kierkegaard calls the ‘deep qualitative difference between God and 
humanity’. Paralleling Wisdom’s affirmation of the unimpeachable justice of God (Wis. 12.12-18), 
Paul insists that the creator is not answerable to the creature and appeals to the scriptural 
metaphor of the potter (cf. Wis. 15.7) to emphasise and underwrite God’s freedom to harden 
and to have mercy or, in this context, to form ‘vessels for dishonor’ and ‘vessels for honor’ 
(Rom 9.20-21).48 For Wisdom, the image of the potter is used to explain the origin of idolatry: 
‘the worker in clay’ is free to fashion various vessels and counterfeit gods ‘out of the same 
clay’. For Paul, the potter metaphor is an assertion of divine freedom rather than an 
explanation of the twofold effect of God’s word. In other words, while Paul raises the ‘why’ 
question that Wisdom rewrites the Pentateuch to answer, he insists that God’s ways and will are 
ultimately inexplicable in human terms: there is no identifiable correspondence between God’s 
actions in history and history’s human subjects. The only explanation is the inexplicable 
freedom of God.  
 
(2) The Prophets in the Present-Tense: Romans 9.22-29 
The return to Exodus 9.16 in Romans 9.22 is a movement towards the present. As 
argued above, Paul’s engagement with the texts of Genesis and Exodus is occasioned by the 
                                                        
47 Wagner, Heralds of the Good News, 56 n.40: ‘The objection Paul addresses here actually breaks the flow of 
his argument, for v. 22 continues the exposition of Exod 9.16 begun in v. 17’.  
48 For a detailed discussion of the potter motif in Romans 9.21 in relation to its use in Isaiah and early 
Judaism, see, Wagner, Heralds of the Good News, 56-71. For the potter motif as establishing divine freedom rather 
than denoting divine caprice, see R. Feldmeier, ‘Vater und Töpfer? Zur Identität Gottes im Römerbrief’, in Between 
Gospel and Election (WUNT 257; ed. F. Wilk and J.R. Wagner; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 377-390.   
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implied crisis of Romans 9.1-3. What Romans 9.22-29 suggests is that this rereading is also 
oriented towards and shaped by Paul’s present.49  
Francis Watson detects a chiasmus in Rom 9.7-29: ‘the narrative sequence consists of 
three pairings…. The prophetic sequence is a mirror image of this construction’.50 According to 
this reading, the distinction between being a child of Abraham and a child of God exemplified 
in the choice of Isaac (Rom 9.7-9) corresponds to Isaiah’s prophecies about the remnant (Rom 
9.27-29), the unconditioned call of Jacob (Rom 9.10-13) corresponds to Hosea’s words about the 
incongruous call of Gentiles (Rom 9.24-26) and the duality of mercy and hardening drawn from 
Exodus (Rom 9.15-18) corresponds to the vessels of wrath and mercy Paul constructs from 
Exodus 9.16 (Rom 9.22-23). That Watson needs the Exodus material to do two jobs suggests that 
this chiasm is, perhaps, a little too clean. Romans 9.19-23 is an extension of Exodus 9.16 and it 
is not until 9.24 that the movement from scriptural past to prophetic present fully occurs (see 
below). This qualification notwithstanding, the ordering of Romans 9.7-18 to Romans 9.24-22 is 
exactly right: the narrative sequence ‘deals in types’; the prophetic sequence announces ‘their 
realization’.51   
Romans 9.22-23 is an exegetical extension of Paul’s adapted citation of Exodus 9.16.52 
God’s word to Pharaoh is recast as a rhetorical question about God’s ways and purposes:   
εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐξήγειρά σε ὅpiως ἐνδείξωμαι ἐν σοὶ τὴν δύναμίν μου καὶ ὅpiως διαγγελῇ 
τὸ ὄνομά μου ἐν piάσῃ τῇ γῇ (Exod 9.16 in Rom 9.17) 
 
εἰ δὲ θέλων ὁ θεὸς ἐνδείξασθαι τὴν ὀργὴν καὶ γνωρίσαι τὸ δυνατὸν αὐτοῦ ἤνεγκεν ἐν 
piολλῇ μακροθυμίᾳ σκεύη ὀργῆς κατηρτισμένα εἰς ἀpiώλειαν, καὶ ἵνα γνωρίσῃ τὸν 
piλοῦτον τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ ἐpiὶ σκεύη ἐλέους ἃ piροητοίμασεν εἰς δόξαν (Rom 9.22-23) 
This theological extension maintains the duality of the divine economy – ‘vessels of mercy’ and 
‘vessels of wrath’ pick up the doubleness of mercy and hardening from 9.15-18 –, but the 
doubleness of the divine intention indicated by the two ὅpiως clauses of Exodus 9.16 and the 
                                                        
49 Cf. C. Müller, Gottes Gerichtigkeit und Gottes Volk (FRLANT 86; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964), 
32. Watson describes the transition from Romans 9.6-18 to 9.19-29 as the move from the ‘narrative sequence’ to 
the ‘prophetic sequence’ (Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 317-18).  
50 Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 317.  
51 Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 317. Watson contrasts this ordering of narrative and prophetic 
material to the ‘salvation-historical reading of N.T. Wright, for whom Romans 9.6-29 tells “the story of Israel from 
Abraham to exile and beyond”’ (Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 317 n.29; quoting N.T. Wright, ‘The Book of Romans’, 
in NIB X [Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2002], 634).   
52 N. Dahl, ‘The Future of Israel’, in Studies in Paul (Minneapolis: Ausgsburg, 1977), 144; Wagner, Heralds of 
the Good News, 72-78; Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 314-17. For the syntactical complexities of Romans 9.22-
23, especially the apparent protasis without an apodosis, see Cranfield, Romans, 2.492-97; Wilckens, Der Brief an die 
Römer, 2.202-205.      
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equivalence of mercy and hardening in 9.18 ‘shifts from symmetry to teleology’.53 Here, the 
objects and/or instruments of wrath54 still serve to demonstrate God’s power (δυνατός; cf. 
δύναμις in 9.17), but according to Romans 9.23, God’s act of enduring them is oriented to his 
purpose (ἵνα) of ‘making known the riches of his glory for vessels of mercy’. Thus, whereas 
Wisdom explains the doubleness of divine action as a necessity of divine justice – God drowns 
the ungodly Egyptians and has mercy on righteous Israel (Wis. 10.15-21) –, it is, for Paul, divine 
mercy that is, in Barclay’s phrase, ‘the very fundament of history’55 – that towards which the 
divine acts of hatred and hardening are directed and that which both explains and orders the 
duality of election and rejection. But, as the quotation from Exodus 33.19 in Romans 9.15 
indicates, mercy is precisely inexplicable, its objects are unspecifiable and its operations are 
future-tense. To ground Israel’s history on and to orient Israel’s history towards the creative 
mercy of God is thus to interpret Israel’s past as a promise – that is, to read the potentiality 
and promissory character of Israel’s story as a pointer to its future fulfillment. According to 
Paul, that future is (partially) his present. 
 The return of first-person discourse in Romans 9.24 marks the transition from the 
typological testimony of Israel’s history to Paul’s present. The ‘vessels of mercy’ introduced as 
an extension of Exodus 9.16 (and 33.19) are identified as ‘us’ (ἡμᾶς). This ‘us’ signals that, as 
suggested above, Paul’s engagement with Israel’s scripture is not only occasioned by the crisis 
of Romans 9.1-3; it is oriented towards the current existence of a community ‘called...not only 
from the Jews but also from the nations’. Romans 9.24 is thus the middle point of Paul’s 
scriptural argument in Romans 9.6-29: Israel’s past anticipates Paul’s present; Israel’s prophets 
announce it in the present-tense.   
                                                        
53 Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 315. Cranfield, explicitly dependent on Barth’s thesis of the single, 
saving will of God (cf. CD II/2 §34), over-emphasises the singularity of the divine purpose and elides the duality of 
the divine economy (Romans, 2.472,488; cf. Wagner, Heralds of the Good News, 77 who admits that his reading, which 
is close to Cranfield’s, ‘imports into Romans 9.22-24 convictions that Paul does not state clearly until chapter 11’). 
Barclay cautions against ‘prematurely resolving the duality of Romans 9’, noting that ‘Divine mercy for Paul is 
neither an automatic nor a “natural” state of affairs, but a willed act, reversing God’s own equally willing (but 
deserved) judgement’ (The Golden Calf and Divine Mercy, 101 n.62; cf. Grindheim, The Crux of Election, 147). In 
Romans 9.22-23, Paul indicates that the twofold effect of the divine word is asymmetrical (God endures vessels of 
wrath but makes known his glory for vessels of mercy) and teleological (God endures vessels of wrath in order to 
communicate his glory to vessels of mercy), but this is an interpretation rather than a rejection of the doubleness 
of God’s will and word.   
54 See A.T. Hanson, ‘Vessels of Wrath or Instruments of Wrath: Romans 9.22-23’, JTS 32 (1981): 433-43; cf. 
Wagner, Heralds of the Good News, 72 n.92.  
55 Barclay, ‘The Golden Calf and Divine Mercy’, 101.  
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 As Paul reads the present and the prophets, the calling of a people ἐξ Ἰουδαίων and ἐξ 
ἐθνῶν occurs ‘just as he says in Hosea’. What he records Hosea as saying, however, is 
rearranged, rewritten and, most strikingly, reapplied. First, citing Hosea 2.25, Paul replaces καὶ 
ἐλεήσω with καλέσω, fronts the reference to ‘not my people’ and substitutes ἀγαpiάω for 
ἐλεέω. As Watson notes, the inclusion of καλέω and ἀγαpiάω links Hosea’s prophecy with the 
Jacob and Esau narrative as recalled in Romans 9.10-13, thereby indicating that the 
unconditioned call of Jacob is an anticipation of the incongruous call of Gentiles (cf. Rom 9.24), 
the creating of ‘my people’ out of ‘not my people’.56 In other words, as Paul rereads Israel’s 
scripture, God’s current act of creating a beloved people out of the alienated and unloved 
Gentiles has its scriptural type in Genesis 25.23 and its prophetic announcement in Hosea 2.25. 
This rereading is only intelligible as a reinterpretation of Israel’s past and prophets from the 
perspective of Paul’s present. As Wagner remarks, this reapplication of Hosea 2.25 (and 2.1 in 
Rom 9.26) ‘audaciously appropriates for the Gentiles an oracle…that originally envisioned the 
redemption of Israel’.57 Put differently, Hosea’s future-tense prophecy about the restoration of 
Israel is interpreted by Paul as a promise fulfilled in the present calling of non-Jews. Hosea’s 
words are thus subsumed under the present-tense (λέγει, 9.25), and it is therefore the nations 
(ἔθνη) who are the ‘not my people’ and who fulfill Hosea’s prophecy as they are created ex 
contrario – that is, as this ‘not my people’ are called (καλέω) ‘children of the living God’ (Rom 
9.26; Hos 2.1). It is worth noting, however, that while this re-voicing of Hosea’s oracle involves 
a radical reinterpretation, it preserves what Wagner terms ‘the logic of redemptive reversal 
already present in Hos 1-2’.58 The inclusion of non-Jews, like the calling of Isaac and Jacob (Rom 
9.7-13), is a creative and incongruous act of mercy. Their adoption and belovedness contradict 
rather than correspond to their natural state: it is the ‘not my children’ who are called ‘my 
children’ and the ‘not loved’ who are called ‘loved’.59 In other words, the inclusion of non-Jews 
                                                        
56 Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 320. Cf. the discussion of Romans 9.30-32 below.   
57 J.R. Wagner, ‘“Not from the Jews Only, But Also from the Gentiles”: Mercy to the Nations in Romans 9-
11’ in Between Gospel and Election (WUNT 257; ed. F. Wilk and J.R. Wagner; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 417-31 
(22). Wagner notes elsewhere that Romans 9.24 assumes the inclusion of Israel and accents the inclusion of the 
Gentiles which in turn invites the reapplication of Hosea’s words as an argument for the calling of nations (Heralds 
of the Good News, 79).    
58 Wagner, ‘Mercy to the Nations’, 422.  
59 Dahl notes that the logic of this ex contrario call in Romans 9.25-26 echoes Romans 4.17:  (‘The Future of 
Israel’, 146; cf. Müller, Gottes Gerechtigkeit, 28).  
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is explainable only as a free act of the surprising and sovereign God identified as ‘the one who 
calls’ (9.12) and ‘the one who has mercy’ (9.16).     
 The election of the Gentiles, however, is only half of the twofold effect of God’s word in 
Paul’s present. Just as Israel’s scriptural history is typological testimony to the unconditioned 
call of God (Rom 9.10-13) and the distinction between Abraham’s fleshly progeny and God’s 
promise-born children (9.7-9), so Israel’s prophets, as reread by Paul, announce both the 
unexpected and incongruous call of the Gentiles (9.25-26) and the reduction of Israel to a 
remnant (9.27-29). As Paul reads Isaiah, he hears him ‘crying out’ in the present-tense: Ἠσαΐας 
δὲ κράζει ὑpiὲρ τοῦ Ἰσραήλ (9.27).60 Thus interpreted, Isaiah’s prophecy about the future 
salvation of a remnant within Israel (Isa 10.22-23) becomes a word about Paul’s present crisis 
(cf. 9.1-3; 11.1-4). The current catastrophe is anticipated in Israel’s history – ‘not all who are of 
Israel are Israel’ (9.6b); ‘not all Abraham’s children are seed’ (9.7) – and it is correspondingly 
announced by Israel’s prophet: the multitude of Israel is contrasted with the minority who will 
be saved (Isa 10.22-23 in Rom 9.27)61 and it is the existence of a ‘seed’ (σpiέρμα, cf. 9.7) that 
prevents Israel from becoming like Sodom and Gomorrah (Isa 1.9 in Rom 9.29). This 
identification of Isaiah’s ‘remnant’ (ὑpiόλειμμα) and ‘seed’ with the ‘Israel-Israel’ of Romans 
9.6b and the σpiέρμα or ‘children of God’ of 9.7-8 suggests that, in itself, the remnant/seed is a 
salvific category (cf. σῴζω, 9.27).62 Paul’s focus here, however, is not on the remnant as such, 
but rather on the reduction of Israel to a remnant by the enactment of the promised divine 
‘sentence’ (λόγον συντελῶν καὶ συντέμνων, 9.28 citing Isa 28.22).63 This punitive ‘word’ 
appears to be the dark side of the singular divine λόγος, the operations and effects of which 
Paul has been tracing since Romans 9.6: God’s one word is, as heard in Paul’s present, the 
                                                        
60 Even the perfect of piρολέγω in Romans 9.29 introduces Isaiah’s words as prophecy fulfilled: ‘just as 
Isaiah foretold…’  
61 Paul’s citation of Isaiah10.22-23 substitutes ὁ ἀριθμὸς τῶν υἱῶν for ὁ λαός, an alteration that appears to 
be derived from Hosea 2.1 (Koch, Die Schrift als Zeuge, 168; Wagner, Heralds of the Good News, 95-100).  
62 For this reason, and because it is argued that the ἐάν of Romans 9.27 introduces a conditional clause 
within which the reference to the remnant is the logical conclusion, some have argued that Paul’s use of Isaiah is 
promissory and positive (see E. Seitz, ‘λόγον συντελῶν eine Gerichtsankündigung? (Zu Röm 9.27/28)’, BN 105 
(2001): 59-61; cf. Wagner, Heralds of the Good News, 93). This reading, as we will see, overlooks the function and 
effect of the divine word that ‘concludes and cuts short’ (Rom 9.28). The ἐάν clause should therefore be read as a 
concessive: ‘Even though the number of the children of Israel were like the sand of the sea, [only] a remnant will 
be saved’ (so Cranfield, Romans, 2.471; Wilckens, Der Brief an die Römer, 2.198; Lohse, Der Brief an die Römer, 276, 283).   
63 For the preservation of divine judgment in the Septuagint translation of Isaiah 28.22 MT and thus the 
translation of λόγος as sentence in Romans 9.28, see Grindheim, The Crux of Election, 154. For the negative function 
of the remnant motif within the argument of Romans 9.24-33, see F. Wilk, Die Bedeutung des Jesajabuches für Paulus 
(FRLANT 179; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), 186. 
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‘calling (καλέω) of Gentiles’ (9.24-26) and the ‘cutting short’ (or ‘cutting off’, cf. Rom 11.17, 19, 
22) of most Jews (9.27-29).  
 At this point, the deep and essential incommensurability between the rereadings of 
Israel’s scripture in Romans 9.6-29 and Wisdom 10-19 comes fully into view. As argued above, 
there is a striking (and startling) contrast between Wisdom’s strategy of rereading and 
rewriting pentateuchal history so as to uncover and underline the fit between divine action 
and human subjects and Paul’s parading of the unconditioned and incongruous double-effect 
of the divine word in Romans 9.6-18. This contrast, however, is incomplete. For Wisdom, the 
identification of a correspondence between God’s gifts and their recipients is not a 
historiographic abstraction; it is a word of encouragement to Jewish readers: it is Israel (qua 
the righteous) who is the fitting object of God’s salvific actions. Considered from this 
perspective, Paul’s reinterpretation of portions of the Pentateuch as a typological testimony 
to, and his reactivation of Hosea and Isaiah as a present-tense announcement of the 
disjunctive call of the Gentiles and the traumatic reduction of Israel to a remnant reads like an 
intentional inversion of the logic of Wisdom’s pentateuchal re-narration. For Wisdom, the 
retelling of history has to be carefully calibrated because it is a recurrent concretion of the 
pre-creational moral order. In other words, Wisdom’s hermeneutic is protological. Paul’s 
hermeneutic is eschatological: he rereads Israel’s scripture from the arrival of the antitype and 
the fulfillment of prophetic promise. We are, however, in danger of getting ahead of Paul. 
Romans 9.6-29 is a rereading of scripture from the eschatological present; it is Romans 9.30-
10.21 that names the eschatological event.   
    
The Christological Crisis: Romans 9.30-10.21 
 The central claim of the last section was that Paul rereads Israel’s scripture from the 
perspective of his present. Israel’s past anticipates (Rom 9.7-18) and Israel’s prophets 
announce (Rom 9.25-29) the current crisis that Paul positively characterises as the calling of a 
people ‘not only from the Jews but also from the Gentiles’ (Rom 9.24) and negatively describes 
as the reduction of Israel to a remnant (Rom 9.27, 29). As suggested above, when considered in 
conversation with Wisdom’s recasting of Israel’s history, Paul’s rereading results in a 
disorienting double oddity: first, election and rejection operate counter to rather than in 
correspondence with any comprehensible criteria of human worth; second, it is therefore the 
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Gentiles who are the incongruous objects of divine mercy and the majority of Jews who are 
subjected to divine judgment. The unanswered question at this point in Paul’s argument, 
however, is what has occasioned this paradoxical present and thus shaped this peculiar 
hermeneutic? Romans 9.30-10.21, I will argue, provides an answer: the divine act that is Jesus’ 
history is at once the shame of those who stumble on this christological stone and the 
salvation of those who believe on him. Put another way, the Christ-event is the singular and 
concrete actualisation of the scriptural anticipation and announcement of rejection and 
election. Thus, to say that Paul’s reading of Israel’s scripture is a reading from the perspective 
of his present is to say that he interprets the Old Testament as a typological testimony to and a 
prophetic promise of the event and impact of the crucified and risen Jesus.64 
 
(1) The Promised and Paradoxical Present: Romans 9.30-33 
 Romans 9.30-32 is a redescription of Paul’s present. Putting what Wagner describes as a 
‘comic spin on the rather pedestrian metaphor of a footrace’,65 Paul announces the 
actualisation of theologoumena that Israel’s history anticipated: ‘not by works, but by the one 
who calls’ (Rom 9.12); ‘not the one who wills or runs, but the God who has mercy’ (9.16).66 As 
argued above, God’s choice of Jacob and God’s word to Moses prefigure, to borrow Calvin’s 
description, the ‘singular paradox’ that is Paul’s present.67 Paul makes this point in Romans 
                                                        
64 This ordering of the scriptural witness to election/rejection to what Watson calls ‘its concrete 
realization in Christ’ (Hermeneutics, 21 n.41) suggests that the christological content of Romans 9.30-10.21 is the 
hermeneutical and theological centre of Romans 9-11. So rightly, W.A. Meeks, ‘On Trusting an Unpredictable God: 
A Hermeneutical Meditation on Romans 9-11’, in In Search of the Early Christians: Selected Essays (ed. A.R. Hilton and 
H.G. Snyder; New Haven: YUP, 2002), 210-229 (217); C.K. Rowe, ‘Romans 10:13: What is the Name of the Lord?’, HBT 
22 (2000): 135-73 (138-40, 158). This proposal positions me against Hays for whom ‘Rom. 9:30-10.21 has a 
parenthetical place in the logic of the argument’ (Echoes, 75) and Flebbe for whom the fact that Christ appears ‘nur 
viermal, und zwar eng zusammenstehend an einer Stelle (10,4-17)’, indicates that theology rather than 
Christology is the determinative theme of Romans 9-11 (Solus Deus, 275-76; cf. E.E. Johnson, The Function of 
Apocalyptic and Wisdom Traditions in Romans 9-11 [SBLDS 109; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989], 204). Not only is Flebbe’s 
tabulation of christological references highly misleading – Rowe notes that depending on the identification of the 
stone and the κύριος, there are as many as seventeen references to Christ in Romans 9.30-10.21 (‘What is the 
Name of the Lord’, 138 n.9) –, the dichotomizing of theology and Christology fundamentally misconstrues the 
dialectic relation of identification and differentiation between Jesus and God that characterises Paul’s theological 
grammar (Rowe, ‘What Is the Name of the Lord?’, 136-37, 144, 160, 170-73; cf. E.P. Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the 
Jewish People [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1983], 194; L.E. Keck, ‘Toward the Renewal of New Testament Christology’, 
NTS 32 [1986]: 362-77; Hahn, Theologie, 2.194, 301-308).       
65 Wagner, ‘Mercy to the Nations’, 423.  
66 The connection between Romans 9.12 and 9.30-32 is noted by S. Westerholm, ‘Paul and the Law in 
Romans 9-11’, 223-24; Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 312-13.   
67 J. Calvin, ‘Acts 14-28 and Romans 1-6’, in Calvin’s Commentaries Volume XIX (trans. J. Owen; Grand Rapids: 
Baker, 2003), 377.  
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9.30-32 by combining the roles of apostle and athletic commentator and announcing an ironic 
race with an incongruous outcome: ‘Gentiles, who did not pursue righteousness, attained 
righteousness, that is, the righteousness by faith (ἐκ piίστεως); but Israel, running after the law 
of righteousness, did not catch up with the law’; and this because they raced ‘not by faith, but 
as by works’ (οὐκ ἐκ piίστεως ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐξ ἔργων, 9.30-32). Here, the race to righteousness is 
literally won ‘not by works’ and ‘not by the one who runs’. As Calvin observes, ‘nothing could 
appear more unreasonable or less befitting’ than the incongruous results of this footrace:68 ‘the 
δικαιοσύνη that Paul announces’, to quote Barclay’s comment in conversation with Wisdom, 
‘appears qualitatively different from a normal configuration of justice’.69   
 Paul’s interest in Romans 9.30-33, however, is not just the paradoxicality of the 
present; he is arguing that this current incongruity is the fulfillment of a scriptural promise. 
Conflating Isaiah 28.16 and 8.14 LXX, Paul, as Watson writes, ‘creates a text that announces a 
forthcoming divine act with two contrasting outcomes’.70 As Paul rereads and rewrites Isaiah, 
replacing piολυτελῆ ἐκλεκτὸν ἀκρογωνιαῖον ἔντιμον (Isa 28.16) with piροσκόμματος καὶ piέτραν 
σκανδάλου (cf. Isa 8.14),71 he hears God promising to place a stone in Zion that will 
simultaneously occasion stumbling and salvation: ἰδοὺ τίθημι ἐν Σιὼν λίθον piροσκόμματος καὶ 
piέτραν σκανδάλου, καὶ ὁ piιστεύων ἐpi᾽ αὐτῷ οὐ καταισχυνθήσεται.72 For Paul, to repeat a point 
made above in relation to Romans 9.24, his present is the realisation of this promise. The 
citation formula that introduces Paul’s antithetical re-voicing of Isaiah 28.16 (καθὼς 
γέγραpiται) indicates a correspondence between the prophetic word and its fulfillment in the 
paradoxical present described in 9.30, 32: ‘Paul understands ὁ piιστεύων ἐpi᾽ αὐτῷ οὐ 
καταισχυνθήσεται (Rom 9.33) to speak of a righteousness that is ἐκ piίστεως (9.30, 32), just as he 
understands “stumbling” as occasioned by the pursuit of righteousness “by works” (9.32)’.73 
This suggests that the current crisis that is the stumbling of Israel and the salvation of Gentiles 
                                                        
68 Calvin, Romans, 377.  
69 Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 108.  
70 Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 323.  
71 The lexemes that Paul lifts from Isaiah 8.14 are piρόσκομμα and piέτραν. For a full discussion of Paul’s 
textual emendations to Isaiah 28.16 and an accompanying suggestion that Paul was writing from ‘a Septuagint 
text that had been reworked…to bring it closer to a Hebrew exemplar’, see Wagner, Heralds, 130.   
72 For the future form of καταισχύνω as a reference to final judgment and thus as a reference to 
eschatological salvation when qualified by the negative particle (οὐ), see R. Bultmann, ‘αἰσχύνω κτλ.’, in TDNT 1 
(ed. G. Kittel; trans. G.W. Bromiley; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964), 189.     
73 Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 324. Watson adds that the connection between ὁ piιστεύων ἐpi᾽ 
αὐτῷ  and ἐκ piίστεως ‘makes it difficult to refer ἐκ piίστεως to the faithfulness of Christ’.  
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is occasioned by and is the aftermath of God’s act of placing a stone in Zion. In other words, the 
paradoxical present that generates and orients Paul’s hermeneutic is the effect of a concrete 
divine cause.74 Wisdom, it should be noted, for whom God’s punitive actions towards Israel are 
limited to discipline and testing, could not imagine that God is the agent of Israel’s stumble. 
Scripture is reread and rewritten to show that while God can act with brief educational 
severity, he is consistently beneficent to Israel because Israel is a consistently fitting recipient 
of divine benefaction. For Paul, by contrast, it is precisely God’s act that occasions Israel’s 
stumble that reconfigures Paul’s reading of Israel’s scripture. However, while Romans 9.30-33 
announces the strange impact and scriptural foreordination of this event, it does not name or 
specify it. What I want to argue, building on a suggestion by Kavin Rowe, is that Romans 10.1-
13 gives ‘christological content’ to this divine cause: the act and aftermath promised by Isaiah 
are fulfilled in the event and effect of God’s action of sending and raising the crucified Jesus.75 
 
(2) The Christological Content: Romans 10.1-13 
Romans 10.1-13 is tied together lexically and thematically by repeated references to 
‘salvation’ (σωτηρίαν, 10.1, 10; σῴζω, 10.9, 13). Paul desires and prays for the salvation of Israel 
(10.1), but he sees a contradiction between their admirable ‘zeal for God’ (10.2) and their 
ignorance of God’s christological righteousness and salvation (10.2b-4, 6-13). In fact, as noted 
in the previous chapter, it is, however oddly, the people who read the pentateuchal and 
prophetic witness to the righteousness of God (cf. Rom 3.21) who do not know its christological 
content (10.2b-4). Thus, in this context, Israel’s attempt ‘to establish her own righteousness’, 
and the concomitant failure to ‘submit to God’s righteousness’, are a twofold consequence of 
an epistemological incapacity: Unbelieving Israelites are describable as ἀγνοοῦντες τὴν τοῦ 
θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην (10.3) because (γάρ) they do not recognise that ‘Christ is the telos of the law 
unto righteousness for everyone who believes’ (10.4). In other words, that which Israel sought 
as the νόμος δικαιοσύνης (9.31) and Gentiles received as the δικαιοσύνη ἐκ piίστεως (9.30) is 
                                                        
74 For Israel’s stumble as the result of intentional divine action, see M. Theobald, Studien zum Römerbrief 
(WUNT 136; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 374-78; F. Avemarie, ‘Israels rätselhafter Ungehorsam. Römer 10 als 
Anatomie eines von Gott provozierten Unglaubens’, in Between Gospel and Election (WUNT 257; ed. F. Wilk and J.R. 
Wagner; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 299-320.    
75 Rowe, ‘What is the Name of the Lord’, 139. Rowe’s more specific argument is that ‘10.1ff. functions…to 
give christological content to the righteousness that is ἐκ piίστεως (9.30, 32)….to the concept of salvation (10.1) 
and to Israel’s disobedience (9.30-33 and 10.14-21)’, as well as ‘christological identity to the stone/rock (9.32, 33)’ 
(139-40).   
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identified in 10.4 with the one Paul calls Χριστός.76 It is this contrast between ‘the 
righteousness of the law’ and the christological ‘righteousness of faith’ that is articulated as an 
antithetical rereading (and rewriting) of Israel’s scriptures in Romans 10.5-8.77  
The often overlooked γάρ that connects Romans 10.5 to the preceding claim that 
zealous Israel is ignorant of God’s christological righteousness indicates that Israel’s 
epistemological failure is hermeneutically grounded. As Paul rereads Leviticus 18.5 from the 
perspective of the law’s christological telos, he encounters what Watson calls a ‘soteriological 
rationale’ that is ‘something other than the righteousness of faith’: Μωϋσῆς γὰρ γράφει τὴν 
δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ [τοῦ] νόμου ὅτι ὁ piοιήσας αὐτὰ ἄνθρωpiος ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς (Rom 10.5).78 It 
is notable that ‘the righteousness from the law’ is summarily expressed in the actual voice of 
the law (Lev 18.5b),79 and thus Israel’s pursuit of the ‘law of righteousness’ (9.31) and attempt 
to ‘establish her own righteousness’ (10.3) can be read as synonymous descriptions of a 
scripturally determined soteriology: life is contingent on nomistically defined human action.80 
                                                        
76 Hays, Echoes, 76; cf. Wagner, Heralds, 125. The important debate about the translation of τέλος (end or 
goal) does not impact the central claim of this section – that is, Christ is the content of scripture’s witness. 
However, that Romans 10.3-4 is linked to the footrace metaphor by the reappearance of δικαιοσύνη, piιστεύω and 
νόμος suggests that τέλος likely refers to the finish-line of the race to righteousness and therefore is the ‘end of 
the law’ precisely as ‘the goal of the law’ (see Wagner, Heralds, 120; cf. Avemarie, ‘Israels rätselhafter 
Ungehorsam’, 306-15 for a recent argument that τέλος is a positive description and should thus be translated as 
‘Ziel’, but in a way that includes a reference to completion).   
77 For the argument in favor of an antithetical construal of Paul’s presentation of Leviticus 18.5 and 
Deuteronomy 30.12-14 in Romans 10.5-8, see P.M. Sprinkle, Law and Life: The Interpretation of Leviticus 18.5 in Early 
Judaism and in Paul (WUNT II/241; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 170-73; cf. Dunn Romans 9-16, 602. Against Hays’ 
suggestion that ‘the righteousness of the law’ and ‘the righteousness of faith’ are ‘synonymous’ rather than 
antithetical (Echoes, 76), Sprinkle notes: 1) the antithetical relationship of Leviticus 18.5 and Habakkuk 2.4 in 
Galatians 3.12, 2) the adversative force of δέ in Pauline constructions in which this preposition relates 
righteousness ἐκ piίστεως and righteousness ἐκ law/works, 3) the characteristically Pauline contrast between 
law/works and faith, 4) the parallel antithesis between ‘the law’ and ‘righteousness of faith’ in Romans 4.13, and 
5) the elimination of the references to ‘doing the commandment’ in Deuteronomy 30.12-14 (Law and Life, 70-72; cf. 
Watson, Hermeneutics, 329-41).   
78 Watson, Hermeneutics, 332-33. Considering the difficult textual issue in Romans 10.5, the manuscript 
evidence of P46 and the majority text and its status as the lectio difficilior incline me to place the ὅτι after τοῡ νόμου 
(cf. A. Lindemann, ‘Die Gerechtigkeit aus dem Gesetz: Erwägungen zur Auslegung und zur Textgeschichte von 
Römer 10, 5’, ZNW 73 [1982]: 231-50; Koch, Die Schrift als Zeuge, 293-94; Sprinkle, Law and Life, 166 n.2).    
79 Paul’s citation alters Leviticus 18.5b LXX by dropping the relative pronoun and changing the object to a 
demonstrative so that ‘the person who does these things’ has no definite antecedent, thus rendering Paul’s 
version of Leviticus 18.5b a suitable summary of ‘the righteousness of the law’ (Seifrid, ‘Romans’, 655).   
80 This reading assumes (pace Dunn, Romans 9-16, 601) that ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς should be interpreted 
instrumentally rather than locatively. As Sprinkle argues, the early Jewish texts Dunn appeals to actually support 
a tradition of soteriological interpretation of Leviticus 18.5 and Paul’s correlation of life and righteousness in 
Galatians 3.21, together with the theme of salvation that frames Romans 10.1-13, suggests that Paul understands 
the reference to ‘life’ in Leviticus 18.5b as a soteriological consequence of doing the law (Law and Life, 141 n.38). In 
this vein, Watson critiques N.T. Wright’s claim that law in Romans 9.30-10.5 describes ‘a charter of racial privilege’ 
(The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991], 241), noting that 
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In this sense, as Watson suggests, the uninformed zeal and misdirected action of Israel ‘is 
mediated through a text’81 – that is, scripture both announces (Isa 28.16 in 9.33) and occasions 
(Lev 18.5b in 10.5) Israel’s foreordained failure. It is precisely as readers of Leviticus 18.5b that 
Paul’s ‘kinsfolk according to the flesh’ (9.3) pursued the law of righteousness as if by works and 
thus stumbled over the stumbling stone, thereby fulfilling the promise of Isaiah 28.16 (Rom 
9.32-33). Sprinkle, I think rightly, resists construing the logic of Paul’s contrast between ‘the 
righteousness of the law’ and ‘the righteousness of faith’ in terms of an abstract antithesis 
between either legalism/faith82 or nationalistic exclusivity/ethnic inclusion,83 arguing instead 
that the exclusion of human action as an explanation for election (9.11-12, 16, 32; 10.3), and 
especially Paul’s deletion of the repeated references to ‘doing the commandment’ in 
Deuteronomy 30.12-14 (Rom 10.6-8, see below), suggest that Paul interprets the implied 
soteriology of Leviticus 18.5b as ‘contrary to the theological structure of the gospel’ because it 
‘enjoins a human activity as a precondition for blessing’ whereas ‘the righteousness of faith’ is 
determined ‘by God’s unilateral act’.84 In other words, the Pauline antithesis is not between two 
modes of human agency; it is between divine and human agency. However, lest this contrast 
become another abstract polarity, it is essential to note that the argumentative function of 
Romans 10.5 as grounding the claim that ‘Christ is the telos of the law’ and Paul’s christological 
rewriting of Deuteronomy 30.12-14 in Romans 10.6-8 indicate that the intended antithesis is 
not between divine and human action per se or in abstracto, but between nomistic human 
agency and a single and specific divine act – that is, between doing the law and the Christ-
event. For Paul, then, in contrast to Wisdom, righteousness is not defined by its congruence 
with the ultimate pre-creational structures of the cosmos. Rather, as argued in chapter seven, 
God’s righteousness is defined in and as an event, or more specifically, in and as the Christ-
event. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
while ‘privilege is an appropriate term for the items listed in [Romans] 9.4-5, in 9.30-10.5 the emphasis is on the 
praxis that corresponds to the privilege of νομοθεσία’ (Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 328-29 n.44; emphasis 
original).    
81 Watson, Hermeneutics, 333.  
82 E.g. Cranfield, Romans, 2.510; H. Hübner, ‘Was Heisst bei Paulus “Werke des Gesetzes”?’, in Glaube und 
Eschatologie (ed. E. Grässer and O. Merk; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1985), 123-33; D.J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans 
(NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 619.  
83 E.g. Dunn, Romans 9-16, 581-83; Wright, Climax, 242; cf. Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 36-41; 
Wagner, Heralds, 158 n.122  
84 Sprinkle, Law and Life, 176.  
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In Romans 10.6-8, the christological content of this concrete divine action is spoken by 
‘the righteousness of faith’ as a subversive re-saying of the prohibited quest motif of 
Deuteronomy 30.12-14. Paul’s editorial activity eliminates the reference to ‘the commandment’ 
(ἡ ἐντολή) that opens the passage in Deuteronomy 30.11 LXX and erases the threefold 
occurrence of piοιέω (Deut 30.12, 13, 14 LXX),85 thus creating a text that is lexically dislocated 
from and soteriologically opposed to Leviticus 18.5. Whereas Leviticus 18.5b invites human 
action with the verb piοιέω, Paul deletes this verbal link between Deuteronomy and Leviticus 
and reactivates the deuteronomic prohibition against supra-human acting as an inner-
pentateuchal antithesis to ‘the righteousness of the law’.86 As noted above, however, the 
contrast between Leviticus 18.5 and Paul’s rewritten Deuteronomy 30.12-14 is not an abstract 
antithesis between divine and human initiative; it is a concrete antithesis between a 
soteriologically intended observance of the law and God’s single and specific act that is the 
incarnate and risen Christ. Thus, Paul not only represses the references to ‘the commandment’ 
and ‘doing’ in Deuteronomy 30.11-14;87 he rewrites the text with an introduction taken from 
Deuteronomy 8.17/9.9 LXX and replaces the references to doing the commandment with 
christological glosses.88 In its rewritten form and as an antithesis to Romans 10.5, Deuteronomy 
30.12-14 cautions the ἄνθρωpiος of Leviticus 18.5 not ‘to say in his or her heart’ either ‘who will 
ascend to heaven’ or ‘who will descend into the abyss’ because both questions suppose that 
Christ is a passive prize rather than the incarnate and risen subject of God’s saving initiative 
(10.6-7). The proper soteriological statement is therefore predicated on God’s christological 
action rather than nomistic human agency: ἀλλὰ τί λέγει; ἐγγύς σου τὸ ῥῆμά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ 
στόματί σου καὶ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου (10.8a). In this context, the present word is the preached 
Christ (10.8b; cf. 10.17).89 The fault-line between ‘the righteousness of the law’ and ‘the 
righteousness of faith’ is thus irreducibly christological. As Sprinkle concludes, ‘“their own 
righteousness” refers to righteousness that is sought through human means’, or more 
                                                        
85 For a detailed discussion, see Koch, Die Schrift als Zeuge, 295. 
86 Sprinkle, Law and Life, 181. ‘The exegetical result’ of Paul’s rewritten text is, as Sprinkle adds, ‘a 
theological point that is antithetical both to Lev 18.5 and the original context of Deut 30’ (Law and Life, 180).  
87 Koch, Die Schrift als Zeuge, 295.   
88 Watson, Hermeneutics, 340: ‘Where Deuteronomy speaks of the doing of the commandment, Paul 
rewrites it so that it will speak of Christ and faith’.  
89 Romans 10.8b and 10.17 are ‘complementary descriptions of the gospel’; τὸ ῥῆμα τῆς piίστεως points to 
‘the call to faith that is inherent to God’s work in Christ’, τὸ ῥῆμα Χριστοῦ underscores ‘the unchanging content of 
that address’ (Seifrid, ‘Romans’, 663).  
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concretely, righteousness via the Mosaic Law, ‘while “the righteousness of God” is God’s saving 
action in Christ’.90 In other words, the witness of Israel’s scripture – the law and the prophets – 
to the righteousness of God just is scripture’s witness to the divine act that is Jesus’ single and 
saving history.      
This christological centering of Paul’s hermeneutic is confirmed and deepened in 
Romans 10.9-13. While the christological glosses of 10.6, 7 imply that the sent and exalted 
Christ is the content of ‘the word of faith’, the ὅτι that connects 10.8 and 10.9 signals a 
specification of the subject matter of the kerygma as the ruling and resurrected Jesus. Here, 
the content of confession is ‘Jesus is Lord’ (κύριος Ἰησοῦς) and the object of faith is God’s act of 
raising him from the dead. This ‘christo-theological’91 soteriology is explained and expanded in 
10.10 and then scripturally grounded in 10.11 (λέγει γὰρ ἡ γραφή). Re-citing Isaiah 28.16 
(cf.9.33) with the slight yet significant addition of piᾱς,92 Paul underwrites his claim that 
confession of and faith in the reigning and risen Christ is salvific with the scriptural promise 
that ‘everyone who believes on him (ἐpi᾽ αὐτῷ) will not be put to shame’. While it is possible to 
argue that the object of faith indicated by ἐpi᾽ αὐτῷ refers either to God (θεός) or God’s act of 
raising Jesus from the dead,93 it is far more likely that Jesus Christ is the referent of ἐpi᾽ αὐτῷ.94 
The nearest and most natural pronominal antecedent is the unambiguously christological 
αὐτόν of 10.9 and the object of faith in 10.9 is not θεός per se, but rather, as the ὅτι indicates, 
the divine act that establishes Jesus as the resurrected one. It is thus the identity of Jesus as 
Lord and risen, an identity that is inseparable from his history as a divine act, that is the 
content of confession and object of faith.95 Paul’s reading of Isaiah 28.16 is therefore only 
explicable as a christological rereading: Isaiah’s oracle is re-voiced as a promise that all who 
believe in Jesus will be saved. 
Both of these Pauline innovations to Isaiah – i.e., the ‘all’ and the christological content 
– are picked up and radicalised in Romans 10.12-13. The addition of the piᾱς to Isaiah 28.16 LXX 
                                                        
90 Sprinkle, Law and Life, 175.  
91 Rowe, ‘What Is the Name of the Lord’, 144.  
92 Wilk, Bedeutung des Jesajabuches, 61 notes that the piᾱς establishes a lexical and thematic connection 
with the soteriological universalism of Romans 10.12-13 indicated by the threefold piᾱς and the phrase οὐ γάρ 
ἐστιν διαστολὴ Ἰουδαίου τε καὶ Ἕλληνος.    
93 See e.g. Meeks, ‘On Trusting and Unpredictable God’, 217  
94 So most commentators, e.g. Cranfield, Romans, 2.531; Dunn, Romans 9-16, Wilckens, Der Brief an die Römer, 
2.228.   
95 Cf. Rowe, ‘What Is the Name of the Lord’, 143-44.  
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is grounded (γάρ) in the claim that ‘there is no distinction between Jew and Greek’ (cf. Rom 
3.22), a soteriological assertion that is itself grounded in a theological confession: ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς 
κύριος piάντων (10.12). However, as argued in relation to the mutually-interpreting interaction 
of justification and the Shema in Romans 3.30 (see chapter seven), Paul is not arguing from an 
axiomatic affirmation of divine oneness (‘there is one Lord’) to a soteriological universalism 
(‘the same Lord is Lord of all’). Rather, as the identification of Jesus as the κύριος indicates,96 
God’s act that is the universally salvific history of the incarnate and risen Christ reconfigures 
Paul’s articulation of ‘kyriotic identity’97 and thus grounds Paul’s rethinking and reapplication 
of the logic and limits of the Lord’s singularity. As the conclusion of 10.12 suggests, it is as this 
single, saving and christological Lord is describable as ‘richly giving to all who call upon him’ 
(piλουτῶν εἰς piάντας τοὺς ἐpiικαλουμένους αὐτόν) that he is identified as ‘Lord of all’. In other 
words, the christological character and identity of the κύριος are known from the christological 
content and anthropological indiscrimination of the saving event: the universality of Jesus’ 
lordship is deduced from the christological call of a people ‘not only from the Jews but also 
from the Gentiles’ (Rom 9.24); Jesus’ identity as Lord is disclosed in and through God’s saving 
act in Christ.   
This dramatic and theologically daring christological identification of the Lord is 
intensified and ‘inscripturated’ in Romans 10.13. The verb ἐpiικαλέω in Romans 10.12 both 
echoes what Rowe calls ‘the oracular dimension of vv. 9-10 (ὁμολογήσῃς, ὁμολογεῖται)’98 and 
provides a lexical link between the Christology and soteriology of 10.12 and its scriptural 
grounding in 10.13. In a radical re-saying of Joel 3.5a LXX,99 Paul appropriates the phrase τὸ 
ὄνομα κυρίου as a christological title and announces that ‘everyone who calls upon the name 
of the Lord [Jesus] will be saved’.100 This is a christological hermeneutic with subtle yet 
significant theological consequences. As Rowe argues, the application of Joel’s ‘the name of the 
Lord’ to Jesus requires a relational and dynamic account of divine identity in which ‘Jesus 
                                                        
96 That Jesus is the intended referent of κύριος is confirmed by the explicit association of κύριος and 
Ἰησοῦς in Romans 10.9 and the christological identification of ἐpi᾽ αὐτῷ in 10.11 (Rowe, ‘What Is the Name of the 
Lord’, 146; cf. Cranfield, Romans 2.531; Dunn, Romans 9-16, 610).   
97 C.K. Rowe, ‘Luke and the Trinity: An Essay in Ecclesial Biblical Theology’, SJT 56 (2003): 1-26 (25).  
98 Rowe, ‘What Is the Name of the Lord’, 151.  
99 Paul’s citation is verbatim except that it drops the καὶ ἔσται that opens Joel 3.5 LXX.  
100 The identification of Jesus as ‘Lord’ in 10.9 and 10.12 make the christological referent of κύριος in 10.13 
indisputable. 
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Christ is to be understood theologically’ and ‘God is to be understood christologically’. 101 This 
hermeneutical revolution, however, is also a clear indication that Paul’s understanding of 
Israel’s failure and soteriological future are essentially and inescapably christological.102 The 
salvation of his ‘kinsfolk according to the flesh’ for which Paul longs and prays (9.1-3; 10.1) has 
its kerygmatic content in the ruling and risen Jesus (10.6-8, 17) and is therefore realisable in 
and as the confession of his Lordship. Expressed from the other side, God’s act of placing a 
stumbling stone in Zion is, as the explicitly christological repetition of Isaiah 28.16 in Romans 
10.11 makes plain, identical to and therefore identifiable as Jesus Christ. In other words, both 
the present stumble and the promised salvation of Israel are effects of the Christ-event. 
 
(3) A Christological Rereading: Romans 10.14-21  
The identification of God’s act of placing a stumbling stone in Zion as Jesus Christ 
brings us back to the central thesis of this section: the divine cause of the current crisis that 
defines Paul’s present and restructures his hermeneutic is the divine act that is Jesus’ severe 
and saving history. In other words, to repeat a point made above, Paul’s reading of scripture is 
only intelligible as a christological rereading. Romans 10.14-21 confirms this hermeneutical 
point.  
Whether Romans 10.14-18 refers to the preaching of the gospel to Israel103 or Paul’s own 
Gentile mission,104 the citation of Isaiah 52.7 (Rom 10.15) and Isaiah 53.1 (Rom 10.16) rereads 
the prophet’s phrases about ‘those who proclaim good news’ (οἱ εὐαγγελιζομένοι [τὰ] ἀγαθά) 
and ‘the message’ (ἡ ἀκοή) as references to ‘the gospel’ (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον) and thus fills the 
prophetic-protoevangelium with christological content: τὸ ῥῆμα Χριστοῦ (10.17). In this context, 
the apostolic announcement of Jesus Christ is the agent of judgment and grace as rejection and 
election are concretely realised in and as unbelief (‘not all have obeyed the good news’, 10.16) 
and belief (‘faith comes by hearing’).105 It is therefore the preached gospel of God’s Son that 
occasions the incongruous present that Paul hears promised in Israel’s prophets (9.25-29, 33; 
                                                        
101 Rowe, ‘What Is the Name of the Lord’, 160, 172.  
102 Pace, e.g., L. Gaston, Paul and the Torah (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1987), 148-49; J.G. 
Gager, Reinventing Paul (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 142.  
103 The majority reading, so e.g., Cranfield, Romans, 2.533; E. Käsemann, Commentary on Romans (trans. G.W. 
Bromiley; Grand Rapids, 1980), 294; Moo, Romans, 664.  
104 See Dunn, Romans 9-16, 620; Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 331-32.  
105 Cf. Westerholm, ‘Paul and the Law in Romans 9-11’, 224.  
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10.19-20) and thus orients Paul’s hermeneutic to scripture’s christological content. In other 
words, ‘the holy scriptures’ are readable as a pre-promise of the gospel of God’s Son (Rom 1.2-
4) only as they are reread as promise fulfilled. The pattern of non-correspondence that Paul 
uncovers in Israel’s history (Rom 9.7-18) and hears in Israel’s prophets (9.25-26) is a typological 
anticipation and pre-announcement of a moment that Paul is able to describe in the aorist 
tense: εὑρέθην [ἐν] τοῖς ἐμὲ μὴ ζητοῦσιν, ἐμφανὴς ἐγενόμην τοῖς ἐμὲ μὴ ἐpiερωτῶσιν (Rom 
10.20; citing Isa 65.1). As in Romans 9.30-33, this incongruity is the effect of a concrete 
christological cause. Just as the divine act of placing a christological stone in Zion occasioned 
the contradiction between running after and receiving righteousness, the proclamation of ‘the 
word of Christ’ produces a paradox: ‘I was found by those who did not seek me’. It is thus the 
event, announcement and aftermath of the christological gospel that patterns Paul’s 
paradoxical hermeneutic.  
At this point Wisdom’s perspective is again suggestive. As indicated in the previous 
section, Wisdom’s rereading and rewriting of Israel’s scripture is characterised by a patterned 
correspondence between the form and objects of divine action. Thus, in contrast to Paul’s 
paradoxical claims that righteousness is attained by those who do not pursue it (Rom 9.30) and 
that God is found by those who do not seek him (Rom 10.20), Wisdom insists on an affinity 
between the beneficence and beneficiaries of σοφία: ‘she is discerned by those who love her’ 
(6.12a), ‘she seeks those who are worthy (ἄξιος) of her’ (6.16), and, in direct antithesis to 
Romans 10.20, ‘she is found (εὑρίσκω) by those who seek (ζητέω) her’ (6.12b). For Wisdom, as 
noted above, this ‘fit’ between divine saving action and human recipients is a necessary 
instantiation of the protological conviction that σοφία is both ‘the fashioner of all things’ (ἡ 
piάντων τεχνῖτις, 7.21) and the one who ‘governs all things well’ (διοικεῖ τὰ piάντα χρηστῶς, 
8.1b). In this sense, Wisdom’s rereading of the Pentateuch is a reading from the beginning (or 
from before the beginning): Israel’s history is a repeated concretion of an ordered and just pre-
creational pattern of correspondence as Israel qua the righteous and Egypt qua the ungodly are 
the recurrent and respective objects of salvific favor and divine judgment.  
Paul’s hermeneutic is different. Rather than interpreting the canonical past as a 
recurrent exemplification of an immutable protological order, Paul reads Israel’s history as an 
anticipation of an event. In this sense, for Paul, history’s temporal beginning is not its 
hermeneutical beginning. To borrow a couple of phrases from David Horrell, in Pauline 
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historiography, the Christ-event is the ‘determinative centre’ and the ‘generative beginning’.106 
As I suggested in the introduction, for Pauline hermeneutics, Christology has a centrifugal and 
generative significance – that is, Jesus Christ both orders and occasions Paul’s rereading of 
Israel’s scripture. In other words, whereas Wisdom rereads scripture from a pre-creational 
pattern and thus as a repeated concretion of the protological order, Paul rereads scripture 
from the divine act that is Jesus’ history and thus as a typological anticipation and prophetic 
promise of the Christ-event.  It is in this sense that the advent and impact of Jesus represent 
scripture’s ‘Das Jetzt der Lesbarkeit’: the disjunctions and paradoxes that Paul traces in the law 
and prophets have their logical and hermeneutical antecedent in the event and aftermath of 
the crucified and risen Jesus.107  
Christology, then, is the essential hermeneutical fault-line that divides Wisdom and 
Paul. As suggested in the introduction to this chapter, Wisdom and Paul are connected by a 
canon – they read the same texts – yet disconnected by a hermeneutic – they read the same 
texts differently. The nature of this hermeneutical difference is now specifiable: Wisdom reads 
from and in the form of the cosmic order; Paul reads after and according to the Christ-event. It 
is this contrast between pre-creational and christological hermeneutics that ultimately 
explains the incommensurable exegeses of Israel in Wisdom 10-19 and Romans 9-11. For 
Wisdom, an acknowledgment of Israel’s stumble (Rom 9.32), ignorance (Rom 10.2), 
insubordination (Rom 10.3), unbelief (Rom 10.16) and disobedience (Rom 10.21) would 
foreclose the possibility of a salvific future. For Paul, however, a reading of Israel’s history 
occasioned by and oriented towards God’s unconditioned and incongruous act in Christ reveals 
that God’s grace has never been conditioned by or contingent upon any pre-existing worth in 
Israel. It is precisely as a ‘disobedient and contrary people’ that Israel remains within the 
sphere of soteriological hope.108 If God’s counterintuitive and creative call in Christ is the 
                                                        
106 D.G. Horrell, ‘Paul’s Narratives or Narrative Substructure? The Significance of “Paul’s Story”’, in 
Narrative Dynamics in Paul: A Critical Assessment (ed. B.W. Longenecker; Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 
2002), 157-71 (167 n.18).  
107 A similar point could be made from Romans 5.12-21. If Adam is a type of Christ (Ἀδὰμ ὅς ἐστιν τύpiος 
τοῦ μέλλοντος, 5.14), then Adam is presented as patterned after and therefore logically posterior to Jesus Christ. 
In Pauline hermeneutics and historiography, the Christ-event is the first thing.  
108 Avemarie (‘Israels rätselhafter Ungehorsam’, 315-320) suggestively notes that Paul asks but does not 
directly answer the question ‘Hat Israel etwa nicht erkannt’ (Rom 10.19) and thereby, in tandem with the citations 
of Deuteronomy 32.21 and Isaiah 65.1-2 (Rom 10.19-21), points beyond Israel’s disobedience to ‘die 
Handlungssouveränität Gottes’ – that is, ‘zunächst zu der These von der Verstockung und von da zu dem alles 
überwältigenden Mysterium von Israels Errettung’ (320).     
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grounds of Israel’s salvation (Rom 10.1-13; cf. 9.24-26), then the disjunction between Israel’s 
current disobedience and God’s δικαιοσύνη is an opportunity for rather than an impediment to 
the incongruous grace of God. In other words, if the Christ-event is what orients and interprets 
Israel’s past and present history (Rom 9-10), there is reason to hope that that same divine act is 
the hermeneutic and basis for Israel’s soteriological future.  
This is where Romans 10 ends, in crisis and hope. Paul’s citations of Deuteronomy 
32.21’s promise that God will make Israel jealous of a ‘no people’ and Isaiah 65.2’s description 
of God’s outstretched arms (Rom 10.19, 21) leave the prayer of Romans 10.1 open but 
unanswered. I will argue that Romans 11 points towards and imagines God’s Christ-shaped 
‘yes’ to Paul’s heartfelt prayer.   
 
The Christ-Shaped Hope: Romans 11.1-36 
 The last two sections suggest a single thesis: Paul’s reading of Israel’s scripture in 
Romans 9-10 is occasioned by and oriented towards the act and aftermath of the Christ-event. 
In Romans 9.7-29, Paul rereads Israel’s past and prophets as, respectively, a typological 
anticipation and promissory announcement of his paradoxical present. In Romans 9.30-10.21, 
Paul argues that the current crisis of Gentile election and Israelite rejection anticipated and 
announced in scripture is an effect of a concrete, christological cause. Thus, read together, 
Romans 9 and 10 indicate that Paul’s interpretation of Israel’s scripture is a christological 
reinterpretation: the holy writings pre-promise (Rom 1.2), witness to (Rom 3.21) and only now 
(νῦν) reveal (Rom 16.26) the event and impact of the risen and preached Jesus. Put another 
way, for Paul, the Christ-event is the hermeneutic for reading history. There is, however, a 
possible objection to this thesis: Romans 11. 
 With the disputed exception of the phrase ἥξει ἐκ Σιὼν ὁ ῥυόμενος (Rom 11.26; citing 
Isa 59.20), Romans 11 locates the present and future of salvation history within the 
‘unsearchable judgments’ and ‘untraceable ways’ of God (11.33) without a single explicit 
reference to Jesus Christ. While the significance of this christological lacuna is explained in 
various ways, the net effect is almost always a dislocation of Christology from the material 
centre of Romans 9-11. For some, the relative christological silence of Romans 11 is indicative 
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of a more or less non-christological Sonderweg for Israel.109 This minority reading is able to 
capitalise on the lack of explicit references to Christ in Romans 11, but the implied argument 
from the non-reference to Christ to a non-christological soteriology is ultimately an exegetical 
non sequitur. Not only does it make of the somewhat artificial chapter divisions of Romans a 
sound-proof barrier that prevents the association of Christology and salvation announced in 
Romans 10.1-13 (and 3.21-8.39!) to be heard from within the argument of Romans 11, it 
wrongly supposes that Romans 11 is about the grounds of Israel's salvation. But this is precisely 
what Romans 11, unlike Romans 10.1-13, is not about. As I will argue below, whereas Romans 
10.1-13 grounds soteriology in Christology, Romans 11 is about how the specifically 
christological salvation of Israel (and all) announced in Romans 10.1-13 unfolds and is 
actualised in Israel’s present and future.110 A second and ultimately more significant realisation 
of the interpretive potential of the christological silence of Romans 11 is the (sometimes 
implicit) suggestion that, for Paul, Christology is subsumable and interpretable within 
something more hermeneutically basic than the Christ-event. So, for example, Flebbe argues 
that the fact that Christ appears ‘nur viermal, und zwar eng zusammenstehend an einer Stelle 
(10,4-17)’ in Romans 9-11 indicates that Paul’s hermeneutic and account of history is 
theological rather than christological.111 Or, from a different angle, N.T. Wright regularly 
suggests that ‘an essentially Jewish story’ provides the narrative and interpretative frame 
within which Paul plots Jesus as ‘climax’ and ‘subversive twist’112 and thus Romans 9-11 is 
characterised as ‘a retelling of the story of Israel, from Abraham to (Paul’s) present day’.113 The 
christological consequence of these admittedly different readings is that the single and saving 
history of Jesus Christ is referred to and explained within a more essential and comprehensive 
reality. The result is that God’s act in Jesus is afforded (at most) tectonic rather than 
                                                        
109 E.g. Gaston, Paul and the Torah, 148-49; K. Stendahl, Final Account: Paul’s Letter to the Romans 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 40.    
110 The standard arguments against a Sonderweg interpretation of Romans 11 – e.g. the references to faith 
in 11.20 and the mention of ‘the redeemer from Zion’ in 11.26 (cf. Grindheim, The Crux of Election, 167 n.114) – are 
correct as far as they go, but ultimately this line of argumentation concedes too much as it assumes that Romans 
11 is about the grounds of Israel’s salvation. Watson’s reply to Gaston takes the right approach: ‘such a 
reading…can offer no coherent explanation of Romans 10.1-13 in its relation to the prayer for Jewish salvation in 
v.1. Indeed, it becomes incomprehensible how Paul could ever have prayed such a prayer’ (Paul, Judaism and the 
Gentiles, 329 n.45).  
111 Flebbe, Solus Deus, 275-76.  
112 N.T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God (London: SPCK, 1992), 79, 405.  
113 Wright, ‘Romans’, 622. It should be noted that Wright is able to turn the interpretative direction 
around and speak in terms more compatible with the reading offered here; e.g. ‘Romans’, 625: ‘Israel…is Messiah-
shaped. The pattern of Israel’s history…is none other than the pattern of death and resurrection’.    
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centrifugal significance: the Christ-event is hermeneutically consequential, not 
hermeneutically central. 
 The thesis of this section is that Romans 11 makes the opposite point. Rather than 
marginalising the hermeneutical and historiographic importance of Jesus, the Christ-shaped 
reimagining of Israel’s soteriological present and future in Romans 11 indicates that the divine 
act that is the concrete and sui generis history of Jesus Christ is the gravitational centre of 
Pauline theology. Just as Paul’s rereading of Israel’s scripture in Romans 9-10 suggests that the 
Christ-event makes sense of and gives meaning to (rather than primarily gaining meaning 
from) Israel’s past (9.7-18; cf. 11.2-4) and present (9.24-10.21; cf. 11.1, 5-22), the projection of 
the Christ-pattern over and onto Israel’s future (11.23-32) precludes any perspective on history 
that eclipses, de-centres and/or abstracts from what J. Louis Martyn calls Paul’s ‘evangelical, 
cosmic, history-creating Christology’.114 Thus, as I will argue, Romans 11 is not a subsuming of 
Jesus in or under an axiomatic meta-theology (Flebbe), nor is it a plotting of the Christ-event 
within a substructural meta-narrative (Wright). On the contrary, the hermeneutical logic of 
Romans 11 is only legible as a reimagining of Israel’s present and future from the 
hermeneutical perspective of, and as a soteriological effect of, the shape and singularity of 
God’s action in Jesus Christ.  
 
(1) The Past and the Present: Romans 11.1-10 
 Romans 11 opens by confronting the crisis that closes Romans 10. Israel’s 
characterisation as ‘a disobedient and contrary people’ (10.21) raises a question that the 
reference to God’s outstretched arms (10.21) implicitly answers: μὴ ἀpiώσατο ὁ θεὸς τὸν λαὸν 
αὐτοῦ; (11.1). Paul grounds his emphatic no (μὴ γένοιτο) to this rhetorical question with a 
reference to his personal present and its analogous scriptural past.115 Paul can say, echoing 1 
Kingdoms 12.22 and Psalm 93.14 LXX (Rom 11.2),116 that ‘God has not rejected his 
people/inheritance’ both because God has not rejected Paul – an Israelite from the seed of 
                                                        
114 J.L. Martyn, ‘Events in Galatia: Modified Covenantal Nomism Versus God’s invasion of the Cosmos in 
the Singular Gospel: A Response to J.D.G. Dunn and B.R. Gaventa’, in Pauline Theology: Volume One (ed. J. Bassler; 
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 160-79 (165).   
115 Cf. Käsemann, Romans, 299. Gaston is right to emphasise that it is Paul’s particular identity as a Jewish 
believer that grounds his ‘no’, but it is an over-reading to suggest that Paul’s identity as a Jewish apostle indicates 
that the ‘remnant’ of the present time (11.5) is limited to Jewish preachers to Gentiles (Paul and the Torah, 142).   
116 The allusion to Psalm 93.14 LXX is strengthened if the minority witness of P46, F, G, Ambrosiaster, 
Pelagius and the Gothic is adopted, replacing λαόν with κληρονομίαν (Wagner, Heralds, 222).    
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Abraham and the tribe of Benjamin (11.1b) – and because this present is paralleled in Israel’s 
history. This biographical and scriptural evidence of God’s faithfulness to Israel functions as an 
argument and announcement that while the reduction of Israel to a remnant is always an 
enactment of divine judgment (cf. Rom 9.27-29), the divine saving action of ‘leaving behind’ 
(καταλείpiω, 11.4) a remnant, whether in the days of Elijah (3 Kgdms 19) or in Paul’s present, 
means that reduction is not rejection – that ‘grace’, as Seifrid puts it, ‘operates at the “null 
point” of God’s judgment’.117 In the case of Paul, his self-description as an ‘Israelite from the 
seed of Abraham’ (ἐγὼ Ἰσραηλίτης εἰμί, ἐκ σpiέρματος Ἀβραάμ, 11.1b), demonstrates that the 
privileges and promises given to ‘Israelites’ (Ἰσραηλῖται, Rom 9.4-5) are being realised rather 
than revoked (cf. Rom 11.29), and that this soteriological fulfillment is continuous with the 
scriptural pattern of God’s  unconditioned and creative ‘reckoning’ (Rom 9.8) and ‘leaving’ 
(9.29, citing Isa 1.9) of a ‘seed’ (σpiέρμα). Paul is thus able to anchor his reaffirmation of divine 
faithfulness (οὐκ ἀpiώσατο ὁ θεὸς τὸν λαὸν αὐτοῦ) by asking an exegetical question: ἢ οὐκ 
οἴδατε ἐν Ἠλίᾳ τί λέγει ἡ γραφή; (11.2). Citing only a selection of the spoken words of 3 
Kingdoms 19.10-18, Paul constructs a simple dialogue consisting of Elijah’s complaint ‘against 
Israel’ (κατὰ τοῦ Ἰσραήλ, 11.2) – ‘they have killed your prophets…I alone am left’ (11.3) – and 
‘the divine response’ (ὁ χρηματισμός) – ‘I have reserved for myself (κατέλιpiον ἐμαυτῷ) seven 
thousand who have not bent the knee to Baal’ (11.4).  
For Paul, however, as the interpretative deductions of Romans 11.5-6 suggest, the Elijah 
story is not just an anchor-point for a theological affirmation; the narrative, as reread by Paul, 
is analogous to and an anticipation of his present. There is, in other words, a correspondence 
(οὕτως οὖν) between God’s act of reserving seven thousand non-idolaters for himself and the 
current coming-into-being of a remnant according to the election of grace (11.5). Wagner 
notes that the ‘resumption of “remnant” language in Romans 11.3-5 recalls the words of Isaiah 
quoted earlier (Rom 9.27-29)’, but rightly adds that Paul’s time-specification (ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ) 
indicates that he ‘understands Isaiah’s words to refer to the present time: Isaiah’s τὸ 
ὑpiόλειμμα σωθήσεται…is realized in Paul’s own day as λεῖμμα κατ᾽ ἐκλογὴν χάριτος γέγονεν’.118 
The correspondence between scriptural past and Paul’s present, however, is not just 
typological; it is, to stress etymology over connotation, ‘charismatic’ – that is, the Elijah story 
                                                        
117 Seifrid, Christ, Our Righteousness, 161.  
118 Wagner, Heralds, 235.  
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prefigures the existence of the remnant and the unconditioned act of electing grace that 
establishes it. While it is possible to read the Elijah story as implying that God preserved a 
remnant because they were faithful, Paul’s activation of this text as an analogy to the aftermath 
of the Christ-event precludes this interpretation. In other words, because this text anticipates 
this present, it is retrospectively readable only as an exemplification of God’s unconditioned 
grace. The exegetical extension of the Elijah story into Paul’s present in Romans 11.5-6 
confirms this. Paul’s addition of the reflexive pronoun to the divine speech of 3 Kingdoms 
19.18 (‘I will reserve for myself [ἐμαυτῷ]) signals an emphasis on divine initiative that it 
sharpened to exclusivity by the antithesis Paul derives from the narrative: εἰ δὲ χάριτι, οὐκέτι 
ἐξ ἔργων (11.6).119 Thus, according to Paul’s rereading of 3 Kingdoms 19, ‘the refusal to bend 
the knee to Baal’, as Seifrid remarks, ‘represents the content of divine deliverance and not its 
basis’.120 In other words, the Elijah story anticipates Paul’s present not just as an analogous 
instance of the simultaneity of divine judgment and grace evident in the reduction of Israel to 
and the reservation of a remnant. The seven thousand that God kept for himself corresponds 
to those who are currently ‘called from the Jews’ (Rom 9.24) because, when 3 Kingdoms 19 is 
reread as a typological analogy to Paul’s present, both groups are describable as a λεῖμμα κατ᾽ 
ἐκλογὴν χάριτος (11.5). It is thus Paul’s christologically occasioned present and a reread 
scriptural story from that perspective that ground Paul’s hopeful insistence that ‘God has not 
rejected his people’. 
If Romans 11.1-6 sounds the note of hope for Israel in the form of the remnant, Romans 
11.7-10 emphasises the current crisis that is God’s act of hardening (or making insensible)121 
‘the rest’ (οἱ λοιpiοί, 11.7). The structural analysis of Enno Edzard Popkes convincingly argues 
that while the phrase ἡ ἐκλογὴ ἐpiέτυχεν (11.7) points back to the existence of a remnant 
embodied by Paul (11.1-6), it is the phrase οἱ λοιpiοὶ ἐpiωρώθησαν that introduces the theme of 
                                                        
119 As noted in the previous chapter, Paul’s additional statement, ἐpiεὶ ἡ χάρις οὐκέτι γίνεται χάρις, 
indicates that his particular definition of grace is deduced from God’s unconditioned and unfitting gifting of 
Christ; cf. H. Moxnes, Theology in Conflict: Studies in Paul’s Understanding of God in Romans (NovTSup 53; Leiden: Brill, 
1980), 49. 
120 Seifrid, Christ, Our Righteousness, 161.  
121 For the translation of piωρόω with terms indicating sensory and intellectual incapacity and 
obtuseness, see Wagner, Heralds, 240 n.68. For ἐpiωρώθησαν as a ‘passivum divinum’, see E.E. Popkes, ‘“Und David 
spricht…” Zur Rezeption von Ps LXX 68,23f. im Kontext von Röm 11,1-10’, in Between Gospel and Election (WUNT 257; 
ed. F. Wilk and J.R. Wagner; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 321-37 (324); cf. Romans 9.18.       
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Romans 11.7-10 and initiates the catena of scriptural quotations that follows (11.8-10).122 The 
ironic redescription of Israel seeking (ἐpiιζητέω) yet failing to obtain (οὐκ ἐpiιτυγχάνω, 11.7) 
evokes the antithesis between running after and receiving righteousness in 9.30-33 and thus, 
together with the reference to σκάνδαλον taken from Psalm 68.23 LXX (Rom 11.9), indicates 
that the current contrast between the elect and the rest is an effect of the same concrete 
divine cause announced in Romans 9.33-10.13. As Seifrid writes, ‘it is the proclamation of the 
crucified and risen Christ that brings the present moment of judgment and hardening upon 
Israel’.123 This christological conditioning of the present, however, is more than an inference 
from Romans 9.30-10.13 (and 9.1-5, 24-29); it is essentially a restatement of Romans 10.16-21: 
‘the word of Christ’ is the agent of election (‘faith comes by hearing’, 10.17) and rejection (‘not 
all have believed our message’, 10.16). Thus, just as Moses and Isaiah were re-voiced in that 
context as witnesses against Israel in the aftermath of the christological kerygma (10.19, 21), 
Romans 11.8-10 rereads Deuteronomy 29.4 LXX and Psalm 68.23-24 LXX as imprecatory 
promises fulfilled in Paul’s christologically occasioned present. This link between Israel’s past 
and Paul’s present is signaled by the citation formula that opens the scriptural series (καθὼς 
γέγραpiται): the current crisis that is the divine act of rendering Israel insensible occurred ‘just 
as it is written, God gave them a spirit of stupor (piνεῦμα κατανύξεως),124 eyes to not see and 
ears to not hear, to the present day’ (Rom 11.8). As Wagner notes, ‘the final temporal phrase’, 
ἕως τῆς σήμερον ἡμέρας, ‘taken from Deuteronomy 29.4, is particularly important, for it 
affords Paul the hermeneutical leverage to treat the citation as a diagnosis of the condition of 
“the rest” of Israel in his own day’. To borrow a sentence from Erich Auerbach, the current 
crisis indicated by the aorist of piωρόω (11.7) ‘makes recognisable (erkennbar) and establishes 
(herstellen) a connection between two events’, 125 or more precisely in this case, a connection 
between God’s unfinished and therefore forward-pointing act of blinding Israel and its 
concrete and antitypical recapitulation in and as the impact of ‘the word of Christ’. The 
citation of Psalm 68.23-24 LXX sharpens this christological point. The reappearance of 
σκάνδαλον in the Davidic malediction (Rom 11.9) recalls the influence of Isaiah 8.14 in Romans 
9.32-33 and thereby evokes the christological cause of Israel’s present stumble. Wagner 
                                                        
122 Popkes, ‘“Und David spricht…”’, 322-24.    
123 Seifrid, ‘Romans’, 671.  
124 This phrase is lifted from Isaiah 29.10 LXX.  
125  Auerbach, ‘Figura’, 53. 
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captures this intertextual dynamic: ‘For Paul, “the rest” of Israel suffers the effects of the 
Davidic curse because they have not put their trust for deliverance in the “stone” – the God 
who has now acted in Jesus Christ to effect Israel’s redemption’;126 or as I would prefer to put it, 
Israel’s stumble is an effect of the divine act that is the history and proclamation of Jesus 
Christ.  
For Paul, then, the connection between Israel’s scriptural past and Paul’s 
christologically determined present is not a hermeneutical creation; it is an exegetical 
recognition of anticipations of the event and the impact of Jesus’ history from the vantage 
point of its aftermath. As John David Dawson says about figural interpretation in general, 
Paul’s ‘acts of interpretation are mimetic rather than constructive: [he] does not turn a past 
person or event into a figura; instead, [he] discovers past persons or events to have been a 
figura’.127 But this is merely to restate the argument thus far: Paul’s reading of Israel’s scripture 
is a rereading that hears Israel’s history as a typological testimony and prophetic promise of 
the history, proclamation and impact of Jesus Christ. The implicit question generated by Paul’s 
emphatic double assertion that God has not rejected his people (11.1, 2), however, is not 
primarily about the correspondence between Israel’s scriptural past and Paul’s present; it is 
about the relationship between the current christological crisis and Israel’s soteriological 
future. For Wisdom, the present possibility of sin does not foreclose Israel’s future – ‘even if we 
sin we are yours’ – because Israel knows God’s power (Wis. 15.2a). This potential sin, however, 
as argued in chapter four, is an actual impossibility because Israel knows that God knows Israel 
and because such knowledge is ‘complete righteousness’ (ὁλόκληρος δικαιοσύνη, 15.2b-3). In 
other words, Wisdom’s confidence about Israel’s future is tied to a two-part epistemic 
affirmation that grounds a predicate: Israel knows and is known by God and is therefore 
righteous. Romans 11.11-32 is equally emphatic in its insistence on Israel’s soteriological 
future, but, as will be argued presently, this confidence is anchored in God’s christological and 
unconditioned mercy rather than in Israel’s righteousness.   
 
 
                                                        
126 Wagner, Heralds, 264. Wagner wants to push this connection further, suggesting that the lexical link 
between Psalm 68.23 and Isaiah 8.14, piαγίς and σκάνδαλον, indicates that ‘for Paul the two passages fit within the 
same underlying story’ and thus that the citation of ‘David’s imprecatory prayer’ in Romans 11.9-10 ‘becomes a 
plea for God to visit on the wicked the fate threatened in Isaiah’s oracle’.  
127 Dawson, Figural Reading, 122.  
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(2) Soteriological Solidarity: Romans 11.11-24 
 The reference to Israel’s stumble in the quotation from Psalm 68.23 LXX (Rom 11.9) 
raises a question: μὴ ἔpiταισαν ἵνα piέσωσιν; (Rom 11.11a).128 Paul’s answer, μὴ γένοιτο, is a 
denial of the finality of the current condition of Israel and thus an invitation to imagine a 
different, salvific future. In other words, the rejection of the teleological ultimacy suggested by 
the phrase ἵνα piέσωσιν is an implied argument that the present is penultimate – that Israel’s 
hardening is ‘the middle point’ rather than telos of God’s redemptive plan.129  
 Romans 11.11b points towards this other and open future:  ‘through [Israel’s] trespass 
salvation has come to the Gentiles, in order to make them jealous’. As Watson observes, this 
statement contains ‘a double teleology’: 1) Israel’s piαράpiτωμα is instrumental in the salvation 
of the Gentiles; 2) Gentile salvation intends Israel’s salvation (cf. 11.30-32).130 The first 
movement of this sub contrario salvation history echoes the teleological ordering of rejection 
and election articulated in Romans 9.22-23. In that context, God’s word to Pharaoh – ‘for this 
very reason I raised you up, so that (ὅpiως) I may demonstrate my power in you and so that 
(ὅpiως) my name may be proclaimed in all the earth’ (Rom 9.17; citing Exod 9.16) – grounds the 
more general assertion that divine wrath is oriented towards and intends divine mercy (9.22-
23). The same scriptural logic appears to structure Paul’s repeated claim that Israel’s 
trespass/rejection/unbelief/disobedience issues in and in a certain sense effects the Gentiles’ 
reception of salvation/riches/reconciliation/mercy (11.11, 12, 15, 19, 30). As Wright puts it, 
‘Israel’s hardening relates to Gentile salvation somewhat as Pharaoh’s hardening related to the 
exodus (9.17)’.131 The second movement – from Israel’s rejection to re-election – is also derived 
from scripture. In an exegetical extension of Deuteronomy 32.21 (quoted in Rom 10.19), Paul 
insists that the salvation of the Gentiles, and thus his ministry as apostle to the Gentiles, 
intends the salvation of Israel through their provocation to jealousy (piαραζηλόω, 11.11, 14).132 
                                                        
128 Cf. Popkes, ‘“Und David spricht…”’, 326.   
129 Grindheim, The Crux of Election, 162.  
130 Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 338.  
131 Cf. Wright, ‘Romans’, 680. For a detailed survey of interpretative options relating to the salvific 
connection between Israel’s rejection and Gentile election, see R.H. Bell Provoked to Jealousy: The Origin and Purpose 
of the Jealousy Motif in Romans 9-11 (WUNT II/63; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1994), 110-13; idem, The Irrevocable Call of 
God: An Inquiry into Paul’s Theology of Israel (WUNT 184; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 245-49. We will return to 
this question below.    
132 Bell, The Irrevocable Call, 249: ‘The term piαραζηλοῡν here takes on a positive meaning in the sense of 
provoke to emulation’; cf. K. Haacker, who describes the provocation as being ‘zu einem heilsamen Wettbewerb’ 
(Der Brief des Paulus an die Römer [ThHK 6; Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1999], 226).  
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God’s word of judgment – ‘I will make you jealous of a no-nation’ – is reinterpreted as a word of 
divine grace: Israel’s jealousy is not the end; it is a means to a soteriological end – that is, the 
way in which God’s christological accomplished salvation of Israel will become actual for 
Israel.  
The soteriological solidarity between Jew and Gentile, and the double-teleology that 
describes its outworking in history, can thus be said to be structured by scripture. The 
movement from Israel’s rejection to Gentile election is formally parallel to Exodus 9.16; the 
movement from Gentile election to Israel’s re-election is an exegetical extension of 
Deuteronomy 32.21. The driving question of this chapter, however, is not simply whether Paul 
reads Israel’s scripture; the question is why he rereads scripture in a particular way. Applied to 
the double-teleology Paul derives from Exodus 9.16 and Deuteronomy 32.21, the question is 
what Paul’s ‘exegesis’ indicates about his hermeneutic. Two observations help to answer this 
question: 1) the salvific roles of both Israel and the Gentiles are instrumental rather than 
causal; 2) both the salvific instrumentality and soteriological hope of Israel are Christ-shaped.  
To the first point, while Israel’s rejection and Gentile salvation are oriented to and in 
some sense effective of the salvation of the other, the grammar with which Paul expresses this 
soteriological relationship indicates that their salvific function is that of a means or 
instrument rather than that of material cause or basis.133 In the case of the Gentiles, their part 
in the salvation of Israel is articulated exclusively with purpose clauses (εἰς + articular 
infinitive, 11.11; ἵνα, 11.31), thus pointing past their instrumental function to God’s intentions 
of provocation and mercy. Israel is shown mercy because of the mercy shown to the Gentiles, 
but it is God who shows mercy. In Wagner’s words,  
The role the Gentiles have been given to play in the restoration of Israel is…not the part 
of benefactors, but of instruments wielded by the hand of God. It is not as active agents, 
but precisely as recipients of the blessings promised to Israel that these Gentiles 
provoke God’s people to seek jealously after God’s favor.134  
Israel’s salvific function is described with more variety (dative case, 11.11, 30; purpose clause, 
11.19; predicate nominative 11.12, 15), but the effect is similar. Israelite branches were broken 
                                                        
133 Watson’s comment that ‘In Romans 11 [Israel’s] violent hostility to the gospel…is placed almost on par 
with the saving act of Christ’ overlooks this distinction between salvific instrumentality and salvific 
ground/material cause (Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 336). Suzanne McDonald’s phrase ‘two acting subjects, one 
saving agent’ nicely encapsulates this dynamic (Re-Imaging Election: Divine Election as Representing God to Others and 
Others to God [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010], 151 n.12).    
134 Wagner, ‘Mercy to the Nations’, 426.  
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off the olive tree because of unbelief and so that Gentile branches could be grafted in, but both 
the cutting off and the grafting in are divine actions (11.17-21). Or again, Gentiles are shown 
mercy because of Israel’s disobedience, but it is God who acts in mercy (11.30). Put another 
way, God is the sole (implied) subject of salvific verbs (ἐγκεντρίζω 11.17, 19, 23, 24; σῴζω, 11.26; 
ἀφαιρέω, 11.27; ἐλεέω, 11.30, 31, 32).135 The theological point of this grammatical observation is 
that the links between, on the one hand, Israel’s rejection and Gentile salvation and, on the 
other hand, the present salvation of the Gentiles and the future salvation of Israel point past 
themselves to the material cause for which they are the instrumental, historical outworking. 
In other words, rather than grounding the salvation of the other, the salvific function of Israel 
and the nations are an instrumental description of the aftermath of the Christ-event: God’s act 
in Jesus intends and effects the reduction of Israel to a remnant and thereby the calling of the 
Gentiles and thereby the salvation of Israel.136 As Watson suggests, ‘the mechanism by which 
Israel is rejected for the sake of Gentiles is established by the citation in 9.33 of Isaiah 26.16 (+ 
8.14)’; it is the divine act of placing the shaming and saving stone that is the crucified and risen 
Christ.137 The severe and saving history of Jesus is thus the single soteriological cause (9.30-
10.13); the soteriological solidarity of Jew and Gentile describes the instrumental realisation of 
this christological salvation in history. 
 This brings us to our second point: Israel’s salvific instrumentality and soteriological 
hope are Christ-shaped. Both parts of this claim are evident in Romans 11.15: ‘For if their 
rejection (ἀpiοβολή) is the reconciliation (καταλλαγή) of the world, what is their acceptance 
but life from the dead’ (ζωὴ ἐκ νεκρῶν). As suggested above, the logic of Israel’s salvific 
instrumentality is structurally parallel to the teleological ordering of hardening and mercy 
Paul derives from Exodus 9.16: God hardens Israel in order to have mercy on the nations. The 
particular way in which Paul describes this scriptural pattern, however, indicates that he is 
interpreting Israel’s history through the lens of the crucified and risen Christ. The concept of 
rejection effecting reconciliation is one that Paul brings to the scriptural ordering of rejection 
                                                        
135 The one exception is that Paul is the subject of σῴζω in 11.14, but, as Wagner suggests, this is an 
exception that proves the rule: ‘[Paul] portrays himself as the sole active intermediary’ (‘Mercy to the Nations’, 426; 
italics added). The nouns that name Israel’s salvation also point to God as the acting subject: piλήρωμα, 11.12; 
piρόσλημψις, 11.15.     
136 Cf. Dahl, ‘The Future of Israel’, 150; D. Zeller, Juden und Heiden in der Mission des Paulus: Studien zum 
Römerbrief (FB 8; Suttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1973), 209-13.    
137 Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 337.  
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and election; and he brings it from the Christ-event. Just as the death of God’s Son means the 
reconciliation of God’s enemies (Rom 5.10), so the rejection of God’s people – the people ἐξ ὧν 
ὁ Χριστὸς τὸ κατὰ σάρκα (Rom 9.5) – means the reconciliation of the world (11.15). 
 A similar point can be made about the shape of Israel’s soteriological hope. While Paul’s 
confidence that ‘God has not abandoned his people’ (11.2) is grounded in the fact that ‘the gifts 
and call of God are irrevocable’ (11.29), the interpretation of Israel’s salvation as resurrection 
suggests a christological imagination. It is sometimes argued that ‘the phrase “life from the 
dead”’, to borrow Käsemann’s words, ‘designates what Paul elsewhere calls ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν 
and thus refers to the parousia’,138 but the γάρ that links Romans 11.14 and 11.15 suggests that 
Paul is employing resurrection language as a description of the salvation of his ‘flesh’ he hopes 
to accomplish through his Gentile mission.139 In fact, the severity with which Paul 
characterises Israel’s stumble requires a divine saving act that is resurrection or new 
creation.140 From the anthropological side Israel’s error is describable as a ‘trespass’ or a 
‘misstep’ (piαράpiτωμα, 11.11), but from the theological side Israel is the object of a divine act of 
‘rejection’ (ἀpiοβολή, 11.15) or ‘imprisoning’ (συγκλείω, 11.32). Accordingly, Paul’s 
soteriological hope for Israel is necessarily hope in the God who ‘justifies the ungodly’ (Rom 
4.5), ‘gives life to the dead’ and creates out of nothing (4.17) – that is, Israel’s salvation must be 
‘life from the dead’ (ζωὴ ἐκ νεκρῶν, 11.15) and mercy (ἐλεέω, 11.31, 32). The olive tree 
metaphor makes exactly this point. While affirming and exploiting Israel’s status as natural 
branches (κατὰ φύσιν κλάδων, 11.17), Paul’s description of the unnatural grafting of Gentiles 
and the unnatural re-grafting of Jews emphasises the kindness and severity of God 
(χρηστότητα καὶ ἀpiοτομίαν θεοῦ, 11.22). As Wagner argues, the unnaturalness of God’s 
gardening, evident both in the inclusion of Gentiles and in a process of ‘cutting off’ (ἐκκλάω, 
11.17, 19, 20) and re-grafting (ἐγκεντρίζω, 11.23, 24) Israel, presents God as ‘the unconventional 
horticulturalist’ and effectively demonstrates both that God is ‘the primary actor’ and that the 
salvation history implied by the olive tree metaphor is sub contrario: saving grace operates on 
the other side and out of divine judgment.141     
                                                        
138 Käsemann, Romans, 307; cf. Moo, Romans, 694-96. 
139 Wright, ‘Romans’, 683; cf. Zeller, Juden und Heiden, 243.  
140 C. Müller, Gottes Gerichtigkeit, 99. 
141 Wagner, ‘Mercy to the Nations’, 427’.  
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For our purposes, the essential point to note is that both the severity of Israel’s 
diagnosis and the shape of Israel’s soteriological prognosis are christological: rejection and 
resurrection are descriptive of Israel’s situation and salvation only as Israel’s present and 
future are reimagined around the rejected and resurrected Jesus. In other words, just as Paul 
brings God’s christological acts of justification and resurrection to the Abraham narrative in 
Romans 4, pointing to Abraham’s reckoning of righteousness as the justification of the ungodly 
(4.3-5) and Abraham’s age and Sarah’s barrenness as states of deadness that require 
resurrection (4.17-21), so in Romans 11 Paul moulds Israel’s ongoing story into the shape of the 
crucified and risen Christ. Thus, while Jesus is integrated into the history of Israel as ‘the seed 
of David’ (Rom 1.3), ‘the root of Jesse’ (15.12) and the ‘Messiah from [Israel] according to the 
flesh’ (9.5), the hermeneutical direction is not from Israel’s story to her Christ; it is from 
Israel’s Christ to Israel’s story of sin and salvation. Expressed in terms of this chapter’s thesis, 
just as Romans 9-10 is a christological rereading of Israel’s scripture, so Romans 11.11-24 is a 
christological reimagining of Israel’s present and future. More concisely, Paul’s historiography 
is ‘christomorphic’; Paul’s hermeneutic is Jesus Christ. 
 
(3) The Justification of Ungodly Israel and Everyone: Romans 11.25-32 
 Romans 11.25-32 is an apostolic apocalypse. Lest his Gentile auditors overestimate their 
wisdom, Paul reveals a ‘mystery’: ὅτι piώρωσις ἀpiὸ μέρους τῷ Ἰσραὴλ γέγονεν ἄχρι οὗ τὸ 
piλήρωμα τῶν ἐθνῶν εἰσέλθῃ καὶ οὕτως piᾶς Ἰσραὴλ σωθήσεται (11.25-26a). Two features of 
Paul’s particular unveiling are relevant: 1) Paul grounds the mystery in Israel’s scripture 
(11.26b-27); 2) Paul’s explication of this scripturally grounded mystery evinces the Christ-
shaped theo-logic of Paul’s hermeneutic.  
 As Paul rereads Israel’s scripture in the aftermath of the Christ-event he sees both that 
the present sinfulness and the promised salvation of Israel are consonant with (καθὼς 
γέγραpiται) Isaiah 59.20-21 and 29.7a LXX. In what Wagner aptly describes as ‘a rather deft 
conflation of two texts’,142 Paul ties his announcement that ‘all Israel will be saved’ to the 
prophetic promise that ‘the redeemer will remove ungodliness from Jacob’ (Isa 59.20) and ‘I 
will take away their sins’ (Isa 27.9a; Rom 11.26b-27). Thus, as in Romans 16.25-26, ‘mystery’, to 
quote Seifrid, ‘signifies the disclosure of truth to which Scripture already bears witness….the 
                                                        
142 Wagner, Heralds, 280.  
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knowledge of a “mystery” entails insight into the message of Scripture, which, although 
present, formerly was hidden and unknown’.143 In other words, Paul’s hermeneutical moment 
is, to return to Agamben’s suggestive phrase, scripture’s ‘Das Jetzt der Lesbarkeit’. Paul’s 
description of the mystery (11.25-26a), emendations to Isaiah 59.20-21 and 29.7a LXX (11.26b-
27), and exegetical extension of the Isaianic oracles (11.28-32) point to the newly legible 
witness of Israel’s scripture and all suggest a christological hermeneutic. 
In the first place, ἄχρι οὗ (11.25) and οὕτως (11.26) indicate that the content of the 
mystery is not so much the fact of Israel’s future salvation as its sequence and shape. As 
Wagner notes, Romans 11.25-26a narrates a ‘temporal scheme’: ‘The “insensibility” (piώρωσις) 
that has come upon “the rest” of Israel will last only until (ἄχρι οὗ) the “fullness” of the 
Gentiles comes in to God’s people’, then ‘God will act to save “all Israel”’.144 This suggests that 
Bockmuehl’s argument from a modal interpretation of καὶ οὕτως (11.26a) to the proposal that 
μυστήριον refers ‘to one particular…aspect of God’s plan of salvation’ – i.e., Israel’s salvific 
instrumentality – requires temporal supplementation:145 together with ἄχρι οὗ (11.25), καὶ 
οὕτως unveils the divinely appointed means and the redemptive historical order of Israel’s 
salvation. As Wagner summarises, the salvation of all Israel will occur ‘as a result of and 
subsequent to the entrance of the full number of Gentiles’.146 Notably, while Paul’s subsequent 
citations of Isaiah ground the fact of Israel’s sinfulness and the promise of Israel’s salvation in 
Israel’s scripture (11.26b-27), this sequential ordering appears as an apostolic novum – that is, a 
reordering of Heilsgeschichte as the effect and aftermath of the Christ-event. It is God’s act of 
                                                        
143 Seifrid, ‘Romans’, 672; cf. Wagner, Heralds, 276-77.  
144 Wagner, Heralds, 277. The reference to piᾶς Ἰσραήλ is probably best understood in terms of the division 
between ἡ ἐκλογή and οἱ λοιpiοί (11.7). So Grindheim, The Crux of Election, 165-66: ‘The most natural way to under 
the expression “all Israel” is in relation to v. 25, where a past of Israel has been hardened, reflecting the partition 
of Israel into the remnant and the rest explained in v. 7. Verse 26 describes the situation when this internal 
division will be overcome’; cf. Cranfield, Romans, 2.576-77; Dunn, Romans 9-16, 681; Haacker, Der Brief des Paulus an 
die Römer, 239; Wilckens, Der Brief an die Römer, 2.255-56. See also Wagner, Heralds, 277-78, though he adds the 
possibility that ‘“all Israel” may also include those Gentiles who have “come in” (11.25)’. For a detailed discussion 
of the interpretative options, see C. Zoccali, ‘And So All Israel Will Be Saved: Competing Interpretations of Romans 
11.26 in Pauline Scholarship’, JSNT 30 (2008): 289-318.       
145 M. Bockmuehl, Revelation and Mystery in Ancient Judaism and Pauline Christainity (WUNT II/36; Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 1990), 170-75, 226.  
146 Wagner, Heralds, 279 n.194. This reading follows the majority, modal interpretation of οὕτως (‘thus’) – 
e.g. Dunn, Romans 9-16, 681; Fitzmyer, Romans, 622; Wilckens, Der Brief an die Römer, 2.255 – but it is able to account 
for the sequential emphasis of Romans 11.25-26a urged by proponents of the revived temporal interpretation 
(‘then’) – e.g. P.W. van der Horst, ‘“Only Then Will All Israel be Saved”: A Short Note on the Meaning of καὶ οὕτως 
in Romans 11.26’, JBL 119 (2000): 521-25; cf. Grindheim, The Crux of Election, 165 n.112. For a modal interpretation 
that stresses the salvation historical sequence, see J.M. Gundry-Volf, Paul and Perseverance: Staying in and Falling 
Away (WUNT II/37; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1990), 180-81.     
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placing the christological stone that is the hardening of part of Israel and the salvation of the 
Gentiles (9.30-33; 11.11ff.) Thus, as Watson suggests, ‘salvation is still “for the Jew first, and also 
for the Gentile” (cf. 1.16)’ – soteriological priority – but the christological consequence that is 
Israel’s rejection and Gentile election indicates ‘that the order might have to be reversed’ – 
sequential priority.147 Put another way, the history and proclamation of the crucified and risen 
Jesus is a stumbling block to Israel and thereby the initiation of a sub contrario sequence: 
Israel’s hardening then (and thereby) the fullness of the Gentiles, then (and thereby) all Israel. 
This is historiography with a christological hermeneutic: the crucified and risen Christ both 
generates and shapes salvation history. 
As noted above, Paul claims that his assertion of the fact of Israel’s current sinfulness 
and announcement of the promise of Israel’s future salvation correspond to the witness of 
Israel’s scripture: καθὼς γέγραpiται… (11.26b). Even here, however, in Paul’s argument from 
scripture, Christology remains determinative for the reimagined Heilsgeschichte of Romans 11. 
The tight consonance between apostolic and prophetic promise is ensured by some significant 
emendations to Isaiah 59.20-21 LXX and its conflation with Isaiah 29.7a LXX. First, whereas 
Isaiah 59.20 refers to the redeemer coming ‘on account of Zion’ (ἕνεκεν Σιων),148 Paul’s 
reworked citation reads ‘the redeemer will come from Zion’ (ἐκ Σιων). While it is possible that 
Paul’s Vorlage read ἐκ, the hypothesised process that this suggestion requires – ἐκ as a 
mistransmission of an unattested septuagintal rendering of the MT with εἰς149  – is too complex 
to be compelling. It is cleaner to see Paul’s alteration as ‘theologically motivated’, both because 
the ἐκ helps to secure the christological identity of ὁ ῥυόμενος and because it establishes 
Israel’s ‘exile’.150 While most commentators agree that ‘the redeemer’ is a reference to Jesus 
based on the parallel predication in 1 Thessalonians 1.10 and the switch from third to first 
person between Romans 11.26b and 11.27,151 the confirmation of this christological 
identification by the change from ἕνεκεν to ἐκ generally goes unnoticed. Romans 9.33 
                                                        
147 Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 330; cf. Grindheim, The Crux of Election, 165.  
148 The MT has the redeemer coming ‘to Zion’.  
149 Wilk, Bedeutung des Jesajabuches, 39-40.  
150 Seifrid, ‘Romans’, 674; Wagner, Heralds, 284-86; cf. Hübner, Gottes Ich und Israel, 115-16 who suggests 
that the eschatological notion of the Gentiles ‘coming in’ (11.25) accounts for the change to ἐκ.   
151 See especially P.T. Gadenz, Called from the Jews and from the Gentiles: Pauline Ecclesiology in Romans 9–11 
(WUNT II/267. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 283-86; cf. Cranfield, Romans, 2.578; Wilckens, Der Brief an die Römer, 
2.256; Dunn, Romans 9-16, 682 Jewett, Romans, 704. For the minority report, that the redeemer is God rather than 
Christ, see L. Gaston, ‘Israel’s Misstep in the Eyes of Paul’, in The Romans Debate (ed. K.P Donfried; Peabody: 
Hendrickson, 1991), 309-26 (319).  
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interprets Isaiah 28.16 (+ 8.14) as announcing the placement of a christological stone in Zion 
that occasions the stumble of Israel. This both locates Christ in Zion and signifies Israel’s 
divinely intended disobedience. Paul’s rewriting of Isaiah 59.20 LXX as a reference to the 
redeemer coming ἐκ Σιων to ‘remove ungodliness from Jacob’ picks up this christological 
location and the implied dislocation of Israel as a result of her disobedience. As Wagner notes, 
‘the variant ἐκ Σιων reflects a fundamental interpretative shift’; it both points to the messianic 
identity of the redeemer and indicates that the event of his coming is ‘viewed from the 
standpoint of the Diaspora’.152 Paul’s earlier citations from Isaiah (Rom 9.27-29; 10.21; 11.8), 
Deuteronomy (Rom 10.9; 11.8), 3 Kingdoms (Rom 11.2-4) and Psalms (Rom 10.18; 11.9) suggest 
that the proclamation of the christological gospel has occasioned an exile of sorts: the advent 
and announcement of Israel’s messiah is the concrete enactment of Israel’s rejection. The 
christological redeemer thus comes from Zion and to a disobedient (11.30-32) and dead (11.15) 
Israel.  
The second half of this sentence – ‘a disobedient and dead Israel’ – points to a second 
material difference between Romans 11.26b and the Isaianic texts it quotes. While both Isaiah 
59.20 LXX and Romans 11.26b read ἀpiοστρέψει ἀσεβείας ἀpiὸ Ἰακώβ, the context of the Isaiah 
passage (see especially Isa 59.16-21 LXX) indicates that the coming of the redeemer ‘on account 
of Zion’ (ἕνεκεν Σιων) to ‘turn away ungodly things from Jacob’ (Isa 59.20) refers to the 
deliverance of Israel from her ungodly enemies rather than the deliverance of ungodly Israel. 
Paul’s reapplied citation, by contrast, has the redeemer coming to hardened, rejected, 
stumbling, cut off, disobedient Israel in order to remove the ungodliness of Jacob. As Seifrid 
puts it, ‘[Paul] interprets Is. 59.20 in terms of the justification of the ungodly’.153 This 
redirection of Isaiah’s promised redemption is confirmed by the addition of a phrase from 
Isaiah 27.9a LXX to the continued quotation of Isaiah 59 in Romans 11.27. Opening with a 
verbatim citation of Isaiah 59.21a LXX (καὶ αὕτη αὐτοῖς ἡ piαρ᾽ ἐμοῦ διαθήκη), Paul interprets 
the content of this covenant with another Isaianic promise: ὅταν ἀφέλωμαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας 
αὐτῶν (Rom 11.27; citing Isa 27.9a LXX). By combining these texts Paul announces both the 
unilateral nature of God’s covenant with Israel – it is ‘a covenant from me’ (ἡ piαρ᾽ ἐμοῦ 
διαθήκη) and ‘for them’ (αὐτοῖς) – and its necessary actualisation as the salvation of sinful 
                                                        
152 Wagner, Heralds, 284.  
153 Seifrid, Christ, Our Righteousness, 166 n.49.  
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Israel. In other words, the conflation of Isaiah 59.21 and 27.9a suggests that, in this context, 
God’s covenant with Israel just is his promise to forgive Israel. Thus, read together with the 
rewritten and redirected citation of Isaiah 59.20 LXX in Romans 11.26b, Romans 11.27 
reimagines Israel’s promised salvation as the christologically accomplished act of the 
justification of the ungodly. The logic and basis of Israel’s future salvation are therefore 
identical to the present justification of Jew and Gentile: soteriology is christologically 
grounded and grace-shaped – that is, God acts in Jesus to save sinners (cf. Rom 3.23-26). Paul’s 
exegetical extension of Isaiah 59.20-21 and 27.9a in Romans 11.28-32 bring out precisely this 
point. 
Romans 11.28 presents Israel’s existence as a both/and: according to the gospel, ἐχθροί; 
according to election, ἀγαpiητοί. The phrase διὰ τοὺς piατέρας appears to anchor Israel’s 
belovedness in her ancestry, but the γάρ that links 11.28 and 11.29 suggests that the 
perdurance of the promises to the patriarchs is grounded in the irrevocability of ‘God’s gifts 
and call’ (τὰ χαρίσματα καὶ ἡ κλῆσις τοῦ θεου). In other words, grace grounds Israel’s 
belovedness. As Barclay observes, ‘Israel is special to God because of its ancestry…. But it is 
special only because of its election (because of God’s χαρίσματα and κλῆσις)’.154 Thus, in 
contrast to the author of Wisdom for whom Israel is differentiated from the nations qua the 
righteous, for Paul, Israel is unique qua Israel – that is as the chosen and graced people of God. 
To quote Barclay again, ‘Israel’s particularity is, interestingly, more important to Paul than to 
Wisdom…. But her destiny is, according to Paul, to bear witness to the electing mercy of God, 
which operates within her as well as for her, despite her failures and ultimately beyond her 
“stumble”’.155 In other words, Israel is both an instrument and object of divine mercy. Israel’s 
elected uniqueness is therefore bound up with the doubleness of her status: simultaneously 
enemy and beloved. Israel’s sinfulness cannot void the promise of salvation – ‘the gifts and call 
of God are irrevocable’ – and yet it is precisely as disobedient Israel that Israel realises her 
salvific vocation. As Paul puts, Israel is an enemy ‘for your sake’ (11.28):  the once disobedient 
                                                        
154 Barclay, ‘The Golden Calf and Divine Mercy’, 104. Rather than arguing from the γάρ in Romans 11.29, 
Barclay points to ‘the processes of “selection” operative in [Israel’s] foundation (9.6 ff)’ and the promise of ‘divine 
redemption out of disobedience and unbelief (11.11 ff)’. The soteriological significance of ‘the fathers’ in 11.28 
recalls Paul’s principle that ‘if the root is holy, so also are the branches’ (11.16) and may suggest that ‘the root is 
not so much the fathers themselves as the calling, the election, or mercy of God operative in them’ (‘The Golden 
Calf and Divine Mercy’, 103; cf. N. Walter ‘Zur Interpretation von Römer 9-11’, ZTK 81 [1984]: 172-195).   
155 Barclay, ‘Unnerving Grace’, 108. 
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Gentiles have received God’s mercy because of Israel’s disobedience (τῇ τούτων ἀpiειθείᾳ, 
11.30). But this is only half of the double teleology noted above and thus, because ‘the gifts and 
call of God are irrevocable’, only half of the soteriological story. Just as disobedient Gentiles 
receive mercy because of Israel’s disobedience, so the mercy shown to the once disobedient 
Gentiles becomes instrumental in God’s act of showing mercy to disobedient Israel (11.31). As 
Paul rereads the scriptural past and reimagines the soteriological future, disobedience is both 
a means and the sole meeting place of mercy – a contradiction, in other words, is the condition 
of grace and the criterion of salvation history. Paul’s conclusion makes exactly this point: ‘For 
God has consigned all people to disobedience (ἀpiείθεια), in order that he might have mercy 
(ἐλεέω) on all’ (11.32).  
Contained in this terse and paradoxical conclusion is what Stuhlmacher calls ‘the 
quintessential structural law of God’s gracious work’ and ‘history’s fundamental principle’.156  
For Paul, salvation is always enacted as the justification of the ungodly (Rom 4.5) and salvation 
history is therefore the history of God justifying the ungodly (11.32). At this point it is 
necessary to break Wisdom’s silence, for the ‘quintessential structural laws’ and ‘fundamental 
principles’ of history that emerge from Romans 9-11 and Wisdom 10-19 are ultimately 
incommensurable. Whereas Wisdom retells the events of Genesis and Exodus/Numbers as, 
respectively, anticipations and recapitulations of the correspondence between divine action 
and human subjects paradigmatically exemplified at the Red Sea, Paul rereads Israel’s 
scripture and re-imagines Israel’s future as the consistent concretion of a destabilising 
dialectic: life out of death, justification out of ungodliness, creation out of nothing. In other 
words, as Wisdom rereads and rewrites Israel’s pentateuchal past, correspondence is the 
criterion; as Paul rereads and reimagines history in past, present and future tenses, 
contradiction is the criterion. As has been evident throughout this chapter, however, the 
structural differences between Wisdom and Romans are symptoms of a more essential, 
hermeneutical fault-line. Put another way, that both authors have an historiographic criterion 
indicates that Romans 9-11 and Wisdom 10-19 purport to offer a rereading ‘with the grain of the 
universe’, but the incommensurability of their criteria suggests that they read with the grain 
of equally incommensurable configurations of the cosmos – that their divergent readings find 
                                                        
156 P. Stuhlmacher, Revisiting Paul’s Doctrine of Justification: A Challenge to the New Perspective (trans. D.P. 
Bailey; Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2001), 30, 71; cf. E. Käsemann, ‘Justification and Salvation History in the 
Epistle to the Romans’, in Perspectives on Paul (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), 60-78 (70, 75-76).  
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and follow irreconcilable hermeneutical theo-logics. The final question, then, which has been 
the question of this chapter from the beginning, is not whether Paul and the author of Wisdom 
read differently. The final question is why Paul and the author of Wisdom read differently. 
Answering this question brings this chapter full circle, and thus to its conclusion.   
For Wisdom, the patterned correspondence that constitutes history is a repeated 
illustration of the theological and cosmological fact that God ‘has ordered all things by 
measure, number and weight’ (Wis. 11.20). In other words, Wisdom’s reading of Israel’s scripture 
is a rereading from and according to the pre-creational order. This suggests that, for Wisdom, 
correspondence constitutes what might be called the formal criterion of history and hermeneutics 
whereas protology constitutes the material criterion: correspondence is the concretion of the 
pre-creational order. For Paul, as Romans 11.32 indicates, contradiction constitutes salvation 
history because God operates ex contrario – that is, because God, in the idiom of Romans 4, is 
‘the one who justifies the ungodly’ (Rom 4.5), ‘gives life to the dead and calls non-being being’ 
(4.17). As Paul’s christologically determined predications of God in Romans 4.5 and 4.17b 
indicate, however, God is only identifiable as this God as Paul brings the christological acts of 
justification (Rom 4.5; cf. 3.21-26) and resurrection (4.17; cf. 4.24-25) to the acting subject of 
Genesis 15 and Genesis 17.15-18.15. In other words, God is known as the one who acts ex 
contrario from the divine act that is the Christ-event. Applied to Paul’s reinterpretation of 
Israel’s scripture and reimagining of Israel’s future in Romans 9-11, Paul’s exegesis exploits 
incongruity because his hermeneutic is christological. Or again, in Romans 9-11, Paul’s 
historiography is ‘christomorphic’ because his hermeneutic is christological. In this sense, 
contradiction can be said to be the formal criterion of Pauline historiography and hermeneutics 
whereas Christology is the material criterion. This means that, for Paul, the Christ-event is not an 
illustration of something else, whether that something else is named the paradigm of self-
giving,157 the metaphysical beyond158 or even the justification of the ungodly.159 In Badiou’s 
                                                        
157 Horrell, ‘Paul’s Narratives or Narrative Substructure’, 166.  
158 The tendency to reduce Christ to a cipher for the transcendent or the impossible touching of eternity 
and time is especially evident in K. Barth, The Epistle to the Romans (trans. E.C. Hoskyns; Oxford: OUP, 1933), 92. 
Such a characterisation does not apply to Barth’s later Christology, especially as developed in CD IV/1.     
159See Käsemann, ‘Justification and Salvation History’, 75; idem, Romans, 317-18, for whom ‘the doctrine of 
justification’ functions as the heilsgeschichtliche hermeneutic. However, note the insistence that ‘justification is 
Paul’s interpretation of Christology’ (‘Justification and Salvation History’, 73). For an account of the 
hermeneutical function of justification as ‘the basis and boundary of theology’ that maintains the link between 
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provocative phrase, ‘Christ is not a mediation’160 – that is, the Christ-event is not an example or 
even paradigmatic instantiation of a reality more foundational than itself; it is that towards 
which history points and that from and through which history makes sense. In other words, 
for Paul, the Christ-event is the beginning and centre of history; its hermeneutical significance 
is both generative and centrifugal. In Romans 9-11, this christological hermeneutic is evident 
as Israel’s scriptural past is reread as a typological testimony to the event and impact of Jesus 
(9.7-19), as Israel’s prophets are re-voiced as a present tense announcement of God’s act that is 
the Christ-event and its aftermath (9.25-29, 33; 10.18-21; 11.8-10) and as Israel’s present and 
future are reimagined according to and ultimately as effected by the history, proclamation and 
promised coming of Jesus Christ (9.30-32; 10.14-17; 11.1-32). Stated in terms of the thesis of this 
section, Paul’s christological rereading of Israel’s scripture and christological reimagining of 
Israel’s future precludes any perspective on history that eclipses, de-centres and/or abstracts 
from the divine act that is the concrete history of the crucified and risen Christ. To quote 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer as a summary exegesis of Romans 9-11, Paul’s christologically occasioned, 
oriented and patterned reinterpretation of history in past, present and future tenses suggest 
that, as he rereads scripture and Heilsgeschichte, ‘the reality of Christ comprises the reality of 
the world in itself’.161   
Thus the comparative conclusion: Wisdom rereads and rewrites Israel’s pentateuchal 
past according to the formal criterion of correspondence exemplified in the Exodus and from 
the material criterion of protology embedded in the pre-creational order; Paul rereads and re-
imagines Israel’s history according to the formal criterion of contradiction evident in the 
operations of unconditioned election and incongruous grace and from the material criterion 
that is Jesus Christ.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
justification and its christological ground, see O. Bayer, ‘Justification as the Basis and Boundary of Theology’, 
trans. C. Helmer; Lutheran Quarterly 15 (2001): 273-92.  
160 A. Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism (trans. R. Brassier; Standford: Standford University 
Press, 2003), 48.  
161 D. Bonhoeffer, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works: Volume Six, Ethics (ed. C. Green; trans. R. Krauss, et. al.; 
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), 64.  
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Chapter 9 
Concluding the Conversation 
 
Scandalous and foolish. This classification of the ‘word of the cross’ by Jews and Gentiles 
introduced this thesis as a question: how would the Diaspora Jew who wrote the Wisdom of 
Solomon engage and evaluate the theology of Paul’s letter to the Christians in Rome? In an 
effort to imagine the answer to this heuristic question, the preceding chapters employed a 
comparative method I labeled ‘exegetical eavesdropping’, joining Wisdom and Romans in a 
dialogue in the expectation that, to borrow Bakhtin’s image, both texts would come alive ‘by 
coming into contact with another text’.1 In this way, the introductory question has proven to 
be a precise conclusion to this contextual conversation: scandalous and foolish captures the 
double-offense that has characterised our reconstructed reaction of the author of Wisdom to 
Romans. Considered in conversation with Wisdom, Romans sounds scandalous to its Jewish 
sensibilities and foolish to its middle-platonic conceptualities. This conclusion raises a 
question, however. As the Pascal quote that opened this thesis insists, ‘In every dialogue and 
discourse we must be able to say to those who take offence, “Of what do you complain?”’ This 
concluding chapter will attempt to answer this essential hermeneutical question by reviewing 
and linking the argumentative threads of the previous chapters in an effort to specify the 
theological incommensurability of Romans and Wisdom and thus to identify the material cause 
of Wisdom’s offence. 
 
The Christological Fault-Line 
 As argued in the introduction, the long and productive history of comparing Wisdom 
and Romans does not disqualify Monya McGlynn’s observation that ‘The coincidences between 
Paul’s epistle to the Romans and Wisdom…have never been adequately studied and compared’ 
because most comparative projects fail to offer a full reading of Wisdom and, partly as a result, 
are typically content to identify points of continuity and discontinuity without probing the 
                                                        
1 M. Bakhtin, ‘Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences’, in Speech Genres and Other Late Essays (eds. 
C. Emerson and M. Holquist; trans. V.W. McGee; Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 159-72, (162).  
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hermeneutical rationale and theological basis for this similarity-in-contrast.2 This thesis has 
attempted to fill this gap by, first, in part one, providing a comprehensive reading of Wisdom 
without reference to Romans and then, secondly, in part two, rereading pivotal sections of 
Romans in conversation with Wisdom in an effort to sharpen the theological profile of each text 
and thus pinpoint the generative basis and material cause for their broad continuity and their 
ultimate incommensurability.  
The reading of Wisdom gave voice to a text with an expansive theological and 
cosmological vision, one in which God’s illimitable love is comprehended within the 
operations of his immutable justice. For Wisdom, the bedrock of theological reality is the 
axiomatic status of a carefully and equitably ordered cosmos: God ‘arranged all things by 
measure and number and weight’ (11.20) through the divine σοφία who fashioned (7.22) and 
orders (8.1) all things and who is thus able and eager to gift an ‘unerring knowledge of what 
exists’ (7.17) to those who are ‘worthy of her’ (6.16). This protological pattern is prototypically 
exemplified in the correspondence between the anthropological and soteriological symmetries 
of the Exodus – Wisdom brought the righteous over the Red Sea and she drowned the ungodly 
(10.15-21) – and functions as the criterion by which Wisdom rereads and rewrites pentateuchal 
history (Wis. 10-19) and imagines the necessary outcomes of future judgment (Wis. 2-5). The 
present suffering of the righteous and the current flourishing of the wicked is a cosmological 
contradiction because it appears to disconnect the congruence between the form and object of 
God’s actions, thus disrupting the operations of divine justice and destabilising the symmetry 
and equilibrium that characterise the rational, moral and cosmic order. Wisdom is thus 
simultaneously a theodicy and a pastoral word of hope: as in the re-narrated canonical past, 
the eschaton will evidence the inexorable goodness and justice of God as he acts to overcome 
chaos with correspondence – that is, the loving God will act with the necessary doubleness of 
divine justice to judge the ungodly and graciously reward the righteous. For Wisdom, then, 
σοφία is the architect of a precisely calibrated cosmos, one in which the divine arrangement of 
all things ‘by measure and number and weight’ is principally instantiated in the congruence 
between anthropological and soteriological symmetries. These protologically grounded 
binaries shape Wisdom’s anthropology, determine the definition of Wisdom’s theological 
                                                        
2 M. McGlynn, Divine Judgment and Divine Benevolence in the Book of Wisdom (WUNT II, 139; Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2001), 222.   
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vocabulary and provide the formal hermeneutical criterion for Wisdom’s rereading of Israel’s 
scripture. In this way, these topics expose and exemplify the deep logic of Wisdom’s theology 
and thus focus the comparison of Romans and Wisdom. 
Chapter six took up the old question of the relationship between the anti-idolatry 
polemic of Wisdom 13-15 and the formally parallel Romans 1.18-2.5. While recognising and 
emphasising the lexical, thematic, and argumentative similarities between the two passages, 
the reconsideration of their relationship in light of their rhetorical function and the essential 
theological structures of both texts led to the conclusion that the probable literary 
engagement of Romans 1.18-2.11 with Wisdom 13-15 occurs within an antithetical argument: 
whereas Wisdom contrasts the idolatry and immorality of the non-Jewish world with the 
religious and moral innocence of Israel in order to reinforce the irreducible distinction 
between Israel qua the righteous and non-Israel qua the ungodly, Paul situates his accusation 
within the apostolic and apocalyptic kerygma and introduces a series of alterations into the 
polemical tradition that subtly includes Israel within the human history of sin and thereby 
reduces the Jew-Gentile binary to a single anthropological denominator, homo peccator. Chapter 
seven compared the meaning and relationship of two theological terms – δικαιοσύνη and χάρις 
– that are central to both texts. Paul and the author of Wisdom, it was argued, are both 
theologians of grace and righteousness, but these shared lexemes represent a common 
vocabulary that is deployed in incommensurable theological grammars. For Wisdom, justice 
and grace are instantiations of the protological pattern and as such, by pre-creational pre-
definition, God’s righteousness is located in the correspondence between the form of divine 
action – judgment or grace – and the object of divine action – the righteous or the ungodly. 
Within this comprehensive and ultimately cosmological definition, God’s gifts and grace are 
instances rather than antitheses of God’s justice: divine benefits, while emphatically unearned, 
are necessarily explicable in terms of a ‘fit’ between God’s gifts and their human recipients. For 
Paul, by contrast, the righteousness and grace of God are not exemplified in an event; they are 
enacted in and as the event that judges ungodliness and thereby justifies the ungodly. For this 
reason, Paul’s definitions of grace and righteousness are re-definitions that are deduced from 
and descriptive of the disjunction between the form and object of divine action – God justifies 
the ungodly – and the incongruence between the gift and recipients of God’s Son – ‘when we 
were weak…Christ died for the ungodly’ (Rom 5.6). Lastly, chapter eight compared the 
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rereadings of Israel’s scripture in Wisdom 10-19 and Romans 9-11. In Wisdom’s reordered and re-
narrated account of Genesis, Exodus and Numbers, pentateuchal history is, as the Red Sea 
crossing exemplifies, the recurrent and programmatic concretion of the correspondence 
between divine action and human subjects: God, with tempering mercy, judges and destroys 
the ungodly Egyptians and, with mild pedagogical and paternal testing, rescues and rewards 
righteous Israel. In Romans 9-11, rather than detecting a canonical pattern of correspondence, 
Paul traces the unconditioned and often contradictory operations of the divine word in Israel’s 
pentateuchal past and prophetically announced present and future. Rereading Israel’s 
scripture and reimaging Israel’s future from the current crisis that is the divinely-effected 
stumble of Israel and incongruous call of Gentiles, Paul is able to summarise salvation history 
as the operations of the God who works ex contrario: ‘God has consigned all people to 
disobedience so that he might have mercy on all’ (Rom 11.32). 
The identification of these anthropological, semantic and hermeneutical differences, 
however, rather than ending the comparison, functioned as invitations to press the ‘why’ 
question – to enquire after the theological rationale for these formal incompatibilities in an 
effort to identify the material basis for the recurrent incommensurability. It was in repeatedly 
asking and answering why Romans and Wisdom configure the theological world differently that 
a single thesis emerged: Wisdom’s theology is governed by the protological order that σοφία 
fashioned, manages and reveals; the theology of Romans is determined by the Christ-event. 
The essentialness of this contrast does not mean that Wisdom and Romans are always or 
necessarily antithetical. As emphasised throughout this thesis, Wisdom and Romans share a 
range of theological vocabulary, topical interests, argumentative patterns and theological 
methods. These commonalities, however, are comprehended within ultimately 
incommensurate configurations of reality, not because the theologies of Romans and Wisdom 
are unrelated opposites but because the anchor-point and organising hermeneutic of their 
respective theologies are finally different.  
This fundamental or hermeneutical difference is evident in each of the comparative 
chapters. For Wisdom, the irreducible distinction between Jew and non-Jew (qua the righteous 
and the ungodly) is constitutive of the rational and moral order that σοφία architected and 
engineers. The symmetrical structuring of created reality requires an anthropological binary 
that can relate to the respective forms of divine action with just equilibrium. For Paul, the 
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proclamation of the christological kerygma reveals the universal scope of divine wrath (Rom 
1.18) and thereby announces the gospel’s verdict on the world: ‘Jew and Gentile are under sin’ 
(Rom 3.9). Similarly, whereas for Wisdom, righteousness and grace are, by protological pre-
definition, a δικαιοσύνη determined by correspondence and a χάρις defined by congruence, for 
Paul, by christological re-definition, God’s righteousness and grace are a disjunctive 
δικαιοσύνη and an unconditioned and incongruous χάρις. In both cases, these definitions are 
not ideals or univocal abstractions; they are semantic consequences and descriptions of what 
each author considers the basic theological reality: the well-ordered cosmos and the 
ineluctable justice of the illimitably loving God (Wisdom) or the unconditioned and disruptive 
divine act that is the single and saving history of Jesus Christ. Finally, the exegetical difference 
between the rereadings of Israel’s scripture in Wisdom 10-19 and Romans 9-11 were shown to 
be symptomatic of an essential hermeneutical incommensurability: Wisdom rereads and 
rewrites pentateuchal history according to the formal criterion of correspondence because 
canonical history is necessarily the paradigmatic exemplification of the pre-creational order; 
Paul rereads and re-imagines Israel’s history according to the formal criterion of contradiction 
(ex contrario) because he hears Israel’s past as a typological testimony to and Israel’s prophetic 
tradition as a pre-announcement of the unconditioned and incongruous event and impact that 
is God’s act in Jesus. In this way, the various anthropological, semantic and hermeneutical 
differences between Wisdom and Romans point to and are generated by a single, material 
contrast: Wisdom’s theology is governed by and reflective of the nuclear significance of the 
protological order σοφία fashioned, sustains and reveals; the theology of Romans is 
determined by and radiates from the generative and centrifugal significance of the divine act 
that is the event, impact and proclamation of Jesus Christ.3 
 
Paul and Wisdom – Paul and Judaism 
 As emphasised in the introduction, the particular question of the relationship between 
Romans and Wisdom is part of but by no means equivalent to the larger question about Paul’s 
relationship to early Judaism. It would thus be a category mistake to translate the results of the 
                                                        
3 One way to further this comparison between Wisdom’s protological orientation and Paul’s ‘evental’ and 
eschatological perspective would be to consider together the nature and functions of σοφία in Wisdom 6-7 and the 
character and operations of the Spirit in Romans 8.   
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present two-text comparison into a series of conclusions about ‘Paul and Judaism’. Rather, the 
more specific question raised in the introduction was whether the ‘paradigm’ – that is, the 
interpretative and evaluative frame – within which comparisons of Pauline and early Jewish 
literature typically occurs clarifies or obfuscates the deep logic of Wisdom’s theology and thus 
whether the standard comparative questions about the degree and priority of grace and/or the 
causal or instrumental function of human obedience tunes into or mutes a theological dialogue 
between Romans and Wisdom. The purpose of this concluding section is to make the implicit 
answers to these questions throughout the thesis explicit by specifying points at which the 
comparison of Romans and Wisdom exposes and qualifies some of the assumptions that govern 
reconstructions of Paul’s theological relationship to early Judaism.  
 One of the central arguments of the introduction was that the tacit influence and 
presuppositional status of an interpretative paradigm – a shared constellation of beliefs about 
the method, objects and principles of investigation and evaluation – is evident in the assumed 
univocity of grace and the related assumption that human obedience and God’s grace are 
necessarily in tension. This presupposition is clearly operative in the value-loaded conclusions 
of E.P. Sanders: Palestinian Judaism ‘kept grace and works in the right perspective’; ‘the gift 
and demand of God were kept in a healthy relationship’.4 The evaluative language here – ‘right 
perspective’ and ‘healthy relationship’ – points to a presupposed definition of divine grace: 
grace is necessarily ‘groundless’, ‘free’, ‘not earned’ and ‘unmerited’.5 This assumed univocity 
is also evident in the work of Sanders’ critics. Chris VanLandingham fundamentally disagrees 
with Sanders’ summary of early Jewish soteriology as ‘a religion of grace’, insisting instead that 
a ‘post-mortem or Last Judgment of God determines an individual’s eternal destiny’ and that 
‘an individual’s behavior…provides the criterion for this judgment’.6 However, while standing 
‘in direct opposition to Sanders’ on the role of grace and works in Jewish soteriology,7 
VanLandingham agrees with Sanders’ presupposed definition of grace. Disputing the 
graciousness of Philo’s use of χάρις based on Philo’s insistence on the correspondence between 
God’s grace and Abraham’s worth, VanLandingham remarks, ‘considering what “grace” means, 
                                                        
4 E.P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1977), 427 (italics added).  
5 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 394-96.  
6 C. VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification in Early Judaism and the Apostle Paul (Peabody: Hendrickson, 
2006), 15.  
7 VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification, 15.  
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Philo’s portrayal of Abraham’s election cannot be characterized as such’.8 But what does grace 
mean? Wisdom would be happy with Sanders’ insistence that God’s gifts are ‘not earned’ and 
‘free’, but to call grace ‘groundless’ would, for Wisdom, render its operations inexplicable and 
thus jeopardize the goodness and justice of the gracious God. Similarly, responding to 
VanLandingham, it is easy to imagine Wisdom redacting his comment to turn his incredulity 
into a complement: considering what grace means – that is, considering it is an unearned 
though explainable benefit directed towards a fitting beneficiary – Philo’s portrayal of 
Abraham’s election can only be characterised as such.  
The point here is not to replace one definition of grace with another, but to note that 
the comparison of Wisdom and Romans suggests that the meaning of grace is not univocal. This 
observation invites a method of analysis that is not, in the first instance, concerned with the 
question of degree – how much grace is there in a given text – but enquires after definition – 
what grace means in a particular text. This line of questioning resists the imposition of an 
alien interpretative framework because it demands that a text’s theological vocabulary be 
defined contextually and exegetically. In the case of Wisdom, it is ultimately obfuscating to ask 
whether it keeps grace and works in the ‘right perspective’ because such a question 
presupposes an evaluative criterion other than the grammar of the text’s own discourse. 
Wisdom’s definition of grace as an emphatically unearned (i.e. non-contractual, voluntary) 
though necessarily explainable (i.e. congruous) divine benefit gifted to a fitting human 
beneficiary is both an instance of contextual commonsense – it reflects the social patterns of 
Greco-Roman gift-exchange – and theological consistency – because God is good his acts of 
grace are necessarily comprehended within and consistent with the operations of divine 
justice. To read Wisdom with a presupposed definition of divine grace as ungrounded and 
incongruous is thus to erase its emphatic celebration of the gifts and grace of God because its 
contextually locatable and theologically consistent use of χάρις conflicts with a semantic a 
priori.  
A similar observation can be made about the significant studies of Friedrich Avemarie.9 
As argued in the introduction, the novel and needed contribution of Avemarie’s work is that it 
                                                        
8 VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification, 27.  
9 F. Avemarie, Tora und Leben: Untersuchungen zur Heilsbedeutung der Tora in der frühen rabbinischen Literatur 
(TSAJ 55; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996); idem, ‘Erwählung und Vergeltung: Zur optionalen Struktur rabbinischer 
Soteriologie’, NTS 45 (1999): 108-26.   
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identifies and acknowledges the co-existence of ‘recompense’ (Vergeltung) and ‘election’ 
(Erwählung) as soteriological principles in rabbinic literature without attempting to 
subordinate election to recompense (Billerbeck) or recompense to election (Sanders).10 
Avemarie’s own solution to this ‘problem’ of co-existence, as endorsed and summarised by 
Gathercole, ‘is to recognize the diversity of rabbinic views…. The better model is…one of 
tension’.11 The doubleness of this conclusion – its recognition of the apparent 
commensurability of gracious election and recompense and its evaluative claim that the co-
existence of grace and reward language is, despite appearances, a theological tension – exposes 
a presupposition: it assumes rather than asks after the meaning of grace. For Wisdom, however, 
there is no tension: the moral, rational and/or social worth of the recipient of God’s gifts do 
not conflict with or diminish the graciousness of grace; affinity between benefit and 
beneficiary ensures that God’s gifts are good, reasonable and just rather than arbitrary, 
irrational or unfair.   
The tension, then, is not, in Wisdom, between God’s grace and human worth but 
between presuppositions about the meaning of grace and the actual definition of grace in 
Wisdom. To quote Pascal again, ‘Les mots diversement rangés font un divers sens’.12 As argued 
in chapter seven, Wisdom and Romans both articulate theologies of grace, but their definitions 
of grace are ultimately incommensurable – they deploy a shared vocabulary in distinct 
theological grammars. Applied to the comparison of Paul and Judaism more generally, this 
suggests that if we are to ask after rather than assume the meaning of theological terms, we 
need to allow a text’s theological grammar to define its theological vocabulary.  
This need to get to a text’s grammar – to penetrate its deep logic – can be teased out in 
dialogue with the central thesis of the ‘new perspective’. As indicated in the introduction, the 
diverse readings of Paul and early Judaism subsumed under the label the ‘new perspective’ 
agree on two basic points: first, Sanders’ reconstruction of Jewish soteriology is basically right 
and therefore (i.e. because legalistic Jewish soteriology is a fiction), second, Paul’s polemic 
against ‘works of law’ targets ‘national righteousness’ rather than ‘works righteousness’. The 
comparison of Wisdom and Romans qualifies both of these claims. First, for Wisdom, though 
                                                        
10 Avemarie, ‘Erwählung und Vergeltung’, 113.  
11 S.J. Gathercole, Where is Boasting? Early Jewish Soteriology and Paul’s Response in Romans 1-5 (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmanns, 2002), 155.  
12 Blaise Pascal, Pensées (Brunschvicg edition, 1897), I.23.  
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there is a necessary and irreducible distinction between Israel and the nations, this 
anthropological binary is a concretion of the symmetrical structuring of the cosmos and, more 
pertinently, is based on moral and rational criteria. Israel and non-Israel are distinct qua the 
righteous and the ungodly, and this dualism is the necessary correlate of the respective divine 
acts of judgment and grace because God’s justice is evident in the fit between the form and 
objects of his action. A distinction between ‘national righteousness’ and ‘works/worth 
righteousness’ thus fails to capture the logic of Wisdom’s anthropology: Israel’s soteriological 
privilege is grounded in Israel’s innocence from idolatry and immorality. Second, as chapter 
six argued, comparing Wisdom’s perspective with Paul suggests that the function of Paul’s 
polemic in Romans 1.18-3.20 is, as the ‘new perspective’ rightly notes, to reduce the 
Jew/Gentile distinction to a single anthropological denominator and, as the new perspective 
tends to overlook, to do so on the basis of the apostolic announcement of universal human 
sinfulness. In other words, if for Wisdom Jew and non-Jew are different qua the righteous and 
the ungodly, for Paul Jew and Gentile share an anthropological status because ‘all are under 
sin’.  
This anthropological conclusion, however, as noted above (and as argued in chapter 
six), is a theological consequence of the Christ-event: it is the apostolic announcement of the 
christological gospel that reveals the universal scope of divine wrath (Rom 1.18). This suggests, 
as argued in chapter seven, that it is the divine act that is Jesus’ single and saving history that 
finally accounts for Paul’s anthropological and soteriological universalism. While proponents 
of the ‘new perspective’ have rightly insisted on Paul’s Gentile mission as the Sitz im Leben for 
this anthropological and theological universalism, there has been a failure to probe the 
rationale for Paul’s subversive social practice and theology. Appeals to Gentile rights,13 the 
implications of monotheism14 and the axiomatic attribute of divine impartiality15 tend, on the 
one hand, to impose an ideological assumption about the superiority of universalism over 
particularism16 and, on the other hand, to forget that the authors of texts like Wisdom confess a 
God who is both singular and just. The essential though regularly unasked question is, Why? – 
                                                        
13 K. Stendahl, Paul Among Jews and Gentiles (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976), 2.  
14 N.T. Wright, ‘The Book of Romans’, in NIB X (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2002), 482.   
15 J.M. Bassler, Divine Impartiality: Paul and a Theological Axiom (SBLDS 59; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1982); 
cf. C.H. Cosgrove, Elusive Israel: The Puzzle of Election in Romans (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1997).  
16 Cf. D. Boyarin, A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1994).  
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why did Paul conclude that ‘there is no distinction’? For Wisdom, God’s particular and 
discriminate acts of saving grace are a necessary instantiation of divine justice. For Paul, by 
contrast, it is because the saving event of divine righteousness and grace that Paul calls ‘the 
redemption that is in Christ Jesus’ (Rom 3.24) is unconditioned by any criterion of human 
worth, including worth defined in terms of Jewish ethnicity or law-observance, that the Christ-
gift is given to Jew and Gentile, male and female, slave and free. In other words, the logic and 
basis for Paul’s announcement of incongruous and boundary-breaking grace is not a 
theological principle or doctrinal a priori; it is the shape and effect of God’s act of justifying the 
ungodly in Jesus. Thus, while the ‘new perspective’ is right to insist on the social impact and 
exigent application of justification evident in Galatians and Romans, it is the christological 
basis and content of justification that ultimately grounds and shapes Paul’s anthropological 
and soteriological universalism. The contrast between Wisdom’s insistence that Israel alone is 
righteous and will be rewarded and Paul’s law-free mission to the Gentiles is thus more 
essential than Paul widening Judaism’s (or at least Wisdom’s) anthropological boundaries. 
Wisdom’s theology requires an anthropological distinction; the Christ-event announces and 
effects the end of anthropological distinctions. The basic difference, then, is not between 
abstract commitments to particularism or universalism; the contrast is a product of two 
different and ultimately incommensurable theological anchor-points: Wisdom’s distinction 
between Jew and Gentile is determined by and reflective of the symmetrical structuring of the 
cosmos fashioned and ordered by σοφία; Paul’s announcement that ‘there is no distinction’ 
(Rom 3.22) is generated by the unconditioned and centrifugally significant divine act that is 
the history and proclamation of Jesus Christ. 
The import of these observations is not, to repeat the point, a series of general 
conclusions about ‘Paul and Judaism’ derived from the relationship of Romans and Wisdom. 
Rather, by identifying a number of presuppositions that tactically determine the investigation 
and evaluation of early Jewish literature, the particular comparison of Romans and Wisdom 
contributes to the larger question about ‘Paul and Judaism’ by challenging comparative 
projects to deepen their theological soundings – to ask ‘why’: Why do some Jewish texts 
coordinate divine grace and human worth when Paul sets them in antithesis? Why do election 
and recompense coexist in some Jewish texts without any indication of incompatibility when 
Paul emphasises the unconditioned operations of God’s electing word? Why do some Jewish 
222 
 
texts make up for the Pentateuch’s occasional failure to specify the human quality that makes 
divine blessing sensible and just, when Paul’s exegesis often exploits that same silence? Why, 
in basic terms, are Paul and various Jewish texts different?  
This thesis has been an attempt to ask and answer these essential hermeneutical 
questions by specifying the theological continuity and discontinuity between Wisdom and 
Romans and then pressing beneath this similarity-in-contrast to locate its theological rationale 
and material cause. This approach enabled the essential structures of Wisdom’s theology to 
emerge without the evaluative restrictions embedded in the usual comparative questions, but 
it also gave the sharp and revolutionary edge back to Paul’s theological voice. When read with 
Wisdom, Paul’s distinctiveness is not located in his emphatic stress on divine grace (Wisdom is 
equally emphatic); it is the radical redefinition of grace he deduces from and uses to describe 
the Christ-event that would shock and offend Wisdom. Similarly, what divides Romans and 
Wisdom – and what from Wisdom’s perspective makes Romans so theologically dangerous – is 
not that Paul emphasises God’s righteousness or theologises with and from Israel’s scripture 
(Wisdom does both); the scandal and folly of the theology of Romans is that Paul redefines 
righteousness and rereads Israel’s scripture in consequence of the divine act that is the 
justification of the ungodly by Jesus’ single and saving history.  This christologically-focused 
conclusion cannot be generalised into a statement about the essential fault-line between Paul 
and Judaism; it can only raise questions in that direction. What it does suggest, however, is 
that the particular Diaspora Jew who wrote Wisdom, for all his similarities and sympathies with 
Romans, would finally respond to Paul’s christological gospel with the cry of the Thessalonian 
synagogue: ‘This man turned the world upside down’ (Acts 17.6).  
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